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United States Relations with South Africa: Historical Antecedents from the Perspective of the "Other"

Y. G-M. Lulat

NOTE: This reading comprises Appendix I ("The Historical Antecedents from the Perspective of the 'Other'") from a book titled *United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present* by Y.G-M. Lulat (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2008). For more on the book click here: http://bit.ly/sabook

Chapter Contents

Appendix I

The Historical Antecedents from the Perspective of the "Other"

The purpose of this appendix is to consider the historical antecedents of U.S. relations with South Africa, but from the perspective of those who had no say in the commencement and development of these relations: the aboriginal peoples. It is mandated by the wholly legitimate assumption that without the colonization of their lands by European settlers, entailing dispossession and subjugation of the aboriginal peoples on a scale hitherto unknown to humankind, any relations that may have developed over the course of time between the aboriginal peoples of these two different parts of the world would have followed a completely different historical trajectory. And the same thought experiment may be performed with this scenario: the Europeans arriving to find lands devoid of any human habitation. Here too, whatever relations that may have developed between them (meaning those in the United States and those in South Africa) would have taken a very different form than the one that eventually transpired and is chronicled in the pages of this work. In other words, in delving into the historical context of the beginning of those early relations between the United States and South Africa we can provide the historical background to the central theme that has been developed in the pages of this work: that the character of these relations were ultimately shaped by the dialectic of relations between the European intruders and the aboriginal peoples on both sides of the Atlantic.

We may begin by observing that to the Africans of Southern Africa (as in the case of their counterparts the U.S. First Americans) the arrival of those first U.S. ships in Southern African waters (beginning with the slavers and the whalers) constituted the harbinger—albeit unbeknownst to them needless to say—of their entrapment, forever, in a complex matrix of forces unleashed by an expanding and hitherto unknown global capitalist economy, one dominated by the West, in which, it must be emphasized, the role of the United States would be absolutely salient (both as a critical factor in its original birth as well as in its essential hegemonic expansion).[1] This matrix would be expressed along two basic axes: First, the permanent propulsion of millions of Europeans, primarily from the lower classes, for a variety of reasons—but almost all turning on the slow but steady relegation of the European feudal order into the dustbin of history and its replacement by a capitalist order as a concomitant process in the evolution of the new global economy—on to the colonial emigratory circuit that would include territories that in time would evolve to become the modern-day nations of United States, and South Africa. (One may note here the tendency to often forget that without the bodies needed to colonize other lands there would have been no European colonization in the first place, and of course, as just noted, these bodies were, for the most part, the flotsam and jetsam "surplused" by the evolving European capitalist order—in this sense then the colonists were often both the oppressed and the oppressors.)[2] Second, the simultaneous implantation of dendrites of the emerging global economy in these two territories through the agency of the emigrant settlers, which in turn would *dialectically* generate their own momentum that would culminate in the permanent capture of the historical trajectory of the aboriginal peoples—concretely expressed in the form of a massive and forcible expropriation of, in one case (South Africa), land, "potential capital" (livestock), and labor, and in the other case primarily land. Yet, this latter process, one ought to point out here, occurring over a period of roughly two-and-a-half centuries, was not acceded to with equanimity by the aboriginal peoples. That is, even as their backs were pushed against the wall by the relentless accretion of pressures ensuing from a steady but virtually unending stream of "illegal" European immigrants, and despite the woefully enormous technological mismatch between the inferior weapons of the aboriginal peoples and the superior ones of the interlopers where

this became a determinative issue, the aboriginal peoples refused to quietly disappear into the sunset.[3] However, this is not to say that the lot of the vanquished did not, in the end, fall upon them—it did, and with most tragic consequences for some, as will be indicated presently.

But first, before going further, a brief prolegomena: Writing a little over 200 years ago—specifically in the same year that the new nation of United States of America declared its independence from the British crown for reasons that included, as was noted, the question of the status of U.S. First Americans and their lands which had been precipitated by the *Royal Proclamation of 1763*—Adam Smith the Scottish economist (whom we met above but in a different context) would observe: "The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already been very great: but in the short period of between two and three centuries that has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits, or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events, no human wisdom can foresee." Yet, in the next breath Smith would note: "To the natives, however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned…. At the particular time when these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote countries." Smith, an eternal optimist, however, would further write: "Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker, and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another" (1961 [1776], Vol. 2: 141).

As we look back over the past 200 years or so since he made these observations we now know what happened: the equality of nations never did materialize. On the contrary, those events set in motion forces that would lead to the decisive movement of the loci of mercantile capitalism from the eastern end of the Afro-Eurasian ecumene to the western end, the European peninsula, as a result of the simultaneous quickening of the pace of capitalist development within Western Europe, and the European undermining of capitalism elsewhere in the ecumene. Recall, that initially the Europeans had almost nothing to offer to the Afro-Asian ecumene by way of trade goods in their first encounters. As Wolff (1998: 298) has pointed out:

> The Explorers in the "Age of Discovery" have been so firmly canonized that we tend to forget that when they first entered these trade routes, they were engaging a complex social and economic system within which initially they had limited bargaining power. After all, they had relatively little that others wanted to buy. They had little to offer in trade and had underestimated the sophistication of markets in both Africa and Asia. They had also assumed, erroneously, that overseas markets were equally accessible.

The European solution, states Wolff, to the problem of prying open the Afro-Asian commercial empire was, as we now know, nothing more sophisticated than predation, by means of conquest and plunder. Later, however, they would come to possess what the Asians wanted: gold and silver; but that would have to await the colonization and plunder of the Americas.[4]

And as the events that emerged out of 1492 (Christopher Columbus) and 1498 (Vasco da Gama) led to the evolution of a Euro-North American-dominated global world economy (replacing the thousands of years old Asian-dominated global economy), the fate of at least one group of peoples, the Khoena (also sometimes referred to as the Khoikhoi), at the southern end of Africa, as in the case of the U.S. First Americans in the Americas, became, willy-nilly, entangled in this process with disastrous results for them.[5]

In other words, then, yes, the impact of the emerging U.S. economic relations with South Africa on the Cape Khoena and other coastal Africans, by themselves, was probably not much, other than what we considered briefly in the matter of the transient coastal activities of the U.S. whalers. However, in a broader sense, when viewed in terms of the *totality* of commercial activities of the European settlers at the Cape, as the increasing maritime intercourse of the settlers with ships of other nations, including the United States, intensified with the passage of time, the impact of these relations was profound—but only, it must be emphasized when seen in catalytic terms—in fact, for the Khoena it was nothing short of cataclysmic. For them, the arrival of U.S. merchant marine in their waters would represent simply one more link in a long economic chain that would bind their fate to the emerging European-dominated global economic empire, but in which their relegation to the role of bit players would have profoundly grave consequences for them: it would be nothing less than their genocidal exit from the stage of human history.

