
Wilson's Achilles' Heel: The Continuing Significance of Racially Based Segregation

Race and Place

The book *When Work Disappears* appeared to be in part an implicit debate with Douglas Massey and his colleagues. Wilson¹ observed that concentrated poverty might result when a highly segregated group experiences a rise in its poverty rate. Nevertheless, segregation does not explain why concentrated poverty grows faster than observable increases in the poverty rate would predict. To focus on segregation to account for the growth of concentrated poverty is to overlook certain demographic and social changes occurring—in this case—in Chicago. The out-migration of working- and middle-class blacks from inner-city neighborhoods, the in-migration of lower-class blacks, changes in the age structure of the neighborhoods, and increased joblessness interact with segregation to produce the social transformations and dislocations evidenced since the late 1960s.²

These neighborhoods are characterized by severe losses of opportunities and resources and by inadequate social controls. A race-specific argument (which Wilson associated with liberals) is not sufficient to explain these changes. The practices of racial steering and redlining, the use of exclusionary zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants, and the politics of locating public housing projects in low-income areas matter to the extent that they created the ghetto in the first place.³ Segregation exacerbates the problem of joblessness because it contributes to social isolation and weakens employment networks, reducing residents' chances of acquiring the human capital necessary to compete.⁴ Wilson extended the arguments of *The Truly Disadvantaged*; however, he implied again that segregation is an artifact of historical discrimination.

The out-migration of working- and middle-class blacks, and increases

in the proportion of the unemployed, make it difficult to sustain basic neighborhood institutions, from banks to community organizations. As these institutions decline or disappear, formal and informal mechanisms of social control become increasingly difficult to maintain, accelerating disinvestments and neighborhood decline. Property values drop, encouraging landlords to abandon buildings, which in turn become havens for criminal activities such as drug-dealing. In part, Wilson⁵ attributed this problem to redlining by banks and other financial institutions. However, he implied that redlining follows from, rather than precedes, neighborhood decline—a causal claim that runs contrary to a substantial body of evidence. Wilson⁶ then argued for a tight labor market as a way to redress this problem, supported by job information databanks, training and apprenticeship programs, subsidized car pools, and city-suburban cooperation.

Wilson has been criticized by a number of scholars for underestimating the significance of racially based patterns of residential segregation in creating and perpetuating the underclass.⁷ I have suggested that this problem derives, in large part, from the problematic separation of the economic sector from the sociopolitical order. Racial segregation is a complex phenomenon. Conclusions may be affected by (1) the choice of segregation indices; (2) criteria used to delineate neighborhoods (census tracts have been used as proxies for neighborhoods even though census tracts are not necessarily neighborhoods and their boundaries reflect technical imperatives, as Wilson observed in *When Work Disappears*); (3) variables included or excluded in complex models; (4) demographic and political-economic characteristics of the metropolitan areas in question; (5) the rate at which the black population is growing relative to the white population; (6) the presence or absence of other populations, particularly Hispanics and Asian Americans; and (7) the region of the country.⁸

Massey and his colleagues argued that racial segregation is crucial to understanding changes in the black community today, at least in the ten major metropolitan areas characterized by concentrated or extreme poverty.⁹ Racial segregation is the structural condition imposed on blacks that makes extremely deprived neighborhoods possible, characterized by high rates of family disruption; educational underachievement; welfare dependency; property abandonment; violence, delinquency, and crime; and "excess mortality."¹⁰ *Wilson did not adequately explain why blacks are represented disproportionately in the underclass, or why geographical mobility by the working and middle classes should concentrate poverty among blacks but not among other groups.*¹¹ Industrial restructuring in and of itself, and the exodus of working- and middle-class blacks from poor neighborhoods, are insufficient to explain the concentrated (and extreme) poverty left in their wake.

In response to Wilson,¹² Massey and Eggers¹³ examined trends in the geographic concentration of poverty among whites, blacks, Hispanics, and

Asian Americans in sixty U.S. metropolitan areas from 1970 to 1980. They confirmed Wilson's conclusion that the concentration of poverty has increased in U.S. cities; however, region and group must qualify this conclusion. Concentrated urban poverty is mainly confined to blacks outside the West and to Hispanics outside the Northeast. The concentration of poverty among these groups cannot be explained by the exodus of middle-class residents from the ghetto or by industrial restructuring; these may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for concentrating poverty. Rather, the underclass is disproportionately composed of blacks and Hispanics because in the nation's largest urban areas they are also the only ones that have experienced high levels of residential segregation. In other words, the occurrence of rising poverty under conditions of high racial or ethnic segregation explains the growing spatial isolation of poor blacks and Hispanics.¹⁴

It may be that neighborhoods become poorer because they attract more poor in-movers, not because they expel nonpoor out-movers. In conjunction with this observation, Massey and his colleagues¹⁵ stressed complex interaction effects: racial segmentation in housing (which subsumes a series of practices in the banking, insurance, and real estate industries; see below) interacts with high and rising rates of black poverty to spatially concentrate poverty. In other words, concentrated poverty results from the net in-migration of lower-class blacks into poor black neighborhoods, given limited options for low-income housing in a racially discriminatory housing market, as well as the rapid deterioration of life-circumstances, including employment opportunities, brought about by the structural transformation of the U.S. economy. These arguments are not mutually exclusive, contradictory, or inconsistent necessarily. However, the validity of Wilson's¹⁶ class-selective out-migration claim becomes problematic in the context of the persistence of high levels of racial residential segregation.¹⁷

Patterns observed across major metropolitan areas contradict those that would be expected if increasing interclass segregation among blacks were in fact behind the increase in poverty concentrations. The highest levels of interclass segregation among blacks are found in metropolitan areas characterized by a lack of concentrated black poverty, whereas low to moderate levels of interclass segregation are found in metropolitan areas characterized by highly concentrated black poverty.¹⁸ Therefore, concentrated poverty is not a general condition of urban society; rather, it is isolated within specific regions and groups. Stated simply, levels and trends in interclass segregation are not sufficient to explain current patterns of poverty concentration.¹⁹

Geographically concentrated poverty stems from racially segregated U.S. housing markets. *Class-selective patterns of out-migration seem to have relatively little to do with the accumulation of poverty in black neigh-*

neighborhoods *per se*.²⁰ To the extent that concentrated poverty is linked to the geographic moves of nonpoor blacks, it reflects a reluctance on the part of those living outside of poor neighborhoods to move back in. Efforts to escape the poor do not distinguish middle-class blacks from middle-class members of other racial and ethnic groups. Nonpoor blacks are less able to escape living in poor neighborhoods than are nonpoor members of other groups; and poor blacks have few housing options outside of the poorest and most disadvantaged neighborhoods.²¹

Massey and Eggers's²² research confirmed Wilson's²³ hypothesis that black segregation by income has grown. Black interclass segregation (or the movement of working- and middle-class blacks from poor areas) increased during the 1970s. Increasingly, working- and middle-class blacks have separated themselves from poor blacks. However, these trends do not explain the unusually high and growing concentration of poverty among blacks. The level of black interclass segregation is low compared to other minority groups, especially Hispanics and Asian Americans, and levels are not high in an absolute sense. The indices fall almost exclusively in the low and moderate ranges.²⁴ As noted above, the highest levels are observed in metropolitan areas that lack concentrated black poverty (e.g., Anaheim and San Jose, California), whereas low to moderate levels are observed in metropolitan areas with very high concentrations of black poverty (e.g., New York City, Philadelphia, and Detroit). Blacks in the West experience lower levels of racial segregation, earn higher incomes, and evidence lower concentrations of poverty than do blacks in other regions of the United States.²⁵

Levels of racial segregation outside the West are high and show few signs of decreasing; in other words, as educational, occupational, and earnings attainments among blacks increase, the degree of racial segregation between blacks and whites does not fall. Although the degree of class segregation between rich and poor blacks increased slightly during the 1970s, it is lower than that observed between the rich and poor of other minority groups. Recent changes in the propensity for rich blacks and poor blacks to live in different neighborhoods are unrelated to levels and trends in black poverty concentration.²⁶

Massey²⁷ agreed with central tenets of Wilson's argument. However, he disagreed with Wilson's hypothesis that this transformation was brought about by the exodus of middle-class blacks from the ghetto and with his argument that industrial restructuring, in and of itself, was responsible for concentrating urban poverty. Poverty concentration is not caused by the departure of middle-class blacks from the ghetto; rather, it is caused by strong interaction between the level of racial segregation and changes in the structure of income distribution. Groups that experience both a high degree of racial segregation and a high poverty rate evidence the highest levels of

poverty concentration. More specifically, the degree of poverty concentration rose most dramatically in urban areas where major shifts in the income distribution brought about by industrial restructuring occurred in a highly segregated environment—for example, Chicago and New York City.²⁸

Generally, ecological approaches examine how race affects the process of spatial assimilation by computing segregation indices for blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and other groups in selected metropolitan areas.²⁹ According to these approaches, residential succession begins with the entry of a minority group into an area occupied by the majority group. A period of consolidation follows invasion, and eventually the minority group entirely displaces the majority group to form an established neighborhood. Each interracial area can be classified according to its stage in the succession process. This model has worked well in depicting the dynamics of black-white segregation in U.S. cities. However, ecological approaches were originally formulated with ethnic immigrants in mind.³⁰

Ecological approaches predict that the educational, occupational, and income gains by minority groups should lead to integration. Thus, these approaches posit an inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and racial or ethnic segregation.³¹ Individuals in the upper socioeconomic strata are progressively more likely to move out of areas of racial or ethnic concentration. Generally, the absolute advance of racial and ethnic groups up the socioeconomic ladder affects underlying processes of residential mobility, which in turn give rise to reduced levels of residential segregation.³² Massey and Denton's³³ research confirmed that as the socioeconomic status of a minority rises, so does the probability of residential contact with whites; at the same time, rising socioeconomic status leads to a lower probability of contact with other minorities.

