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Preface to the 1994 Edition

In this book we explore how concepts of race are created and changed, how they become the focus of political conflict, and how they have come to permeate U.S. society. Based on our account of the construction and transformation of racial meanings, we argue that today, as in the past, concepts of race structure both state and civil society. Race continues to shape both identities and institutions in significant ways.

Until we understand the concept of race, it is impossible effectively to analyze the familiar issues which involve race. It is hard to grasp the way racial identity is assigned and assumed, or to perceive the tacit racial dimensions of everyday experience, for example, without a clear sense of the socially constructed meaning of race. Similarly, without an awareness that the concept of race is subject to permanent political contestation, it is difficult to recognize the enduring role race plays in the social structure—in organizing social inequalities of various sorts, in shaping the very geography of American life, in framing political initiatives and state action. Nor is it possible to acknowledge or oppose *racism* without comprehending the sociohistorical context in which concepts of race are invoked.

We began working together on the project that would become *Racial Formation in the United States* in the late 1970s, and published the first edition in the mid-1980s. We initially conceived our task as a straightforward critique of the main social science literatures on race in the U.S. The inadequacies of these currents, both mainstream and radical, had become quite apparent in the 1970s. Mainstream approaches to racial theory and racial politics had become an embarrassment. Beginning in the 1970s, and

with greater intensity in the 1980s, neoconservative racial doctrine, with its combination of theoretical endorsement and practical abandonment of racial equality, was used to cover the state's retreat from racial justice concerns. At the same time, the new right made a politics of subtextual race-baiting the centerpiece of a series of successful Republican campaigns not only for high office, but also to institutionalize ever more regressive social policies in the U.S.

While the right and center had retreated from democratic and egalitarian ideals with respect to race, the left had succumbed to a series of romantic illusions. Because the radical paradigms of race adopted by movement groups and progressive intellectuals had proved utopian, there was little analytical effort or theoretical ammunition available to counter the assaults of the right. By the early 1980s the various nationalisms which had emerged from the movement's black power phase had largely abandoned the quest for serious political alternatives. The limits of anticolonial ideologies imported from various third world conflicts had also become apparent. Similarly, Marxist approaches to race, unable to develop any class-based strategy for combating racial injustice and inequality, massively failed the test of political realism.

As we examined these currents—right, left, and center—we were struck by their reductionism. They shared a common tendency (perhaps the only thing they shared) to diminish the significance of race, to treat it as a mere manifestation of some other, supposedly more important, social relationship. Starting from a resistance to this reductionism, from an insistence that race be understood as a fundamental dimension of social organization and cultural meaning in the U.S., we developed our critique of the established views, both mainstream and radical. We also suggested the beginnings of an alternative approach, which we called *racial formation theory*, based on the idea that concepts of race were always politically contested. We identified the state as the preeminent—though by no means the only—site of racial contestation. Finally, we applied our racial formation approach to postwar U.S. racial politics from the 1960s to the 1980s. The “straightforward” critique of the social science literature on race had developed into something quite a bit bigger.

This new edition of *Racial Formation in the United States* appears a decade after we first presented this analysis of contemporary U.S. racial dynamics. There have been many developments since then, not only in U.S. racial politics, but also in racial theory. Drawing on a wide variety of approaches, from studies of social movements to studies in Gramsci, from critical theory to postcolonial theory, from cultural studies to feminist studies, a global

network of scholars and activists has interrogated and debated the concept we designate as “race.” We offer a second edition of *Racial Formation* in the hope of contributing to the burgeoning interest in racial issues.

In general we believe that the book's original formulations have stood up well. Thus we have not altered our critique of the main paradigms of race (Chapters 1–3). We think it remains sound and applicable to much of the literature even today. Since we have no wish to write and rewrite extended reviews of the vast literature on race, we would rather invite the reader to employ our categories and concepts to critique those works which interest her. Furthermore, a good deal of newer work has come out since the first edition of *Racial Formation* appeared in 1986, work which, we believe, avoids reductionist pitfalls and approximates our own position—notwithstanding particular differences and disagreements.¹

Beyond some small updates, we have not changed the chapter on “The Racial State” (Chapter 5), whose model of an unstable equilibrium of racial conflict and contestation we continue to find useful. Nor have we greatly altered the two historical chapters which ended the first edition. The first of these (Chapter 6) covered the rise of the movement for racial justice and “The Great Transformation” it launched in U.S. politics. The second historical chapter (Chapter 7) analyzed the containment and ultimate destruction of the movement initiative in a “Racial Reaction” which began around 1970.

When we wrote and published the first edition, Ronald Reagan was President. Thus both Chapter 7 and the conclusion reflect on the mid-1980s racial situation from within, so to speak. Our analysis of that moment, we feel, has been borne out by many studies produced later. For example Thomas and Mary Edsall's *Chain Reaction*² underscored the points we were making about the centrality of race to the Republican ascendancy, and William Julius Wilson's *The Truly Disadvantaged*³ analyzed in detail the debilitating effects on African Americans of the U.S.'s fall from economic preeminence. Thus we consider these chapters to retain their usefulness.

We have, however, made some major modifications in other sections of the book. We have completely reworked the theoretical chapter entitled “Racial Formation” (Chapter 4), to provide a more detailed account of racial formation processes. In this chapter we include new material on the historical development of race, on the question of racism, on race-class-gender interrelationships, on everyday life, and on hegemony. And we have written an epilogue, “Closing Pandora's Box: Race and the ‘New Democrats,’” which extends our account of postwar racial politics up to the early 1990s.

In our 1986 “Acknowledgments” we noted that, in the U.S., work on matters of race must be carried out in a particularly conflictual atmosphere. The bitterness, pain, paranoia, and aggressiveness so often displayed in this

field undoubtedly reflect the highly charged nature of this subject matter in U.S. society. Such difficulties quite effectively illustrate that there is no “ivory tower” for those in the universities who wish to understand the problems of the age, and more important, who hope to change the circumstances that produce them. It remains as true in 1994 as it was in 1986 that our collaboration contrasts as sharply as possible with both the miseries of the alienated academic life, and with the increasingly ravaged and competitive social landscape of U.S. society. We continue to enjoy the rare privilege of working together, of questioning each other and ourselves as deeply as we know how to do in the process of arduous intellectual labor, and of learning ever more to respect, trust, and love one another. Our deepest thanks go, then, awkwardly and in a deliberately public fashion, to each other.

Of course, in any intellectual—and emotional, and political—effort of this kind, one incurs enormous debts. We owe a tremendous vote of thanks to our friends and critics. Since the 1986 publication of the first edition of *Racial Formation in the United States*, we have been inundated with critical responses to our work, many favorable, some hostile. We have benefited greatly from these reactions. We would like to acknowledge some of the folks—friends and colleagues—whose continuing inspiration, support, and sometimes merciless commentaries have helped us produce this work: Tomás Almaguer, Margaret Anderson, Raphael Allen, Kimberly Benston, Bob Blauner, Sucheng Chan, Joe Feagin, Charles (Chip) Gallagher, Eddie Glaude, Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Michael Hanchard, Paul Jefferson, Lisa Lowe, Wahneema Lubiano, Lou Outlaw, Silvia Pedraza, Debbie Rogow, Stephen Small, Dana Y. Takagi, Fasaha M. Traylor, L. Ling-chi Wang, David Wellman, and Dianne Yamashiro-Omi.

Last but certainly not least, we would like to dedicate this edition to our children, Evan Minoru Omi, Johanna Celia Winant, Carmen Margaret Winant, and Gabriel Emmet Winant. May they live with dignity, respect, and justice in the society of the future.

Preface to the 1986 Edition

To study race in the United States is to enter a world of paradox, irony, and danger. In this world, arbitrarily chosen human attributes shape politics and policy, love and hate, life and death. All the powers of the intellect—artistic, religious, scientific, political—are pressed into service to explain racial distinctions, and to suggest how they may be maintained, changed, or abolished. The intellectual climate is anything but benign where racial studies are concerned. The ordinary competitiveness and isolation of academic work only adds to the peril.

In such an atmosphere, we have enjoyed a rare privilege: the opportunity to share a prolonged and difficult labor. For the past seven years, we have collaborated in the research and writing which have led to this book. The project has been a most demanding one. It has forced us to re-examine our beliefs, our politics, our lives. It has given us new respect, not only for the scholars whose work inspired us, but also for those with whom we most disagreed. Above all, it has taught us to love and trust each other.

We have drawn on the knowledge and skill of many friends and colleagues. Thanks to the following people for their tireless support, helpful comments, and merciless criticisms: Robert Allen, Carol Baker, Harold Baron, Mario Barrera, Gary Delgado, Doug Dowd, Jeff Escoffier, William Friedland, Hardy Frye, Frances Goldin, Amber Hollibaugh, Jim Jacobs, Andrés Jimenez, Michael Kazin, Robert Meeropol, James O'Connor, David Plotke, Juan Carlos Portantiero, Michael Rosenthal, Pamela Rosenthal, Alex Saragoza, Paul Scheifer, Gay Seidman, Nancy Shaw, Larry Shinagawa,

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Finally, we would like to thank loved ones who made our work possible in more ways than we could ever express. We dedicate this book to Debbie Rogow and to Ben and Mabel Omi.

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Introduction

In January 1985, the chair of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Clarence Pendleton, Jr., told President Reagan that members of the then recently reconstituted Commission were “working on a color blind society that has opportunities for all and guarantees success for none.”¹ Pendleton’s remarks echoed the President’s own sentiments, which in turn have resonated with broad sectors of U.S. populace. The notion of a color-blind society where no special significance, rights, or privileges attach to one’s “race” makes for appealing ideology. Taken at face value, the concept reaffirms values of “fair play” and “equal opportunity”—ideals, some would argue, which constitute the very essence of our democratic way of life.

Yet even a cursory glance at American history reveals that far from being color-blind, the United States has been an extremely “color-conscious” society. From the very inception of the Republic to the present moment, race has been a profound determinant of one’s political rights, one’s location in the labor market, and indeed one’s sense of “identity.” The hallmark of this history has been *racism*,² not the abstract ethos of equality, and while racial minority groups have been treated differently, all can bear witness to the tragic consequences of racial oppression. The U.S. has confronted each racially defined minority with a unique form of despotism and degradation. The examples are familiar: Native Americans faced genocide, blacks were subjected to racial slavery, Mexicans were invaded and colonized, and Asians faced exclusion.³

Optimistic observers of this history often acknowledge past atrocities, but offer a vision of the contemporary U.S. as an egalitarian society, one which

is trying to live up to its original principles by slowly extending and applying them to the gnawing issue of race. In such a vision recent history is seen as a period of enlightened progress—an unfolding drama of the social, political, and economic incorporation of minorities which will not be thwarted or reversed. The “color-blind” society, it is argued, will be the end result of this process.

Yet viewed more deeply, recent history—particularly the period from the 1960s to the 1980s—reveals a more complex and contradictory trajectory in which the pattern of race relations seems far less certain, and much less tranquil.

In the 1960s, race occupied the center stage of American politics in a manner unprecedented since the Civil War era a century earlier. Civil rights struggles and ghetto revolts, as well as controversies over state policies of reform and repression, highlighted a period of intense conflict in which the very *meaning* of race was politically contested. The 1970s, by contrast, were years of racial quiescence when the racial minority movements of the previous period seemed to wane. Racial oppression had hardly vanished, but conflicts over race receded as past reforms were institutionalized.