But who, one ought to ask here, were the Khoena? The Khoena (also spelt khoekhoe, a self-designated name meaning "men of men," and derisively named "Hottentots" by the Dutch [see Raven-Hart (1971) on the origins of the latter term]) were descendants of the proto-Khwe society of Khoena-speaking gatherer-hunter societies, and who many, many centuries before, possibly by the fourth or third century BCE, had acquired the practice of livestock-raising from Eastern Sahelians peoples who had migrated from the north into the East African region (Ehret 1998)—however, see also the discussion by Mitchell and Whitelaw (2005).[6] From the perspective of Europeans, they were, comparatively speaking, a peaceful people (unless provoked, of course) and until the arrival of van Riebeeck had had *fairly* amicable relations with passing European ships that dropped by for fresh water and food with some regularity. The fact that hundreds of merchant ships from Europe for more than a century and a half *prior* to 1652 had seen fit to drop anchor on the South African coast without much fear

for the safety of their crews would appear to suggest nothing but that. (According to calculations by Jaffe [1994: 37], it is likely that some 2000 European ships had dropped anchor off the coasts of Southern Africa for food and water prior to 1652.) Plus, one must be reminded here that most of those who made up these crews were not drawn from the upper classes of the societies they came from; in fact it was quite the opposite: as Elphick (1985: 82) observes, they were "usually a rough lot, swept together from the squalid quarters of North European ports; and their leaders often could not, or would not, restrain their bellicose instincts" (see also Debroey 1989).[7]

Now, as one may legitimately surmise, over the course of nearly two hundred years the Khoena were lured into unequal exchange relationships with passing European ships (in which trinkets worth literally no more than a cent or two were exchanged by the Europeans for whole animals in a context where animal husbandry was the lynchpin of the entire economic system of the Khoena), thereby placing them on the path of irremediable underdevelopment and dependency.[8] Viewed against this backdrop, then, van Riebeeck's arrival was a portent of nothing less than their eventual elimination as a culturally distinct people. Yes, it is true that colonization of territory was not the original Dutch intent when Jan van Riebeeck and his men, sailing aboard the *Drommedaris* and its accompanying ships, dropped anchor in Table Bay (the harbor at the Cape of Good Hope). The inability of the Dutch to develop a reliable and adequate supply of meat and agricultural produce for their ships, on the basis of casual barter with the Khoena (against the backdrop, it is very important to point out, of highly divergent economic and cultural regimes that the two groups operated under and neither of which was understood by the other), is what eventually drove them to establish a permanent colonial settlement—initially, with the help of company employees released from employment (to become "free burghers" and farmers) in 1657. An inkling of what was in store for the Khoena can be surmised from a February 1657 entry in the official VOC journal kept by van Ribeeck:

> Harry [Autshumao of the Goringkaikona people] and the fat chief, with some principal men, seeing us looking about and hearing us say that we intended building houses here and there, etc. (for many of them are already able to understand much of the Dutch language and to speak it, some to such a degree that they use it when bartering with us), asked where they were to go should we build houses there and cultivate land. This they saw was our intention, for they were encamped at the spot where some of the freemen had selected their sites. We answered that they might live under our protection and that there was everywhere room enough for grazing their animals.… They were satisfied with that, but it was evident that it was not entirely to their liking. (Van Riebeeck [1952–1958, vol. 2, p. 89])

This first hesitant step that already, so early on, quickly brought up the issue of the land question, over time, set in motion the typical set of events that would characterize the establishment of permanent European colonial settlements, generally, elsewhere in the Afro-Asian and American ecumene (Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Hispaniola, New Zealand, United States, and so on): the forcible expropriation of lands of the aboriginal peoples—by means, usually, of a relentless and systematic immigration (which involved exploiting the generally instinctual hospitality of the aboriginal peoples) that would in time not only provoke violent conflict over resources between the indigenous and the interlopers, but through sheer force of numbers the interlopers would overwhelm the indigenous; and where the latter strategy was not feasible, violent campaigns of dispossession based on a superior military strategy and armory proved an effective alternative.[9]

In other words, once the decision was made by the VOC to allow a permanent expansion of the Cape settlement beyond what it had originally envisaged, it set in motion a chain of events—in which the comings and goings of European maritime traffic (including that from the United States) looms large—the fate of the Khoena was effectively sealed.[10] They were, in time, despite considerable and concerted resistance on their part, virtually decimated—thanks to their relatively low population numbers, fluid social organization, imported diseases (especially smallpox), internal divisions and rivalry, and armed European violence *and* enslavement.[11] After all, one ought to point here that van Riebeeck for one had never shied of advocating, almost from the beginning of his arrival at the Cape, the enslavement of the Khoena while relieving them of their droolingly tempting cattle herds, as a number of shameless entries in his journal, such as this one, attest: "with 150 men ten or twelve thousand cattle could be secured without the danger of losing a single person. On the other hand," he continued, "many savages could be captured without a blow as they always come to us unarmed; they could then be sent to India as slaves (van Riebeeck 1952–1958 [vol. 1, p. 112])." Or consider this one: "If, then, there is no longer any trade to be expected, would it matter so much if one deprived them of some six or eight thousand cattle? For this there would be ample opportunity, as we have observed that they are not very strong—indeed they are extremely timorous." "Often," he further observed, "only two or three of them would drive a thousand cattle within range of our cannon, and it would therefore be quite easy to cut them off (vol. 1, p. 116)."

The surviving Khoena remnants were, in due course, as in the case of a number of American societies in North America, genetically absorbed by the rest of the population—amalgamating with either the early Europeans, or the enslaved persons they (the Europeans) had brought in from outside, or other African ethnicities—to give rise to, in the South African racial context, a new ethnicity: *Coloreds.* (En route to this designation, some of them would also be referred to variously as *Bastaards*, and later, *Griqua*.)

The fate of the *San* (that other Khoena subgroup—also referred to as the /Xam, and derogatorily referred to as the "Bushmen" by European settlers) who differed from the pastoralist Khoena only in that they were primarily a gatherer-hunter people, with livestock-keeping a secondary occupation, was no better.[12] As the

European settler frontier (see glossary) expanded into their lands, they were virtually hunted down like wild animals by the marauding settlers. Debroey (1989: 89) provides this chilling description of what happened to the San:

> Official documents state that, between 1786 and 1795, no less than 2,480 San were killed and 654 captured. In reality, many more must have been killed. Col. Collins, who was in charge of an investigation into the extermination of the San and whose reports were considered very reliable, heard from an old trekboer that, under his leadership, 3,200 san had been killed in the course of the six years. Another boer told him that the commandos in which he had taken part had shot down 2,700 San. Some 6,000 people were thus killed by psalm-singing colonists, who complained about the lack of civilization among the natives.[13]