Between 1950 and 1970, differential rates of suburbanization resulted in the overrepresentation of whites in the highest educational, occupational, and income categories on the peripheries of U.S. metropolitan areas.³⁴ After 1970, black suburbanization increased in many of the metropolitan areas whose central cities experienced the greatest black in-migration from the South prior to 1970, as well as in southern SMSAs with traditionally large black populations.³⁵ For the most part, black suburbanization has followed segregated patterns (although regional variations exist). The large increases between 1950 and 1970 in the geographical and population sizes of ten major metropolitan areas studied by Albert Simkus³⁶ did not result in substantial and consistent changes in the degree of racial segregation in housing that characterized these areas; neither has suburbanization of blacks had much effect more recently. Black suburban residence is not inevitably linked to substantially greater proximity to whites.³⁷

Racial changes between 1970 and 1980 in suburbs in the North and West followed a pattern consistent with the model of invasion, transition,

and succession.³⁸ However, in the North, racial changes occurred mainly in high-density inner suburbs. Blacks gained access to suburbs that had weak tax bases and high tax rates and that had the most difficulty providing municipal services at acceptable tax rates. Black movement into the suburbs occurred where the proportion of rental housing to homeownership was high. In rental housing, blacks have not incurred the institutional discrimination they face in buying a home.³⁹ The conventional view of racial segregation in the suburbs as a natural process that results from the growth and aging of the metropolis appears to have little empirical support in this context. Discriminatory practices in the banking, insurance, and real estate industries steered blacks to the weaker suburbs.⁴⁰

Between 1970 and 1980, segregation between blacks and whites decreased in some smaller SMSAs in the South and West; however, little change occurred in the large metropolitan areas in the northeastern and north-central states. In these areas, blacks remained segregated and spatially isolated. Where blacks could suburbanize, this process had no consequential effect on segregation.⁴¹ Despite increases in suburbanization between 1970 and 1980, blacks remained less suburbanized than other minority groups, including Hispanics and Asian Americans. On average, blacks are less segregated in suburbs than in central cities; however, even in suburbs black segregation remains high. Hispanics and Asian Americans are considerably more suburbanized than blacks. The segregation levels of Hispanics and Asian Americans in central cities are moderate, and in suburbs they vary from low to moderate. Given the same objective characteristics and "metropolitan context," blacks are much more segregated than Hispanics or Asian Americans.⁴²

Hispanics evidence a complex profile, reflecting the diversity within the Hispanic population itself. For example, Mexicans are most likely to reside in proximity to whites and Cubans are least likely to reside in proximity to whites.⁴³ Hispanic segregation from whites is not as severe as black segregation from whites. However, Hispanic segregation increased in some metropolitan areas that experienced Hispanic immigration and population growth between 1970 and 1980. The degree of Hispanic segregation from whites is strongly related to indicators of socioeconomic status and acculturation. Asian American segregation from whites is low everywhere. During the 1970s, the spatial isolation of Asian Americans increased somewhat, even as dissimilarity from whites decreased, reflecting the formation of Asian American enclaves in a number of metropolitan areas.⁴⁴

Between 1960 and 1970 in the Southwest, residential succession was much less common in Hispanic areas than in black areas, and established Hispanic areas were rare. The main difference between Hispanic areas and black areas was that black invasion was followed by succession in almost all of the cases, whereas Hispanic invasion was followed by succession in

less than 50 percent of the cases. Whether tracts lost or gained whites following invasion by Hispanics depended on the objective characteristics of the invaders and the location of the tract relative to established minority areas.⁴⁵ Unlike black movement up the socioeconomic ladder, Hispanic movement is positively related to distance from an established minority area and to probability of contact with whites. Overall, blacks are much less able to translate socioeconomic status attainments into mobility out of established minority areas and into contact with whites. Given the same "socioeconomic inputs," the ultimate probability of residential contact with whites is much lower for blacks than for Hispanics.⁴⁶ Patterns of Hispanic-white segregation are strongly related to social class. As the general socioeconomic status of Hispanics increases, within-class segregation between Hispanics and whites decreases. Moreover, variations between cities in the degree of Hispanic-white segregation are strongly related to variations in the socioeconomic status of the cities' Hispanic populations.⁴⁷ These relationships imply that residential segregation is largely a function of group socioeconomic status differentials and that changes in relative socioeconomic status levels among racial and ethnic groups should affect the degree of segregation between them.

Using 1970 and 1980 census-tract data, Denton and Massey⁴⁸ showed that Caribbean Hispanics display a low degree of segregation from white Hispanics and a high degree from both black Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks. However, they also display a high degree from non-Hispanic whites, suggesting that people of mixed racial ancestry are accepted by white Hispanics on the basis of shared ethnicity but are rejected by non-Hispanic whites on the basis of race. Black Hispanics are highly segregated from all groups. These findings have changed little over time and persist despite socioeconomic controls. Caribbean Hispanics are drawn together on the basis of an emerging ethnic identity forged in the United States and bifurcated on the basis of race, revealed in the discrepant residential situations of black Hispanics compared to white Hispanics. Black Hispanics remain highly segregated from non-Hispanic whites but only moderately segregated from U.S. blacks, whereas for white Hispanics it is the opposite: a high degree of segregation from blacks but a moderate level of segregation from whites. Black Hispanics and white Hispanics are relatively segregated from each other.⁴⁹ These observations suggest that race remains a fundamental basis for separation and that it is more important than other variables, such as ethnicity, for explaining patterns of residential segregation.⁵⁰

In contrast to Hispanics, blacks face strong barriers to spatial assimilation. Compared with those in other neighborhoods, blacks within invasion areas possess relatively high levels of education, occupational status, and income. Although black socioeconomic status should be positively related

to distance from an established black area and to probability of contact with whites, increasing black socioeconomic status apparently does not reduce the social distance that whites perceive between themselves and blacks. Areas of potential black settlement are restricted to tracts adjacent to existing black neighborhoods; and entry of blacks into these neighborhoods is almost always followed by residential succession, no matter what the objective socioeconomic characteristics of the entering blacks. Put more bluntly, the ghetto follows upwardly mobile blacks as they attempt to leave. They are less able than Hispanics to convert socioeconomic status attainments into spatial assimilation with whites.⁵¹ Compared to Hispanics, upwardly mobile blacks begin the assimilation process at a lower level if measured by contact with whites, are less efficient at converting socioeconomic status into contact with whites, and achieve less contact with whites per unit of socioeconomic status. Essentially, blacks are channeled into highly segregated residential distributions.⁵²

Generally, Puerto Ricans are highly segregated from non-Hispanic whites and moderately from blacks. However, these findings contradict those observed for other Hispanic groups. The Puerto Rican anomaly results because this population possesses low socioeconomic status and black ancestry. Low socioeconomic status leads directly to high segregation, whereas black ancestry encourages residence near non-Hispanic blacks. Because whites avoid living near blacks, Puerto Ricans become secondary victims of whites' preferences.⁵³ Subsequent research into the relationship among blacks, whites, and Puerto Ricans revealed considerable variation in levels of segregation, depending on region, size of the metropolitan area, and size of the Puerto Rican population. On average, in 1980 approximately 60 percent of all Puerto Ricans would have had to move from their place of residence to achieve residential integration with whites; the average level of segregation between Puerto Ricans and blacks was almost as high. The low socioeconomic status of Puerto Ricans relative to whites was the most significant factor affecting the level of segregation.⁵⁴

In summary, although blacks have suburbanized, this movement has had little effect on the integration of neighborhoods. According to Massey,⁵⁵ the high degree of segregation between blacks and whites cannot be explained by blacks' objective socioeconomic characteristics (which serve as a proxy for social class), their housing preferences, or their limited knowledge of white housing markets. Blacks in large cities are segregated no matter how much they learn, earn, or achieve. Rather, the high degree of segregation between blacks and whites is empirically linked to the persistence of discrimination in housing markets and to continuing antiblack prejudice.

According to Massey and Denton,⁵⁶

when socioeconomic status, population composition, metropolitan context, and sample selectivity are controlled for, blacks are systematically less segregated in suburbs than in central cities. This effect, however, reflects the extremely high segregation of blacks in cities instead of their low segregation in suburbs. For blacks with upper-blue-collar occupational statuses and middle-class family incomes, multivariate models predict relatively high levels of segregation in the suburbs, an outcome that is consistent with actual patterns of dissimilarity and spatial interaction.

Blacks' spatial assimilation is blocked at three successive junctures: First, they are not integrated within central cities; second, they find it difficult to move to the suburbs; third, if they make it to the suburbs, they will experience only modest levels of integration.⁵⁷

In all regions of the country, blacks receive less residential return than whites on their individual resources. Because blacks do not have the same spatial mobility as other groups, they are unable to take full advantage of other social and economic resources. Race acts as a channeling device, confining blacks within black neighborhoods. This phenomenon inhibits interclass segregation among blacks and has a "depressing effect" on neighborhood quality.⁵⁸ For blacks, residential proximity to whites is substantially determined by race and is not affected much by other individual characteristics.⁵⁹ Therefore, Wilson's⁶⁰ argument—that the spatial assimilation of blacks will be facilitated by the acquisition of human capital—is incomplete. *The acquisition of human capital is necessary but insufficient to bring black and white residential mobility patterns closer together—particularly in areas that have large black populations, large suburban populations, and older housing stocks.* Differences in residential segregation among racial and ethnic groups are highly related to differences in socioeconomic status; however, residential segregation would continue for blacks even if socioeconomic status differentials between them and other groups disappeared.⁶¹

Blacks seek spatial assimilation; however, only some are successful. In addition, working- and middle-class blacks face a residential environment that, quality-wise, only the poorest of whites face. Compared to their white counterparts, working- and middle-class blacks are subjected to less healthy environments, more dilapidated surroundings, and higher rates of violence, delinquency, and crime. They must live with people below their station and send their children to substandard schools disproportionately populated by students who have comparatively limited cognitive, linguistic, and social skills. Here, their children are susceptible to the strong effect of peers on aspirations, motivation, and achievement.⁶²

Residential segregation by race seems to be tenacious. Despite the advent of fair housing legislation, increasingly tolerant white racial atti-

tudes, and a growing black middle class with incomes sufficient to promote residential mobility, the segregation of blacks in large cities such as Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia has not changed much.⁶³ Given differing patterns for Hispanics and Asian Americans, it is not race per se that matters but black race.⁶⁴ Apparently, blacks are viewed as qualitatively different. Where residential integration has occurred, it is in small and mid-sized metropolitan areas that currently contain proportionately few black residents. In southern states, residential integration has partly resulted from the encroachment of white suburbs into rural black areas rather than from the movement of central-city blacks into white suburbs.⁶⁵

The primary organizing principle of housing patterns in major metropolitan areas is race, not social class.⁶⁶ Future improvements in the socioeconomic status attainment level of the black population as a whole will have little effect on existing patterns of segregation.⁶⁷ These observations are consistent with Scott South and Kyle Crowder,⁶⁸ who determined that (1) among both blacks and whites, those who move to the comparatively "whiter neighborhoods" are the more advantaged socioeconomically, (2) Even after adjusting for racial differences in socioeconomic status attainment levels and numerous other characteristics, race remains an important predictor of migration patterns. That is, blacks are substantially less likely than whites to move out of racially mixed tracts and into predominantly white tracts and substantially more likely than whites to leave racially mixed tracts for predominantly black tracts. (3) Increasing age and homeownership deter mobility out of and into all tracts, regardless of racial composition. (4) Mobility rates between black, white, and racially mixed tracts vary significantly across metropolitan areas. This variation is linked partially to the distinctive characteristics of SMSAs—for example, western SMSAs and SMSAs with substantial new housing stocks show higher rates of black mobility into whiter areas. These areas have comparatively smaller black and suburban populations and newer housing stocks. Much new housing is built and marketed under antidiscrimination legislation, thereby reducing the number of neighborhoods that are exclusively black or white. A high percentage of new housing relative to total housing promotes integration in these SMSAs. Consequently, integrated suburbs are more likely to be found in the rapidly growing areas of the West and New South and in small to mid-sized cities that at this time have comparatively few black residents.

