

The Great Transformation

Introduction

The racial upsurges of the 1950s and 1960s were among the most tumultuous events in postwar American history. The struggles for voting rights, the sit-ins and boycotts to desegregate public facilities, the ghetto rebellions of the mid-1960s, and the political mobilizations of Latinos, Indians, and Asian Americans, dramatically transformed the political and cultural landscape of the U.S. The postwar period has indeed been a racial crucible. During these decades, new conceptions of racial identity and its meaning, new modes of political organization and confrontation, and new definitions of the state's role in promoting and achieving "equality" were explored, debated, and contested on the battlegrounds of politics.

The racial minority movements responsible for these developments achieved limited but very real reforms in their struggle for racial justice and equality. By the 1970s however, through repression, cooptation, and fragmentation, these movements experienced a sharp decline, losing their vitality and coherence. In the ensuing context of the economic, political, and cultural crises of the period, even the moderate gains they had achieved came under attack by an alliance of right-wing and conservative forces.

In this chapter, we examine the minority movement upsurge of the 1950s and 1960s. We do not seek to reprise the history of these decades, but to employ our theory of *racial formation* to interpret the events of the period. We suggest that two important changes characterize the racial politics of the 1950s and 1960s: the first of these was a *paradigm shift*: the established

system of racial meanings and identities, based in the ethnicity paradigm of race, experienced increasing strain and opposition. This opposition gradually took shape within the civil rights movement, as the challenge it had launched against segregation in the South was transformed into a national movement against racism.¹ The second change was the mobilization of *new social movements*, led by the black movement, as the primary means for contesting the nature of racial politics. These movements irreversibly expanded the terrain of political contest, and set the stage for the general reorganization of U.S. politics.

Paradigm Shift

The modern civil rights movement was initially organized *within* the dominant paradigm of ethnicity. The ethnicity perspective provided an analytic framework by which to assess the situation of blacks, and correspondingly shaped the movement's political agenda. The early movement leaders were racial moderates who sought to end "race-thinking" and assure "equality" to each individual. The movement initially focused its energies on the South, where the ethnicity paradigm remained a challenging ideology to the racist logic of segregation. Later, when demands for racial reforms attained national scope and expanded beyond the black movement to other racially defined minorities, the limited explanatory abilities and programmatic usefulness of the ethnicity paradigm were revealed. The "eclipse" of this perspective led to a period where competing paradigms—the class- and nation-based views—flourished and contested for hegemony.

New Social Movements

The upsurge of racially based movements which began in the 1950s was a contest over the *social meaning* of race. It was this process which created what we call "the great transformation"² of racial awareness, racial meaning, racial subjectivity. Race is not only a matter of politics, economics, or culture, but of all these "levels" of lived experience simultaneously. It is a pre-eminently *social* phenomenon, something which suffuses each individual identity, each family and community, yet equally penetrates state institutions and market relationships. The racial minority movements of the period were the first *new social movements*—the first to expand the concerns of politics to the social, to the terrain of everyday life. New social movement politics would later prove "contagious," leading to the mobi-

lization of other racial minorities, as well as other groups whose concerns were principally social. As playwright David Edgar has noted, most of the new social movements of the 1960s—student, feminist, and gay—drew upon the black struggle "as a central organizational fact or as a defining political metaphor and inspiration."³

Taken together, these two interrelated dimensions—the eclipse of the ethnicity paradigm and the emergence of new social movement politics—constitute an alternative framework by which to assess the racial politics of the period. Our account suggests that racial identity, the racial state, and the very nature of racial politics as a whole were radically transformed during the 1960s—transformed so profoundly that the racial meanings established during this period continue to shape politics, even in the current period of reaction.

While the 1960s witnessed the weakening of the ethnicity paradigm and the growth of perspectives within the class-based and nation-based paradigms of race, none of the challenging viewpoints could achieve hegemonic status. They suffered from serious deficiencies, largely because (as we have argued in Part One) of their reduction of race to other phenomena. The subsequent waning of the movements and specific organizations operating within these challenging paradigms left a vacuum in racial theory and politics. This created the political space for the resurgence of the ethnicity paradigm in the 1980s.

Despite this, the depth and breadth of "the great transformation" can hardly be exaggerated. The forging of new collective racial identities during the 1950s and 1960s has been the enduring legacy of the racial minority movements. Today, as gains won in the past are rolled back and most organizations prove unable to rally a mass constituency in racial minority communities, the persistence of the new racial identities developed during this period stands out as the single truly formidable obstacle to the consolidation of a newly repressive racial order. Apparently, the movements themselves could disintegrate, the policies for which they fought could be reversed, their leaders could be coopted or destroyed, but the racial subjectivity and self-awareness which they developed had taken permanent hold, and no amount of repression or cooptation could change that. The genie was out of the bottle.

The Emergence of the Civil Rights Movement

The moderate goals of the early civil rights movement did not challenge the nationally dominant paradigm of racial theory, the ethnicity perspec-

tive. Indeed, early movement rhetoric often explicitly appealed to the ideal of a "race-free" society, the centerpiece of the liberal ethnicity vision.⁴ This was consistent with the call for integration framed by Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, or with Nathan Glazer's description of the "national consensus" which abolished Jim Crow in the mid-1960s.⁵

Although its political goals were moderate, the black movement had to adopt the radical tactics of disruption and "direct action" due to the "massive resistance" strategy of the South, a region which clung to the racist assumptions of an earlier paradigm. The modern civil rights movement came into being when southern black organizations, frustrated by southern intransigence and drawing on both national and indigenous support bases, moved to mobilize a *mass* constituency in the South. They thus augmented the tactics of judicial/legislative activism—used in the elite politics which had previously characterized the civil rights struggle⁶—with those of direct action, which required an active "grass-roots" constituency. This was the key shift of the mid-1950s.

What made this change possible? Traditionally studies of social movements have developed models of "collective behavior" or "resource mobilization" to explain the emergence of significant struggles for change. Analyses of the formation of the modern civil rights movement in the mid-1950s are often based on one of these models.⁷ Clearly both these approaches have their merits: the essential conditions for each—inadequacy of "normal" political channels to process demands (collective behavior model), and availability of material and political resources for the mobilization of movement constituencies (resource mobilization model)—were both present. The monolithic southern resistance to desegregation is an instance of the failure of "normal" politics to respond to demands for change. The role of such organizations as the local NAACP chapters, and particularly the black churches, effectively documented by Aldon Morris,⁸ exemplifies the centrality of resource mobilization issues.

Although both the resistance to change and the availability of economic and political resources in the black community were essential components of the civil rights movement's shift to a direct action strategy, neither of these conditions were sufficient to spark the transition. A third factor, perhaps the most central, was required. This was an ideological or cultural intervention, the politicization of black identity, the *rearticulation of black collective subjectivity*. It was this change which would eventually place radical objectives on the agenda of racial minority movements, facilitate the diffusion of racially based movement activity to other groups, and become anathema to the moderate advocates of civil rights operating within the ethnicity paradigm of race.