However, this matter (of the impact of early U.S. commercial relations with the Cape on the indigenous), it may be argued, raises an even more profound issue: In a very interesting account of the various "ceremonies of possession" that early European colonizers performed in various parts of the world to legitimate among themselves their competing colonization projects, Patricia Seed (1995) reminds us that "sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europeans also believed in their right to rule" (p. 2). In other words, the fact that they were violating with unconscionable impunity the *Natural Law of Prior Claim* was of absolutely no consequence to them.[14] The point here, then, is this: much in the same way that the Europeans had no business to arbitrarily settle and colonize the Americas (the homeland of U.S. First Americans), the Dutch had no business settling at the Cape (the homeland of the Khoena) in the first place.[15] However, to all intents and purposes, as far as they (and other Europeans who dropped by the Cape) were concerned the Khoena were less than full human beings, as is attested by this refrain that runs through most of their observations of them in their writings: "The natives of the land are savages, not tall in stature, thin, smeared with grease and filthy. They cluck in their speech almost like turkeys.… They know nothing of money, nor desire it" (comment by an early Dutch visitor to the Cape, Johann Jakob Merklein).[16] Therefore, the Khoena, like countless other ethnicities elsewhere subjected to the jackboot of European imperial projects, were deemed by the Dutch and other Europeans, on the basis of nothing more than self-arrogated dispensation and unmitigated hubris, not to be entitled to any rights under the Natural Law of Prior Claim. (Compare the fate of U.S. First Americans in the United States, including those who had "assimilated," such as the five so-called "civilized" Native American ethnicities, the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, and Seminoles, chronicled below.[17]) As Jaffe (1994) forcefully reminds us, from the perspective of the rest of the world, the European imperial project was a three-headed monster comprising capitalism, colonialism, *and* racism.[18] Furthermore, it is absolutely important not to lose sight of this historically incontrovertible fact: that the circumstance of the loss of their lands and resources, highlights of which will be presented momentarily, to the European interlopers was not occasioned by unprovoked aggression on the part of the aboriginal peoples, and as a result of which they were militarily defeated and conquered (in other words, that there was a moral basis to their eventual dispossession in the sense of spoils of a "just war" landing in the laps of an innocent people who emerged as victors). On the contrary, from the moment the interlopers arrived on their shores with the intent of settlement (backed by the threat of superior weapons) that act in itself constituted nothing less than aggression. Everything that followed from that act on the part of the aboriginal peoples constituted nothing less than the defense of their homeland—even though in the end they were defeated by a combination of a variety of factors ranging from, on one hand, superior weapons and technology of the enemy to overwhelming population numbers of the interlopers, and on the other, from disease to miscalculations and acts of self-defeat in the face of incomprehensible aggression that European colonization represented. The veracity of this point should become self-evident by this thought experiment: imagine that the tables had been reversed; that is the aboriginal peoples of Africa and the Americas had gone to Europe to inflict colonization on the Europeans, propelled by capitalist-driven greed.

Now, while it is true that the demise of the Khoena as a culturally distinct people—which Elphick (1985: 235) observes was almost complete within a mere seventy years of Van Riebeeck's arrival—was a consequence of often imperceptible actions and reactions among and between themselves and the early Dutch settlers provoked by the Dutch intrusion in 1652, and not a systematically planned policy of genocidal extermination on the part of the Dutch, the fact still remains: the Cape Peninsula was *their* country and the Dutch (or any other European peoples) had no mandate under the Natural Law of Prior Claim to settle there permanently. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the Khoena did not desire anyone to settle permanently in their domain (see Elphick 1985).

Of course, to the European mind—long inured, as Williams (1989) so eloquently demonstrates, to the racist Lockeian discourse of barbarism versus civilization (see also Arneil 1994)—to even think of raising this entire matter is to go beyond the point of utter ludicrousness.[19] Consider: Even as sympathetic a modern chronicler of the Khoena as Elphick, who masterfully details the processes that underlay the demise of the Khoena wrought by the Dutch intrusion, nowhere in his book (1985) challenges the legitimacy of that intrusion in the first place. However, be that as it may, in the interest of scholarly integrity, if nothing else, it behooves one (at the very minimum) to raise this issue, even if it is in passing. Moreover, we have a duty, dear reader, to respectfully acknowledge the *legitimate* presence, once upon a time, of the Khoena (and other similarly placed peoples elsewhere) on the stage of human history and their cruel and unwarranted banishment from it by an alien people—who, even while claiming to be harbingers of civilization to the benighted, were at heart motivated by nothing

more sordid and banal than insatiable greed (its structural origins and legitimation in the capitalist economic realm notwithstanding).

Following the demise of the Cape Khoena, as the frontier of the European colonial settlement expanded further and further into the hinterland (as a consequence of both natural population increases and immigration)—against the backdrop of an equally expanding domestic colonial economy that continued to cement its integration with the ever-growing post-1776 Euro-American-dominated global world economy—there would soon come a time when it would be the turn of other Africans, the Bantu-speaking peoples (descendants of Eastern Sahelian peoples who had drifted slowly—by way of agrarian-creep—into Southern Africa over the course of centuries but who were well-established by, as far as we can tell, around third or fourth century CE to as far south as Natal [Ehret 1998]), to confront their colonial destiny, the seeds of which, unbeknownst to them of course, had been planted over a century before at the ironically named (from their perspective) the "Cape of Good Hope."[20] However, the destiny of the Africans of the hinterland, thanks to their numbers vis-à-vis the interlopers, would take a slightly different turn from that of their fellows at the Cape: while they too would lose their lands, by means of violence underwritten by superior armory unleashed on them by the land-hungry interlopers, who by now were calling themselves *Afrikaners,* they would be spared the fate of the Khoena. On the contrary, their continued existence would be perversely cherished as the colonial economy continued to expand (but while at the same time the interlopers remained a permanent numerical minority), producing in its wake an insatiable demand for economically cheap labor that they would soon be called upon to deliver.

The highlights of this road to the eventual transmutation of the aboriginal peoples from an independent and self-subsistent peoples to a mere factor of production in the evolving Western-dominated capitalist economy can be listed as follows—but not before stressing this observation: Although our knowledge, today, of what actually happened at the synapse of settler/African contacts on the settler frontier as it successively expanded from Table Bay into the hinterland over the course of roughly two-and-a-half centuries, beginning in 1657, is now much more deeper than it has ever been before—thanks to the diligent work of a number of scholars, especially over the past two to three decades (here the seminal work of contributors to Eldredge and Morton (1994), Elphick and Giliomee (1989b), and Marks and Atmore (1980b); as well as scholars such as Newton-King (1999) and Penn (2005), readily come to mind)—revealing a complexity that had been largely hidden (that is where data has been available), for ideological reasons and/or lack of research diligence and analytical sophistication, for the purposes of this particular work, the overriding theme of those contacts remain essentially and incontrovertibly this: Regardless of the cooperation of a few (which no doubt there was, for a variety of reasons), and the resistance of the many among the aboriginal peoples regarding the colonists' project of dispossession and subjugation, and regardless of the fundamentally racist binary discourses of "civilization" versus "savagery" on one hand, and on the other, "Westernized" Christianity versus "heathenism" that exercised (and in some quarters continue to exercise) the intellect of the European interlopers as they fabricated an ideological excuse for justifying their project, in the final analysis the eventual denouement of the expansion of the settler frontier was nothing less than the wholesale abrogation, at the point of the gun, of the rights that ensue from the *Natural Law of Prior Claim* (see glossary) of *all* Africans, and which found its expression in the massive expropriation of their land, "potential capital" (livestock) and eventually labor—the continuing legacy of which is the mind-boggling disparities between black and white access to land, labor and capital in contemporary South Africa. (Of course this same observation, in its broadest parameters, is also applicable to the United States.)[21]

The Hundred-Year War. As the Dutch colonists in the Eastern Cape region moved their frontier inland in the early 1700s in search of pasture for their ever-expanding herds of cattle and flocks of sheep (which were usually tended by their Khoena slaves/servants since they themselves were loathe to do any manual work, other than hunting), acquiring in the process the cultural lifestyle of what came to be known as the *trekboer* they ran up against the mixed-farming Xhosa peoples. The result of this encounter was predictable: the trekboers soon precipitated violent clashes with them over land and cattle in a pattern the colonists had established almost from the very beginning of their arrival at the Cape: provoking conflicts with the Africans to serve as a ploy to grab their land, steal their cattle (and at times enslave them—especially their women and children) at the point of the gun. In fact, as Debroey (1989: 97) reminds us, "the first cattle thefts at the frontier were made by whites." Later, similar tactics, motivated by avarice and based on treachery and the like, would be used by the British colonial authorities as well in support of British settlers, merchants, and land speculators. Though, it should be stressed, the dialectic of a ratchet-like successive territorial expansion to secure what had already been forcibly alienated in a preceding campaign, against an equally successive Xhosa counter-effort to regain what they had lost (against the backdrop of sluggish nineteenth century means of communication between London and the Cape that often left governors to rely on their own initiatives)—referred to by Galbraith (1960) as the "turbulent frontier factor"—was a parallel motif of the British colonial phase of the Hundred-Year War (as elsewhere in Southern Africa). At the same time, however, one ought to also be reminded here that any claims to self-defense by the colonial interlopers were by definition hollow given that they had no right whatsoever to infringe upon the inherent rights of the Africans that flowed from the *Natural Law of Prior Claim* (see glossary) in the first place.