Among people with similar socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, blacks are less likely to move than whites and Hispanics—a finding that is consistent with evidence showing racial discrimination in the banking, finance, insurance, and real estate industries. High levels of segregation reflect limited housing opportunities for blacks, constraining their choices to few neighborhoods of low status; thus, many choose not to

move.⁶⁹ Lack of adequate public transportation and high rent also inhibit mobility.

If segregation levels increase, then it is likely that black-white occupational disparities will also increase: occupational disparities exacerbate income disparities. As black socioeconomic status attainment levels fall, discrimination in the housing market increases, strengthening segregation in a vicious circle.⁷⁰ Whites benefit from segregation because it isolates higher rates of black poverty within black neighborhoods. Concentrated black poverty encourages a belief among whites that race (specifically, black race) causes the behaviors associated with poverty, such as family disruption, welfare dependency, and crime. Segregation reinforces this belief by concentrating people who seem to confirm it in a small number of highly visible black neighborhoods—thereby strengthening prejudice, maintaining the motivation for segregation, and making discrimination more likely.⁷¹ The research of Massey and his colleagues provides evidence that the significance of race continues and that it is more important than other factors in explaining patterns of residential segregation. In contradistinction to Wilson,⁷² industrial restructuring and the out-migration of middle-class blacks are not sufficient conditions, considered alone or together, to explain the plight of urban blacks today.⁷³

The Separation of the Economic Sector from the Sociopolitical Order Revisited

Suburbs are ordered hierarchically; they are associated with more, or less, favorable life-chances for the people who reside in them. The hierarchy of suburbs is a means by which more advantaged groups seek to preserve social distance from less advantaged groups.⁷⁴ One of the mechanisms that make this possible is housing policies.⁷⁵ In this context, black suburbanization patterns are little more than an extension of the urban ghettoization process that concentrates blacks in a small number of residential areas that are avoided by whites.⁷⁶ These residential areas share many characteristics with their central-city counterparts, including aging infrastructures, strained municipal finances, lack of diversity in employment opportunities, poor quality or deteriorated housing, and impoverished neighbors.⁷⁷

Apparently, upwardly mobile blacks migrate to older suburbs already containing a relatively large percentage of blacks. Migration to older suburbs can be explained by a selection process among blacks (e.g., a relatively large percentage of blacks is necessary to support the activities and services unique to a black community) but, more important, by the functioning of the suburban real estate market.⁷⁸ In contrast, comparable whites avoid older suburbs. Generally, real estate agents do not show housing units to

blacks in an all-white area until white demand for housing in that area declines. Evidence suggests that blacks are relegated to neighborhoods with declining infrastructures or to neighborhoods where the racial composition is changing sufficiently to decrease white demand for housing. Because where one lives has a strong effect on one's future life-chances, inequalities in acquiring housing in desirable neighborhoods may perpetuate racial disparities in socioeconomic status attainment outcomes.⁷⁹ Upwardly mobile whites who have sufficient socioeconomic resources are not restricted by discrimination in their residential choices or by the need for a supportive community. More often than not, they choose newer housing units on the periphery of the metropolitan area rather than older housing units near the core.⁸⁰

The functioning of the suburban real estate market determines the types of neighborhoods and housing units that are available to blacks. As a consequence, blacks are less able than whites to convert educational, occupational, and income attainments into improved quality of housing, homeownership, and safer neighborhoods. Blacks and whites encounter different levels of access to housing, even after controls for socioeconomic status attainment and household composition levels are introduced. Evidence points to continuing racial discrimination in the housing market as the crucial factor maintaining segregation at the aggregate level. Available vacancies are controlled through the use of informal contacts, selective recruitment tactics such as targeted advertising, and the withholding of information.⁸¹

*The current level of residential segregation must be attributed largely to attitudes and actions, past and present, that have restricted the entry of blacks into predominantly white neighborhoods,*⁸² from a climate of opinion to mortgage-lending and insurance practices. In particular, racial prejudice and discrimination structure housing markets and constrain the ability of black renters and homebuyers to convert their socioeconomic status attainments into desirable spatial outcomes.⁸³ Therefore, the "web of discrimination"—the combination of banking, finance, insurance, real estate, and government practices that structure life-chances—must be analyzed.⁸⁴ Through a variety of discriminatory mechanisms, these institutions play an active role in structuring housing markets to create a hierarchy of place that affects the life-chances of blacks and whites alike.⁸⁵

A critical component in this process is the role of the state. For example, the infrastructure that enables urban growth must be planned, organized, and constructed by public authorities. Suburban governments make zoning and other land-use decisions. The power to do so gives suburban governments substantial influence in the local land market. They appear to have the ability to accelerate or retard the invasion-succession process by changing local growth and development policies as dictated by larger socie-

tal trends.⁸⁶ Often, they restrict blacks' access to housing through exclusionary zoning laws (which may be, and often are, challenged in court).⁸⁷ Here Wilson's⁸⁸ relatively benign view of the state in the industrial and modern industrial periods stands in marked contrast to the historical record.

In other words, Wilson underestimated the importance of judicial and other governmental administrative decisions in the interpretation and enforcement of antidiscriminatory laws such as fair housing—decisions that structure life-chances in the economic order.⁸⁹ When Wilson claimed that state intervention in the modern industrial period promoted racial equality, his analysis was limited to federal legislation and excluded many decisions made locally on urban development plans, transportation systems, low-income housing policies, social welfare programs, and prison construction. Wilson's case would have been much harder to make if state and local governments were included.⁹⁰

Through the recent past, the state has played an active role in creating and legitimizing residential segregation in the United States.⁹¹ The Federal Housing Administration mortgage-loan guarantees established by the National Housing Act of 1934, and the Veterans Administration loan guarantees of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill), had a profound impact on the spatial development of urban areas. By loosening the credit market, these programs encouraged the rapid growth in suburban housing construction that followed World War II. Between 1935 and 1974, the FHA insured 11.4 million home mortgages. Most of the mortgage insurance backed the construction of new housing units in suburbs. FHA administrators promoted the idea that neighborhoods should be racially segregated. They shared the real estate industry's view that racial segregation protected neighborhood stability and, therefore, housing values. In the 1930s and 1940s, FHA administrators advised, and sometimes required, housing developers to draw up restrictive covenants against blacks as a condition of obtaining FHA-insured financing. Restrictive covenants are contractual agreements among property owners stating that they would not permit a black family, for example, to own, occupy, or lease their property for a specified period of time. A typical covenant might last twenty years and require the assent of three-fourths of the property owners to become enforceable.⁹² In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of *Shelley v. Kramer*, declared racially restrictive covenants unenforceable.⁹³ Nevertheless, homeownership represents a substantial investment for many families. Therefore, they have stakes in their own property and in the properties and characteristics of the people nearby, making collective action highly likely.⁹⁴

During the 1940s and 1950s, the FHA invented redlining and effectively established it as standard practice within the banking industry. Neighborhoods adjacent to black areas were colored red on the agency's

Residential Security Maps and denied access to FHA-insured loans; private lenders took their cue from the FHA and followed suit.⁹⁵ Redlining, then, is the practice of denying mortgages or home improvement loans in certain neighborhoods because of the presumed risks related to the influx of blacks.⁹⁶ The FHA, the Veterans' Administration, and the Federal National Mortgage Association endorsed redlining. The federal government institutionalized the practice of redlining and supported state and local governments in their use of urban renewal and public housing programs to attempt to segregate blacks.⁹⁷ The discriminatory policies of the FHA and the banking industry constituted institutional forces that benefited whites and hindered blacks in the accumulation of equity.⁹⁸ Significant changes did not occur until passage of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (also known as the Omnibus Fair Housing Act), which was upheld and strengthened by federal court decisions outlawing segregation in all aspects of the sale or rental of housing units. In turn, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act required federally chartered financial institutions to report exactly where they made or denied loans; later it required information about the race and income of those granted or denied mortgages.⁹⁹ Executive Order 11063 (1962) prohibited discrimination in federally assisted housing.¹⁰⁰

However, lack of enforcement and a complicated grievance process have undermined the effectiveness of antidiscriminatory housing initiatives.¹⁰¹ For example, the Fair Housing Act was problematic, but not because of its coverage or the forms of discrimination that it banned specifically; rather, its enforcement provisions weren't standardized, and it had a short statute of limitations. In addition, the Fair Housing Act relied on individual efforts to combat a social problem that was systemic and institutional in nature.¹⁰² The 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act remedied in principle the flaws of the early act, including expanding the role of the U.S. Justice Department in enforcing fair housing.¹⁰³ Paradoxically, the recent liberalization of FHA lending to blacks accelerated racial transition: FHA loans were used by blacks to buy homes from whites in racially mixed areas, who then fled to all-white neighborhoods using conventional loans denied to blacks.¹⁰⁴