Origins of New Social Movement Politics: Identity, Rearticulation, and Political Opposition

Before the modern black movement's appearance on the political stage, the U.S. political system had not significantly changed since the New Deal. The Democratic Party had served as a repository of consensus ever since Roosevelt led it to power in the 1930s. Compromise and pragmatic coalition-building among disparate interests, constituencies, and loyalties ("interest-group liberalism")⁹ shaped national politics. "Interests" themselves were largely defined economically. Such a system had obvious limitations in its ability to respond to challenges which cut across class (or status) lines. It was limited by an inability to confront an unjust *social* system which had not only economic but also political and cultural causes and consequences.¹⁰

In its efforts to transform precisely that social system, the black movement sought to *expand* the concerns of politics, without abandoning the earlier economically centered logic. This expansion of "normal" politics to include racial issues—this "common sense" recognition of the political elements at the heart of racial identities and meanings—made possible the movement's greatest triumphs, its most permanent successes. These did not lie in its legislative accomplishments, but rather in its ability to create new racial "subjects." The black movement *redefined the meaning of racial identity*, and consequently of race *itself*, in American society.

Social movements create collective identity by offering their adherents a different view of themselves and their world; different, that is, from the worldview and self-concepts offered by the established social order. They do this by the process of *rearticulation*,¹¹ which produces new subjectivity by making use of information and knowledge already present in the subject's mind. They take elements and themes of her/his culture and traditions and infuse them with new meaning.

The civil rights movement linked traditional black cultural and religious themes with the ideas and strategies of social movements around the world. On this basis it could rearticulate black collective subjectivity—it could forge a new black politics.

The movement's "intellectuals" were largely preachers. They infused their activism with a well-known set of symbols and rhetorical tools.¹² The centuries-long black interrogation of biblical images of bondage and liberation—as embodied in the Exodus, for instance, or the theology of Christian redemption—had traditionally furnished a familiar vocabulary and textual reference-point for freedom struggle, a home-grown "liberation theology."¹³

The civil rights movement augmented this imagery with ideas, lessons, and strategies developed in India, Africa, Europe (in the experience of anti-

Nazi resistance),¹⁴ and in the U.S. (in the sit-down strikes of the 1930s). Martin Luther King's application of the Gandhian philosophy of *satyagraha*, the adoption of the "sit-in" as a tactic for forcing integration, and the parallels drawn to African liberation movements, were examples of this borrowing from the repertoire of other political struggles.

The formation of the modern civil rights movement is a classical illustration of rearticulation processes. In order to win mass black support for the tactics of direct action, it was necessary to replace the established cultural norms through which ordinary blacks, particularly in the South, had previously sought to ameliorate the impact of racial oppression: "shuckin and jivin," "putting on Whitey," feigning ignorance and humility, etc. These strategies had served in the past to limit the extent of white control, to insulate the black community and black institutions from white intrusion and surveillance, and to protect individual blacks who ran afoul of white authority. But they had also limited the extent and depth of black organization, organization that would be necessary to challenge the system of segregation. They had been pre-political responses, survival efforts carried out by blacks as *individuals* in the absence of a movement. They were, in effect, adaptations to powerlessness.¹⁵

The modern civil rights movement sought not to survive racial oppression, but to overthrow it. Thus the traditional ideological themes of liberation and redemption and the political tactics of protest derived from movements around the world were incorporated in the heat of political struggle as elements of a new *identity*, one of *collective* opposition. According to Robert Moses or Martin Luther King, Jr., blacks were, collectively, the moral, spiritual, and political leadership of American society. They represented not only their own centuries-long struggle for freedom, but the highest and noblest aspirations of white America as well.

Far from having to passively accept the "bukés and scorns" of segregation and perhaps trying to outmaneuver "Whitey," blacks were now called upon to oppose the system with righteous and disciplined action:

To accept passively an unjust system is to cooperate with that system; thereby the oppressed become as evil as the oppressor. Noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as cooperation with good.¹⁶

The old linkages of religious and cultural themes—of the Christian virtues of humility, of "turning the other cheek"—were thus not negated, but dramatically captured by the movement. The "culture of resistance" with which these virtues had previously been identified was displaced from an

emphasis on individual survival to one of collective action. This process of rearticulation made the movement's political agenda possible, especially its challenge to the existing racial state.

The Radicalization of the Black Movement: Black Power

In subsequent stages of the movement's history, rearticulation processes continued to function as radical perspectives filled the void created by the eclipse of the ethnicity paradigm. This is particularly true of the emergence of *black power*. After the moderate demands of the civil rights movement were met in 1964 with the passage of the Civil Rights Act, and in 1965 with the enactment of voting rights legislation, many black activists saw their underlying ideals as unfulfilled. Not only had they failed to create a "beloved community" (which they now admitted had been a utopian vision),¹⁷ but they had failed to achieve significant change in the social conditions faced by blacks. Kenneth Clark echoed these sentiments in 1967:

The masses of Negroes are now starkly aware that recent civil rights victories benefited a very small number of middle-class Negroes while their predicament remained the same or worsened.¹⁸

The radicalization of an important segment of the black movement took shape in the myriad disappointments and disillusionments that afflicted civil rights activists: the acrimonious division between SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) and civil rights moderates at the August, 1963 March on Washington;¹⁹ the ferocity of the Birmingham campaign of April–May, 1963, combined with the limited victory won there;²⁰ the experience of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, a SNCC-organized project to unseat the segregationist "regular" delegation at the 1964 Democratic Party convention in Atlantic City;²¹ the onset of rioting in many Northern cities during the summer of 1964, followed by hundreds of riots during the next four years;²² and the development of a new "backlash" politics in the middle 1960s, after the "massive resistance" strategy of the South had been broken.²³

By the time of the Selma campaign (February–March 1965), no more than limited tactical cooperation existed between the radicals, led by SNCC, and the moderate SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference). Militants from SNCC were infuriated when King, maneuvering between Washington, the federal courts, and the marchers themselves, halted an attempt

to march from Selma to Montgomery on March 10, 1965.²⁴ By June, 1966, when diverse civil rights groups came together to complete a march through Mississippi begun by James Meredith (who had been shot by a sniper), there was open competition between advocates of "black power" and supporters of integration.

Beginning with the Meredith march,²⁵ the more radical wing of the movement signalled its disillusionment with past emphases on civil rights and the transformative power of nonviolence. SNCC and CORE (Congress of Racial Equality), in particular, adopted the more militant positions associated with the slogan *black power*.

Black power was a flexible, even amorphous concept, but it was frequently interpreted to mean separatism. It was this connotation which the moderates, operating within the ethnicity paradigm, despised and strenuously denounced:

We of the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People] will have none of this. It is the father of hatred and the mother of violence. Black power can mean in the end only black death.²⁶

Ironically, the cry of "black power" was no more a complete break with the civil rights movement than that movement had been a break with the older "establishment" of civil rights organizations such as the NAACP and National Urban League. The concept of black power embraced a wide spectrum of political tendencies, extending from moderate "self-help" groups through reform-oriented advocates of "community control" to cultural and revolutionary nationalists. The concept's emergence as a rallying cry was an effort once more to rearticulate traditional themes of the black movement. It was an effort which, interestingly, drew upon the themes of the dominant ethnicity paradigm and the civil rights movement, while simultaneously rejecting their integrationist and assimilationist goals.