Beginning in 1779, and going on for the next hundred years until 1879 there were nine major wars (1779–81, 1793, 1799–1802, 1811–12, 1818–19, 1834–1835, 1846–48 [also known as the *War of the Axe*], 1850–52 [also known as the *War of Mlanjeni*], 1877–78), referred to collectively as "Cape Frontier Wars"—but labeled by colonial historians as the "Kaffir Wars"—between, primarily, the Afrikaners, and later the British, on one hand, and on the other the Xhosa (who, it may be noted, at times fought among themselves on how best to deal with the

colonial interlopers). Notable events associated with these wars included: the involvement of large numbers of Khoena servants of the Afrikaners in the 1799–1802 war, and later, in the 1850–52 war, the Khoena descendants of the Kat River Settlement (on both occasions they fought on the side of the Xhosa); the arrival of the British settlers in 1820 that eventually led to the 1834–35 war (and during the same war the homicide of the Xhosa paramount chief Hintsa and the mutilation of his body while in British custody); and the participation of the Mfengu ("Christianized" Xhosa who lived around European missionary stations) on the side of the colonists against their fellow Xhosa in the 1877–78 war. As one would readily surmise, the endpoint of one of the longest running wars of resistance by an African people fought against European colonization anywhere on the African continent was their eventual defeat and subjugation, to be forcibly incorporated into the expanding Western-dominated global economy.[22]

Wars of Dispossession. The Hundred-Year War was not the only war of dispossession that the colonists fought with Africans; there were many others. Among the more salient that eventually led to the permanent defeat of the Africans, amidst a massive loss of land and livelihood (in favor of permanent bondage to the colonists), are these:

- 1659, and 1673–77: the defeats of the Khoena by the VOC.
- 1837: The Voortrekkers under the leadership of Hendrik Potgieter defeat the Ndebele at Marico River and dispossess them of their land between the Vaal and Limpopo Rivers, naming it the Transvaal (it would be recognized as Afrikaner territory, in 1852, following the Sand River Convention by the British). In 1857, this settler-occupied territory would rename itself the South African Republic, with Marthinus W. Pretorius as its first president.
- 1838: The Voortrekkers under the leadership of Andries Pretorius defeat the Zulu at the "Battle of Blood River," and dispossess them of their land to establish the Afrikaner republic of Natal (however, the British would soon annex the territory, in 1843).
- 1873: suppression of the rebellion by Hlubi chief Langalibalele in Natal.
- 1876: the Pedi under Sekhukhune, repel an attack by Afrikaner commandos.
- 1877–78: suppression of the rebellion by the Tswana.
- 1879: Zululand is conquered by British forces (despite their initial defeat by the Zulus at the battle of Isandlwana), and who in the same year also defeat the Pedi and depose Sekhukhune.[23]
- 1880: the southern Sotho under Letsie stage a rebellion against the British—it is partially successful.
- 1898: the Venda are subjugated by the Afrikaners.

It should be noted that this listing in no way describes the full extent of the resistance that the Africans presented to the European settlers, though their bravery was often suicidal given that their assegais were no match for bullets, or, when later some of them acquired guns, their single-shot weapons were a poor match for the Maxim machine guns of the British.[24] At the same time, one would be seriously remiss in not mentioning at least two major events that were of pivotal importance in accelerating the eventual total defeat and colonization of the aboriginal peoples by the Afrikaners and the British: the *Great Trek* (about 1835–60), and the *Xhosa Cattle-killing* (1856–1857). Before we proceed, however, we must first dispose of consideration of another major historical event called the *Mfecane*, a huge several decades long conflagration initiated by the Africans themselves (for a variety of reasons on which historians have been divided) that engulfed a large part of *un*colonized Southern Africa in the nineteenth century, in part as a result of the rise of the Zulu kingdom under Shaka. Historians have suggested that this tragedy, involving a tremendous loss of life as well a massive out-migration of survivors as refugees and who in turn inflicted war on others (a chain of events that together led to the depopulation of large swathes of territory), helped to hasten the colonization of the South African hinterland. Yet, the truth is that in all likelihood this event never happened—at least in the manner it has often been presented as a pivotal historical event in nineteenth-century South Africa. That is, to be specific: there is increasing evidence that the *Mfecane* (including the very term itself) was nothing more than a figment of imagination produced toward specific political ends by Africans themselves and their European missionary allies. The clearest such position is articulated thusly by one of its chief proponents, Norman Etherington (2004: 203): "African struggles for land and power in the period 1833–54 played a decisive role in developing the *Mfecane* concept. The self-serving narratives devised by African rivals and their missionary clients in and around the emerging kingdom of Lesotho set the pattern for future accounts and were responsible for introducing the word *lifaqane* into historical discourse long before the word *Mfecane* first appeared in print." He goes on to conclude that examination of historical records has yielded almost no evidence for the *Mfecane*, and therefore "it would be wise to maintain an agnostic stance on '*Mfecane* violence' and its consequences" (p. 219).[25]

The Great Trek. Among the many unsavory attributes of human beings that separates them from lower order animals is their inordinate propensity to not only fabricate lies, but through the alchemy of time transform them into nothing less than historical "truths." One such lie is the mythology woven by the Afrikaners around a historical event that they came to refer to, in retrospect of course, the Great Trek—the mass migration of thousands of Afrikaners (who would come to be called *Voortrekkers)* into the Cape hinterland during the period roughly 1835 to 1860 (includes, besides the original movement out of the Cape from around 1835 to 1840, the mass movements into territories that would become the Orange Free State, and Transvaal). Afrikaner historians came to romanticize this migration as the Afrikaner quest for freedom from the tyranny of British colonial rule, and over time they imbued it with the biblical ideological aura of the Exodus, and the search for the Promised

Land. While there was some truth to their assertions about the desire to escape British tyranny, a more accurate rendering of the causes of this migration would see it as one that was prompted by a dialectic between, on one hand, dissatisfaction with British colonial rule—especially in relation to its initially liberal (comparatively speaking) policies vis-à-vis the formerly enslaved, the Africans, and the Coloreds which upset the Afrikaner's racially stratified sensibilities against the backdrop of his own increasing subordination to the English—and on the other, the usual quotidian desire to improve one's standard of living (which in this case translated into a quest for land and labor "for the taking," that is free of constrictive British colonial administrative regulations one on hand, and on the other, the Cape land speculators, and justified by his racist notions of barbarity versus civilization vis-à-vis the Africans whose land and labor he would appropriate). The veracity of the latter point is attested to in part by the irony of the Afrikaners appealing, at times, to the very British colonial authorities they claimed to despise, for assistance in mounting the wars of dispossession.