Most whites are willing to accept open housing in principle, but not in practice.¹⁰⁵ Despite the passage of the Fair Housing Act, discrimination in housing continues, reflected in credit assistance and marketing practices.¹⁰⁶ James Blackwell¹⁰⁷ pointed out that the majority of implementation plans of local real estate boards in the 1970s had no declarations against redlining, had inadequate strategies for promoting integrated housing, did not provide for monitoring by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and did not gather adequate data for determining sales and rentals by race.¹⁰⁸

Scholarly disagreement exists over the effect on homeownership rates of discrimination in mortgage financing compared with the influence of other factors.¹⁰⁹ Aggregate data on mortgage-lending practices disguise the number and characteristics of loan applicants from census tracts; thus, these data cannot be used to determine whether racial differences are due to lack of demand, legal supply constraints, or illegal supply constraints. Crucial variables such as credit histories, degree of indebtedness, assets, and characteristics of the properties are difficult to control in mathematical models.¹¹⁰

However, studies continue to document the persistence of racial discrimination. For example, after controlling for socioeconomic status attainment factors, a study of one midwestern city found that racial factors were related to the number and amount of mortgage loans made: black tracts received significantly less of each.¹¹¹ Even when tracts appeared to be similar on all major mortgage-lending criteria except race, mortgage-lending outcomes remained unequal.¹¹² Another study, which conducted a series of experiments, concluded that real estate agents were more likely to provide information about conventional loans to white testers and information about government-insured loans to minority testers.¹¹³ Other research suggested that racial factors play a significant role in the undervaluation of properties in integrated and predominantly black neighborhoods.¹¹⁴

The fact that blacks and whites have different levels of access to various types of housing and neighborhoods is incontrovertible. Whites have greater opportunities to move into the more desirable housing units that previously were occupied by blacks than vice versa; blacks have greater access to the less desirable housing units that previously were occupied by whites.¹¹⁵ How much of that difference can be accounted for by institutional practices, outright discrimination on the part of sellers and agents, or differences in market knowledge and housing preferences remains unclear.¹¹⁶ It is likely, though, that the practices of lending institutions, realtors, subdivision developers, and local governments interact with, and reinforce, individuals' housing preferences, raising blacks' cost of entry into white neighborhoods.¹¹⁷

Most real estate agents belong to local real estate boards, and many agents belong to the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB)—an organization that was instrumental in shaping real estate ethics, standards, and policies. Discriminatory "perceptions" were embedded in the training of real estate agents, who studied how residential transitions would affect property values and taxes.¹¹⁸ Although NAREB now supports open-housing laws, it continues to favor policies and practices that more often than not are discriminatory in effect. Realtors depend on professional and personal ties to the white community to succeed in a competitive business. They steer blacks to suburbs that whites no longer find desirable

by using their monopoly over housing information. These practices tend to be informal and difficult to police. Whites' tacit approval of these practices is an important factor in perpetuating segregation.¹¹⁹

The actions of realtors may reflect personal prejudices or the perceptions they have of what clients want. (Opposition to open-housing laws may not be entirely racially based. Although some opposition reflects prejudicial attitudes toward blacks, other objections appear to be based on social-class issues and a general antipathy to government coercion—particularly the requirement to enforce federal laws in contrast to laws based on local referenda.) Financial institutions may be reluctant to grant blacks mortgages in all-white neighborhoods for fear that their presence may change the economic life of the neighborhood. They may deny blacks mortgages in other neighborhoods because they are deemed risky investments.¹²⁰

The failure to support integrated neighborhoods with credit re-creates segregation.¹²¹ Interestingly, when factors that influence the loan review process are controlled, the probability that a black applicant's mortgage will be approved increases when the proportion of black professionals in the institution increases. This effect is "especially significant" at thrift institutions.¹²² Gregory Squires and Sunwoong Kim¹²³ suggested that regulatory agencies should incorporate affirmative action initiatives into their enforcement activities: the mortgage-lending process may become more equitable if affirmative action initiatives increase the percentage of black professionals at the appropriate institutions.

The redlining practices of insurance companies, as well as the decisions to locate or relocate insurance agencies, contribute to uneven development and neighborhood decay.¹²⁴ Squires et al.¹²⁵ analyzed the distribution of homeowners' insurance policies by tract and found a strong bias in favor of suburban white neighborhoods and against inner-city black neighborhoods. The pattern that was observed resulted from a combination of variables, including minimum policy requirements that will not insure homes under a certain value, such as \$50,000; how agents perceive risk; whether or not agents are accessible; agency location (agents want to maximize their premiums, minimize their losses, and reduce the work involved in selling policies); and racial discrimination. These authors¹²⁶ argued that the racial composition of neighborhoods is associated with, and may affect, the location of insurance agencies themselves. This relationship persists even after controlling for a variety of background variables, including income levels and neighborhood characteristics that presumably influence decisions on where to locate.

Some sociologists have argued that the consequences of segregation may worsen when it occurs in the public sector rather than in the private sector, as public housing adds social-class isolation to the racial isolation

that black families already experience.¹²⁷ For example, during the 1970s, a local business elite in Chicago adopted public housing provisions as an institutional mechanism to restrict the infringement of a growing black poor population on white business districts. *Residential segregation thus plays an important role in social-class structuration, because it concentrates people from the lower reaches of the social-class structure in small spaces and encourages the reproduction of values, attitudes, and behaviors detrimental to success in the larger society.*¹²⁸

When Department of Housing and Urban Development data are disaggregated by unit ownership and design, they reveal that racial segregation is common in the nation's public housing stock. Whereas whites are distributed fairly evenly among elderly, family, and mixed projects, as well as local authority-owned and multisubsidized projects, blacks are concentrated in family and local authority-owned projects. As a result, elderly projects are overwhelmingly white, whereas family projects are predominantly black. Black households concentrate in centralized, high-density projects that are owned and operated by local authorities, whereas white households concentrate in scattered-site, low-density projects that are developer-owned.¹²⁹ In short, within large metropolitan areas, blacks and whites are segregated across housing projects as well as across neighborhoods.

The racial structuring of housing markets has important implications for life-chances. Housing markets distribute housing units; however, they also distribute educational resources, opportunities for employment, public services, tax burdens, insurance and health care options, and safety and security.¹³⁰ For example, the tradition of funding public schools through local property taxes means that schools that are disproportionately black—located in economically stagnant areas with limited opportunities—are vulnerable given declining tax bases. These neighborhoods are not likely to have the material conditions that foster the values, study habits, and social skills that are rewarded by teachers and that lead to academic success. Student behaviors are strong predictors of educational performance and mediate the effects of race on grades. These material conditions permeate schools and create a climate that is not conducive to success.¹³¹

Contrasted with their white counterparts, the characteristics of the neighborhoods in which black middle-class families live differ in major metropolitan areas such as Chicago: black middle-class families live in closer proximity to the lower classes than do white middle-class families. This fact has relevance to probabilities of school achievement, victimization by crime, participation in community organizations, and other life-chances.¹³² For example, because black middle-class neighborhoods are not far removed from areas with high poverty and crime rates, they struggle to remain in the majority and to maintain the norms of public conduct and social order. Mainstream residents discover that certain values, attitudes, or

beliefs, such as “their scorn for drug dealing and its violent enforcement,” must be compromised in order to maintain a quiet neighborhood.¹³³ Ironically, gang hierarchies may mirror the occupational status hierarchies that mainstream residents experience. With some “reminders” by community organizations, local gangs operate under similar rules of conduct and with similar goals.¹³⁴

Wilson¹³⁵ argued that the “most realistic approach” to the problem of concentrated poverty in the inner city is to provide underclass families with the resources that promote social mobility, understood as the capacity to take advantage of educational and occupational opportunities. Social mobility leads to spatial mobility. Spatial mobility would be enhanced if efforts to improve the resources of inner-city residents were accompanied by legal steps to eliminate certain practices by state and municipal authorities, including locating low-income housing in low-income neighborhoods, and preventing construction through zoning ordinances of low-income housing in other neighborhoods. However, for blacks spatial mobility is difficult to achieve.¹³⁶ Rooted in racially discriminatory processes, barriers to spatial mobility exist because mechanisms such as segregation mediate the socioeconomic status attainment process among blacks.¹³⁷

In contrast to some human capital arguments, ecological approaches do not assume freedom of movement in unconstrained markets. They maintain that housing markets are socially structured and are subject to constraints that are institutional and political in nature.¹³⁸ The failure to recognize this point explains, in part, why the policies intended to redress racial disparities in housing opportunities have had little impact. Individual victims have challenged racial discrimination in housing opportunities mainly in the federal courts, with the assistance of fair housing groups.¹³⁹ However, if residential segregation is maintained by a complex set of institutional and political practices, then case-by-case litigation is not likely to solve the problem. Massey¹⁴⁰ argued that the federal government, particularly the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Justice Department, must increase its involvement in the enforcement of fair housing laws if residential desegregation is to occur, including (1) the investigation and prosecution of housing discrimination complaints; (2) where preliminary data suggest, the investigation of institutional mortgage-lending practices; and (3) mandated changes in real estate advertising and marketing practices. (These policy recommendations imply that the market cannot be trusted to fairly allocate opportunities to get ahead.)