In the early 1960s, ethnicity theorists, mindful of their model's origins in the experiences of white ethnic groups of previous generations, suggested that blacks in the North should be organized as an interest group.²⁷ Much of the black power current could be understood as following this advice. The ideas that the black community should patronize businesses owned by blacks, that it should adopt cooperative forms of organization, that it should mobilize politically at the local level ("community control") were concepts which borrowed as much from the tradition of Booker T.

Washington as they did from those of Cyril Briggs, Marcus Garvey, or Malcolm X. Robert Allen notes that in many respects black power was "only another form of traditional ethnic group politics."²⁸

Despite its many "moderate" elements, black power drew an important line of demarcation within the black movement and deeply disturbed the dominant (i.e., white) political culture. White liberals reacted in horror when their ethnic prescriptions were put into practice by black militants and quickly retreated into a fundamentalist individualism which would have embarrassed Adam Smith.²⁹

While embracing aspects of the ethnicity paradigm, black power theorists also initiated a rupture with that perspective by drawing upon colonial analogies to analyze the plight of blacks in America, and by focusing attention on racially based intra-class conflict. The political implications of this paradigmatic shift represented a distinct departure from the "interest group" politics of the ethnicity paradigm. Some examples were Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton's *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America*,³⁰ which addressed black conditions in the U.S. within a nationalist paradigm, and James Boggs's essays,³¹ which focused on the role of black industrial workers and urban struggles from a perspective based in Marxism-Leninism.

A key figure in the transition from civil rights to black power was Malcolm X, who placed a radical nationalist position on the political agenda and attracted mass black support for that view. First as organizer and chief spokesperson for the Nation of Islam, and then, briefly, as founder of the Organization of Afro-American Unity, Malcolm played a role unparalleled in the black community since Garvey's time. Although he often derided the civil rights movement, referring to its organizations and leaders as "Uncle Toms," Malcolm also recognized the importance of raising civil rights demands, even while arguing that the U.S. could not meet them.³² After his 1963 break with the Nation of Islam, Malcolm moved closer to the radical wing of the movement and influenced SNCC thinking. In late 1964 he met with SNCC leaders in Nairobi, Kenya, at which time he stressed the importance of Pan-Africanism for U.S. blacks. He also approached socialist positions in a number of respects.³³ Malcolm formulated a radical challenge to the moderate agenda of the civil rights movement and prefigured the themes of black power. In February, 1965 he was assassinated at the Audubon Ballroom in Harlem, under circumstances that remain mysterious.³⁴

Black power advocates and adherents broke away from the earlier black movement's struggle for a "raceless society." Integration, they argued, could only be a *result* of political power and equality, never its cause. The

radicalization of the black movement appropriated the legacy of civil rights, much as the earlier movement had appropriated the legacy of the Southern "culture of resistance" which had been nourished in the black church, in black music, in folklore and literature, even in food.³⁵

In addition to the demand for social justice, the question of "self-determination" was raised. The prospect of having not only "rights" but "power" once again rearticulated black cultural and political traditions, reviving themes from black political history. The cultural nationalism and black Marxism of the late-1960s were restatements of positions which harked back to the 1920s and 1930s, the days of the Harlem Renaissance, the African Blood Brotherhood, the Garvey movement, and the "black nation" thesis of the Communist Party.³⁶ The nation-based paradigm was not, however, synonymous with radical politics. Less "progressive"—or, as Huey P. Newton once called them, "pork chop"—nationalists tended to dilute their vision of black power by ignoring its racial dimensions for a more limited, "ethnic" view of its meaning. These groups often adopted reformist orientations, embracing "black capitalism," for example.³⁷ Here the distinction between the two paradigms became muted.

Encountering and Reforming the Racial State

There were two phases to the minority encounter with the state in the 1950s and 1960s.³⁸ The first phase was shaped by the civil rights movement's mass mobilization in the South, a "direct action" political strategy which, as we have seen, already depended upon new social movement politics, on the "politics of identity." This first phase resulted in the civil rights reforms of the mid-1960s. Through desegregation campaigns the black movement set in motion a reform-oriented democratization process. The resulting concessions were limited but real: policy shifts through executive order and legislation, judicial action against specific racist practices, establishment of new state programs and agencies with "equal opportunity" mandates, and the hiring of many black activists by state institutions. These victories ended the exceptional situation in the South by forcing that region to accept the nationally dominant racial ideology, as defined by the ethnicity paradigm. The reforms of the 1960s also signalled the fulfillment of that paradigm's limited vision of racial equality.

The second phase of the movement/state encounter was marked by the fragmentation of the minority movements into competing currents during the institutionalization of the racial reforms of the mid-1960s. This took place as the new reforms took hold, gradually and partially transforming

the movement into a constituency for the new programs its efforts had won.

The state was the chief movement target for several reasons. First, the state, as the "factor of cohesion in society,"³⁹ had historically maintained and organized racial practices. In the present too, it gave shape to the racial order. Second, the state was traversed by the same antagonisms which penetrated the entire society, antagonisms that were themselves the results of past cycles of racial struggle. The lukewarm commitments to desegregation in public employment and the armed forces extracted by A. Philip Randolph from Roosevelt and Truman, the use of the 14th Amendment by NAACP lawyer Thurgood Marshall to challenge school segregation, the freedom rides of the 1940s and 1960s (which probed the federal commitment to integration of interstate travel), and the voting rights drives in the South were all examples of the small but significant "openings" through which the existing racial state was susceptible to challenge. Movement tactics often sought to make use of the state's internal racial contradictions. For example, the voting rights drives sought to induce confrontations between different branches of the state: the courts vs. state legislatures, federal police vs. local or state police. The idea was to force the federal government to defend civil rights from infringement by racist local and state agencies.

By the latter stages of this process—the late 1960s—the reform-oriented program of the black movement had acquired a foothold in state institutions such as social service agencies, and in electorally based positions. At the same time, splits and divisions had surfaced in the movement, and in minority communities as well. These included inter-group rivalries, class divisions, controversies over strategy, and disputes over the meaning of race within the minority movements themselves (e.g., integration vs. black power).⁴⁰ Class polarization was deepening within minority communities as those who were able to do so took advantage of new jobs and educational opportunities, while the majority of ghetto and barrio dwellers remained locked in poverty. The war on poverty was lost, as King had warned, on the battlefields of Vietnam.⁴¹ Some formerly integrated movement organizations now became all black (e.g., SNCC); others that formed in the mid-1960s were organized from the beginning as exclusively black, Mexican American, Asian American, etc.

In the racial minority movements of the period, the state confronted a new type of opposition. Racial minority movements challenged established racial practices simultaneously through direct action, through penetration of the mainstream political arena (electoral/institutional projects from voter registration to community organization), and through "ethical/political" tactics (taking the "moral initiative," developing "resistance cultures," etc.).⁴² These movements were able to link spontaneity and mass partici-

pation on the one hand, with electoral/institutional politics on the other. The unifying element in this opposition was at first the burgeoning collective subjectivity of blacks—and later that of other minorities—which connected demands for access to the state with more radical demands for freedom, “self-determination,” cultural and organizational autonomy, “community control,” and a host of other issues.