Moreover, it is important to stress the point that appears to allude so many: ideologies and cultural values do not drop like manna from heaven. They do not come out of nowhere; they are self-serving ideational artifacts rooted in the material circumstances of their adherents. The Afrikaners' quasi-Christian notion of constituting a specially chosen people in "uncivilized" Africa was ultimately undergirded by a long and unbroken history of a deep addiction to servile labor wrenched from the aboriginal peoples that permitted them a lifestyle not very different, in principle (if not outward manifestation), from that of European manorial lords.[26] Anyhow, for our purposes, the historical significance of the *Great Trek* is that it helped to rapidly expand the settler frontier into the hinterland with the concomitant violent subjugation (wars of dispossession) of the Africans of the interior, and the subsequent acceleration of their absorption into the expanding settler capitalist economy—but on terms primarily determined by the settlers, of course.[27]

Xhosa Cattle-Killing. At times of great stress communities throughout the world have sometimes resorted to millenarian movements of redemption. Such was the case, for example, with the emergence of the *Ghost Dance* among some American ethnicities (such as the Lakota and the Sioux) in the late nineteenth century in the United States which promised, through special dances and songs, according to their religious leaders (first the prophet-dreamer Wodziwob, and some years later Wovoka) freedom from the oppression of settler colonial rule and restoration of their lands and old way of life. The Xhosa, beset by nearly a century of relentless settler depredations, and oppressive colonial legislation on one hand (not to mention their most recent defeat, *War of Mlanjeni,* in the Hundred-Year War), and on the other, the tragic onset in 1854 of a hitherto unknown (among the Xhosa) bovine disease, inadvertently introduced from Europe a year before, that began to claim their cattle by the thousands, resorted for relief to a millenarian movement of their own—but unlike in the case of the *Ghost Dance*, with a much, much more tragic consequence for almost the entire Xhosa people. Following a delusionary prophecy, based on a fusion of Christian and pre-Christian ideas, by Nongqawuse, a teenage Xhosa girl, that if the Xhosa purified themselves by killing all their livestock and destroying their granaries a terrible whirlwind would sweep all the settlers into the sea and the Xhosa would have their lands and cattle restored to them, they soon found themselves pathetically and absolutely supine before the settlers: the more than year-long period, April 1856–May 1857, of large-scale livestock slaughter and destruction of grain stock (even many of those who initially resisted were forced into compliance by community pressure) would leave them in almost complete and utter destitution—starvation was the order of the day and tens of thousands died, with many more becoming refugees seeking any kind of work available on settler farms.

For the settlers and the British colonial administration (under governor Sir George Grey) this tragic event was a godsend: it broke the back of Xhosa resistance and opened up opportunities for appropriation of their lands and labor on a scale the Xhosa had never experienced before. Motivated by dastardly colonial political and economic objectives, and justified by a combination of personal hubris, outright racism, and belief in the warped notions of charity espoused by the ruling classes of Victorian Britain, this, one of the esteemed sons of the British colonial empire, not only opposed practically any suggestion of mounting a program of food relief for the starving thousands (which included of course children)—going so far as to successfully sabotage even the most modest of private efforts of those very few among the settlers with a modicum of humanitarian conscience who dared to organize any kind of relief—but instead he even went a step further by encouraging settler predation against the surviving Xhosa to try and bring about their complete dispossession. Peires in his book-length study (1989b) of this most tragic event is unequivocal in his summation: "And while the Xhosa nation was lying prostrate and defenseless, Sir George Grey, a self-proclaimed benefactor of the non-European peoples of the world, trampled on this human wreckage: he exiled the starving, crushed the survivors, and seized more than half of Xhosaland for a colony of white settlement" (p. ix).[28]

A slight digression that requires our attention at this point, before proceeding on: an elaboration on the hint above that the colonists did not achieve their goals of conquest unaided by some among the aboriginal peoples themselves. Leaving aside the self-destructive incident of the Xhosa Cattle-Killing, treachery in the matter of resistance to colonization was also a serious problem among the aboriginal peoples. Whereas the colonial interlopers had the advantage of unity, usually—at least in their common goal of dispossession and subjugation (if little else)—this was not always the case on the other side. Ethnic divisions, internal rivalries, and differences over how best to meet the colonial threat among the aboriginal peoples were often exploited by the colonists (a strategy that was also employed, as one may recall, against the U.S. First Americans to great advantage by U.S. colonists, that is after rivalry among colonial powers had ended). This tactic was used by Van Riebeeck in his effort to undermine the independence of the Khoena; it was used by the Afrikaners later on; and it was employed by

the British. In fact, very often the deployed British colonial army often had sizeable contingents of soldiers recruited from among the aboriginal peoples themselves. (This certainly was the case, for example, in the *War of Mlanjeni*, and in the 1879 conquest of the Zulu.) There was also of course the problem of the Griqua (the forebears, who aspired to a "white" status, of a section of the present day Cape Coloreds); their predations on the frontier were as destructive as those of the Afrikaner/British colonists (see, for instance, Legassick 1989).

The Parallel Scenario in North America

As the events recounted so far were being played out in Southern Africa, almost the same scenario was unfolding in North America, during the period under consideration—except of course it was on a much, much larger scale. There too the aboriginal peoples were on the retreat in the face of, initially, the relentless and sustained immigration of European settlers, and later as this process took its logical course, the precipitation of the paradigmatic colonist themes (played out contingently at varying levels of intensity depending upon time and place, and the specific nations or ethnicities involved on both sides) of violence, enslavement, habitat destruction, and land alienation.[29] (Some would also add disease to this basket, but not all historians agree on this—see Raudzens 2001.)

Now, although the U.S. First Americans, like their counterparts in the Southern African hinterland, refused to go quietly and disappear into the genocidal dustbin of colonial history, the population numbers of the European immigrants were often (but not always) stacked much too greatly against them; hence they did not all escape from the latter's appalling fate, but on the other hand some did. In other words, while such U.S. First American nations as the Calusa, the Narragansetts, the Mohicans, and the Pequots now tragically exist only in the pages of history books, not all nations were doomed into extinction by the European colonization project—as U.S. Euro-American leaders and opinion-makers such as Andrew Jackson (the "Indian Fighter" and two-time president of a still evolving United States) had prophesized; a small group of them did manage to outwit the European interlopers and escaped the fate of the Khoena—they survive to the present day as testimony to their resilience.[30] However, it is true that with their eventual transformation into a tiny minority relative to the interlopers, they were herded onto economically superfluous bits of land designated as "Indian reservations," with the palliative of a superficial autonomy thrown in—which, one may add, proved no match for the cultural genocide inflicted upon many of them by missionaries and regimented compulsory boarding schools located outside reservations. Certainly by the end of the period under consideration, that is by 1866, this was the circumstance of most of the U.S. First Americans in the territory that eventually came to be known as the United States.

While there is no dearth of literature on the colonization of North America and the concomitant *eventual* demise of the U.S. First Americans, a brief chronological listing of the key relevant events over roughly a four-hundred year period marking the dislocation, dispossession, plunder, perfidy, brutality, murder, and yes even genocide they would experience at the hands of the European colonizers—no matter that they valiantly resisted in every way they could, and that within this overall general pattern there were also isolated "islands" of negotiation, bargaining, and even amicable trade and other relations between the interlopers and the aboriginal peoples—has already been indicated in the chronology at the front of this book (though one must be reminded here *(*à la Raudzens [2001b]*) that these events were generally part of an* endgame *in the colonization project*).[31]

In recounting the chronology of U.S. First American dispossession by Europeans in the United States, there has been allusion to the matter of European perfidy (often exercised in the name of either an all-loving and benevolent "Christian" God, or "civilization," or both). It is necessary to emphasize that far from being a flourish of melodramatic excess, it is an effort to point to the hypocrisy that has run throughout the history of the creation of so-called "democracy" in the United States in so far as the rights of aboriginal peoples and the enslaved U.S. African Americans and their descendants are concerned. With respect, specifically, to the aboriginal peoples the abundance of treaty violations by the "Great White Father" chronicled by the sources mentioned (see endnote no. 31 below), and upon which the chronology at the beginning of this work in part rests, obviates their recounting here; instead a gist of what is implied, given limitations of page-space, may be indicated by means of the jarring discordance between the pronouncements of the highest authorities in the land, when juxtaposed against the chronology of dispossesion. We will consider two.