Issues of race have once again been dramatically revived in the 1980s, this time in the form of a “backlash” to the political gains of racial minority movements of the past. Conservative popular movements, academics, and the Reagan administration have joined hands to attack the legacy and logic of earlier movement achievements. They have done this, moreover, in a way which escapes obvious charges of “racism.”

Such an intense ebb and flow in the politics of race truly begs for interpretation. This book developed from our desire to comprehend the recent tumultuous decades and to assess their meaning for a broader understanding of race in the U.S. We address three broad topics. First, we consider and critique recent theories of race in the U.S. Second, we advance an alternative conception, based in the concept of *racial formation*. Finally, we apply our racial formation approach to postwar U.S. racial history and politics.

Most racial theory fails to capture the centrality of race in American politics and American life. In general, theoretical work on race has not successfully grasped the shifting nature of racial dynamics in the postwar U.S., a failure which sparked important challenges as postwar racial events appeared to conflict with the predictions of theory. Most theories are marked by a tendency to *reduce* race to a mere manifestation of other supposedly more fundamental social and political relationships such as ethnicity or class. Our doubts about this literature derived from this reductionism—an inability to grasp the uniqueness of race, its historical flexibility and immediacy in everyday experience and social conflict.

Instead of exploring how groups become racially identified, how racial identities and meanings changed over time, or how racial conflicts shape the American polity and society, “mainstream” approaches consider race as a problem of policy, of social engineering, of state management. In the largest number of works, incorporation and assimilation of differences (or the problems involved in achieving this) is the principle governing not only social policy, but theory construction and analysis. “Radical” theories embrace class or nationalist perspectives which, while critical of the existing racial order, are often no more appreciative of the uniqueness and irreducibility of their subject than were the “established” analyses. Thus radicals too often submerge race in other social relations—most frequently class- or nation-based conflicts—thought to operate as the “motor force of history.” Often influenced by movements and traditions whose reference points were located outside the U.S., many radical perspectives simply fail to address specific U.S. conditions.⁴

Part of the confusion resides in the fact that race in the U.S. is concurrently an obvious and complex phenomenon. Everyone “knows” what race is, though everyone has a different opinion as to how many racial groups there are, what they are called, and who belongs in what specific racial categories.

For example, consider the U.S. census. The racial categories used in census enumeration have varied widely from decade to decade. Groups such as Japanese Americans have moved from categories such as “non-white,” “Oriental,” or simply “Other” to recent inclusion as a specific “ethnic” group under the broader category of “Asian and Pacific Islanders.” The variation both reflects and in turn shapes racial understanding and dynamics. It establishes often contradictory parameters of racial identity into which both individuals and groups must fit.⁵

How one is categorized is far from a merely academic or even personal matter. Such matters as access to employment, housing, or other publicly or privately valued goods; social program design and the disbursement of local, state, and federal funds; or the organization of elections (among many other issues) are directly affected by racial classification and the recognition of “legitimate” groups. The determination of racial categories is thus an intensely political process.⁶ Viewed as a whole, the census’s racial classification reflects prevailing conceptions of race, establishes boundaries by which one’s racial “identity” can be understood, determines the allocation of resources, and frames diverse political issues and conflicts.

Such an example underscores the fact that race and racial logic are ubiquitous. Yet existing racial theory, both mainstream and radical, has not grasped this reality. Consequently it minimizes the importance of race

in recent American political history. Our work is an effort to overcome these limitations.

We sought an approach that would remedy the defects of existing theory. Three crucial, and related, concerns shaped our theoretical orientation. The first was to assess the significance of the emergence of *new social movements* in the 1960s, heralded by the black movement. By challenging existing patterns of race relations, the black movement created new political subjects, expanded the terrain of political struggle beyond “normal” politics, and inspired and galvanized a range of “new social movements”⁷—student, antiwar, feminist, gay, environmental, etc. The black movement’s ability to *rearticulate*⁸ traditional political and cultural themes and in so doing mobilize a mass base of adherents is, we believe, a striking feature of racial politics in the postwar period.

The second concern was to locate race at the center of American political history, not in order to displace other important social relationships such as class and sex/gender, but to serve as a corrective to the reductionism characteristic of racial theory. Our theory of *racial formation* emphasizes the social nature of race, the absence of any essential racial characteristics, the historical flexibility of racial meanings and categories, the conflictual character of race at both the “micro-” and “macro-social” levels, and the irreducible political aspect of racial dynamics.

Our third concern was to suggest a new “expanded” model of the state and state activity, which would place socially based movements, rather than traditionally defined, economically based interest groups, at the center of contemporary political processes. In order to do this, we examined the *trajectory* of racial politics in the U.S.—the processes by which the state shapes and is shaped in turn by the racial contours of society and the political demands emanating from them.

While not possessing the ability to resolve all the problems inherent in the field of racial theory, our effort does provide an analytic framework with which to view the racial politics of the past three decades. Our argument is advanced in three parts.

Part One is an analytic assessment of contemporary racial theory. In each epoch of U.S. history, a certain school of racial theory has been dominant, serving as the racial “common sense” of its age. For much of our country’s history, explicitly racist theories have played this role. During the postwar period, however, for the first sustained period in U.S. history, the dominant racial theory has upheld a notion of racial equality, albeit in various versions. In Chapter 1 we explore the particular approach to race—*ethnicity theory*—which since the early 1940s has been the main (though by no means the only) source of American racial concepts and values. Guided by ethnicity theory, Americans have come to view race as a vari-

ety of ethnicity, and to apply to racially defined groups certain standards and values whose pioneers and exemplars were European immigrants.

During its long reign, ethnicity theory has frequently been modified as its proponents attempted to account for new empirical phenomena or to address competing theoretical approaches. In the early postwar period, the ethnicity model encountered its main opponents in conservative quarters. Explicitly racial (and racist) perspectives on race, rooted in the formerly dominant paradigm of the prewar era, lived on in the South (and to some extent the Southwest). The early civil rights movement in the South, and the mobilization of Mexican Americans in the Southwest, destroyed these vestiges by the mid-1960s. Subsequently, the most severe challenge to ethnicity theory’s dominance came from radical viewpoints, particularly *class-* and *nation-*based theories of race. These challenging approaches are the subjects of Chapters 2 and 3, respectively.⁹

Based on our criticism of existing racial theory (and also drawing upon it for the many partial insights it provides), Part Two advances an alternative theory of race and the racial state in the U.S. context. This approach is based on our conception of *racial formation*, which we present in Chapter 4, and on the socially based *trajectory* of racial politics, which we discuss in Chapter 5.

With these theoretical premises in place, we proceed in Part Three to analyze recent racial history, focusing on the expansion of politics to the terrain of social life, political competition among paradigms of race, postwar transformations of the racial state, and the nature of racial movements, both “radical democratic” and “reactionary.”

The period from the 1960s to the 1980s represented anything but a slow, steady evolution to a “color-blind” society. It was a period of racial upsurge, failed consolidation, and reaction which, we believe, demonstrated the centrality of race in shaping American politics and culture. Today, faced with the antics of a Clarence Pendleton or the outlandish claims of Ronald Reagan that racial equality has been achieved, it is all too easy to regard race as an issue of the past. It is all too easy, even for those opposed to the right’s racial policies, to suggest that today the crucial confrontation over America’s future is taking place on some other ground. This book’s conclusions, for the 1980s as much as for the 1960s, suggest the opposite. Race will *always* be at the center of the American experience.

Racial Formation

In 1982–83, Susie Guillory Phipps unsuccessfully sued the Louisiana Bureau of Vital Records to change her racial classification from black to white. The descendant of an 18th-century white planter and a black slave, Phipps was designated “black” in her birth certificate in accordance with a 1970 state law which declared anyone with at least 1/32nd “Negro blood” to be black.

The Phipps case raised intriguing questions about the concept of race, its meaning in contemporary society, and its use (and abuse) in public policy. Assistant Attorney General Ron Davis defended the law by pointing out that some type of racial classification was necessary to comply with federal record-keeping requirements and to facilitate programs for the prevention of genetic diseases. Phipps’s attorney, Brian Begue, argued that the assignment of racial categories on birth certificates was unconstitutional and that the 1/32nd designation was inaccurate. He called on a retired Tulane University professor who cited research indicating that most Louisiana whites have at least 1/20th “Negro” ancestry.

In the end, Phipps lost. The court upheld the state’s right to classify and quantify racial identity.¹

Phipps’s problematic racial identity, and her effort to resolve it through state action, is in many ways a parable of America’s unsolved racial dilemma. It illustrates the difficulties of defining race and assigning individuals or groups to racial categories. It shows how the racial legacies of the past—slavery and bigotry—continue to shape the present. It reveals both the deep involvement of the state in the organization and interpreta-

tion of race, and the inadequacy of state institutions to carry out these functions. It demonstrates how deeply Americans both as individuals and as a civilization are shaped, and indeed haunted, by race.

Having lived her whole life thinking that she was white, Phipps suddenly discovers that by legal definition she is not. In U.S. society, such an event is indeed catastrophic.² But if she is not white, of what race is she? The *state* claims that she is black, based on its rules of classification,³ and another state agency, the court, upholds this judgment. But despite these classificatory standards which have imposed an either-or logic on racial identity, Phipps will not in fact “change color.” Unlike what would have happened during slavery times if one’s claim to whiteness was successfully challenged, we can assume that despite the outcome of her legal challenge, Phipps will remain in most of the social relationships she had occupied before the trial. Her socialization, her familial and friendship networks, her cultural orientation, will not change. She will simply have to wrestle with her newly acquired “hybridized” condition. She will have to confront the “Other” within.

The designation of racial categories and the determination of racial identity is no simple task. For centuries, this question has precipitated intense debates and conflicts, particularly in the U.S.—disputes over natural and legal rights, over the distribution of resources, and indeed, over who shall live and who shall die.

A crucial dimension of the Phipps case is that it illustrates the inadequacy of claims that race is a mere matter of variations in human physiognomy, that it is simply a matter of skin color. But if race cannot be understood in this manner, how *can* it be understood? We cannot fully hope to address this topic—no less than the meaning of race, its role in society, and the forces which shape it—in one chapter, nor indeed in one book. Our goal in this chapter, however, is far from modest: we wish to offer at least the outlines of a theory of race and racism.

What Is Race?

There is a continuous temptation to think of race as an *essence*, as something fixed, concrete, and objective. And there is also an opposite temptation: to imagine race as a mere *illusion*, a purely ideological construct which some ideal non-racist social order would eliminate. It is necessary to challenge both these positions, to disrupt and reframe the rigid and bipolar manner in which they are posed and debated, and to transcend the presumably irreconcilable relationship between them.

The effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and “decentered” complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle. With this in mind, let us propose a definition: *race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.* Although the concept of race invokes biologically based human characteristics (so-called “phenotypes”), selection of these particular human features for purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process. In contrast to the other major distinction of this type, that of gender, there is no biological basis for distinguishing among human groups along the lines of race.⁴ Indeed, the categories employed to differentiate among human groups along racial lines reveal themselves, upon serious examination, to be at best imprecise, and at worst completely arbitrary.