By combining these different oppositional tactics, the racial minority movements of the 1960s initiated the reforms which eventually created a new racial state. This new state, however, was not the institutional fulfillment of the movements’ ideals. Rather it held a cloudy mirror up to its antagonists, reflecting their demands (and indeed their rearticulated racial identities) in a distorted fashion.

The state responded to movement demands with tactics of *absorption* and *insulation*.⁴³ Absorption (or cooptation) reflected the recognition that movement demands were often greater threats as rallying cries for minority opposition than they were after they had been adopted in suitably moderate form. Furthermore, absorption resulted in a certain “ghettoization” within state institutions that transformed militancy into constituency.⁴⁴ A pluralist interest-group framework replaced “grass-roots” opposition as the main organizational dynamic.

For example, civil rights workers in the South during the 1960s were continually frustrated in their efforts to obtain Justice Department protection for their efforts, frequently asking why the U.S. government was so willing to “defend democracy” in Vietnam but so slow to do so in Mississippi.⁴⁵ In such a form the demand for federal protection was ominous, for it linked issues which state policy makers preferred to keep separate and thus “insulated” from movement demands. U.S. foreign and domestic policy, interventionism abroad and racial despotism at home, and the domestic and international “third worlds” were all articulated in a single oppositional demand for *state guarantees of democratic rights*. But once the demand for protection was absorbed, appearing in the creation of the Community Relations Service in the Justice Department under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, its challenge to the state was largely blunted.⁴⁶

Insulation is a related process in which the state confines democratizing demands to areas that are, if not entirely symbolic, at least not crucial to its operation as a “factor of cohesion” in society. The federal system in the U.S. permits a degree of insulation of key state institutions from popular demands that is unequalled elsewhere in the capitalist democracies.⁴⁷ Thus whole areas of potential conflict, such as the operation of the Federal Reserve Board or the framing of tax policy, were defined as non-racial issues during the 1960s.

Challenging Paradigms and Strategic Divisions

By the late 1960s, the fragmentation within the racial minority movements was clearly visible and consolidated into discernible currents. New social movement politics had galvanized activists in their respective communities, but the lack of theoretical clarity about racial dynamics in the U.S. splintered political action. Although the ethnicity paradigm had been seriously challenged, it remained an important explanatory model, not only for academics, but also for movement activists. The challenging paradigms—the class- and nation-based views—gave rise to counterposed strategic orientations. Strategic divisions also flowed from class cleavages internal to minority communities, from state repression which marginalized radical tendencies, and from the very effectiveness of state strategies of reform, which tended to replace movement perspectives with the constituency-based viewpoints of “normal” politics.

Three broad political currents can be recognized within the racial minority movements of this period.⁴⁸ These were *electoral/institutional “entrism,” socialism, and nationalism*.

Advocates of *electoral/institutional entrism* argued for greater movement participation in existing political organizations and processes, such as party politics, local government agencies, welfare state and poverty programs, etc. While this tendency was perhaps most closely associated with the reform orientation of moderate movement factions, more militant currents also adopted “entrism” perspectives, for example the La Raza Unida Party,⁴⁹ or the Georgia legislative campaigns of SNCC activist Julian Bond.⁵⁰ The necessity of “entering the mainstream” was advocated for the following reasons: to avoid marginalization, since no other historically continuous political terrain was available to minority activists; to achieve reforms that would allow for further movement-building, redistribution of income, goods, and services, and increased access to the racial state; and to educate and “raise consciousness,” since electoral office and bureaucratic position confer opportunities to publicize one’s views and to initiate policy.

A second tendency was the *socialist* tradition. Marxist-Leninist and internal colonialist perspectives were the main representatives of this current. Marxist-Leninist approaches pointed out the class dimensions of antiracist struggles. They argued that racism is an indispensable support to advanced capitalism; that class cleavages exist within minority communities (this served to curb excessive nationalism and point out the dangers of multiclass alliances); and that it was essential to base organizational efforts on the (traditionally defined) working class. Somewhat paradoxically, Marxist-Leninist groups often successfully recruited minority mem-

berships, particularly among students, even as they became increasingly marginal on the U.S. political landscape.⁵¹

Internal colonialist perspectives saw racism as an ongoing historical process which contained *both* class- and nationally based elements. Racially defined communities within the U.S. were analogized to colonies, and said to face the same types of economic exploitation and cultural domination which the developed nations had visited on the underdeveloped ones. The internal colonialism rubric included a strategic spectrum running all the way from moderate reform initiatives to revolution and "national liberation." Demands for increases in the number of "natives" occupying key posts in businesses or state institutions (police, schools, social agencies), plans to achieve "community control" of the ghetto and barrio economies, and schemes for a two-stage revolutionary process⁵² analogous to the Angolan or Vietnamese experiences, were all put forward based on the internal colonialism analysis.

Nationalism was a diverse current whose main strategic unity lay in rejection of the assimilationist and integrationist tendencies associated with the movement moderates. A tremendous diversity of political tendencies were understood in different minority communities under the "nationalist" label.

In the black community, for example, the term referred not only to a legacy of radical opposition to integration, but also to the "separate development" strategy associated with Booker T. Washington, and to various Pan-Africanist currents which passed through Garvey and Du Bois. It also encompassed black Marxism-Leninism and anticolonialist orientations (which straddle the nationalist and socialist categories), and even included a cultural nationalist current which was largely antipolitical.

In the Mexican American community, nationalism had its roots in Mexican revolutionary traditions, notably those of land struggles,⁵³ and in the proximity of the border. In the pre-1960s period, political activity aimed at improving conditions for Mexican Americans in the U.S. had been linked to an "entrist" perspective of civil rights/integration, such as that advocated by LULAC or the GI Forum. Nationalism in this context focused on Mexico, not the U.S., and was fueled by immigration, geographical proximity, and the regional particularities of the border area, on both the Mexican and U.S. sides.⁵⁴

With the 1960s, though, an alternative *Chicano* nationalism appeared, which rearticulated many traditionally Mexican elements within a U.S.-based perspective, usually focused on the Southwest. In Chicano communities, new "anticolonial" struggles erupted, taking the form of land seizures as well as the community control struggles of the urban barrio.

The struggle for land was necessarily premised on the existence of substantial Mexican American populations which could constitute local majori-

tarian constituencies for radical political action. Such concentrations in turn reflected the long-standing semi-colonial conditions which existed in many rural areas of the Southwest. In these areas Mexican Americans were an impoverished agricultural labor force, exploited by agribusiness interests, victimized by immigration policies, and heir to a "colonial labor system."⁵⁵

The urban manifestations of this new *Chicanismo* largely took shape among student and youth organizations, which flourished in the Mexican American community during the middle- and late-1960s, often adopting cultural nationalist orientations.⁵⁶ Many groups rejected the Mexican American identity, which they saw as assimilationist, in favor of a specifically Chicano identity which in their view reflected commitment to a new and higher level of political struggle.⁵⁷

Asian American nationalism, for the most part, centered on community control issues. In many cities Asian Americans fought to prevent commercial transformation or obliteration of their communities. In many urban areas (such as San Francisco), Manilatowns and Japantowns had been destroyed by urban renewal schemes which had dispersed residents. Always a popular tourist attraction, Chinatowns have historically been the site of continual political battles over low-cost housing versus commercial development.⁵⁸ Within this context, Asian Americans sought to build alternative institutions which would more adequately address the needs of community residents than could the state or the existing conservative community leadership.