One of the most important documents issued by the Continental Congress in 1787 under the Articles of Confederation was the *Northwest Ordinance* (that laid out the procedures for the alienation of U.S. First American lands that lay north and west of the Ohio River). Here is a paragraph from that document:

> Article 3. …The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them. (From the Ordinance as reproduced in Taylor [1987: 61–62])

In its ruling in among the most significant cases concerning the sovereignty of U.S. First Americans—in this specific instance the Cherokees—that have come before the U.S. Supreme Court (on which of course no U.S. First American to date has ever sat, it is important to note), the Supreme Court in *Worcester v. Georgia* (1832), laid out a judgement that upheld this sovereignty. Beginning with the words, "This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest," and pointing out that "[t]he defendant is a state, a member of

the Union, which has exercised the powers of government over a people who deny its jurisdiction, and are under the protection of the United States," Chief Justice John Marshall, then went on to deliver the majority opinion of the Court in these terms:

> The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial…. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties.…The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it, and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is that a weaker power does not surrender its independence—its right to self-government—by associating with a stronger and taking its protection.… The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this Nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the Government of the United States.… The act of the State of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.

Despite this ruling, however, as has already been indicated, Andrew Jackson proceeded to ignore the court with impunity and allowed the removal of the Cherokees under the *Indian Removal Act* of 1830 from Georgia to proceed. In fact, in his State of the Union Address on December 6, he had gloated: "It gives me pleasure to announce to Congress that the benevolent policy of the Government, steadily pursued for nearly 30 years, in relation to the removal of the Indians beyond the white settlements is approaching to a happy consummation." He then went on to spell out in the openly racist and hypocritical language characteristic of his day the ideological premise of the removal policy his Administration intended to pursue (and supported by most of the U.S. Euro-American populace of the day as evidenced by his huge margin of victory in the 1832 presidential elections):

> Toward the aborigines of the country no one can indulge a more friendly feeling than myself, or would go further in attempting to reclaim them from their wandering habits and make them a happy, prosperous people. … Humanity has often wept over the fate of the aborigines of this country, and Philanthropy has been long busily employed in devising means to avert it, but its progress has never for a moment been arrested, and one by one have many powerful tribes disappeared from the earth. To follow to the tomb the last of his race and to tread on the graves of extinct nations excite melancholy reflections. But true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of one generation to make room for another.… Philanthropy could not wish to see this continent restored to the condition in which it was found by our forefathers. What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?… The tribes which occupied the countries now constituting the Eastern States were annihilated or have melted away to make room for the whites. The waves of population and civilization are rolling to the westward…. May we not hope, therefore, that all good citizens, and none more zealously than those who think the Indians oppressed by subjection to the laws of the States, will unite in attempting to open the eyes of those children of the forest to their true condition, and by a speedy removal to relieve them from all the evils, real or imaginary, present or prospective, with which they may be supposed to be threatened (USP-AJ 1896–99: 519–21).[32]

Yet, this is how Tocqueville saw the picture (who, recall, happened to have made his now famous visit to the United States just a year later, in 1831): "Nowadays the dispossession of the Indians is effected in a regular and, at it were, quite legal manner. …Half convinced and half compelled, the Indians move away to dwell in new deserts where the whites will not allow them to live ten years in peace. Thus it is that Americans acquired for next to nothing whole provinces, which the richest monarchs of Europe could not afford to buy (Tocqueville, 2003 [1835–40]: 380–381)." He then goes on to presciently observe:

> The Indians readily discover… how temporary is the settlement proposed for them. Who will guarantee that they will be able at last to remain in peace in their new refuge? The United States commits itself to maintaining them there but the land they are presently occupying had been previously guaranteed by the most solemn of oaths. Today the American government, it is true, does not remove their land from them but it tolerates encroachments. No doubt, in not many years' time, the same white population which is now pressing around them will once again be on their tracks in the wild deserts of Arkansas; then they will encounter again the same evils without the same remedies and once, sooner or later, land is no longer there for them, *they will forever have to resign themselves to the grave* (p. 394, emphasis added).

We will conclude this section on the fate of U.S. First Americans by first restating its central theme. As the events described in the preceding pages clearly demonstrate, the absorption of the Americas (specifically in this instance the territory that we today call the United States) by the evolving Western-dominated capitalist world order was, as in the case of South Africa, achieved on the basis of the demise of U.S. First Americans as a free and independent people and masters of their own destiny by means of relentless and unstoppable European immigration coupled with the looting of their lands and resources (in which European violence, deceit, and treachery loomed large). Since the population numbers of U.S. First Americans were small relative to the size of

the European colonists (and rendered even smaller as a result of inadvertent importation of diseases—albeit not all historians, as noted, agree on this point) their demise paralleled almost, but not completely, that of the Khoena. (Hence, some U.S. First American nations did eventually survive European colonialism.)

Now, what we should also observe here is that as the numbers of U.S. First Americans dwindled both absolutely and relatively against the backdrop of an ever-expanding European settler economy, the precapitalist economic mode of production of the U.S. First Americans was also simultaneously marginalized and rendered irrelevant—unlike in the case of South Africa where the scenario was one of a harnessing of the precapitalist mode (to be described shortly) by the ascendant capitalist mode through the nexus of *labor*. In the United States, capital solved the problem of labor by importing it in the form, initially, of enslaved labor from Africa, and later free (non-slave) immigrant labor from Europe released from the countryside by a disintegrating feudal economic order. One may note here then that by almost extinguishing the presence of U.S. First Americans (to all intents and purposes), it permitted the development of the capitalist mode of production within the United States to its fullest potential (compare here also the experiences in this regard of Canada, Australia and New Zealand). This is an option that, of course, did not present itself in South Africa to the settlers there (given the imbalance in population ratios between the aboriginal peoples and the interlopers in favor of the former).

It is, then, this combination of the massive pillage of U.S. First American lands and resources, and the equally massive and brutal plunder of African labor by means of the oceanic slave trade (supplemented by the importation of European immigrant labor) that would constitute the twin pillars on which would rest the eventual rise of the United States as a global hegemonic economic power. The comings and goings of U.S. ships at the Cape and other parts of the Southern African coast, beginning in the seventeenth century, are among the beacons that marked the journey toward this denouement.

The African Economy Prior to the European Intrusion

In recounting the brief overview, above, of the awfully tragic consequences for the aboriginal peoples of South Africa of the economic incorporation of their part of the world by the evolving Western-dominated global economy (*dialectically* sponsored, initially, by mercantile capitalism in the sixteenth century, and then roughly about two hundred years later by the emerging industrial capitalism), we are left with consideration of the form of that incorporation, but not from the perspective of the European interlopers, but the African peoples themselves.[33] However, in order to do that we must first describe the character of the African precapitalist mode of production on the eve of colonization—this subtask will be accomplished in this Appendix.