If the concept of race is so nebulous, can we not dispense with it? Can we not “do without” race, at least in the “enlightened” present? This question has been posed often, and with greater frequency in recent years.⁵ An affirmative answer would of course present obvious practical difficulties: it is rather difficult to jettison widely held beliefs, beliefs which moreover are central to everyone’s identity and understanding of the social world. So the attempt to banish the concept as an archaism is at best counterintuitive. But a deeper difficulty, we believe, is inherent in the very formulation of this schema, in its way of posing race as a *problem*, a misconception left over from the past, and suitable now only for the dustbin of history.

A more effective starting point is the recognition that despite its uncertainties and contradictions, the concept of race continues to play a fundamental role in structuring and representing the social world. The task for theory is to explain this situation. It is to avoid both the utopian framework which sees race as an illusion we can somehow “get beyond,” and also the essentialist formulation which sees race as something objective and fixed, a biological datum.⁶ Thus we should think of race as an element of social structure rather than as an irregularity within it; we should see race as a dimension of human representation rather than an illusion. These perspectives inform the theoretical approach we call racial formation.

Racial Formation

We define *racial formation* as the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed. Our attempt to elaborate a theory of racial formation will proceed in two steps. First, we argue that racial formation is a process of historically situated *projects*

in which human bodies and social structures are represented and organized. Next we link racial formation to the evolution of hegemony, the way in which society is organized and ruled. Such an approach, we believe, can facilitate understanding of a whole range of contemporary controversies and dilemmas involving race, including the nature of racism, the relationship of race to other forms of differences, inequalities, and oppression such as sexism and nationalism, and the dilemmas of racial identity today.

From a racial formation perspective, race is a matter of both social structure and cultural representation. Too often, the attempt is made to understand race simply or primarily in terms of only one of these two analytical dimensions.⁷ For example, efforts to explain racial inequality as a purely social structural phenomenon are unable to account for the origins, patterning, and transformation of racial difference.

Conversely, many examinations of racial difference—understood as a matter of cultural attributes *à la* ethnicity theory, or as a society-wide signification system, *à la* some poststructuralist accounts—cannot comprehend such structural phenomena as racial stratification in the labor market or patterns of residential segregation.

An alternative approach is to think of racial formation processes as occurring through a linkage between structure and representation. Racial projects do the ideological “work” of making these links. *A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines.* Racial projects connect what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning. Let us consider this proposition, first in terms of large-scale or macro-level social processes, and then in terms of other dimensions of the racial formation process.

Racial Formation as a Macro-Level Social Process

To interpret the meaning of race is to frame it socially. Consider for example, this statement by Charles Murray on welfare reform:

My proposal for dealing with the racial issue in social welfare is to repeal every bit of legislation and reverse every court decision that in any way requires, recommends, or awards differential treatment according to race, and thereby put us back onto the track that we left in 1965. We may argue about the appropriate limits of government intervention in trying to enforce the ideal, but at least it

should be possible to identify the ideal: Race is not a morally admissible reason for treating one person differently from another. Period.⁸

Here there is a partial but significant analysis of the meaning of race: it is not a morally valid basis upon which to treat people “differently from one another.” We may notice someone’s race, but we cannot act upon that awareness. We must act in a “color-blind” fashion. This analysis of the meaning of race is immediately linked to a specific conception of the role of race in the social structure: it can play no part in government action, save in “the enforcement of the ideal.” No state policy can legitimately require, recommend, or award different status according to race. This example can be classified as a particular type of racial project in the present-day U.S.—a “neoconservative” one.

Conversely, to recognize the racial dimension in social structure is to interpret the meaning of race. Consider the following statement by the late Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall on minority “set-aside” programs:

A profound difference separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral government activity from perpetuating the effects of such racism.⁹

Here the focus is on the racial dimensions of social structure—in this case of state activity and policy. The argument is that state actions in the past and present have treated people in very different ways according to their race, and thus the government cannot retreat from its policy responsibilities in this area. It cannot suddenly declare itself “color-blind” without in fact perpetuating the same type of differential, racist treatment.¹⁰ Thus, race continues to signify difference and structure inequality. Here, racialized social structure is immediately linked to an interpretation of the meaning of race. This example too can be classified as a particular type of racial project in the present-day U.S.—a “liberal” one.

To be sure, such political labels as “neoconservative” or “liberal” cannot fully capture the complexity of racial projects, for these are always multiply determined, politically contested, and deeply shaped by their historical context. Thus, encapsulated within the neoconservative example cited here are certain egalitarian commitments which derive from a previous historical context in which they played a very different role, and which are rearticulated in neoconservative racial discourse precisely to oppose a more open-ended, more capacious conception of the meaning of

equality. Similarly, in the liberal example, Justice Marshall recognizes that the contemporary state, which was formerly the architect of segregation and the chief enforcer of racial difference, has a tendency to reproduce those patterns of inequality in a new guise. Thus he admonishes it (in dissent, significantly) to fulfill its responsibilities to uphold a robust conception of equality. These particular instances, then, demonstrate how racial projects are always concretely framed, and thus are always contested and unstable. The social structures they uphold or attack, and the representations of race they articulate, are never invented out of the air, but exist in a definite historical context, having descended from previous conflicts. This contestation appears to be permanent in respect to race.

These two examples of contemporary racial projects are drawn from mainstream political debate; they may be characterized as center-right and center-left expressions of contemporary racial politics.¹¹ We can, however, expand the discussion of racial formation processes far beyond these familiar examples. In fact, we can identify racial projects in at least three other analytical dimensions: first, the political spectrum can be broadened to include radical projects, on both the left and right, as well as along other political axes. Second, analysis of racial projects can take place not only at the macro-level of racial policy-making, state activity, and collective action, but also at the micro-level of everyday experience. Third, the concept of racial projects can be applied across historical time, to identify racial formation dynamics in the past. We shall now offer examples of each of these types of racial projects.

The Political Spectrum of Racial Formation

We have encountered examples of a neoconservative racial project, in which the significance of race is denied, leading to a “color-blind” racial politics and “hands off” policy orientation; and of a “liberal” racial project, in which the significance of race is affirmed, leading to an egalitarian and “activist” state policy. But these by no means exhaust the political possibilities. Other racial projects can be readily identified on the contemporary U.S. scene. For example, “far right” projects, which uphold biologistic and racist views of difference, explicitly argue for white supremacist policies. “New right” projects overtly claim to hold “color-blind” views, but covertly manipulate racial fears in order to achieve political gains.¹² On the left, “radical democratic” projects invoke notions of racial “difference” in combination with egalitarian politics and policy.

Further variations can also be noted. For example, “nationalist” projects,

both conservative and radical, stress the incompatibility of racially defined group identity with the legacy of white supremacy, and therefore advocate a social structural solution of separation, either complete or partial.¹³ As we saw in Chapter 3, nationalist currents represent a profound legacy of the centuries of racial absolutism that initially defined the meaning of race in the U.S. Nationalist concerns continue to influence racial debate in the form of Afrocentrism and other expressions of identity politics.

Taking the range of politically organized racial projects as a whole, we can “map” the current pattern of racial formation at the level of the public sphere, the “macro-level” in which public debate and mobilization takes place.¹⁴ But important as this is, the terrain on which racial formation occurs is broader yet.

Racial Formation as Everyday Experience

At the micro-social level, racial projects also link signification and structure, not so much as efforts to shape policy or define large-scale meaning, but as the applications of “common sense.” To see racial projects operating at the level of everyday life, we have only to examine the many ways in which, often unconsciously, we “notice” race.

One of the first things we notice about people when we meet them (along with their sex) is their race. We utilize race to provide clues about *who* a person is. This fact is made painfully obvious when we encounter someone whom we cannot conveniently racially categorize—someone who is, for example, racially “mixed” or of an ethnic/racial group we are not familiar with. Such an encounter becomes a source of discomfort and momentarily a crisis of racial meaning.

Our ability to interpret racial meanings depends on preconceived notions of a racialized social structure. Comments such as, “Funny, you don’t look black,” betray an underlying image of what black should be. We expect people to act out their apparent racial identities; indeed we become disoriented when they do not. The black banker harassed by police while walking in casual clothes through his own well-off neighborhood, the Latino or white kid rapping in perfect Afro patois, the unending *faux pas* committed by whites who assume that the non-whites they encounter are servants or tradespeople, the belief that non-white colleagues are less qualified persons hired to fulfill affirmative action guidelines, indeed the whole gamut of racial stereotypes—that “white men can’t jump,” that Asians can’t dance, etc., etc.—all testify to the way a racialized social structure shapes racial experience and conditions meaning. Analysis of such stereotypes reveals

the always present, already active link between our view of the social structure—its demography, its laws, its customs, its threats—and our conception of what race means.

Conversely, our ongoing interpretation of our experience in racial terms shapes our relations to the institutions and organizations through which we are imbedded in social structure. Thus we expect differences in skin color, or other racially coded characteristics, to explain social differences. Temperament, sexuality, intelligence, athletic ability, aesthetic preferences, and so on are presumed to be fixed and discernible from the palpable mark of race. Such diverse questions as our confidence and trust in others (for example, clerks or salespeople, media figures, neighbors), our sexual preferences and romantic images, our tastes in music, films, dance, or sports, and our very ways of talking, walking, eating, and dreaming become racially coded simply because we live in a society where racial awareness is so pervasive. Thus in ways too comprehensive even to monitor consciously, and despite periodic calls—neoconservative and otherwise—for us to ignore race and adopt “color-blind” racial attitudes, skin color “differences” continue to rationalize distinct treatment of racially identified individuals and groups.

To summarize the argument so far: the theory of racial formation suggests that society is suffused with racial projects, large and small, to which all are subjected. This racial “subjection” is quintessentially ideological. Everybody learns some combination, some version, of the rules of racial classification, and of her own racial identity, often without obvious teaching or conscious inculcation. Thus are we inserted in a comprehensively racialized social structure. Race becomes “common sense”—a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world. A vast web of racial projects mediates between the discursive or representational means in which race is identified and signified on the one hand, and the institutional and organizational forms in which it is routinized and standardized on the other. These projects are the heart of the racial formation process.

Under such circumstances, it is not possible to represent race discursively without simultaneously locating it, explicitly or implicitly, in a social structural (and historical) context. Nor is it possible to organize, maintain, or transform social structures without simultaneously engaging, once more either explicitly or implicitly, in racial signification. Racial formation, therefore, is a kind of synthesis, an outcome, of the interaction of racial projects on a society-wide level. These projects are, of course, vastly different in scope and effect. They include large-scale public action, state activities, and interpretations of racial conditions in artistic, journalistic, or academic fora,¹⁵ as well as the seemingly infinite

number of racial judgments and practices we carry out at the level of individual experience.

Since racial formation is always historically situated, our understanding of the significance of race, and of the way race structures society, has changed enormously over time. The processes of racial formation we encounter today, the racial projects large and small which structure U.S. society in so many ways, are merely the present-day outcomes of a complex historical evolution. The contemporary racial order remains transient. By knowing something of how it evolved, we can perhaps better discern where it is heading. We therefore turn next to a historical survey of the racial formation process, and the conflicts and debates it has engendered.