Cultural nationalism found expression in every minority community. This was an explicit critique of the dominant Eurocentric (i.e., white) culture, understood to pervade both everyday life and "high culture." Cultural nationalists sought to redefine and recapture the specificity of their minority cultures, an objective which they identified as "nationalist." Painting, theater, dance, music, language, even cars and clothes, all became media through which a new style could be developed, and through which "genuine" oppositional culture could be distinguished from assimilationist practices.

In the Chicano student movement, a variety of organizations sought to educate their members and communities about their heritage and the lost "nation" of *Aztlán*, to set up schools and cultural clubs (for folk dancing, mural painting, etc.), and to establish journals and newspapers.⁵⁹ In Native American communities there was a return to traditional religious and spiritual concerns. Cultural nationalism helped to link distinct groups who were racialized as one monolithic entity. The very term "Asian American" arose to express the similarity of experiences and treatment at the hands of various institutions which the specific "ethnicities" of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Filipino, among others, encountered in the U.S. Cul-

tural and historical antagonisms which existed between these groups were muted among college students who became radicalized during the Vietnam War. The war was seen as a racist one in which Asian life as a whole was regarded as "cheap."⁶⁰

Each of these tendencies—"entrism," socialism, and nationalism—rearticulated racial ideology and each responded to existing racial practices while initiating new ones.

The electoral/institutional "*entrists*" built political organizations that could win elections, penetrate and influence state bureaucracies, and either exercise power in the Democratic Party⁶¹ or openly compete with it. By the 1970s forces such as the Congressional Black Caucus and the Joint Center for Political Studies had achieved real influence on the national political scene, while local political machines developed under victorious black and Chicano mayors in such cities as Atlanta, Birmingham, Denver, Detroit, Philadelphia, and San Antonio.⁶² These instrumentalities were in turn linked to the many civil rights, lobbying, and local political groups, including those at the neighborhood, social agency, union, or church level. Thus, as a result of the 1960s movement victories, social programs and policies—with all their limitations—addressed the needs of minority communities as never before. The nascent influence of "entrism" minority activists made innovations not only in the obvious areas of policy, in employment, housing, education, health; but also established the less obvious racial content of such policy areas as foreign affairs, taxation, environment, science and arts support, etc. The network of "entrists" as a whole played a key long-term role in maintaining minority viewpoints and positions—for example the Congressional Black Caucus's annual alternative budget proposals—in the mainstream political process.

Among the *socialists*, Marxist-Leninists confronted the substantial class cleavages that exist in minority communities, as well as the conflicts that exist among minority groups (such as black/Asian American conflict or Chicano/black rivalries for electoral office), precisely by stressing the supposedly "fundamental" class conflict. This pointed to an alternative perspective which could allow people to understand that the sources of racial oppression lay in the broader society. The focus on class, it was felt, could permit communication across the chasms and gulfs that separate minority communities and racial minorities as a whole from the white working class.

Socialists or nationalists who adopted the internal colonialist approach offered a synthesis of cultural nationalism and the Marxist-Leninist analysis of class, arguing that cultural domination reinforced and shaped class domination, and that racial logic characterized the system as a whole. Strategies based on the internal colonialism perspective frequently focused

on community control struggles, and on efforts to develop autonomous racial minority organizations.⁶³

Nationalists called on minority communities to develop their unique histories, distinct collective identities, and separate political agendas. They opposed both integrationist political currents and the homogenizing, culturally dominant thematics of "mainstream" America. This generated the range of particularist racial movements we have described above—focused on Africa, *Aztlan*, or the ghetto/barrio as a locus of "community control."⁶⁴ Cultural nationalists in every minority community challenged the ubiquitous and at times forcible imposition of the dominant white culture.⁶⁵ They often formulated this challenge in terms which were explicitly antipolitical, focusing on the recreation (and creation!) of the cultural framework by which their group recognized and understood itself.

Considered critically, none of these political projects succeeded even remotely in forging an oppositional racial ideology or movement capable of radically transforming the U.S. racial order. The electoral/institutional "entrists" succumbed to illusions about the malleability of the racial state and were forced into a new version of ethnic group pluralism—the idea that racial minorities, like the white ethnics of the past, could claim their rights through "normal" political channels. The Marxist-Leninists could fight racism only by recourse to a futile dogma, and moreover one which consigned race to the terrain of "false consciousness." The internal colonialists, like an earlier generation of black (and other minority) nationalists, refused to recognize the particularities of the U.S. racial order and the limits of all analogies with revolutionary movements abroad.⁶⁶ The cultural nationalists ignored the political sphere, and indeed heaped scorn upon both reform-oriented "entrists" and minority socialists.⁶⁷

All these tendencies were but partial assaults on the U.S. racial order; all failed to grasp the comprehensive manner by which race is structured into the U.S. social fabric. All *reduced* race: to interest group, class fraction, nationality, or cultural identity. Perhaps most importantly, all these approaches lacked adequate conceptions of the racial state. In their radical as much as in their moderate phases, minority movements neglected the state's role in the organization and enforcement of the U.S. racial order, not to mention its capacity for adaptation under political pressure.

The movement's limits also arose from the strategic divisions that befell it as a result of its own successes. Here the black movement's fate is illustrative. Only in the South, while fighting against a backward political structure and overt cultural oppression, had the black movement been able to maintain a *decentered* unity, even when internal debates were fierce. Once it moved north, the black movement began to split, because competing

political projects, linked to different segments of the community, sought either integration in the (reformed) mainstream, or more radical transformation of the dominant racial order.

After initial victories against segregation were won, one sector of the movement was thus reconstituted as an interest group, seeking an end to racism understood as discrimination and prejudice, and turning its back on the oppositional "politics of identity." Once the organized black movement became a mere constituency, though, it found itself locked in a bear hug with the state institutions whose programs it had itself demanded, while simultaneously isolated from the core institutions of the modern state.

The radical sectors of the movement were marginalized in cultural arenas or on the left. Cultural nationalists disdained engagement with the racial state. Those who confronted the state from radical positions (SNCC, the Black Panther Party, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, and others) were met with intense repression.

Beyond this, organizationally, the minority movements of the 1950s and 1960s nearly ceased to exist. Yet, as we have argued, the complex of racial meanings had been irrevocably altered by years of political activity, by intense campaigns for racial equality and democracy, by the transformed character of "blackness," "whiteness," and all other racial identities that the movements had initiated. The specter of racial equality, and beyond that, of an end to racial oppression itself, continued to haunt American dreams and nightmares.

temporary racial conflicts has received relatively little attention. Some social psychological studies have been directed at the identity crisis experienced by whites in the face of minority demands for equality, political rights, cultural/organizational autonomy, etc. The idea that the great Western societies are somehow fundamentally white—which today is espoused by explicitly racist groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the National Front in Britain—seems to us to be an attempt to keep the formerly unquestioned (or barely questioned) subjective coherence of “whiteness” alive. See for example Michael Billig, “Patterns of Racism: Interviews With National Front Members,” *Race and Class*, Vol. 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1978) pp. 161–179.