The validity of Wilson’s argument hinges on the acceptability of dividing the world into an economic sector and a sociopolitical order—a practice that critics¹⁴¹ argue is not justifiable. Bonacich¹⁴² suggested that this is a failing in liberal approaches to race relations generally, which “mistakenly”

divide economic goals from sociopolitical goals. Dividing the world into an economic sector and a sociopolitical order on the matter of the declining significance of race is an arbitrary and difficult-to-justify exercise: race relations and their manifestations are too ubiquitous to be confined within spheres.¹⁴³

The Complex Motivations Underlying the Racial Structuring of Housing Markets

In *The Declining Significance of Race*, Wilson claimed that income was overtaking skin color as a determinant of where blacks lived and that blacks who had the requisite resources could move into the suburbs. It appears now that this statement oversimplified the complex dynamics that drive the racial structuring of housing markets. Wilson’s Achilles’ heel is persisting white opposition to black integration. This opposition may be rooted in a variety of factors, including (1) racial prejudice, perhaps reinforced by media accounts of the black underclass; (2) social-class prejudice, reflecting disparities in educational, occupational, and income attainments; (3) expected patterns of invasion and succession, which whites anticipate will have negative effects on property values; and (4) a “general resistance to government coercion,”¹⁴⁴ particularly federally imposed initiatives as opposed to laws based on local referenda. Although prejudices and other aversive attitudes support discriminatory housing practices, so do non-racially specific beliefs such as ideologies of local autonomy and control. These ideologies embody democratic principles as well as hostility to redistributive initiatives expressed, for example, in public housing proposals. Therefore, white opposition to black integration may not be entirely, or even partly, a matter of racial affect. Determining whether racial factors, nonracial factors, or a complex combination of other factors that supersede social-psychological accounts best describe the complex motivations that drive the racial structuring of housing markets is important because the findings have different implications for policy formulation and implementation.¹⁴⁵

Many accounts claim that the segregation of blacks from whites results from racial prejudice. (Indeed, when Japanese Americans are substituted for blacks in statements of preference, whites express fewer objections.) Real estate agents and mortgage lenders who share these prejudices market housing units accordingly. In other cases, real estate agents and mortgage lenders who do not share these prejudices nevertheless discriminate out of material self-interest. These phenomena imply that the overall aversion of whites toward living among blacks remains strong. A substantial minority of whites cite racial stereotypes as reasons to oppose integration, and fewer

than half of whites say that they would move into neighborhoods with more than a small proportion of blacks.¹⁴⁶

However, even though racial prejudice contributes to the origin of racial segregation in housing, it may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the persistence of segregation. In recent years, racial prejudice against blacks has declined, albeit more rapidly in the South than elsewhere. In addition, despite publicized exceptions, subgroups known to be very prejudiced have become more tolerant over time. Cohort replacement (the generational transition from older, more prejudiced birth cohorts to younger, less prejudiced ones) and attitudinal change contributed to the decline in racial prejudice during the 1970s and early 1980s, although the relative importance of cohort replacement and attitudinal change varies from item to item on questionnaires. For example, the increasing tolerance for interracial marriage results from cohort replacement and not from attitudinal change.¹⁴⁷ Current research does not substantiate any claims of decreasing tolerance among cohorts that reached adulthood in the 1980s. In other words, the sociopolitical conservatism of the Reagan presidency did not produce a post-civil rights generation that is distinctly illiberal in its racial attitudes.¹⁴⁸

Whites increasingly reject racial injustice and endorse racial equality as a matter of principle. By 1990, a large majority of whites supported the principle of equal opportunity in the housing market, and a majority of whites reported a willingness to live in integrated neighborhoods. These observations do not mean that increasingly liberal attitudes translate into more equitable practices.¹⁴⁹ Some observers view this trend as superficial and, therefore, of little consequence. Indeed, much contemporary research has implicitly discounted the significance of changing attitudes toward blacks since the 1960s.¹⁵⁰ For example, policies intended to reduce racial disparities in socioeconomic status attainment outcomes, such as affirmative action, open housing, and busing, continue to face controversy and opposition. Although whites acknowledge the legitimacy of racial integration as a social goal, they remain uncomfortable about the implications of integration in practice and are reluctant to support the measures intended to bring it about.¹⁵¹

Research that is more detailed suggests that tolerance for racially integrated neighborhoods may be limited. Among homeowners, blacks are the "least preferred out-group neighbors" because they are perceived in unfavorable terms.¹⁵² Limited tolerance may result because homeowners prefer well-educated and relatively affluent neighbors; these socioeconomic status characteristics are more common among whites than among blacks. In this case, black neighbors are avoided for reasons that are related to social class. Limited tolerance may result from the belief that an increasing proportion of blacks relative to whites has negative consequences for neigh-

borhoods.¹⁵³ In principle, when blacks and whites have similar socioeconomic status characteristics, increasing levels of integration should have little effect on property values and white flight should not ensue. In practice, however, property values respond to racial composition, although research has not conclusively established why this is the case. For example, compared to their counterparts located in neighborhoods that are less than 10 percent black, housing units lose at least 16 percent of their value if they are located in neighborhoods that are more than 10 percent black. This finding corroborates other research showing that homeowners, regardless of race or ethnicity, avoid black neighbors out of material self-interest.¹⁵⁴

However, estimates of the effects of the racial composition of neighborhoods on property values that do not control for nonracial factors are biased upward.¹⁵⁵ Important submarket differences in the sensitivity of property values to the racial composition of neighborhoods are known to exist. The effects of the racial composition of neighborhoods on property values are strongest among concentrated homeowners and in certain regions outside the West. The extent to which property values drop, as the proportion of blacks relative to whites increases, depends on the percentage of current residents who are black; the percentage of housing units that are owner-occupied or rented; the region of the country; and the demographic, political economic, and sociohistorical characteristics of the city.¹⁵⁶

Generally, the higher the educational and income levels of whites, the more likely they are to express social-class prejudices rather than racial prejudices. The lower the educational and income levels of whites, the more likely they are to express the opposite. The extent to which one or the other is expressed partly depends on the educational and income levels of the subgroup and is complicated by socioeconomic status inconsistency issues (e.g., some whites have high levels of education or income, but not both).¹⁵⁷ The kinds of prejudice vary because different in-groups perceive different levels of threat, and experience different levels of competition, in their interactions with out-groups.¹⁵⁸

For example, white ethnic groups that compete directly with blacks for jobs in secondary labor markets are less tolerant (or more prejudiced) than white ethnic groups employed in primary labor markets.¹⁵⁹ Apparently, racial tolerance and intolerance among white ethnic groups are, in part, social-psychological products of labor market conditions. Irish Protestants, Eastern Europeans, and Italians are less tolerant because they are disproportionately concentrated in secondary labor markets characterized by racially integrated industries; they compete directly with blacks for the more desirable jobs. Yet groups that are more tolerant are farther removed from blacks; they are employed within primary or secondary labor markets characterized by racially segregated industries. Generally, racial tolerance decreases as one moves from the upper reaches of the primary labor market

to racially integrated industries in the secondary. Ethnicity per se does not appear to be an important factor affecting the degree of racial tolerance or intolerance shown by whites.¹⁶⁰

Beliefs about the causes of racial disparities in socioeconomic status attainment outcomes help to explain white opposition to black integration. Prior to the early 1960s, a large percentage of whites viewed blacks as innately inferior in ways that would explain their relative disadvantage and justify segregation. The attribution of responsibility to whites by whites that emerged in the 1963 Gallup poll data may have been a brief anomaly. At that point, the U.S. Supreme Court and the general public were more inclined to believe that the subordination of blacks was rooted in discriminatory processes created and sustained by whites. After the late 1960s, attribution of blame to blacks increased again; however, racial disparities in socioeconomic status attainment outcomes were more likely to be attributed to motivational causes than to genetic causes.¹⁶¹ These attributions influence attitudes toward government policies intended to reduce disparities between whites and blacks. For example, support for federal intervention to desegregate schools dropped after the late 1960s as it became entangled in the volatile issue of court-ordered busing versus local control of, and choice over, schools.¹⁶²

In school districts that allow choice, white families avoid black schools, even if they are located in neighborhoods more affluent than the disproportionately white schools they eventually select. Apparently, they equate racial composition with school quality and fear the consequences for college or university admissions if their children attend a predominantly black school. White families express more concern about the perceived reputation of the school among college and university admissions officers than about the quality of education that the school offers. The implication is that white families respond more strongly to the devalued status of being black than they do to the impact that the school may have on their children's scholastic achievements. In this context, the objections of white parents in California to naming a high school after Martin Luther King Jr. are relevant. Some parents worried that the name-change would reduce their children's chances of getting into the college or university of their choice.¹⁶³ However, what race represents is not obvious or clear. In other words, school choice is not a simple matter of individual taste guided by prejudice or bigotry. The decisionmaking process itself is socially charged (i.e., racialized) as a consequence of how individuals and groups organize and evaluate their experiences.¹⁶⁴

According to Michael Emerson et al.,¹⁶⁵ individuals and groups organize and evaluate their experiences through a cultural repertoire that delimits perspectives and suggests appropriate actions. For example, faith-based values, assumptions, and beliefs (or schema) underpin the views of white

conservative Protestants, which are transposed to new and diverse situations. Assumptions that shape explanations of inequality generally, and black-white racial inequality specifically, include accountable freewill individualism (the choices that individuals make are not constrained), antistructuralism (macrosociological factors are omitted, ignored, or rejected), and relationalism (family, friends, and significant others are crucial to making right or wrong choices). Although white conservative Protestants may have encountered macrosociological accounts, they rely heavily on their own subcultural accounts. In contrast, liberals (who also recognize the centrality of the individual) believe that individuals are *shaped* by social structures such as inadequate educational opportunities. People are viewed as essentially good, morality is the prerogative of the individual, and individual happiness is perhaps the greatest goal.