The Evolution of Modern Racial Awareness

The identification of distinctive human groups, and their association with differences in physical appearance, goes back to prehistory, and can be found in the earliest documents—in the Bible, for example, or in Herodotus. But the emergence of a modern conception of race does not occur until the rise of Europe and the arrival of Europeans in the Americas. Even the hostility and suspicion with which Christian Europe viewed its two significant non-Christian “Others”—the Muslims and the Jews—cannot be viewed as more than a rehearsal for racial formation, since these antagonisms, for all their bloodletting and chauvinism, were always and everywhere religiously interpreted.¹⁶

It was only when European explorers reached the Western Hemisphere, when the oceanic seal separating the “old” and the “new” worlds was breached, that the distinctions and categorizations fundamental to a racialized social structure, and to a discourse of race, began to appear. The European explorers were the advance guard of merchant capitalism, which sought new openings for trade. What they found exceeded their wildest dreams, for never before and never again in human history has an opportunity for the appropriation of wealth remotely approached that presented by the “discovery.”¹⁷

But the Europeans also “discovered” people, people who looked and acted differently. These “natives” challenged their “discoverers” pre-existing conceptions of the origins and possibilities of the human species.¹⁸ The representation and interpretation of the meaning of the indigenous peoples’ existence became a crucial matter, one which would affect the outcome of the enterprise of conquest. For the “discovery” raised dis-

turbing questions as to whether *all* could be considered part of the same “family of man,” and more practically, the extent to which native peoples could be exploited and enslaved. Thus religious debates flared over the attempt to reconcile the various Christian metaphysics with the existence of peoples who were more “different” than any whom Europe had previously known.¹⁹

In practice, of course, the seizure of territories and goods, the introduction of slavery through the *encomienda* and other forms of coerced native labor, and then through the organization of the African slave trade—not to mention the practice of outright extermination—all presupposed a worldview which distinguished Europeans, as children of God, full-fledged human beings, etc., from “Others.” Given the dimensions and the ineluctability of the European onslaught, given the conquerors’ determination to appropriate both labor and goods, and given the presence of an axiomatic and unquestioned Christianity among them, the ferocious division of society into Europeans and “Others” soon coalesced. This was true despite the famous 16th-century theological and philosophical debates about the identity of indigenous peoples.²⁰

Indeed debates about the nature of the “Others” reached their practical limits with a certain dispatch. Plainly they would never touch the essential: nothing, after all, would induce the Europeans to pack up and go home. We cannot examine here the early controversies over the status of American souls. We simply wish to emphasize that the “discovery” signalled a break from the previous proto-racial awareness by which Europe contemplated its “Others” in a relatively disorganized fashion. In other words, the “conquest of America” was not simply an epochal historical event—however unparalleled in its importance. It was also the advent of a consolidated social structure of exploitation, appropriation, domination. Its representation, first in religious terms, but soon enough in scientific and political ones, initiated modern racial awareness.

The conquest, therefore, was the first—and given the dramatic nature of the case, perhaps the greatest—racial formation project. Its significance was by no means limited to the Western Hemisphere, for it began the work of constituting Europe as the metropole, the center, of a group of empires which could take, as Marx would later write, “the globe for a theater.”²¹ It represented this new imperial structure as a struggle between civilization and barbarism, and implicated in this representation all the great European philosophies, literary traditions, and social theories of the modern age.²² In short, just as the noise of the “big bang” still resonates through the universe, so the overdetermined construction of world “civilization” as a product of the rise of Europe and the subjugation of the rest of us, still defines the race concept.

From Religion to Science

After the initial depredations of conquest, religious justifications for racial difference gradually gave way to scientific ones. By the time of the Enlightenment, a general awareness of race was pervasive, and most of the great philosophers of Europe, such as Hegel, Kant, Hume, and Locke, had issued virulently racist opinions.

The problem posed by race during the late 18th century was markedly different than it had been in the age of “discovery,” expropriation, and slaughter. The social structures in which race operated were no longer primarily those of military conquest and plunder, nor of the establishment of thin beachheads of colonization on the edge of what had once seemed a limitless wilderness. Now the issues were much more complicated: nation-building, establishment of national economies in the world trading system, resistance to the arbitrary authority of monarchs, and the assertion of the “natural rights” of “man,” including the right of revolution.²³ In such a situation, racially organized exploitation, in the form of slavery, the expansion of colonies, and the continuing expulsion of native peoples, was both necessary and newly difficult to justify.

The invocation of scientific criteria to demonstrate the “natural” basis of racial hierarchy was both a logical consequence of the rise of this form of knowledge, and an attempt to provide a more subtle and nuanced account of human complexity in the new, “enlightened” age. Spurred on by the classificatory scheme of living organisms devised by Linnaeus in *Systema Naturae* (1735), many scholars in the 18th and 19th centuries dedicated themselves to the identification and ranking of variations in humankind. Race was conceived as a *biological* concept, a matter of species. Voltaire wrote that “the negro race is a species of men (sic) as different from ours . . . as the breed of spaniels is from that of greyhounds,” and in a formulation echoing down from his century to our own, declared that

If their understanding is not of a different nature from ours . . . , it is at least greatly inferior. They are not capable of any great application or association of ideas, and seem formed neither for the advantages nor the abuses of philosophy.²⁴

Jefferson, the preeminent exponent of the Enlightenment doctrine of “the rights of man” on North American shores, echoed these sentiments:

In general their existence appears to participate more of sensation than reflection. . . . [I]n memory they are equal to whites, in reason much inferior . . . [and] in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and

anomalous. . . . I advance it therefore . . . that the blacks, whether originally a different race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites. . . . Will not a lover of natural history, then, one who views the gradations in all the animals with the eye of philosophy, excuse an effort to keep those in the department of Man (sic) as distinct as nature has formed them?²⁵

Such claims of species distinctiveness among humans justified the inequitable allocation of political and social rights, while still upholding the doctrine of “the rights of man.” The quest to obtain a precise scientific definition of race sustained debates which continue to rage today. Yet despite efforts ranging from Dr. Samuel Morton’s studies of cranial capacity²⁶ to contemporary attempts to base racial classification on shared gene pools,²⁷ the concept of race has defied biological definition.

In the 19th century, Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau drew upon the most respected scientific studies of his day to compose his four-volume *Essay on the Inequality of Races* (1853–1855).²⁸ He not only greatly influenced the racial thinking of the period, but his themes would be echoed in the racist ideologies of the next one hundred years: beliefs that superior races produced superior cultures and that racial intermixtures resulted in the degradation of the superior racial stock. These ideas found expression, for instance, in the eugenics movement launched by Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton, which had an immense impact on scientific and sociopolitical thought in Europe and the U.S.²⁹ In the wake of civil war and emancipation, and with immigration from southern and Eastern Europe as well as East Asia running high, the U.S. was particularly fertile ground for notions such as social darwinism and eugenics.

Attempts to discern the *scientific meaning* of race continue to the present day. For instance, an essay by Arthur Jensen which argued that hereditary factors shape intelligence not only revived the “nature or nurture” controversy, but also raised highly volatile questions about racial equality itself.³⁰ All such attempts seek to remove the concept of race from the historical context in which it arose and developed. They employ an *essentialist* approach which suggests instead that the truth of race is a matter of innate characteristics, of which skin color and other physical attributes provide only the most obvious, and in some respects most superficial, indicators.

From Science to Politics

It has taken scholars more than a century to reject biologicistic notions of race in favor of an approach which regards race as a *social* concept. This

trend has been slow and uneven, and even today remains somewhat embattled, but its overall direction seems clear. At the turn of the century Max Weber discounted biological explanations for racial conflict and instead highlighted the social and political factors which engendered such conflict.³¹ W. E. B. Du Bois argued for a sociopolitical definition of race by identifying “the color line” as “the problem of the 20th century.”³² Pioneering cultural anthropologist Franz Boas rejected attempts to link racial identifications and cultural traits, labelling as pseudoscientific any assumption of a continuum of “higher” and “lower” cultural groups.³³ Other early exponents of social, as opposed to biological, views of race included Robert E. Park, founder of the “Chicago school” of sociology, and Alain Leroy Locke, philosopher and theorist of the Harlem Renaissance.³⁴

Perhaps more important than these and subsequent intellectual efforts, however, were the political struggles of racially defined groups themselves. Waged all around the globe under a variety of banners such as anticolonialism and civil rights, these battles to challenge various structural and cultural racisms have been a major feature of 20th-century politics. The racial horrors of the 20th century—colonial slaughter and apartheid, the genocide of the holocaust, and the massive bloodlettings required to end these evils—have also indelibly marked the theme of race as a political issue *par excellence*.

As a result of prior efforts and struggles, we have now reached the point of fairly general agreement that race is not a biologically given but rather a socially constructed way of differentiating human beings. While a tremendous achievement, the transcendence of biologicistic conceptions of race does not provide any reprieve from the dilemmas of racial injustice and conflict, nor from controversies over the significance of race in the present. Views of race as socially constructed simply recognize the fact that these conflicts and controversies are now more properly framed on the terrain of politics. By privileging politics in the analysis which follows we do not mean to suggest that race has been displaced as a concern of scientific inquiry, or that struggles over cultural representation are no longer important. We do argue, however, that race is now a preeminently political phenomenon. Such an assertion invites examination of the evolving role of racial politics in the U.S. This is the subject to which we now turn.

Dictatorship, Democracy, Hegemony

For most of its existence both as European colony and as an independent nation, the U.S. was a *racial dictatorship*. From 1607 to 1865—258 years—most non-whites were firmly eliminated from the sphere of poli-

tics.³⁵ After the Civil War there was the brief egalitarian experiment of Reconstruction which terminated ignominiously in 1877. In its wake followed almost a century of legally sanctioned segregation and denial of the vote, nearly absolute in the South and much of the Southwest, less effective in the North and far West, but formidable in any case.³⁶ These barriers fell only in the mid-1960s, a mere quarter-century ago. Nor did the successes of the black movement and its allies mean that all obstacles to their political participation had now been abolished. Patterns of racial inequality have proven, unfortunately, to be quite stubborn and persistent.

It is important, therefore, to recognize that in many respects, racial dictatorship is the norm against which all U.S. politics must be measured. The centuries of racial dictatorship have had three very large consequences: first, they defined "American" identity as white, as the negation of racialized "otherness"—at first largely African and indigenous, later Latin American and Asian as well.³⁷ This negation took shape in both law and custom, in public institutions and in forms of cultural representation. It became the archetype of hegemonic rule in the U.S. It was the successor to the conquest as the "master" racial project.

Second, racial dictatorship organized (albeit sometimes in an incoherent and contradictory fashion) the "color line" rendering it the fundamental division in U.S. society. The dictatorship elaborated, articulated, and drove racial divisions not only through institutions, but also through psyches, extending up to our own time the racial obsessions of the conquest and slavery periods.

Third, racial dictatorship consolidated the oppositional racial consciousness and organization originally framed by marronage³⁸ and slave revolts, by indigenous resistance, and by nationalisms of various sorts. Just as the conquest created the "native" where once there had been Pequot, Iroquois, or Tutelo, so too it created the "black" where once there had been Asante or Ovimbundu, Yoruba or Bakongo.