But is consideration of this subject really necessary, some may ask? Does it not take us even further away than we already are at this point from the subject of this work? The answer is, yes, it is necessary; because it is the modality of the economic absorption of the Africans that, in the final analysis, helped to shape the character of the juridical racial state that emerged in time in South Africa and which in turn helped, in part, to determine the nature of U.S. economic and political relations with that country over the years. Although it may be tiresome to repeat the point, it still bears stressing it once more (for the sake of the non-historian): the present is always rooted in the past (just as the future is always rooted in the present).[34]

Obviously, the massive loss of their lands—albeit more from the perspective, initially, of sovereignty rather than access rights—together with their "potential capital" (cattle), were the first egregious steps in the economic absorption of the Africans. However, close on the heels of these steps would come the appropriation of their labor-power by the interlopers, at first either through direct enslavement or more often by means of brutally enforced indentured and other forms of servitude.[35] Later, however, with the phasing out of these forms there would emerge yet another form of appropriation: one that may be labeled proto-proletarianization (in the non-agricultural sector), and quasi-feudal peasantization (in the agricultural sector).

Although the commencement of the appropriation of their labor-power, arguably, had begun almost from the very beginning of the founding of the Dutch station at Table Bay in 1652, it is with the launch of the mining industry based on the two precious minerals of diamonds (starting in 1867) and gold (in 1886), against the backdrop of the ever-expanding encroachment of agrarian/industrial capitalism within the South African economy, that the process would be accelerated in a systematic manner, rather than on a contingent basis as had been the case hitherto. While the basic mechanics of this systematic commandeering of the labor power of Africans will be considered later, it is necessary to lay the groundwork for that consideration by briefly providing an overview of the nature of the economy of the aboriginal peoples *prior* to the arrival of Europeans on their doorstep. Specifically, our task here is to provide a structural materialist description of their economy employing a concept that is more or less out of fashion now, but which still has a potent heuristic value: the mode of production.[36]

Now, before we proceed, a gentle reminder: As Raatgever (1985: 26) noted some years ago, a mode of production is a theoretical construct that is not constituted out of direct empirical observations. Instead it "brings out, rather than abstracts, the fundamental inter-relationships that constitute reality." The mode of production, therefore, is forged by means of theoretical reconstruction. This conception of the mode of production, it may be further observed, differs fundamentally from the Stalinist/Marxist conception that sees the mode of production as an empirical rather than a theoretical construct (in the sense of a Weberian ideal-type), deducible from direct empirical observations. It is important to keeping this point in mind as we unfold what follows.

We have already seen that when van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape there were two dominant modes of production he confronted among the Khoena: pastoralism and gathering-hunting. However, it did not take long be-

fore these two modes of production were marginalized by the capitalist mercantile/slave mode of production that the Dutch interlopers had introduced so that by the time the European colonist frontier had moved well into the hinterland, some two hundred years later, by which time the mercantile/slave capitalist mode itself was undergoing a major transmutation in the direction of agrarian/industrial capitalism (recall, for instance, the development of woolled sheep-farming), the task confronting the continuously evolving settler economy was to bring to heel the third dominant mode of production that the African peoples had developed prior to the arrival of the European colonists: a specifically African mode of production. This was a mode that, on one hand, combined (at various levels of permutation), features of the first two modes, pastoralism and gathering/hunting, with what is often called "the shifting agricultural system," and on the other, included long-distance trade; and it was a mode that was distinctive to nonacephalous societies, such as those of the Nguni.

What then were the essential characteristics of this Southern African mode of production which we may call, for want of a better term, the BMP (the Bantu mode of production)? Although research in this particular area is still in its infancy, at least of the type that Achim von Oppen (1993), for example, has undertaken—an awe-inspiring meticulously researched empirical study—for the Chokwe peoples living in the upper Zambezi/Kasai region of modern-day Zambia and Angola, we are at least familiar with the broadest outlines of the BMP, and for our purposes that will suffice. (As Barrington Moore, Jr. [1966] reminded his readers some three decades ago, depending upon one's objectives, there is as clear utility in a bird's eye-view of empirical reality as there is in a dog's eye-view [though this is not exactly how he put it]).

Emphasizing only those features most relevant for our purposes, the first and most obvious characteristic of the BMP concerns the division and specialization of labor within the village community. While it was definitely present, it was nevertheless elementary enough to permit the family farming unit, the village homestead, to constitute, for almost all practical purposes, an autonomous and self-sufficient unit of production and consumption.[37] That is to say, the subsistence of each homestead family in the village was, for the most part, procured through the labor of itself. However, where additional labor was required in the execution of, say, land-clearing—that is arduous activities (and which were clearly defined by the village community as such)—it was obtained not via contractual obligations, involving remuneration for the labor power utilized, but via get-togethers and ritual "festivals."

This form of production organization necessitated that the most important means of production, land, was made accessible to all who needed it. This, however, did not imply that those to whom land was apportioned for cultivation (usually by the chief) acquired rights over the land akin to rights over personal property. Land was not a commodity in the capitalist sense, and as such, it was inalienable by anyone. Consequently, the BMP was characterized by a distinct absence of ground rent. The absence of ground rent had an important and a very significant consequence for the community: it helped prevent the emergence of social differentiation based on those who owned the principal means of production (such as a landed aristocracy) and those who labored for the owners of the land (a land-less peasantry), given that no group could engineer artificial land-scarcity in the context of the prevailing land tenure system. This lack of a mechanism for social-differentiation based on the control of the major means of production by a minority (and the resultant absence of meaningful social division of labor) meant that an effective ceiling was placed on the development of the forces of production capable of effecting the production of *significant quantities* of economic surplus. This meant that the dialectic between the development of the forces of production and surplus production on one hand, and on the other the development of social-differentiation based on a division of labor (signifying changes in production relations) was effectively eliminated. Hymer (1970: 35–36) elaborates on this point thus (albeit with reference to another African society—Ghanaian—which, however, at the time period under consideration here, was not very dissimilar in political-economic terms, from many of the communities in Southern Africa):

> Let us suppose that a small group, of superior military strength, had been able to appropriate the land and develop a political system in which they obtained a large share of the agricultural output through rent or taxes.… The landlords and the governing class would have used their income to buy food and other consumption and investment goods; part of the population would have left agriculture to become traders, artisans, servants and the like, engaged in supplying the needs of the leisure class, and the farmers would have had to increase agricultural production, and perhaps consume less food themselves in order to pay rent or taxes…. The ruling group would then have channeled part of the surplus into palaces, monuments, and public buildings; to the extent that it built roads, irrigation systems, and other infrastructures; output per head would have risen and the capacity of the economy increased. Technological change might also have been speeded up as a result of this division of labor in manufacturing and other activities.