White conservative Protestants believe that individuals are accountable for their own free choices—which may be right or wrong as determined by a divine lawgiver—to family, friends, and God. Rooted in conservative Protestant theology and based on a literalist interpretation of the Bible, as the result of original sin white conservative Protestants distrust human propensities. If individuals are not rooted in proper interpersonal contexts, they will make wrong choices—thus the emphasis on relationalism. Relationalism derives from the theological, and nonnegotiable, belief that human nature is fallen and that Christian maturity and salvation can come only through a personal relationship with Christ. Transposed to family and friends, healthy relationships encourage people to make the right choices. As such, white conservative Protestants tend to view social problems as rooted in dysfunctional or pathological relationships.¹⁶⁶

White conservative Protestants reject as irrelevant macrosociological accounts that challenge the extent to which individuals can control their life-circumstances; more often than other whites, they rely on accountable freewill individualism and relationalism as modes of explanation. In other words, they explain racial disparities in educational, occupational, and income attainments primarily in individualistic, not structural, terms; and they highlight what they perceive as dysfunctional relationships among blacks. According to white conservative Protestant theology, individuals tend to absolve responsibility for personal sins by shifting blame elsewhere, such as “the system.” Therefore, white conservative Protestants are antistructural because, in their view, invoking macrosociological factors shifts responsibility from its root source—the accountable freewill individual.¹⁶⁷ The differences between these and other whites are one of degree rather than kind. Whites as a whole are more individualistic than structural; however, because of a reliance on a theologically based cultural repertoire, white conservative Protestants are more individualistic and less structural.¹⁶⁸

A substantial majority of whites believes that educational, occupational, and income opportunities are available to all. The concept of equal opportunity derives from, and maintains, accountable freewill individualism. In fact, freewill individualism requires a belief in equality of opportunity, or the world would be unfair and God would be unjust. In this context, racial disparities are explained by a lack of motivation or individual initiative, as well as by cultural deficiencies such as family breakdown (i.e., dysfunctional relationalism). Blacks lack hope and the ability to envision what is possible.¹⁶⁹ White conservative Protestants, then, are aggregationists or—in the language of the sociology of knowledge—voluntaristic nominalists. Culture, then, is the sum of the behaviors of aggregated accountable freewill individuals and the relations within which they are embedded. Social problems arise because individuals make more wrong choices than right choices—reflected in rising rates of illegitimacy, lack of commitment to family life, failure to stay in school and learn proper English, vandalism, and gang activity.¹⁷⁰

People will make wrong choices if they are not in proper relational context with others. For most white conservative Protestants, blacks suffer from a lack of responsibility; an inability to envision or take advantage of opportunities for improvement; and dysfunctional relationalism (reflected in deteriorating family bonds and inappropriate significant others). By relying on programs rather than themselves, and by shifting blame to the system, they are rendered less competitive in the labor market. White conservative Protestants believe that blacks, despite being Christians, violate key tenets of Christianity; in other words, they are not good *American* Christians.¹⁷¹

Racial inequality would recede into history if blacks would “catch the vision,” change their habits, stop trying to shift blame, and apply themselves responsibly—in short, act more like Christians. As a Free Church member put it in Emerson et al.’s study,¹⁷² “The Christian life is one that is free, and we’re told that if we get into the Word and we meditate on the Word, what happens to us is that we become prosperous and successful. So if it’s a problem of poverty, people come to Christ and find out who they are, then they find ways to become successful.” For some white conservative Protestants, AFDC, food stamps, and related programs for the poor undermine accountable freewill individualism and healthy relationalism. Welfare violates the Protestant work ethic, discourages motivation and responsibility, breaks down the family, and leads to laziness and sin. Blacks, because they are viewed as having less moral fortitude and initiative, are more likely to receive welfare and therefore to suffer its consequences. The state contributes to the problem by trying to solve individual-level failings with societal-level programs. Because these programs obviate, allegedly, personal responsibility and do not change the hearts of

individuals, they are viewed as destructive.¹⁷³ In short, accountable freewill individualism, relationalism, and antistructuralism render structural factors secondary to the belief that obstacles, with individual drive, can be overcome.¹⁷⁴

If school busing and affirmative action programs are proffered to redress racial inequities, then white conservative Protestants will oppose such initiatives. Obstruction occurs not because they oppose the principle of racial equality per se. Rather, they view government efforts to achieve racial equality as naive, misguided, wasteful, and counterproductive because they undermine accountable freewill individualism. The United States offers equal opportunity to its citizens; inequality results from problems of relationships; and the solution to social problems is changing individuals. By sustaining these views, white conservative Protestants explain black-white inequality by holding blacks accountable for their plight, contribute indirectly to the perpetuation of black-white (and likely other forms of) inequality, and provide rationales for the New Right generally. Nevertheless, they are uncomfortable with blacks because the black experience threatens to undermine their subcultural accounts, as well as their faith. In this context, opposition to government efforts to redress racial inequities is rooted deeply in how people understand and explain the social world.¹⁷⁵

These observations might help to explain why a segment of the black middle class, rooted in a self-help approach, opposes school busing to promote integration; believes that minimum wage laws and welfare programs such as AFDC are counterproductive; and argues that progress should come through individual effort, not structural change.¹⁷⁶ The self-help approach assumes it is necessary that individuals change before they can take advantage of the educational, occupational, and income opportunities available to them; therefore, intervention begins at the individual level. A recent version of the self-help approach repudiates the state’s role in creating, and thus its responsibility for remedying, racial inequality.¹⁷⁷

For example, in a book (titled (ironically) *Getting Beyond Race*, Richard Payne¹⁷⁸ revived the claim that irrational misunderstandings, more than any other factor, impede black socioeconomic status gains today. He envisioned a society of liberally minded, inner-directed individuals who, united by the American creed and unfettered by racial categorization, are free to compete for the available rewards. He advised blacks that they should interpret obstacles as challenges rather than as barriers; and he advised whites and blacks that “putting oneself in another person’s shoes helps improve race relations, partly because it enhances communication and feelings of empathy.” For Payne, then, “race is [ultimately] a local and personal concern.”¹⁷⁹

Payne defended the so-called contact hypothesis as a way to improve

race relations and reduce racial inequities. In other words, opportunities for socioeconomic status attainments would improve if people of different races could interact in a positive context: racial prejudice and bigotry would give way to more realistic assessments and, presumably, more equitable life-chances.¹⁸⁰ In a review of fifty-three articles examining the contact hypothesis published in six major journals (*American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, *Social Forces*, *Social Problems*, *Journal of Social Issues*, and *Social Psychological Quarterly*) from 1960 through 1984, W. Scott Ford¹⁸¹ attempted to assess the validity of its claims. He found substantial difficulties in this body of research. For example, to varying degrees, the articles had questionable operationalizations; favored some interactional settings over others, such as schools over places of employment; used data from sources other than general population surveys; and failed to reveal sample sizes. Only three articles conducted controlled laboratory experiments. Ford concluded that the claims of the contact hypothesis are premature and that the hypothesis itself is not valid generally or very useful for understanding the dynamics of race relations. In other words, the link between attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors is highly complex and often contradictory.¹⁸²

Conclusion

Methodological debates aside, residential segregation apparently is the nexus that structures black life-chances. White avoidance of black neighbors is a complex phenomenon rooted in values, attitudes, and beliefs at the individual level; cultural repertoires at the group level; a "web of discrimination" at the regional level; and policies, procedures, and practices at the state level.¹⁸³ Whites move outward in metropolitan areas as a consequence of (1) values, attitudes, and beliefs that may or may not be racially based; (2) disproportional increases in the black population (which, reflecting rising fertility rates and constricted housing opportunities, fuel the fear of declining property values); (3) the suburbanization of employment; (4) infrastructural decline; (5) relative tax and municipal service levels;¹⁸⁴ and (6) the institutionalized practices of the real estate and mortgage-lending industries as well as local, state, and federal governments. Whites may shift to the suburbs of densely populated cities because of the lack of space for, and the high cost of, new housing in central cities; here population redistribution is a function of the redistribution of housing units.¹⁸⁵

Blacks may be able to move into suburbs when they become too large to control by a few realtors, restrictions on land use decrease, and job opportunities increase.¹⁸⁶ Middle-class blacks are more likely to live in

integrated suburbs in the West and the New South as they follow job opportunities. Much new housing is built and marketed under antidiscrimination legislation, thereby reducing the number of neighborhoods that are exclusively white or black. Reynolds Farley and William Frey¹⁸⁷ noted that a high percentage of new housing construction in a metropolitan area is a powerful force promoting integration. In addition, compared to metropolitan areas where segregation levels have remained relatively constant in recent years, metropolitan areas where segregation levels have decreased have substantially smaller—but growing—black populations, as well as the highest average annual growth rate in mean black household income.

Massey and Denton¹⁸⁸ agreed with Wilson's¹⁸⁹ view that the structural transformation of the U.S. economy was an important factor in the emergence of the urban underclass during the 1970s; however, the complex processes that both created and reproduce residential segregation made it disproportionately black. Wilson's¹⁹⁰ rejoinder to Massey and Denton did not constitute a convincing critique; and Wilson's work as a whole on the black underclass remains a partial, albeit important, explanation fettered by conceptual, methodological, and epistemological problems that originated with *The Declining Significance of Race*.¹⁹¹ In downplaying the significance of residential segregation and the complex processes that maintain it, Wilson¹⁹² directed attention from racially discriminatory practices to the so-called cultural deficiencies of the urban black poor (which he attributed primarily to the out-migration of middle-class blacks and secondarily to other processes). It is a short step to assuming that the urban black poor possess integration-preventing characteristics that cause their problems.¹⁹³

Research findings are generally consistent with Wilson's¹⁹⁴ claim that the acquisition of human capital assets will facilitate the spatial assimilation of blacks. However, as the observations above make clear, the acquisition of human capital assets is a necessary but insufficient condition to move blacks closer to equality with whites. In other words, residential segregation is the manifestation of a "coherent and uniquely effective system of racial subordination": it is a primary structural factor perpetuating the black underclass.¹⁹⁵ As long as residential segregation is imposed on blacks, race cannot be ignored as "a salient dimension of stratification in American society."¹⁹⁶ If it were not for segregation—embodied in the activities of the state—it is doubtful that debates about the underclass, characterized by concentration effects, would have the currency that they do today.¹⁹⁷ Policies to redress the problems experienced by the urban black poor specifically, and to redress racial inequities generally, probably will fail if they do not include measures to overcome the disadvantages caused by discrimination in the housing market.¹⁹⁸

Notes

1. Wilson, *When Work Disappears*, 16.
2. *Ibid.*, 42.
3. *Ibid.*, 23–24.
4. *Ibid.*, 24; Wilson, "The Political Economy and Urban Racial Tensions," 308.
5. Wilson, *When Work Disappears*, 44–46.
6. Wilson, "The Political Economy and Urban Racial Tensions," 309, 312–314; cf. Wilson, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*, 73.
7. Cf. Massey and Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality," 1155–1156; Schill, "Race, the Underclass, and Public Policy," Yet Patterson (*The Ordeal of Integration*, 43–48) claimed that Massey and Denton exaggerated the significance of "hyper-segregation" and that the use of the term "apartheid" was "grossly misleading and unfair."
8. Marshall and Jiobu, "Residential Segregation in United States Cities," 449; Morgan, "An Alternative Approach to the Development of a Distance-Based Measure of Racial Segregation"; Reed, "The Underclass as Myth and Symbol," 30; Roof, "Southern Birth and Racial Residential Segregation," 350, 357; Rose, "Are Non-Race-Specific Policies the Key to Resolving the Plight of the Inner-City Poor?" 160–161; Van Valey, Roof, and Wilcox, "Trends in Residential Segregation: 1960–1970"; White, "The Measurement of Spatial Segregation."
9. Krivo et al., "Race, Segregation, and the Concentration of Disadvantage: 1980–1990," 75.
10. Massey, "American Apartheid," 350.
11. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*; Massey, "American Apartheid," 352.
12. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*.
13. Massey and Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality"; cf. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 117–118.
14. Massey, "American Apartheid," 330, 352; Massey and Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality," 1153.
15. Massey, Gross, and Shibuya, "Migration, Segregation, and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty," 427, 443.
16. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*.
17. Massey, Gross, and Shibuya, "Migration, Segregation, and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty," 427.
18. Massey and Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality," 1170–1171.
19. *Ibid.*, 1180.
20. Massey, Gross, and Shibuya, "Migration, Segregation, and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty," 443.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Massey and Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality," 1170–1171; Alba, Logan, and Stults, "How Segregated Are Middle-Class African Americans?" 544, 554, 556.
23. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*.
24. Massey and Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality," 1170.
25. *Ibid.*, 1171, 1179.