6. The Great Transformation

1. By *racism* we mean those social projects which create or reproduce structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race. The concept of racism is discussed extensively in Chapter 4.
2. This phrase, of course, is Karl Polanyi's term for the introduction of market society in pre-capitalist England. We have appropriated it, with apologies to Polanyi, to indicate the epochal character of the shift to a *socially* based politics in the contemporary U.S.
3. David Edgar, “Reagan's Hidden Agenda: Racism and the New Right,” *Race and Class*, Vol. 22, no. 3 (Winter 1981) p. 222.
4. See Chapter 1 for more detailed discussion of this point.
5. Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy* (New York: Basic, 1975) p. 3.
6. Use of the term “elite” is not meant pejoratively. Although the prewar civil rights movement included some episodes of “direct action” and mass mobilization (notably during Reconstruction and in the aftermath of World War I—e.g., the Garvey movement) these were infrequent and antagonistic to moderate programs. Reform strategies concentrated, for reasons of necessity, on lobbying, use of the courts, and appeals to enlightened whites, tactics which depend on knowledgeable elites for leadership and render mass participation counterproductive. In addition, the straitened conditions facing blacks in the prewar period generated a survival-oriented ideology which did not adapt itself well to mass mobilization. For a good history of the black struggle in the 1930s, see Nancy J. Weiss, *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of FDR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
7. Douglas McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
8. Aldon D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change* (New York: Free Press, 1984).
9. For representative statements, see Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the*

United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Arnold Rose, *The Power Structure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). Good critiques are Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan, 1974).

10. Southern loyalty to the Democrats was assured by the national Party's acquiescence in segregation, and specifically in the disenfranchisement of southern blacks.
11. *Rearticulation* is a practice of discursive reorganization or reinterpretation of ideological themes and interests already present in the subjects' consciousness, such that these elements obtain new meanings or coherence. This practice is ordinarily the work of “intellectuals.” Those whose role is to interpret the social world for given subjects—religious leaders, entertainers, schoolteachers, etc.—may on this account be “intellectuals.”
12. For a startling and vivid evocation of that rhetorical toolkit, see Zora Neale Hurston, “The Sermon,” in idem, *The Sanctified Church* (Berkeley: Turtle Island, 1984).
13. Cornel West, *Prophesy Deliverance! Toward A Revolutionary Afro-American Christianity* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1982).
14. Robert Moses drew important inspiration from Camus, for example, as noted by Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981) p. 46.
15. Eugene Genovese, among others, has argued that religious and cultural forms operating during slavery constituted “pre-political” forms of black resistance. See Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: the World the Slaves Made* (New York: Pantheon, 1974).
16. Martin Luther King, Jr., quoted in Harvard Sitkoff, *The Struggle for Black Equality* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981) p. 61.
17. See for example Julius Lester, *Look Out Whitey! Black Power's Gon Get Your Mama!* (New York: Dial, 1968).
18. Quoted in William Julius Wilson, “The Black Community in the 1980s: Questions of Race, Class, and Public Policy,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, Vol. 454 (March 1981) p. 28.
19. The march had been planned as a unified effort to demonstrate black and liberal support for national civil rights legislation. The SNCC speaker, John Lewis, was forced to censor his remarks by white and black moderates, but even the rewritten speech contrasted sharply with the self-congratulatory tone of the rest of the event:

The party of Kennedy is also the party of Eastland . . . the party of Javits is also the party of Goldwater. Where is our party?

(Quoted in Carson, *In Struggle*, p. 94.)

20. The white violence culminated a month after the campaign's end in the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church (September 15, 1963), which killed four black children in the institution which had been the center of the Birmingham movement. Sources on Birmingham are numerous. A few good ones are David Lewis, *King: A Critical Biography* (New York: Praeger, 1970) pp. 171–209; Martin Luther King, Jr., *Why We Can't Wait* (New York: Signet, 1964); Stanley B. Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) pp. 235–242; Aldon D. Morris, *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*, pp. 229–274.
21. At first promised and then denied white liberal support, the MFDP challengers left the convention profoundly disillusioned. On the MFDP, see Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle*, pp. 108–109, 123–129, 185–186.
22. The “long hot summers” of the middle 1960s were viewed by many blacks (and by the U.S. police at all levels) as a proto-revolutionary situation. Many activists saw the black underclass as “voting with shopping carts,” taking what was deservedly theirs, and accelerating the unacceptably slow pace of reform. Moderates, by contrast, questioned the effectiveness of disruption and argued that riots discredited efforts to achieve political reforms. In retrospect we may discount the more extreme claims made by all sides during these years, but during the 1967–1968 period alone, some 384 “racial disorders” were recorded in 298 cities, and these can hardly be considered as unrelated to the atmosphere of black protest which after 1964 engulfed the nation, not just the South. (Data are from McAdam, *Political Process*, p. 227.) Other good sources are Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, *Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in America's Cities* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); James W. Button, *Black Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail* (New York: Vintage, 1979) pp. 248, 272–273. It should be remembered that measurements and statistics are notoriously unreliable on the subject of riots. For the moderate response, see Bayard Rustin, “The Lessons of the Long Hot Summer,” *Commentary* (October 1967); Lewis M. Killian, *The Impossible Revolution, Phase II: Black Power and the American Dream* (New York: Random House, 1975).
23. This trend was most spectacularly demonstrated by the appearance in the national spotlight of George Wallace, the arch-segregationist Governor of Alabama. “Backlash” also took the form of white counterdemonstrations and violence against civil rights marches. Many movement radicals viewed white resistance (especially white resistance in the North) as decisive proof that nonviolent strategy was ineffective in its efforts to lead not only blacks but whites toward greater racial equality and harmony. The “backlash” phenomenon, and Wallace in particular, are considered in greater depth in Chapter 7, below.

24. On March 7th, some 2000 marchers had been ferociously attacked on the Pettus Bridge at Selma. For good analyses of the complexities of the Selma situation, which many see as the point at which southern intransigence was finally ruptured, see Carson, *In Struggle*, pp. 157–162; Lewis, *King*, especially pp. 375–381; David Garrow, *Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of 1965* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).
25. Many commentators date the black power phase of the movement from the “Meredith march” of June 1966, though this is clearly a somewhat arbitrary periodization.
26. Roy Wilkins, quoted in Robert Allen, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic History* (New York: 1970) p. 78.
27. See Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970) p. x.
28. Allen, *Black Awakening*, p. 50; see also Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York: Vintage, 1967) p. 44.
29. See Chapter 7, below.
30. Carmichael and Hamilton certainly did not burn their moderate bridges. Robert Allen wrote that *Black Power* “. . . was largely an essay in liberal reformism . . .” (Allen, *Black Awakening*, p. 247) a judgment based on the authors' lack of a “revolutionary” political program. The book is better interpreted as one of the first postwar efforts—after those of Cruse and Malcolm X—to understand black oppression in a global context. The authors wish to break with the ethnicity paradigm, but not with the mainstream aspirations of U.S. blacks.
31. James Boggs, *Racism and Class Struggle* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).
32. See his speech, “The Ballot or the Bullet,” in *Malcolm X Speaks* (New York: Grove, 1966).
33. See George Breitman, ed., *The Last Year of Malcolm X* (New York: Pathfinder, 1967).
34. Malcolm's chief bodyguard was later revealed to be a police agent.
35. See John Brown Childs, “Afro-American Intellectuals and the People's Culture,” *Theory and Society* 13 (1984).
36. Some good sources here are Mark Naison, *Communists in Harlem During the Depression* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983); Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (London: Zed, 1983).
37. See Allen, *Black Awakening*, pp. 153–164, 210–238.
38. Elsewhere in this work we have referred to the “trajectory” of movement/state relationships (see Chapter 5, for example). In respect to the racial history of the postwar period, we understand this trajectory to include both the