The transition from a racial dictatorship to a racial democracy has been a slow, painful, and contentious one; it remains far from complete. A recognition of the abiding presence of racial dictatorship, we contend, is crucial for the development of a theory of racial formation in the U.S. It is also crucial to the task of relating racial formation to the broader context of political practice, organization, and change.

In this context, a key question arises: in what way is racial formation related to politics as a whole? How, for example, does race articulate with other axes of oppression and difference—most importantly class and gender—along which politics is organized today?

The answer, we believe, lies in the concept of *hegemony*. Antonio Gramsci—the Italian communist who placed this concept at the center of his life's

work—understood it as the conditions necessary, in a given society, for the achievement and consolidation of rule. He argued that hegemony was always constituted by a combination of coercion and consent. Although rule can be obtained by force, it cannot be secured and maintained, especially in modern society, without the element of consent. Gramsci conceived of consent as far more than merely the legitimation of authority. In his view, consent extended to the incorporation by the ruling group of many of the key interests of subordinated groups, often to the explicit disadvantage of the rulers themselves.³⁹ Gramsci's treatment of hegemony went even farther: he argued that in order to consolidate their hegemony, ruling groups must elaborate and maintain a popular system of ideas and practices—through education, the media, religion, folk wisdom, etc.—which he called "common sense." It is through its production and its adherence to this "common sense," this ideology (in the broadest sense of the term), that a society gives its consent to the way in which it is ruled.⁴⁰

These provocative concepts can be extended and applied to an understanding of racial rule. In the Americas, the conquest represented the violent introduction of a new form of rule whose relationship with those it subjugated was almost entirely coercive. In the U.S., the origins of racial division, and of racial signification and identity formation, lie in a system of rule which was extremely dictatorial. The mass murders and expulsions of indigenous people, and the enslavement of Africans, surely evoked and inspired little consent in their founding moments.

Over time, however, the balance of coercion and consent began to change. It is possible to locate the origins of hegemony right within the heart of racial dictatorship, for the effort to possess the oppressor's tools—religion and philosophy in this case—was crucial to emancipation (the effort to possess oneself). As Ralph Ellison reminds us, "The slaves often took the essence of the aristocratic ideal (as they took Christianity) with far more seriousness than their masters."⁴¹ In their language, in their religion with its focus on the Exodus theme and on Jesus's tribulations, in their music with its figuring of suffering, resistance, perseverance, and transcendence, in their interrogation of a political philosophy which sought perpetually to rationalize their bondage in a supposedly "free" society, the slaves incorporated elements of racial rule into their thought and practice, turning them against their original bearers.

Racial rule can be understood as a slow and uneven historical process which has moved from dictatorship to democracy, from domination to hegemony. In this transition, hegemonic forms of racial rule—those based on consent—eventually came to supplant those based on coercion. Of course, before this assertion can be accepted, it must be qualified in important ways. By no means has the U.S. established racial democracy at the

end of the century, and by no means is coercion a thing of the past. But the sheer complexity of the racial questions U.S. society confronts today, the welter of competing racial projects and contradictory racial experiences which Americans undergo, suggests that hegemony is a useful and appropriate term with which to characterize contemporary racial rule.

Our key theoretical notion of racial projects helps to extend and broaden the question of rule. Projects are the building blocks not just of racial formation, but of hegemony in general. Hegemony operates by simultaneously structuring and signifying. As in the case of racial opposition, gender- or class-based conflict today links structural inequity and injustice on the one hand, and identifies and represents its subjects on the other. The success of modern-day feminism, for example, has depended on its ability to reinterpret gender as a matter of both injustice and identity/difference.

Today, political opposition necessarily takes shape on the terrain of hegemony. Far from ruling principally through exclusion and coercion (though again, these are hardly absent) hegemony operates by including its subjects, incorporating its opposition. *Pace* both Marxists and liberals, there is no longer any universal or privileged region of political action or discourse.⁴² Race, class, and gender all represent potential antagonisms whose significance is no longer given, if it ever was.

Thus race, class, and gender (as well as sexual orientation) constitute “regions” of hegemony, areas in which certain political projects can take shape. They share certain obvious attributes in that they are all “socially constructed,” and they all consist of a field of projects whose common feature is their linkage of social structure and signification.

Going beyond this, it is crucial to emphasize that race, class, and gender, are not fixed and discrete categories, and that such “regions” are by no means autonomous. They overlap, intersect, and fuse with each other in countless ways. Such mutual determinations have been illustrated by Patricia Hill Collins’s survey and theoretical synthesis of the themes and issues of black feminist thought.⁴³ They are also evident in Evelyn Nakano Glenn’s work on the historical and contemporary racialization of domestic and service work.⁴⁴ In many respects, race is gendered and gender is racialized. In institutional and everyday life, any clear demarcation of specific forms of oppression and difference is constantly being disrupted.

There are no clear boundaries between these “regions” of hegemony, so political conflicts will often invoke some or all these themes simultaneously. Hegemony is tentative, incomplete, and “messy.” For example, the 1991 Hill-Thomas hearings, with their intertwined themes of race and gender inequality, and their frequent genuflections before the altar of hard work and upward mobility, managed to synthesize various race, gender, and class projects in a particularly explosive combination.⁴⁵

What distinguishes political opposition today—racial or otherwise—is its insistence on identifying itself and speaking for itself, its determined demand for the transformation of the social structure, its refusal of the “common sense” understandings which the hegemonic order imposes. Nowhere is this refusal of “common sense” more needed, or more imperilled, than in our understanding of racism.

What Is Racism?

Since the ambiguous triumph of the civil rights movement in the mid-1960s, clarity about what racism means has been eroding. The concept entered the lexicon of “common sense” only in the 1960s. Before that, although the term had surfaced occasionally,⁴⁶ the problem of racial injustice and inequality was generally understood in a more limited fashion, as a matter of prejudiced attitudes or bigotry on the one hand,⁴⁷ and discriminatory practices on the other.⁴⁸ Solutions, it was believed, would therefore involve the overcoming of such attitudes, the achievement of tolerance, the acceptance of “brotherhood,” etc., and the passage of laws which prohibited discrimination with respect to access to public accommodations, jobs, education, etc. The early civil rights movement explicitly reflected such views. In its espousal of integration and its quest for a “beloved community” it sought to overcome racial prejudice. In its litigation activities and agitation for civil rights legislation it sought to challenge discriminatory practices.

The later 1960s, however, signalled a sharp break with this vision. The emergence of the slogan “black power” (and soon after, of “brown power,” “red power,” and “yellow power”), the wave of riots that swept the urban ghettos from 1964 to 1968, and the founding of radical movement organizations of nationalist and Marxist orientation, coincided with the recognition that racial inequality and injustice had much deeper roots. They were not simply the product of prejudice, nor was discrimination only a matter of intentionally informed action. Rather, prejudice was an almost unavoidable outcome of patterns of socialization which were “bred in the bone,” affecting not only whites but even minorities themselves.⁴⁹ Discrimination, far from manifesting itself only (or even principally) through individual actions or conscious policies, was a structural feature of U.S. society, the product of centuries of systematic exclusion, exploitation, and disregard of racially defined minorities.⁵⁰ It was this combination of relationships—prejudice, discrimination, and institutional inequality—which defined the concept of racism at the end of the 1960s.

Such a synthesis was better able to confront the political realities of the period. Its emphasis on the structural dimensions of racism allowed it to address the intransigence which racial injustice and inequality continued to exhibit, even after discrimination had supposedly been outlawed⁵¹ and bigoted expression stigmatized. But such an approach also had clear limitations. As Robert Miles has argued, it tended to “inflate” the concept of racism to a point at which it lost precision.⁵² If the “institutional” component of racism were so pervasive and deeply rooted, it became difficult to see how the democratization of U.S. society could be achieved, and difficult to explain what progress had been made. The result was a leveling critique which denied any distinction between the Jim Crow era (or even the whole *longue durée* of racial dictatorship since the conquest) and the present. Similarly, if the prejudice component of racism were so deeply inbred, it became difficult to account for the evident hybridity and interpenetration that characterizes civil society in the U.S., as evidenced by the shaping of popular culture, language, and style, for example. The result of the “inflation” of the concept of racism was thus a deep pessimism about any efforts to overcome racial barriers, in the workplace, the community, or any other sphere of lived experience. An overly comprehensive view of racism, then, potentially served as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Yet the alternative view—which surfaced with a vengeance in the 1970s—urging a return to the conception of racism held before the movement’s “radical turn,” was equally inadequate. This was the neoconservative perspective, which deliberately restricted its attention to injury done to the individual as opposed to the group, and to advocacy of a color-blind racial policy.⁵³ Such an approach reduced race to ethnicity,⁵⁴ and almost entirely neglected the continuing organization of social inequality and oppression along racial lines. Worse yet, it tended to rationalize racial injustice as a supposedly natural outcome of group attributes in competition.⁵⁵

The distinct, and contested, meanings of racism which have been advanced over the past three decades have contributed to an overall crisis of meaning for the concept today. Today, the absence of a clear “common sense” understanding of what racism means has become a significant obstacle to efforts aimed at challenging it. Bob Blauner has noted that in classroom discussions of racism, white and non-white students tend to talk past one another. Whites tend to locate racism in color consciousness and find its absence color-blindness. In so doing, they see the affirmation of difference and racial identity among racially defined minority students as racist. Non-white students, by contrast, see racism as a system of power, and correspondingly argue that blacks, for example, cannot be racist because they lack power. Blauner concludes that there are two “languages” of race, one in which members of racial minorities, especially blacks, see the cen-

trality of race in history and everyday experience, and another in which whites see race as “a peripheral, nonessential reality.”⁵⁶

Given this crisis of meaning, and in the absence of any “common sense” understanding, does the concept of racism retain any validity? If so, what view of racism should we adopt? Is a more coherent theoretical approach possible? We believe it is.

We employ racial formation theory to reformulate the concept of racism. Our approach recognizes that racism, like race, has changed over time. It is obvious that the attitudes, practices, and institutions of the epochs of slavery, say, or of Jim Crow, no longer exist today. Employing a similar logic, it is reasonable to question whether concepts of racism which developed in the early days of the post-civil rights era, when the limitations of both moderate reform and militant racial radicalism of various types had not yet been encountered, remain adequate to explain circumstances and conflicts a quarter-century later.

Racial formation theory allows us to differentiate between race and racism. The two concepts should not be used interchangeably. We have argued that race has no fixed meaning, but is constructed and transformed sociohistorically through competing political projects, through the necessary and ineluctable link between the structural and cultural dimensions of race in the U.S. This emphasis on projects allows us to refocus our understanding of racism as well, for racism can now be seen as characterizing some, but not all, racial projects.

A racial project can be defined as *racist* if and only if it *creates or reproduces structures of domination based on essentialist*⁵⁷ *categories of race*. Such a definition recognizes the importance of locating racism within a fluid and contested history of racially based social structures and discourses. Thus there can be no timeless and absolute standard for what constitutes racism, for social structures change and discourses are subject to rearticulation. Our definition therefore focuses instead on the “work” essentialism does for domination, and the “need” domination displays to essentialize the subordinated.