26. Massey, "American Apartheid," 330.
27. *Ibid.*, 329–357.
28. *Ibid.*, 331.
29. Denton and Massey, "Racial Identity Among Caribbean Hispanics," 791.
30. Massey, "A Research Note on Residential Succession."
31. Massey, "Social Class and Ethnic Segregation," 641–642, 649.
32. Massey, "Effects of Socioeconomic Factors on the Residential Segregation of Blacks and Spanish Americans in U.S. Urbanized Areas," 1021.
33. Massey and Denton, "Spatial Assimilation as a Socioeconomic Outcome," 104.
34. Simkus, "Residential Segregation by Occupation and Race in Ten Urbanized Areas, 1950–1970," 91.
35. Logan and Schneider, "Racial Segregation and Racial Change in American Suburbs, 1970–1980," 878.
36. Simkus, "Residential Segregation by Occupation and Race in Ten Urbanized Areas, 1950–1970," 91.
37. Alba and Logan, "Minority Proximity to Whites in Suburbs," 1389; cf. Farley, "The Changing Distribution of Negroes Within Metropolitan Areas"; Kantrowitz, "Ethnic and Racial Segregation in the New York Metropolis, 1960."
38. Logan and Schneider, "Racial Segregation and Racial Change in American Suburbs, 1970–1980," 884.
39. *Ibid.*, 887; Stearns and Logan, "The Racial Structuring of the Housing Market and Segregation in Suburban Areas"; cf. Logan and Stearns, "Suburban Racial Segregation as a Nonecological Process."
40. Logan and Schneider, "Racial Segregation and Racial Change in American Suburbs, 1970–1980," 885–887.
41. Massey and Denton, "Trends in the Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians," 823.
42. Massey and Denton, "Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas," 592.
43. Alba and Logan, "Minority Proximity to Whites in Suburbs," 1423.
44. Massey and Denton, "Trends in the Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians," 802.
45. *Ibid.*; Massey and Mullan, "Processes of Hispanic and Black Spatial Assimilation."
46. Massey and Mullan, "Processes of Hispanic and Black Spatial Assimilation," 836, 868.
47. Massey, "Effects of Socioeconomic Factors on the Residential Segregation of Blacks and Spanish Americans in U.S. Urbanized Areas," 1020.
48. Denton and Massey, "Racial Identity Among Caribbean Hispanics," 790.
49. *Ibid.*, 806.
50. Massey and Mullan, "Processes of Hispanic and Black Spatial Assimilation."
51. *Ibid.*, 869.
52. Massey and Denton, "Spatial Assimilation as a Socioeconomic Outcome," 94–106.
53. Massey and Bitterman, "Explaining the Paradox of Puerto Rican Segregation."
54. Santiago, "Patterns of Puerto Rican Segregation and Mobility." Also see Telles, "Residential Segregation by Skin Color in Brazil," 186. Telles examined residential segregation by skin color in thirty-five of the largest metropolitan areas in

Brazil. Residential dissimilarity between whites, mulattoes, and blacks is only moderate by U.S. standards. White-black dissimilarity is the highest, followed by brown-black dissimilarity, and then white-brown dissimilarity. Residential segregation by race within income groups is lowest for the bottom groups and increases with the middle- and upper-income groups. For most of the white middle class, residential segregation is ensured by the concentration of blacks and mulattoes in the lower classes and in distinct regions. Racial segregation is significantly greater in metropolitan areas characterized by high levels of occupational inequality, low levels of mean income, and concentrated home ownership.

55. Massey, "Effects of Socioeconomic Factors on the Residential Segregation of Blacks and Spanish Americans in U.S. Urbanized Areas"; Massey, "American Apartheid," 354; Massey, "America's Apartheid and the Urban Underclass," 474; cf. Darroch and Marston, "The Social Class Basis of Ethnic Residential Segregation."

56. Massey and Denton, "Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas," 621-622.

57. Massey and Denton, "Spatial Assimilation as a Socioeconomic Outcome," 104; Massey and Denton, "Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas," 622.

58. Massey and Denton, "Spatial Assimilation as a Socioeconomic Outcome," 104; Villemez, "Race, Class, and Neighborhood," 427-428.

59. Alba and Logan, "Minority Proximity to Whites in Suburbs," 1422.

60. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*.

61. Guest and Weed, "Ethnic Residential Segregation," 1088; Jargowsky, "Take the Money and Run," 986; Rosenberg and Lake, "Toward a Revised Model of Residential Segregation and Succession," 1147-1148. According to Rosenberg and Lake, within the private housing market in New York City, white preferences for Puerto Rican tenants and neighbors, as opposed to black tenants and neighbors, are balanced against the relative socioeconomic status attainment levels of the groups to determine the outcome of interminority competition for housing. With somewhat greater socioeconomic resources, apparently blacks can compete more successfully for housing if the private market selects on the basis of ability to pay.

62. Massey and Denton, "Trends in the Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians"; Massey, Condran, and Denton, "The Effects of Residential Segregation on Black Social and Economic Well-Being."

63. Massey and Denton, "Trends in the Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians," 823.

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*; Massey and Denton, "Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas," 606.

66. Jargowsky, "Take the Money and Run," 986.

67. Denowitz, "Racial Succession in New York City, 1960-1970"; cf. Denowitz, "Status Change and Persistence in Chicago Suburbs."

68. South and Crowder, "Leaving the 'Hood,'" 25.

69. South and Deane, "Race and Residential Mobility," 161, 163.

70. Massey, "American Apartheid," 353.

71. *Ibid.*; E. Rosenbaum, "The Constraints on Minority Housing Choices, New York City 1978-1987," 743.

72. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*.

73. Denton and Massey, "Racial Identity Among Caribbean Hispanics," 806.

74. Marshall and Stahura, "Determinants of Black Suburbanization."

75. Alba and Logan, "Minority Proximity to Whites in Suburbs," 1391.

76. Stahura, "Determinants of Change in the Distribution of Blacks Across Suburbs," 422.

77. Stearns and Logan, "The Racial Structuring of the Housing Market and Segregation in Suburban Areas," 28; Marshall and Stahura, "Determinants of Black Suburbanization," 238.

78. Marshall and Stahura, "Determinants of Black Suburbanization," 251.

79. E. Rosenbaum, "The Constraints on Minority Housing Choices, New York City 1978-1987," 743.

80. Stahura, "Status Transition of Blacks and Whites in American Suburbs."

91. Marshall and Stahura, "Determinants of Black Suburbanization," 238.

81. E. Rosenbaum, "The Constraints on Minority Housing Choices, New York City 1978-1987," 742, 725-726, 728.

82. Hermalin and Farley, "The Potential for Residential Integration in Cities and Suburbs," 608.

83. Gross and Massey, "Spatial Assimilation Models," 351.

84. Massey and Fong, "Segregation and Neighborhood Quality," 17. Massey and Fong attributed the phrase "web of discrimination" to Amos Hawley.

85. Gross and Massey, "Spatial Assimilation Models," 350-351.

86. Greer, "The Political Economy of the Local State," 522.

87. Stahura, "Suburban Development, Black Suburbanization, and the Civil Rights Movement Since World War II," 141.

88. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.

89. R. Brooks, *Rethinking the American Race Problem*.

90. Shulman, "Race, Class, and Occupational Stratification," 24; cf. Wilson, *When Work Disappears*, 46-47, 199-200. Here, Wilson noted that the federal government through the practices of the Federal Housing Administration contributed to the "early decay" of inner-city black neighborhoods by encouraging middle-class whites to move to the suburbs. This statement contradicted his claim in *The Declining Significance of Race* that the state stood apart from racial conflict in the industrial period and that racial conflict was confined to the economic sector and instigated mainly by the white working class. In fact, state intervention itself structured the life-chances of a substantial segment of the black community.

91. Judd, "Segregation Forever?" 740, 742, 744; cf. Kushner, "Apartheid in America."

92. Blackwell, *The Black Community*, 208; Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 36.

93. Judd, "Segregation Forever?" 740.

94. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 50; Massey and Fong, "Segregation and Neighborhood Quality," 16.

95. Massey, "America's Apartheid and the Urban Underclass," 476.

96. Stahura, "Determinants of Change in the Distribution of Blacks Across Suburbs," 422.

97. Farley and Frey, "Changes in the Segregation of Whites From Blacks During the 1980s," 25; Blackwell, *The Black Community*, 204-205; Massey, "America's Apartheid and the Urban Underclass," 474; Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 52-55.