- encounter discussed here—a “rising phase,” so to speak, of the racial minority movements—and that considered in the following chapter as a period of “reaction.” See Chapter 7, below.
39. This formulation derives from Marxist state theory. The state provides a political framework for interest concertation—understood in the traditional economically determined meaning of classes, of course, but this is not important for our argument here—which is unavailable to particularistic interests interacting directly. For present purposes the state may be seen as the institutions, policies, conditions, and through which the racial order is organized, enforced, and transformed. For an erudite reading of the Marxist literature on the “factor of cohesion” formulation, see Bob Jessop, *The Capitalist State* (New York: New York University Press, 1982, pp. 16–20. These points are considered in more detail in Chapter 5, above.
 40. Two good sources here are Allen, *Black Awakening*; Manning Marable, “Black Nationalism in the 1970s: Through the Prism of Race and Class,” *Socialist Review* 50/51 (March–June 1980). See also the concluding section of this chapter.
 41. Radical black organizations like SNCC opposed the war, while moderate groups like the Urban League supported it.
 42. Huntington has analyzed the black movement as an “ideals vs. institutions” conflict. He dates the onset of this new upsurge from the Greensboro student sit-ins of February, 1960, which seems to us too late. See Samuel P. Huntington, *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).
 43. See Chapter 5, above.
 44. Consider the transformation of the United Farmworkers into an organized lobbying group for Agricultural Labor Relations Act passage and enforcement, which tended to weaken the Union’s ability to mobilize a national support network, and diverted it from servicing and organizing farmworker members.
 45. For example a SNCC worker’s 1962 letter to President Kennedy: “The people of Ruleville . . . wonder why protection can be given to people 6000 miles away and not be given to American citizens in the South.” (Charles McLaurin, cited in Carson, p. 85).
 46. The CRS was later to be transformed once again into an *agent-provoca-teur* center. See Pat Bryant, “Justice vs. the Movement,” *Southern Exposure*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1980) pp. 79–80.
 47. James O’Connor, “The Democratic Movement in the United States,” *Kapitalistate* No. 7 (1978); Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, “Political Participation and Social Policy,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 1975.
 48. None of these currents is by any means exclusive. Specific perspectives often contain elements of more than one current. Internal colonialism, for example, can be expressed in nationalist or socialist terms. The categories we employ are “ideal types”—they permit the classification of diverse tendencies for analytical purposes.
 49. See Rodolfo Acuña’s account of the LRUP’s trajectory in *Occupied America: A History of Chicanos*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1981) pp. 387–391; see also Mario Barrera, “The Historical Evolution of Chicano Ethnic Goals” (MS, 1984), pp. 31–32; David Montejano, “The Demise of ‘Jim Crow’ for Texas Mexicans, 1940–1970” (ms, 1984), pp. 30–34; John Shockley, *Chicano Revolt in a Texas Town* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1974).
 50. See Carson, *In Struggle*, pp. 167–168.
 51. The history of minority Marxism-Leninism was interesting as an organizational process. Several of the currently active M-L organizations with substantial minority membership—for example, the League for Revolutionary Struggle, the Communist Workers Party—were formed when racially exclusive groups merged and composed “multiracial” organizations, parties or “pre-parties.” The LRS, for example, was formed by a merger of the I Wor Kuen, an Asian American (largely Chinese American) group, with the August Twentyninth Movement, a largely Chicano group. Other M-L organizations began as white “new left” groups and later incorporated substantial numbers of minority members: the Revolutionary Communist Party, Communist Labor Party, and the Democratic Workers Party. By the late 1980s, many of these groups were quite defunct. (This brief survey does not take into account the “old left” groups which can also stake a claim on Marxism-Leninism, such as the Communist Party or Socialist Workers Party; the CP, which traditionally had significant minority membership, has lost much of it in party schisms of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nor do we discuss here the various social democratic currents).
 52. The first “stage” is the creation of a multiclass united front to liberate the colony; the second “stage” is the subsequent pursuit of socialist reconstruction and, presumably, class struggle. The internal colonialist orientation of the 1960s was often explicitly Maoist, as were many other Marxisms of the period.
 53. Land struggles were most strenuously pursued by the *Alianza Federal de Mercedes*, founded in 1963 by Reies Lopez Tijerina. The *Alianza* (later renamed *La Confederación de Pueblos Libres*) sought to restore lands originally held by Mexican Americans in northern New Mexico under grants dating from the conquest, and built upon regional traditions of struggle dating from the 19th century. See Reies Lopez Tijerina, *Mi Lucha Por La Tierra* (Mexico, DF: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1978); Peter Nabokov, *Tijerina and the Courthouse Raid* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1969). Tijerina’s politics have been the subject of some debate. His

personalistic and confrontational style and his focus on the tactics of land occupation place him in a venerable Mexican revolutionary tradition. But Tijerina built upon and altered this legacy in the attempt to address modern U.S. conditions. He ran for Governor of New Mexico in 1968, joined Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Poor People's Crusade, and espoused a Pan American and Third Worldist revolutionary philosophy. After extensive harassment, Tijerina was jailed in 1969, and his movement dispersed.

54. Important regional distinctions also affect Mexican American politics in the Southwest. Andrés Jimenez identifies four regions—the lower Rio Grande valley (incorporating the frontier zone with the Mexican states of Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, and Coahuila), the upper Rio Grande corridor (extending from the state of Chihuahua north into New Mexico), the Arizona area (incorporating the frontier with the state of Sonora), and California (including the Baja California border area)—each with its particular history of political development, incorporation in the U.S. (and global) economy, and cultural traditions. This obviously leaves aside important concentrations such as Colorado, the Pacific Northwest, and the Midwest. Chicago today is one of the largest “Mexican” cities in the world. (Andrés Jimenez, personal communication, July 10, 1985).
55. For the 19th century heritage, see Acuña, *Occupied America*; Matt S. Meier and Feliciano Rivera, *The Chicanos: A History of Mexican Americans* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972) pp. 54–95; Mario Barrera, *Race and Class in the Southwest* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979). Interestingly, Barrera suggests that “The system of colonial labor appears to have been based on racial rather than ethnic distinctions,” (ibid., p. 49) which is consistent with our argument (in Chapter 3, above) that a racial logic structured North American colonialism and was not merely an outcome of that system.
56. Groups such as the Brown Berets, The Crusade for Justice, *El Movimiento Estudiantil Chicanos de Aztlán* (MECHA), and the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) originated at this time. Though asserting their *Chicanismo*, most groups adopted a Mexicanized political style, setting forth their demands in *Planes*, for example. MECHA enunciated its program in *El Plan de Santa Barbara*; Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales launched *El Plan Espiritual de Aztlán* at a Chicano Youth Conference held in Denver in 1969. Many other groups developed their demands in this manner. See Barrera, “The Historical Evolution . . .,” pp. 27–31; Acuña, *Occupied America*, pp. 357–360.
57. “Commitment to the struggle for Chicano Liberation is the operative definition of the ideology used here. Chicanismo involves a crucial distinction in political consciousness between a Mexican American and a Chicano mentality. The Mexican American is a person who lacks respect for his (sic) cultural and ethnic heritage. Unsure of himself, he seeks assimilation