Further, it is important to distinguish racial awareness from racial essentialism. To attribute merits, allocate values or resources to, and/or represent individuals or groups on the basis of racial identity should not be considered racist in and of itself. Such projects may in fact be quite benign.

Consider the following examples: first, the statement, “Many Asian Americans are highly entrepreneurial”; second, the organization of an association of, say, black accountants.

The first racial project, in our view, signifies or represents a racial category (“Asian Americans”) and locates that representation within the social structure of the contemporary U.S. (in regard to business, class issues,

socialization, etc.). The second racial project is organizational or social structural, and therefore must engage in racial signification. Black accountants, the organizers might maintain, have certain common experiences, can offer each other certain support, etc. Neither of these racial projects is essentialist, and neither can fairly be labelled racist. Of course, racial representations may be biased or misinterpret their subjects, just as racially based organizational efforts may be unfair or unjustifiably exclusive. If such were the case, if for instance in our first example the statement in question were "Asian Americans are naturally entrepreneurial," this would by our criterion be racist. Similarly, if the effort to organize black accountants had as its rationale the raiding of clients from white accountants, it would by our criterion be racist as well.

Similarly, to allocate values or resources—let us say, academic scholarships—on the basis of racial categories is not racist. Scholarships are awarded on a preferential basis to Rotarians, children of insurance company employees, and residents of the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. Why then should they not also be offered, in particular cases, to Chicanos or Native Americans?

In order to identify a social project as racist, one must in our view demonstrate a link between essentialist representations of race and social structures of domination. Such a link might be revealed in efforts to protect dominant interests, framed in racial terms, from democratizing racial initiatives.⁵⁸ But it might also consist of efforts simply to reverse the roles of racially dominant and racially subordinate.⁵⁹ There is nothing inherently white about racism.⁶⁰

Obviously a key problem with essentialism is its denial, or flattening, of differences within a particular racially defined group. Members of subordinate racial groups, when faced with racist practices such as exclusion or discrimination, are frequently forced to band together in order to defend their interests (if not, in some instances, their very lives). Such "strategic essentialism" should not, however, be simply equated with the essentialism practiced by dominant groups, nor should it prevent the interrogation of internal group differences.⁶¹

Without question, any abstract concept of racism is severely put to the test by the untidy world of reality. To illustrate our discussion, we analyze the following examples, chosen from current racial issues because of their complexity and the rancorous debates they have engendered:

- Is the allocation of employment opportunities through programs restricted to racially defined minorities, so-called "preferential treatment" or affirmative action policies, racist? Do such policies practice "racism in reverse"? We think not, with certain qualifications. Although

such programs necessarily employ racial criteria in assessing eligibility, they do not generally essentialize race, because they seek to overcome specific socially and historically constructed inequalities.⁶² Criteria of effectiveness and feasibility, therefore, must be considered in evaluating such programs. They must balance egalitarian and context-specific objectives, such as academic potential or job-related qualifications. It should be acknowledged that such programs often do have deleterious consequences for whites who are not personally the source of the discriminatory practices the programs seek to overcome. In this case, compensatory measures should be enacted to vitiate the charge of "reverse discrimination."⁶³

- Is all racism the same, or is there a distinction between white and non-white versions of racism? We have little patience with the argument that racism is solely a white problem, or even a "white disease."⁶⁴ The idea that non-whites cannot act in a racist manner, since they do not possess "power," is another variant of this formulation.⁶⁵

For many years now, racism has operated in a more complex fashion than this, sometimes taking such forms as self-hatred or self-aggrandizement at the expense of more vulnerable members of racially subordinate groups.⁶⁶ Whites can at times be the victims of racism—by other whites or non-whites—as is the case with anti-Jewish and anti-Arab prejudice. Furthermore, unless one is prepared to argue that there has been no transformation of the U.S. racial order over the years, and that racism consequently has remained unchanged—an essentialist position *par excellence*—it is difficult to contend that racially defined minorities have attained no power or influence, especially in recent years.

Having said this, we still do not consider that all racism is the same. This is because of the crucial importance we place in situating various "racisms" within the dominant hegemonic discourse about race. We have little doubt that the rantings of a Louis Farrakhan or Leonard Jeffries—to pick two currently demonized black ideologues—meet the criteria we have set out for judging a discourse to be racist. But if we compare Jeffries, for example, with a white racist such as Tom Metzger of the White Aryan Resistance, we find the latter's racial project to be far more menacing than the former's. Metzger's views are far more easily associated with an essentializing (and once very powerful) legacy: that of white supremacy and racial dictatorship in the U.S., and fascism in the world at large. Jeffries's project has far fewer examples with which to associate: no more than some ancient African empires and the (usually far less bigoted) radical phase of the black

power movement.⁶⁷ Thus black supremacy may be an instance of racism, just as its advocacy may be offensive, but it can hardly constitute the threat that white supremacy has represented in the U.S., nor can it be so easily absorbed and rearticulated in the dominant hegemonic discourse on race as white supremacy can. All racisms, all racist political projects, are not the same.

- Is the redrawing—or gerrymandering—of adjacent electoral districts to incorporate large numbers of racially defined minority voters in one, and largely white voters in the other, racist? Do such policies amount to “segregation” of the electorate? Certainly this alternative is preferable to the pre-Voting Rights Act practice of simply denying racial minorities the franchise. But does it achieve the Act’s purpose of fostering electoral equality across and within racial lines? In our view such practices, in which the post-1990 redistricting process engaged rather widely—are vulnerable to charges of essentialism. They often operate through “racial lumping,” tend to freeze rather than overcome racial inequalities, and frequently subvert or defuse political processes through which racially defined groups could otherwise negotiate their differences and interests. They worsen rather than ameliorate the denial of effective representation to those whom they could not effectively redistrict—since no redrawing of electoral boundaries is perfect, those who get stuck on the “wrong side” of the line are particularly disempowered. Thus we think such policies merit the designation of “tokenism”—a relatively mild form of racism—which they have received.⁶⁸

Parallel to the debates on the concept of race, recent academic and political controversies about the nature of racism have centered on whether it is primarily an ideological or structural phenomenon. Proponents of the former position argue that racism is first and foremost a matter of beliefs and attitudes, doctrines and discourse, which only then give rise to unequal and unjust practices and structures.⁶⁹ Advocates of the latter view see racism as primarily a matter of economic stratification, residential segregation, and other institutionalized forms of inequality which then give rise to ideologies of privilege.⁷⁰

From the standpoint of racial formation, these debates are fundamentally misguided. They frame the problem of racism in a rigid “either-or” manner. We believe it is crucial to disrupt the fixity of these positions by simultaneously arguing that ideological beliefs have structural consequences, and that social structures give rise to beliefs. Racial ideology and social

structure, therefore, mutually shape the nature of racism in a complex, dialectical, and overdetermined manner.

Even those racist projects which at first glance appear chiefly ideological turn out upon closer examination to have significant institutional and social structural dimensions. For example, what we have called “far right” projects appear at first glance to be centrally ideological. They are rooted in biologicistic doctrine, after all. The same seems to hold for certain conservative black nationalist projects which have deep commitments to biologism.⁷¹ But the unending stream of racist assaults initiated by the far right, the apparently increasing presence of skinheads in high schools, the proliferation of neo-Nazi computer bulletin boards, and the appearance of racist talk shows on cable access channels, all suggest that the organizational manifestations of the far right racial projects exist and will endure.⁷² Perhaps less threatening but still quite worrisome is the diffusion of doctrines of black superiority through some (though by no means all) university-based African American Studies departments and student organizations, surely a serious institutional or structural development.

By contrast, even those racisms which at first glance appear to be chiefly structural upon closer examination reveal a deeply ideological component. For example, since the racial right abandoned its explicit advocacy of segregation, it has not seemed to uphold—in the main—an ideologically racist project, but more primarily a structurally racist one. Yet this very transformation required tremendous efforts of ideological production. It demanded the rearticulation of civil rights doctrines of equality in suitably conservative form, and indeed the defense of continuing large-scale racial inequality as an outcome preferable to (what its advocates have seen as) the threat to democracy that affirmative action, busing, and large-scale “race-specific” social spending would entail.⁷³ Even more tellingly, this project took shape through a deeply manipulative coding of subtextual appeals to white racism, notably in a series of political campaigns for high office which have occurred over recent decades. The retreat of social policy from any practical commitment to racial justice, and the relentless reproduction and divulgation of this theme at the level of everyday life—where whites are now “fed up” with all the “special treatment” received by non-whites, etc.—constitutes the hegemonic racial project at this time. It therefore exhibits an unabashed structural racism all the more brazen because on the ideological or signification level, it adheres to a principle of “treating everyone alike.”

In summary, the racism of today is no longer a virtual monolith, as was the racism of yore. Today, racial hegemony is “messy.” The complexity of the present situation is the product of a vast historical legacy

of structural inequality and invidious racial representation, which has been confronted during the post-World War II period with an opposition more serious and effective than any it had faced before. As we will survey in the chapters to follow, the result is a deeply ambiguous and contradictory spectrum of racial projects, unremittingly conflictual racial politics, and confused and ambivalent racial identities of all sorts. We begin this discussion by addressing racial politics and the state.

Notes

Preface to the 1994 Edition

1. To acknowledge all the work which we feel parallels our own would be both impossible and unnecessary. Some important contributions are Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (New York: Routledge, 1991); Yen Le Espiritu, *Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Ann Ferguson, *Sexual Democracy: Women, Oppression, and Revolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Ruth Frankenberg, *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Christopher Newfield, "What Was Political Correctness? Race, the Right, and Managerial Democracy in the Humanities," *Critical Inquiry* 19 (Winter 1993); Suzanne Oboler, *Labeling Hispanics: The Dynamics of Race, Class, Language, and National Origins* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming); Lucius Outlaw, "Toward a Critical Theory of 'Race,'" in David Theo Goldberg, ed., *Anatomy of Racism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York: Verso, 1991); E. San Juan Jr., *Racial Formations, Critical Transformations: Articulations of Power in Ethnic and Racial Studies in the United States* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1992); John Solomos, *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain* (London: MacMillan, 1989); Stephen Small, *Still Catchin' Hell: The Black Experience in the USA and England* (London: Routledge, forthcoming); Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
2. Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991).

3. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

Introduction

1. Cited in J.K. Yamamoto, "Civil Rights Commission Under Fire," *Pacific Citizen*, 5 April 1985.
2. We define racism as a fundamental characteristic of social projects which create or reproduce structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race. See Chapter 4.
3. This is an introductory formulation. We shall have more to say later about the numerous variations (ethnic, national, class-based, etc.) possible within racial identity. Among Latinos, for example, the Puerto Rican, Central American, and Cuban cases all retain distinct aspects; among Asians, Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians, South Asians and Filipinos all have particular histories in the U.S. There are those whose racial category is ambiguous at present (e.g., Arabs). Further still, racial classification, as we shall argue below, is always flexible, a process without an end point or finality of any kind.
4. Concepts such as "internal colonialism" might offer important insights into U.S. racial conditions, but because they ultimately reason by analogy, they cannot range over the uniqueness and complexities of American racial ideology or politics.
5. In a letter to the *New York Times*, Mr. Ko Yung Tung made these comments on the 1980 census:

I was somewhat puzzled and disturbed by the question relating to race/national origin on my census form. The categories were 'white, black, Japanese, Chinese, Korean,' etc.