98. Parcel, "Wealth Accumulation of Black and White Men," 208.

99. Farley and Frey, "Changes in the Segregation of Whites From Blacks During the 1980s," 26.

100. Blackwell, *The Black Community*.
101. *Ibid.*, 211.
102. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 195–198.
103. *Ibid.*, 210.
104. Massey, "America's Apartheid and the Urban Underclass," 477.
105. *Ibid.*, 474.
106. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 99, 105.
107. Blackwell, *The Black Community*, 206.
108. For more information on housing practices at the local governmental level that enforce segregation, see Tabb, *The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto*, 12–20.
109. South and Deane, "Race and Residential Mobility," 161, 163.
110. Cloud and Galster, "What Do We Know About Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Markets?" 107–108; Leahy, "Are Racial Factors Important for the Allocation of Mortgage Money?" 186; cf. H. Horton, "Race and Wealth"; M. Thomas and Horton, "Race, Class, and Family Structure."
111. Leahy, "Are Racial Factors Important for the Allocation of Mortgage Money?" 185–196.
112. *Ibid.*, 193.
113. Cloud and Galster, "What Do We Know About Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Markets?" 108–109.
114. *Ibid.*, 109.
115. Marullo, "Targets for Racial Invasion and Reinvasion"; cf. processes of gentrification.
116. *Ibid.*
117. Stahura, "Determinants of Change in the Distribution of Blacks Across Suburbs," 422; Stearns and Logan, "The Racial Structuring of the Housing Market and Segregation in Suburban Areas," 29.
118. Gotham, "Racialization and the State."
119. Pearce, "Gatekeepers and Homekeepers," 339–341.
120. Stearns and Logan, "The Racial Structuring of the Housing Market and Segregation in Suburban Areas," 30.
121. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 106–107.
122. Squires and Kim, "Does Anybody Who Works Here Look Like Me?"
123. *Ibid.*; cf. Squires, "The Political Economy of Housing."
124. Squires, DeWolfe, and DeWolfe, "Urban Decline or Disinvestment."
125. Squires, Velez, and Tauber, "Insurance Redlining, Agency Location, and the Process of Urban Disinvestment," 569–570; Squires and Velez, "Insurance Redlining and the Transformation of an Urban Metropolis."
126. Squires, Velez, and Tauber, "Insurance Redlining, Agency Location, and the Process of Urban Disinvestment," 481, 570.
127. Bickford and Massey, "Segregation in the Second Ghetto."
128. Massey and Fong, "Segregation and Neighborhood Quality," 17.
129. Bickford and Massey, "Segregation in the Second Ghetto."
130. Gross and Massey, "Spatial Assimilation Models," 348–349; Massey, "America's Apartheid and the Urban Underclass," 477–478.
131. Roscigno, "Family/School Inequality and African-American/Hispanic Achievement," 268–269.
132. Cf. Erbe, "Race and Socioeconomic Segregation," 812; LaVeist, "Linking Residential Segregation to the Infant Mortality Race Disparity in U.S. Cities," 90–94.

133. Pattillo, "Sweet Mothers and Gangbangers," 752, 755.
134. *Ibid.*, 770. Black middle-class residents may experience downward mobility anyway as a function of eroding property values—the main source of equity—and an inability to move out; see Shihadeh and Flynn, "Segregation and Crime."
135. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, 158.
136. Gross and Massey, "Spatial Assimilation Models," 350; Kapsis, "Black Ghetto Diversity and Anomie," 1152; cf. Crain, "School Integration and Occupational Achievement of Negroes," 606. Crain noted that residential segregation, even with the elimination of racial prejudice, would limit the educational and occupational opportunities of blacks for years to come.
137. Massey and Denton, "Spatial Assimilation as a Socioeconomic Outcome," 104.
138. Gross and Massey, "Spatial Assimilation Models," 350.
139. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 199.
140. Massey, "America's Apartheid and the Urban Underclass," 482–484.
141. E.g., Aronoff, "A Review [of *The Declining Significance of Race*]," 19; Bonacich, "Capitalism and Race Relations in South Africa"; R. Brooks, *Rethinking the American Race Problem*; Franklin, *Shadows of Race and Class*; Pettigrew, "The Changing—Not Declining—Significance of Race"; Shulman, "Race, Class, and Occupational Stratification"; R. Thomas, "A Review [of *The Declining Significance of Race*]," 12; Willie, *Caste and Class Controversy on Race and Poverty*. Shulman was one of the first to question why housing was excluded from the economic sector in Wilson's analysis.
142. Bonacich, "Capitalism and Race Relations in South Africa," 242.
143. Shulman, "Race, Class, and Occupational Stratification," 24, 29.
144. D. R. Harris, "Property Values Drop When Blacks Move in Because . . .," 463; Schuman and Bobo, "Survey-Based Experiments on White Racial Attitudes Toward Residential Integration," 296; See, "Ideology and Racial Stratification," 83–84.
145. D. R. Harris, "Property Values Drop When Blacks Move in Because . . .," 475; Farley et al., "Stereotypes and Segregation," 751; Molotch, "Racial Integration in a Transition Community"; cf. Kantrowitz, "Ethnic and Racial Segregation in the New York Metropolis, 1960"; R. Payne, *Getting Beyond Race*.
146. Farley et al., "Stereotypes and Segregation," 753, 776–777. For reasons that are not clear, the preference of blacks for integrated neighborhoods has weakened in recent years.
147. Firebaugh and Davis, "Trends in Antiblack Prejudice, 1972–1984," 266–267; Ransford and Bartolomeo, "Has There Been a Resurgence of Racist Attitudes in the General Population?"
148. Steeh and Schuman, "Young White Adults: Did Racial Attitudes Change in the 1980s?" 360.
149. Farley and Frey, "Changes in the Segregation of Whites From Blacks During the 1980s," 28, 40.
150. C. Brooks, "Civil Rights Liberalism and the Suppression of a Republican Political Realignment in the United States, 1972 to 1996," 484–485, 501–502.
151. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 91–92; Pettigrew, "Race and Class in the 1980s," 252; Schaefer, "Racial Prejudice in the Capitalist State," 196–197.
152. Charles, "Neighborhood Racial-Composition Preferences"; Timberlake, "Still Life in Black and White."

153. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 92, 94. Ironically, little is known about the effects of integration on property maintenance. Based on a limited study, Reese and Matre ("Property Maintenance and Residential Integration") concluded that black residents maintained their homes as well as, if not better than, their neighbors.

154. D. R. Harris, "'Property Values Drop When Blacks Move in Because . . .,'" 463, 476.

155. *Ibid.*, 476.

156. *Ibid.*; cf. J. Rosenbaum et al., "Social Integration of Low-Income Adults in Middle-Class White Suburbs."

157. Giles, Gatlin, and Cataldo, "Racial and Class Prejudice," 280–288.

158. Fuchs and Case, "A Grid-Group Theory of Prejudice."

159. Cummings, "White Ethnics, Racial Prejudice, and Labor Market Segmentation," 938, 945, 948–949.

160. Indeed, much of the behavior commonly associated with ethnicity may be a function of the structural situations within which groups are situated.

161. Schuman and Krysan, "A Historical Note on Whites' Beliefs About Racial Inequality"; Kluegel, "Trends in Whites' Explanations of the Black-White Gap in Socioeconomic Status, 1977–1989," 512; cf. Schuman and Bobo, "Survey-Based Experiments on White Racial Attitudes Toward Residential Integration." According to Schuman and Krysan, white beliefs about who, or what, is responsible for racial disparities in socioeconomic status attainments are influenced by, and reflect, changes in the larger social context at the time the questions are posed. For example, the increased blaming of blacks for racial disparities in socioeconomic status attainments may have resulted, in part, from media constructions. In the middle to late 1960s, the media shifted their attention from peaceful black protesters being assaulted by southern whites to young black males looting and burning inner-city neighborhoods.

162. Schuman and Krysan, "A Historical Note on Whites' Beliefs About Racial Inequality," 853–854.

163. Saporito and Lareau, "School Selection as a Process."

164. Stated more formally, the role of race, as an explanatory variable in discriminatory practices, cannot be grasped correctly without an appropriate understanding of the processes of racialization within which it is embedded.

165. Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink, "Equal in Christ, but Not in the World," 400–401; cf. Weigel and Howes, "Conceptions of Racial Prejudice."

166. Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink, "Equal in Christ, but Not in the World," 401–402.

167. *Ibid.*, 401.

168. *Ibid.*, 401–402.

169. *Ibid.*, 407.

170. *Ibid.*, 408; Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory."

171. Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink, "Equal in Christ, but Not in the World," 409–410.

172. Quoted in Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink, "Equal in Christ, but Not in the World," 410; cf. Hughey, "Americanism and Its Discontents."

173. Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink, "Equal in Christ, but Not in the World," 410–411.

174. *Ibid.*, 413; cf. R. Payne, *Getting Beyond Race*.

175. Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink, "Equal in Christ, but Not in the World," 414; cf. Block et al., *The Mean Season*.

176. Evans, "The New American Black Middle Classes," 225; cf. Billingsley, *Mighty Like a River*; Evans, "Black Middle Classes: The Outlook of a New Generation."

177. Rein, *Social Science and Public Policy*, 82–83; Steinberg, "Occupational Apartheid," 748.

178. R. Payne, *Getting Beyond Race*.

179. *Ibid.*, 18, 21, 27–28.

180. *Ibid.*, 165–166; cf. Cohen and Roper, "Modification of Interracial Interaction Disability," 644.

181. W. Ford, "Favorable Intergroup Contact May Not Reduce Prejudice," 256–258.

182. Cohen and Roper, "Modification of Interracial Interaction Disability," 657; Emerson, "Is It Different in Dixie?"; Langmuir, "Prolegomena to Any Present Analysis of Hostility Against Jews"; Middleton, "Regional Differences in Prejudice."

183. Cf. Guest and Zuiches, "Another Look at Residential Turnover in Urban Neighborhoods."

184. Frey, "Central City White Flight," 444.

185. Marshall, "White Movement to the Suburbs," 975, 991; South and Deane, "Race and Residential Mobility," 161, 163; cf. Goodman and Streitwieser, "Explaining Racial Differences."

186. Stahura, "Suburban Development, Black Suburbanization, and the Civil Rights Movement Since World War II," 142.

187. Farley and Frey, "Changes in the Segregation of Whites From Blacks During the 1980s," 40–41.

188. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 136–137.

189. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*.

190. Wilson, *When Work Disappears*.

191. Cf. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 220. On pages 85, 88, and 109, Massey and Denton argued that race "clearly predominates" as an explanatory variable.

192. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*; cf. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 8–9.

193. Skutnabb-Kangas, "Legitimizing or Delegitimizing New Forms of Racism," 87.

194. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.

195. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*, 8; Massey, "America's Apartheid and the Urban Underclass," 478.

196. Massey and Eggers, "The Ecology of Inequality," 1186; Massey and Mullan, "Processes of Hispanic and Black Spatial Assimilation," 870–871.

197. Judd, "Segregation Forever?" 741.

198. Massey, "American Apartheid," 329.