- as a way out of his “degraded” social status. . . . In contrast, Chicanismo reflects self-respect and pride in one’s ethnic and cultural background. . . . Mexican Americans must be viewed as potential Chicanos. . . . Chicano Liberation is a means of total Chicano liberation.” (“El Plan de Santa Barbara,” quoted ibid., p. 34.)
58. These conflicts often revealed important class dimensions within Asian American communities—dimensions which were played up by Marxist-Leninist groups and played down by “entrists” and more moderate nationalists. For example, Asian entrepreneurs were sometimes branded an indigenous “national” bourgeoisie, whose “class interests” conflicted with those of other class forces.
 59. *El Grito*, *Aztlán*, *El Tecolote*, and *La Raza* were some of these.
 60. Paul Wong notes: “The most widely accepted slogans in the white antiwar movement have been ‘Give peace a chance’ and ‘Bring the G.I.’s home.’ The Asian-American movement, in contrast, emphasized the *racist* nature of the war, using such slogans as ‘Stop killing *our* Asian brothers and sisters,’ and ‘We don’t want *your* racist war.’ Paul Wong, “The Emergence of the Asian-American Movement,” *Bridge*, Vol. 2, no. 1 (September/October 1972) pp. 35–36.
 61. Republican “entrism” has also come into being among minorities long considered to be in the Democratic column, especially since the election of Reagan.
 62. Some campaigns led by community organizations continued into the 1970s with varying degrees of success. In San Antonio, where the Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) was active, a moderate Chicano mayor was eventually elected with a strong community base. Local organizing by Chicano moderates has also continued to flourish or at least survive in Los Angeles and Denver.
 63. Of a voluminous literature, see for example Guillermo Flores, “Internal Colonialism and Racial Minorities in the U.S.: An Overview,” in Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling, eds., *Structures of Dependency* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1973); Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) pp. 82–110; see also Chapter 3, above.
 64. See Chapter 3, above.
 65. Consider the history of Indian education, for example, or the perverse hyperpatriotism of the “relocation camps”—Manzanar, Tule Lake, Gila River—in which Japanese Americans were imprisoned during World War II.
 66. The internal colonialism framework made more sense in dealing with relatively homogeneous concentrations of minorities, for example New York’s Ocean Hill-Brownsville and Bedford-Stuyvesant ghettos (both heavily black), or South Bronx (Puerto Rican). It was less useful where given minority

groups were insufficiently concentrated geographically, or where minority communities were more heterogeneous. Homogeneity, of course, is never more than relative. See Chapter 1, above.

67. See for example Carlos Moore, "Marxism: A Prolet-Aryan Outlook," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX (1974-1975).

7. Race and Reaction

1. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 8 March 1985.
2. In April 1985, the black unemployment rate was 16.3 percent compared to the overall unemployment rate of 7.3 percent. (Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics). The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reported that the poverty rate among blacks is almost 36 percent, the highest proportion since 1968. The Center also noted that while long-term unemployment among whites has increased by 1.5 percent since 1980, among blacks it has increased by 72 percent (cited in Roger Wilkins, "Smiling Racism," *The Nation*, 3 November 1984). For a more recent analysis of an essentially unchanged pattern of racialized poverty, see Gerald D. Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989) pp. 277-291.
3. Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
4. Howard J. Sherman, *Stagflation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
5. James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).
6. "The advantages for the U.S. of this dollar-based system were formidable. Essentially, it created a unique, built-in demand for dollars, independent of the demand for U.S. products. This need for dollars meant the U.S. could buy more than it sold abroad without fearing that the oversupply of dollars would cause the value of the dollar to drop. U.S. multinationals and banks were in a strong position to invest abroad, since the dollars they were spending were in such demand. This in turn encouraged U.S. military expansion worldwide by allowing the U.S. to keep spending the money needed to support its troops overseas. In short, it was precisely through the enthronement of the dollar at Bretton Woods that the U.S. was able to finance the postwar Pax Americana." ("Bretton Woods: The Rise and Fall of an International Monetary System," *Dollars & Sense* 102 [December 1984].) See also Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
7. In 1984 the U.S. trade deficit with Canada was \$20 billion, second only to the nation's \$37 billion deficit with Japan. In spite of this, Americans did not harbor negative attitudes towards Canada.

8. Republican Senator John Heinz during a Congressional debate over U.S.-Japan trade relations stated that "In category after category they [the Japanese] are slicing us neatly and thinly off like a piece of sushi [sic], which they so elegantly do." At a March 8, 1985 hearing, Sen. Heinz noted that when the "Japanese get their little fork into us—or chopsticks ... they really do stick it to us."

During a March 20, 1985 hearing, Democratic Senator Ernest Hollings said the Japanese "love all those bowings—they have been doing that for twenty-five years and getting away with it." Cited in *Hokubei Mainichi*, April 16, 1985.

9. Laura Chin and Ada Kan, *Where We Stand in America: A Report on Anti-Asian Violence and Anti-Foreign Sentiments* (Washington, D.C.: The Organization of Chinese Americans, Inc., August 1984). In 1982 Vincent Chin, a Chinese American man was beaten to death in Detroit by a laid-off plant foreman and his stepson who mistook their victim for Japanese and blamed him for the loss of their jobs. The incident further outraged Asian American communities when Wayne County Circuit Court Judge Charles Kaufman allowed the two men to plead guilty to manslaughter (the original charge had been second-degree murder), placed them on three years' probation, and fined them \$3,780 each.
10. "Illegal aliens" are equated with "Mexicans" or the "brown flood" in general, even though undocumented workers from Mexico constitute at most 60 percent of the "illegal population." It is estimated that of the 1,086,000 undocumented workers in California between 1970 and 1980, 589,000 were from Mexico. See Thomas Muller, *The Fourth Wave: California's Newest Immigrants* (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1984). Despite the numbers, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service directs its enforcement activities at Mexicans. More than 90 percent of arrests of "illegal aliens" are made at the border with Mexico. See Ann Cooper, "Hazy Numbers Complicate the Debate Over How to Slow Illegal Immigration," *National Journal*, 8 June 1985.
11. A Gallup poll conducted in May 1980 revealed that 91 percent of the people interviewed felt that *all* immigration to the U.S. should be halted until the national unemployment rate dropped to 5 percent.
12. See, among a host of similar works, Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984). For a good critical review of Murray's work, see Sar A. Levitan's review in *Society*, Vol. 22, no. 4 (May-June 1985); see also the debate between Murray and Levitan in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 100, no. 3 (Fall 1985).
13. David Edgar has suggested that, "California's tax-cutting referendum Prop. 13 was as much a vote against black welfare as it was a vote for lower taxes." David Edgar, "Reagan's Hidden Agenda: Racism and the New Amer-