If the question is intended to get statistics on race, why is there a distinction between, say, Chinese and Japanese? They are both of the same race. If it is intended to elicit answers as to national origin, why are all whites undifferentiated? Why not German, French, Irish, etc.? Moreover, if this is to be an accurate study, it should allow for 'mixed' people. I myself am half Manchu and half Chinese (Han). My wife is 'white' (part Dutch, English, German, and Irish). What does that make my children?

I had hoped that by 1980 the U.S. government was more enlightened. The question reflects at best ignorance, at worst racism." (Cited in Lewis M. Killian, "Black Power and White Reactions: The Revitalization of Race-Thinking in the United States," *Annals of The American Academy of Social and Political Sciences* 454 (March 1981) p. 50.)

6. The inclusion of the categories of "Hispanic" and "Asian and Pacific Islanders" in the 1980 U.S. census, for example, was the result of lobbying efforts and Congressional debate.
7. We employ this term with reservations to distinguish the popular movements of the postwar period from their earlier antecedents (where applicable), and from movements of class- or status-based groups understood in the traditional Marxian or Weberian sense.
The black movement was hardly "new." It was the oldest and probably the most vital popular movement in U.S. history. Why, then, do we characterize it as the founding "new" social movement in the postwar period? The postwar black movement was different from its predecessors in *its ability to confront racial oppression simultaneously as an individually experienced and as a collectively organized phenomenon*. This is what it imparted to other new social movements. They have all interpreted politically the "immediate experience" of their members, adding the range of issues this engendered to the older grievances their predecessors had lodged, such as (in the case of the black movement) discrimination and prejudice. This "politics of identity" which spilled over into arenas not traditionally defined as "political" is what made the new social movements "new." See Chapter 7.
8. Rearticulation is the process of redefinition of political interests and identities, through a process of recombination of familiar ideas and values in hitherto unrecognized ways. This concept is more fully elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6.
9. It should be noted that while many of the class- and nation-based studies of race challenged the ethnicity perspective from a radical position, by no means all of these analyses entertained such views.

Part I

Paradigms of Race

1. Blauner writes: "... [T]he general conceptual frame of European theory implicitly assumed the decline and disappearance of ethnicity in the modern world; it offered no hints in the other direction. Without significant alteration, American sociology synthesized this framework into its models of social structure and change." Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 4. See also Herman Schwendinger and Julia R. Schwendinger, *The Sociologists of the Chair: A Radical Analysis of the Formative Years of North American Sociology (1883-1922)* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974), p. 39.
2. "After a promising start in the early period, the study of race and ethnic relations suffered. . . . With little room for ethnic and racial phenomena in the macroscopic models of social structure and process, the field was iso-

secution in their countries of origin impelled much immigration to the U.S., but he notes that these problems, however dire, did not force their victims to come to the U.S. *specifically*. Many European emigrants headed for South America, for example. For these and other reasons, we are in accord with Blauner's distinction here.

50. Ibid. p. 89.
51. See Piven and Cloward, *Poor Peoples' Movements*; P. Bachrach and M. Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
52. See M. Omi's review of William Julius Wilson's *The Declining Significance of Race*, in *Insurgent Sociologist*, Vol. 10, no. 2 (Fall 1980), p. 119.
53. See Chapter 7, below.
54. Internal colonialist approaches have tended to see the ghetto and barrio as colonized territory. See for example James Boggs, "The City is the Black Man's Land," in idem, *Racism and Class Struggle* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970); Barrera, Munoz, and Ornelas, "The Barrio as Internal Colony."
55. Burawoy, "Race, Class, and Colonialism," pp. 526–527.
56. See Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963). There is plenty of room for conservative nationalism, though, of the jingoistic sort, and credulity beyond bounds for it as well.

Toward a Racial Formation Perspective

1. In particular this is true of William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
4. **Racial Formation**
 1. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 14 September 1982, 19 May 1983. Ironically, the 1970 Louisiana law was enacted to supersede an old Jim Crow statute which relied on the idea of "common report" in determining an infant's race. Following Phipps' unsuccessful attempt to change her classification and have the law declared unconstitutional, a legislative effort arose which culminated in the repeal of the law. See *San Francisco Chronicle*, 23 June 1983.
 2. Compare the Phipps case to Andrew Hacker's well-known "parable" in which a white person is informed by a mysterious official that "the organization he represents has made a mistake" and that "... [a]ccording to their records . . . , you were to have been born black; to another set of parents, far from where you were raised." How much compensation, Hacker's official asks, would "you" require to undo the damage of this unfortunate error? See Hacker, *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992) pp. 31–32.
 3. On the evolution of Louisiana's racial classification system, see Virginia

- Dominguez, *White By Definition: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1986).
4. This is not to suggest that gender is a biological category while race is not. Gender, like race, is a social construct. However, the biological division of humans into sexes—two at least, and possibly intermediate ones as well—is not in dispute. This provides a basis for argument over gender divisions—how "natural," etc.—which does not exist with regard to race. To ground an argument for the "natural" existence of race, one must resort to philosophical anthropology.
 5. "The truth is that there are no races, there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us. . . . The evil that is done is done by the concept, and by easy—yet impossible—assumptions as to its application." (Kwame Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1992].) Appiah's eloquent and learned book fails, in our view, to dispense with the race concept, despite its anguished attempt to do so; this indeed is the source of its author's anguish. We agree with him as to the non-objective character of race, but fail to see how this recognition justifies its abandonment. This argument is developed below.
 6. We understand essentialism as *belief in real, true human, essences, existing outside or impervious to social and historical context*. We draw this definition, with some small modifications, from Diana Fuss, *Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature, & Difference* (New York: Routledge, 1989) p. xi.
 7. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, "On the Theoretical Status of the Concept of Race" in Warren Crichlow and Cameron McCarthy, eds., *Race, Identity, and Representation in Education* (New York: Routledge, 1993).
 8. Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 223.
 9. Justice Thurgood Marshall, dissenting in *City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.*, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
 10. See, for example, Derrick Bell, "Remembrances of Racism Past: Getting Past the Civil Rights Decline." in Herbert Hill and James E. Jones, Jr., eds., *Race in America: The Struggle for Equality* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993) pp. 75–76; Gertrude Ezorsky, *Racism and Justice: The Case for Affirmative Action* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) pp. 109–111; David Kairys, *With Liberty and Justice for Some: A Critique of the Conservative Supreme Court* (New York: The New Press, 1993) pp. 138–41.
 11. Howard Winant has developed a tentative "map" of the system of racial hegemony in the U.S. circa 1990, which focuses on the spectrum of racial projects running from the political right to the political left. See Winant, "Where Culture Meets Structure: Race in the 1990s," in idem, *Racial Conditions: Politics, Theory, Comparisons* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

12. A familiar example is use of racial “code words.” Recall George Bush’s manipulations of racial fear in the 1988 “Willie Horton” ads, or Jesse Helms’s use of the coded term “quota” in his 1990 campaign against Harvey Gantt.
13. From this perspective, far right racial projects can also be interpreted as “nationalist.” See Ronald Walters, “White Racial Nationalism in the United States,” *Without Prejudice* Vol. 1, no. 1 (Fall 1987).
14. To be sure, any effort to divide racial formation patterns according to social structural location—“macro” vs. “micro,” for example—is necessarily an analytic device. In the concrete, there is no such dividing line. See Winant, “Where Culture Meets Structure.”
15. We are not unaware, for example, that publishing this work is in itself a racial project.
16. Antisemitism only began to be racialized in the 18th century, as George L. Mosse clearly shows in his important *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1978).
17. As Marx put it:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of blackskins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation. (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I (New York: International Publishers, 1967) p. 751.)

David E. Stannard argues that the wholesale slaughter perpetrated upon the native peoples of the Western hemisphere is unequalled in history, even in our own bloody century. See his *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

18. Winthrop Jordan provides a detailed account of the sources of European attitudes about color and race in *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (New York: Norton, 1977 [1968]) pp. 3–43.
19. In a famous instance, a 1550 debate in Valladolid pitted the philosopher and translator of Aristotle, Ginés de Sepúlveda, against the Dominican Bishop of the Mexican state of Chiapas, Bartolomé de Las Casas. Discussing the native peoples, Sepúlveda argued that:

In wisdom, skill, virtue and humanity, these people are as inferior to the Spaniards as children are to adults and women to men; there is as great a difference between them as there is between savagery and forbearance, between violence and moderation, almost—I am inclined to say, as between monkeys and men (Sepúlveda, *Democrates Alter*, quoted in Tsvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 153).

- In contrast, Las Casas defended the humanity and equality of the native peoples, both in terms of their way of life—which he idealized as one of innocence, gentleness, and generosity—and in terms of their readiness for conversion to Catholicism, which for him as for Sepúlveda was the true and universal religion (Las Casas, “Letter to the Council of the Indies,” quoted *ibid.*, p. 163). William E. Connolly interrogates the linkages proposed by Todorov between early Spanish colonialism and contemporary conceptions of identity and difference in *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) pp. 40–48.
20. In Virginia, for example, it took about two decades after the establishment of European colonies to extirpate the indigenous people of the greater vicinity; fifty years after the establishment of the first colonies, the elaboration of slave codes establishing race as *prima facie* evidence for enslaved status was well under way. See Jordan, *White Over Black*.
 21. Marx, *Capital*, p. 751.
 22. Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).
 23. David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in The Age of Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975).
 24. Quoted in Thomas F. Gossett, *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965) p. 45.
 25. Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on Virginia* [1787], in Merrill D. Peterson, *Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: The Library of America, 1984) pp. 264–66, 270. Thanks to Kimberly Benston for drawing our attention to this passage.
 26. Proslavery physician Samuel George Morton (1799–1851) compiled a collection of 800 crania from all parts of the world which formed the sample for his studies of race. Assuming that the larger the size of the cranium translated into greater intelligence, Morton established a relationship between race and skull capacity. Gossett reports that “In 1849, one of his studies included the following results: the English skulls in his collection proved to be the largest, with an average cranial capacity of 96 cubic inches. The Americans and Germans were rather poor seconds, both with cranial capacities of 90 cubic inches. At the bottom of the list were the Negroes with 83 cubic inches, the Chinese with 82, and the Indians with 79.” Gossett, *Race*, p. 74. More recently, Steven Jay Gould has reexamined Morton’s data, and shown that his research data were deeply, though unconsciously, manipulated to agree with his “a priori conviction about racial ranking.” (Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981) pp. 50–69).
 27. Definitions of race founded upon a common pool of genes have not held up when confronted by scientific research which suggests that the differences *within* a given human population are every bit as great as those *between*

- populations. See L. L. Cavalli-Sforza, "The Genetics of Human Populations," *Scientific American* (September 1974) pp. 81–89.
28. A fascinating summary critique of Gobineau is provided in Tsvetan Todorov, *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 129–40.
 29. Two recent histories of eugenics are Allen Chase, *The Legacy of Malthus* (New York: Knopf, 1977); Daniel J. Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (New York: Knopf, 1985).
 30. Arthur Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" *Harvard Educational Review* 39 (1969) pp. 1–123.
 31. See Weber, *Economy and Society*, Vol. I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 385–87; Ernst Moritz Manasse, "Max Weber on Race," *Social Research*, Vol. 14 (1947) pp. 191–221.
 32. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: Penguin, 1989 [1903]), p. 13. Du Bois himself wrestled heavily with the conflict between a fully socio-historical conception of race, and the more essentialized and deterministic vision he encountered as a student in Berlin. In "The Conservation of Races" (1897) we can see his first mature effort to resolve this conflict in a vision which combined racial solidarity and a commitment to social equality. See Du Bois, "The Conservation of Races," in Dan S. Green and Edwin D. Driver, eds., *W. E. B. Du Bois On Sociology and the Black Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) pp. 238–49; Manning Marable, *W. E. B. Du Bois: Black Radical Democrat* (Boston: Twayne, 1986) pp. 35–38. For a contrary, and we believe incorrect reading, see Appiah, *In My Father's House*, pp. 28–46.
 33. A good collection of Boas's work is George W. Stocking, ed., *The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883–1911: A Franz Boas Reader* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
 34. Robert E. Park's *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950) can still provide insight; see also Stanford H. Lyman, *Militarism, Imperialism, and Racial Accommodation: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Early Writings of Robert E. Park* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1992); Locke's views are concisely expressed in Alain Leroy Locke, *Race Contacts and Interracial Relations*, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1992), originally a series of lectures given at Howard University.
 35. Japanese, for example, could not become naturalized citizens until passage of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act. It took over 160 years, since the passage of the Law of 1790, to allow all "races" to be eligible for naturalization.
 36. Especially when we recall that until around 1960, the majority of blacks, the largest racially defined minority group, lived in the South.

37. Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Richard Drinnon, *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Michael Paul Rogin, *Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian* (New York: Knopf, 1975).
38. This term refers to the practice, widespread throughout the Americas, whereby runaway slaves formed communities in remote areas, such as swamps, mountains, or forests, often in alliance with dispossessed indigenous peoples.
39. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971) p. 182.
40. Anne Showstack Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1987); Sue Golding, *Gramsci's Democratic Theory: Contributions to Post-Liberal Democracy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).
41. Ralph Ellison, *Shadow and Act* (New York: New American Library, 1966) p. xiv.
42. Chantal Mouffe makes a related argument in "Radical Democracy: Modern or Postmodern?" in Andrew Ross, ed., *Universal Abandon: The Politics of Postmodernism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
43. Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (New York and London: Routledge, 1991).
44. Evelyn Nakano Glenn, "From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society*, Vol. 18, no. 1 (Autumn 1992).
45. Toni Morrison, ed., *Race-ing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hill, Clarence Thomas, and the Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Pantheon, 1992)
46. For example, in Magnus Hirschfeld's prescient book, *Racism* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938).
47. This was the framework, employed in the crucial study of Myrdal and his associates; see Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, 20th Anniversary Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1962 [1944]). See also the articles by Thomas F. Pettigrew and George Fredrickson in Pettigrew et al., *Prejudice: Selections from The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1982).
48. On discrimination, see Fredrickson in *ibid.* In an early essay which explicitly sought to modify the framework of the Myrdal study, Robert K. Merton recognized that prejudice and discrimination need not coincide, and indeed could combine in a variety of ways. See Merton, "Discrimination and the

- American Creed," in R. M. McIver, ed., *Discrimination and National Welfare* (New York: Harper and Row, 1949).
49. Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954) remains a classic work in the field; see also Philomena Essed, *Understanding Everyday Racism: An Interdisciplinary Theory* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991). A good overview of black attitudes toward black identities is provided in William E. Cross, Jr., *Shades of Black: Diversity in African-American Identity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).
50. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton first popularized the notion of "institutional" forms of discrimination in *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Vintage, 1967), although the basic concept certainly predated that work. Indeed, President Lyndon Johnson made a similar argument in his 1965 speech at Howard University:

But freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, do as you desire, and choose the leaders you please.

You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him (sic), bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, "You are free to compete with all the others," and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.

Thus it is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the opportunity to walk through those gates.

This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity—not just legal equity but human ability—not just equality as a right but equality as a fact and as a result. (Lyndon B. Johnson, "To Fulfill These Rights," reprinted in Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967, p. 125].)

This speech, delivered at Howard University on June 4, 1965, was written in part by Daniel Patrick Moynihan. A more systematic treatment of the institutional racism approach is David T. Wellman, *Portraits of White Racism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

51. From the vantage point of the 1990s, it is possible to question whether discrimination was ever effectively outlawed. The federal retreat from the agenda of integration began almost immediately after the passage of civil rights legislation, and has culminated today in a series of Supreme Court decisions making violation of these laws almost impossible to prove. See Ezorsky, *Racism and Justice*; Kairys, *With Liberty and Justice for Some*. As we write, the Supreme Court has further restricted antidiscrimination laws in the case of *St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks*. See Linda Greenhouse,

"Justices Increase Workers' Burden in Job-Bias Cases," *The New York Times*, 26 June 1993, p. 1.

52. Robert Miles, *Racism* (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), esp. chap. 2.
53. The *locus classicus* of this position is Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1978); for more recent formulations, see Murray, *Losing Ground*; Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).
54. See Chapter 1.
55. Thomas Sowell, for example, has argued that one's "human capital" is to a large extent culturally determined. Therefore the state cannot create a false equality which runs counter to the magnitude and persistence of cultural differences. Such attempts at social engineering are likely to produce negative and unintended results: "If social processes are transmitting real differences—in productivity, reliability, cleanliness, sobriety, peacefulness [!]
—then attempts to impose politically a very different set of beliefs will necessarily backfire. . . ." (Thomas Sowell, *The Economics and Politics of Race: An International Perspective* (New York: Quill, 1983) p. 252).
56. Bob Blauner "Racism, Race, and Ethnicity: Some Reflections on the Language of Race" (unpublished manuscript, 1991).
57. Essentialism, it will be recalled, is understood as belief in real, true human essences, existing outside or impervious to social and historical context.
58. An example would be the "singling out" of members of racially defined minority groups for harsh treatment by authorities, as when police harass and beat randomly chosen ghetto youth, a practice they do not pursue with white suburban youth.
59. For example, the biologicistic theories found in Michael Anderson Bradley, *The Iceman Inheritance: Prehistoric Sources of Western Man's Racism, Sexism and Aggression* (Toronto: Dorset, 1978), and in Frances Cress Welsing, *The Isis (Yssis) Papers* (Chicago: Third World Press, 1991).
60. "These remarks should not be interpreted as simply an effort to move the gaze of African-American studies to a different site. I do not want to alter one hierarchy in order to institute another. It is true that I do not want to encourage those totalizing approaches to African-American scholarship which have no drive other than the exchange of dominations—dominant Eurocentric scholarship replaced by dominant Afrocentric scholarship. More interesting is what makes intellectual domination possible; how knowledge is transformed from invasion and conquest to revelation and choice; what ignites and informs the literary imagination, and what forces help establish the parameters of criticism." (Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark*, p. 8; emphasis original.)

61. Lisa Lowe states: "The concept of 'strategic essentialism' suggests that it is possible to utilize specific signifiers of ethnic identity, such as Asian American, for the purpose of contesting and disrupting the discourses that exclude Asian Americans, while simultaneously revealing the internal contradictions and slippages of Asian Americans so as to insure that such essentialisms will not be reproduced and proliferated by the very apparatuses we seek to disempower." Lisa Lowe, "Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American Differences," *Diaspora*, Vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1991) p. 39.
62. This view supports Supreme Court decisions taken in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example in *Griggs v. Duke Power*, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). We agree with Kairys that only "... [F]or that brief period in our history, it could accurately be said that governmental discrimination was prohibited by law" (Kairys, *With Liberty and Justice For Some*, p. 144).
63. This analysis draws on Ezorsky, *Racism and Justice*.
64. See for example, Judy H. Katz, *White Awareness: Handbook for Anti-Racism Training* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978).
65. The formula "racism equals prejudice plus power" is frequently invoked by our students to argue that only whites can be racist. We have been able to uncover little written analysis to support this view (apart from Katz, *ibid.*, p. 10), but consider that it is itself an example of the essentializing approach we have identified as central to racism. In the modern world, "power" cannot be reified as a thing which some possess and other's don't, but instead constitutes a relational field. The minority student who boldly asserts in class that minorities cannot be racist is surely not entirely powerless. In all but the most absolutist of regimes, resistance to rule itself implies power.
66. To pick but one example among many: writing before the successes of the civil rights movement, E. Franklin Frazier bitterly castigated the collaboration of black elites with white supremacy. See Frazier, *Black Bourgeoisie: The Rise of a New Middle Class in the United States* (New York: The Free Press, 1957).
67. Interestingly, what they share most centrally seems to be their antisemitism.
68. Having made a similar argument, Lani Guinier, Clinton's nominee to head the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division was savagely attacked and her nomination ultimately blocked. See Guinier, "The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success," *Michigan Law Review* (March 1991). We discuss these events in greater detail in this book's Epilogue, below.
69. See Miles, *Racism*, p. 77. Much of the current debate over the advisability and legality of banning racist hate speech seems to us to adopt the dubious position that racism is primarily an ideological phenomenon. See Mari J. Matsuda et al., *Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).

70. Or ideologies which mask privilege by falsely claiming that inequality and injustice have been eliminated. See Wellman, *Portraits of White Racism*.
 71. Racial teachings of the Nation of Islam, for example, maintain that whites are the product of a failed experiment by a mad scientist.
 72. Elinor Langer, "The American Neo-Nazi Movement Today," *The Nation*, July 16/23, 1990.
 73. Such arguments can be found in Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination*, Charles Murray, *Losing Ground*, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America*, among others.
5. **The Racial State**
1. Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991) p. 270.
 2. Dana Y. Takagi, *The Retreat from Race: Asian American Admissions and Racial Politics* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992) pp. 103–105.
 3. Note that such movements can be egalitarian or counter-egalitarian, depending on the concepts of justice, equality, discrimination, etc., to which they adhere. For a theory of political change focused on this issue (drawing on German reference points), see Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, NY: Sharpe, 1978).
 4. This does not mean that these channels are the sole province of reform-oriented movements or democratizing currents. They are also open to other uses, other interests, including those of reaction.
 5. There are important continuities between present-day and past versions of racial ideology. Often in the past, the dominant viewpoint about what race was and what race meant has been believed to represent the culmination of a long struggle to eliminate pre-existing "unenlightened" racial beliefs. Religious and scientific exponents of the dominant racial ideology, for example, have often made such claims. Thus it is all too easy to believe that in the present ("finally") the U.S. has reached a stage at which racial oppression is largely a thing of the past, and that in the future race will play an ever-smaller role in determining the course of U.S. political and social history. We obviously do not share that view.
 6. A brief selection of sources: Eugene Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Pantheon, 1974); Julius Lester, *To Be a Slave* (New York: Dial, 1968); Vincent Harding, "Religion and Resistance Among Antebellum Negroes, 1800–1860," in A. Meier and E. Rudwick, eds., *The Making of Black America*, 2 Vol.s (New York: Atheneum, 1969); George Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972); Herbert C. Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750–1925* (New York: Vintage, 1976); Robert Farris