Three points of clarification about the foregoing: First, concerning surplus, the implication here is not that there was no surplus at all in the village subsistence economy; there was, but it was usually minimal in volume relative to the volume of production. And given that there was insufficient incentive to effect substantial increases in the production of surplus, the level of technological sophistication demanded by the BMP remained at a very low level—typified for instance by the absence of even such elementary forms of agricultural technology as the wheel and the plow. What this also meant is that the implements of production (that is the means of production) were accessible to all who needed them; thereby further ensuring that no one group could monopolize ownership of the implements at the expense of another. Second, concerning stratification: stratification existed, but it was not as severe as it would have been had there been a monopoly over ownership of land. Stratification, instead, was based on ownership of cattle (essentially a means of consumption); however those who did

not have cattle were not necessarily destitute for reasons indicated above. Moreover, means existed for them to acquire cattle, in time, by the twin processes of "cattle-renting" (from cattle-rich owners—in exchange for the labor of herding their cattle) and of course cattle self-reproduction. Third, some African societies (such as the Zulu) by the eighteenth century, it would appear, were beginning to move in the direction of greater political consolidation of their chiefly domain for a number of complex reasons on which there is no agreement among historians (compare the discussion about the *Mfecane*, and see also Kuper [1993]), that required appropriation of food surpluses on a scale hitherto unknown to feed the "age-set"-based standing armies. In what direction this development would have led to in terms of social differentiation, and its attendant economic consequences, had the trajectory of their history not been hijacked by the intrusion of the European colonial project beginning with the *Great Trek* and culminating in their defeat by the British colonial forces in 1879 (and the subsequent annexation of their lands), will always remain a matter of conjecture, but one that would certainly not be bereft of tantalizingly intriguing scenarios.

At the homestead level, the internal economy (as distinct from the external economy of long-distance trade) was characterized by a village social structure based on gender and age—the latter in the form of membership to "age-sets." Now, the socio-economic significance of the age-set rested on the fact that the elders controlled the process of what Dupre and Rey (1973) call "demographic reproduction"—which constituted the basis for the reproduction of the conditions of the BMP. This control of the process of demographic reproduction was achieved via the elders' monopoly of the means of access to women, whose significance in this instance arose not from their role as complements in sexual partnerships, but as bearers of children. The means of access to women was the dowry, which comprised cattle (and sometimes also included "elite" goods) that were rendered inaccessible to the youth until such time that the elders were willing to sanction matrimonial exchange in a given instance. Hence: although it was the youth who procured the "elite" goods through their labor, either directly or indirectly (via exchange), their subordination as a group to the elders was effected through the system of payment of the dowry.[38]

The youth, as just indicated, constituted a stratum dependent upon the elders. And this "dependency" was such that, to go by Dupre and Rey (1973: 151), the elders actually exploited the youth. However, as Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976: 103) points out "as each man throughout his life passed from one age class to another, it balanced out in the end." Perhaps, even more fundamental though (for the purposes of this section), about this exploitation of the youth stratum by the elders, is the point that the elders exerted control only over the distribution and consumption of the production-output, and not over the means of production. Thus while there was surplus skim-off by the elders as a group, the skim-off did not take on the economic force of "profits," and as such it was not only quantitatively of a constant low order of magnitude, but also no part of it re-entered the production process as *investment*—which could have led to expanded reproduction of capital, including the reconstitution of the stratum of the elders into a class of elders. The net effect, to put it differently, of the skim-off of surplus by the elders in the homestead economy was to simply render part of the surplus economically impotent.

Alongside the local homestead economy a broad economy existed based on long-distance trade (and also war to further facilitate this trade). As Pouwels (2002: 385) has pointed out: "For at least 2000 years trade goods have passed with the monsoons between African and Asian ports." However, as he further observes, "[w]hile these regions have shared an ocean highway that has facilitated such material exchanges, differences in their respective hinterlands have made Arabia, Persia, and India exporters of finished wares and Africans suppliers of primary commodities." This latter point is crucial, and its import will be evident in a moment. At the same time, the concept of long-distance trade should not be restricted to cover only inter-continental trade, but also intra-continental inter-regional trade (see Sundstrom 1974 for a window onto this kind of trade in precolonial Africa).

This long-distance trade economy was not fully integrated with the homestead economy; instead it retained a significant degree of autonomy in most communities. In other words, strange though this may appear at first blush, the economy of long-distance trade was, more often than not, dominated by the sphere of exchange (and thereby providing specificity to the BMP), the central characteristics of which we may identify as follows: The commodities involved in the long-distance trade were not, for the most part, derived from production in the homestead economy (for not only was the surplus not large enough to meet the requirements of the trade, but also because there was little demand, in terms of this trade, for the products of the village economy, other than food). The commodities were "produced" in an economic system largely "external" to the homestead economy. The "production" took the form not so much of production in the usual sense of the word, but as extraction; for example: mining (e.g., gold and copper), hunting (e.g., ivory), and warring (e.g., slaves).

The "surplus" generated from the long-distance trading activities was largely destined for the chiefs and kings, who, however, either hoarded or even, note, redistributed whatever "surplus" that could not be consumed. They did not and could not use the surplus for investment (and thereby stimulate production) because no mechanism existed that could allow this, given the absence of organic linkages between the two spheres of production and exchange. As Coquery-Vidrovitch (1985: 101) explains: "the sovereign's power was closely tied up with a specific economic formula: absolute control over a large sector of trade not integrated into local trade and a massive exchange of products rather than true trade, since the king was not looking for profit so much as ways to obtain certain merchandise from far-off lands—weapons (basic to his power and his supply of slaves), textiles, alcohol, and various trade merchandise (la pacotille)." It is precisely because of this accessibility to luxury

commodities generated virtually entirely within the sphere of exchange that the sovereign never felt inclined to intervene in the sphere of production (that is in the homestead economy).

The nature of the trade contact with first the Asian-centered global economy, and later with the emerging Western-dominated global economy, therefore, for a long period of time was one that involved essentially exotic or prestige or luxury goods.[39] Given this fact about the long-distance trade in the BMP the most important factor at play in sustaining the trade was not demand, but effective supply (which depended not so much on production, but in Wallerstein's words on "the politico-technological ability of the long distance traders to transport the material." In this circumstance, there were two consequences: first that no incentive existed in modifying the production process since production was not linked directly to demand variations; and second, the trade was not so much a question of transfer of surplus but simply "a mutual windfall" as Wallerstein puts it (1985: 37).

It is not surprising, therefore, that in this context, "the goods supplied by European capitalism, far from causing, ipso facto, the expansion of the market economy, were absorbed by the lineage economy [BMP] and transformed into prestige goods and, as part of the trade between elders, took the place of locally produced goods (blacksmith crafts, raffia loincloths, and so on)" (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985: 101). And without the expansion of the market economy such as to split open the almost "closed-circuit" village economy, the possibility of evolution in the direction of capitalism was ruled out. In other words, to quote Duprey and Rey (1973: 160): "For four centuries the goods produced by European capitalism of different epochs have been absorbed by the lineage system [however] these goods have not advanced an inch the appearance of the capitalist socio-economic system on the social formations concerned." (This same observation also applies to the imports of Asian goods, needless to say.) Under the circumstances, only an external factor, in the form of colonialism, would make possible the introduction of capitalism to Southern Africa.

However, as we shall see the new economic system of the European interlopers while seeking to displace the BMP, did not displace it totally but only in a limited form, leaving the basic structure of the BMP relatively intact, but even while massively extracting labor from it—albeit in a semi-proletarianized form. How and why this happened will exercise our attention later.

Now, as we wrap up this topic of the character of the economy of the Southern African peoples on the eve of the European colonial intrusion, a few additional but pertinent thoughts. To begin with: having outlined the basic characteristics of the BMP we are left with the task of specifying a number of empirical socio-economic features of relevance to us that characterized the BMP societies. (1) The central repository of wealth was cattle and it was the fundamental source of stratification (between men and women, between chiefs and commoners, between young and old, and between the cattle-rich and the cattle-poor). What this also implies of course is that since wealth did not usually take an inanimate form (money or other similar instruments of circulation) it was one of the surest indicators that this was not a capitalist society, even though the use of money itself was not unknown. In fact, the acquisition and husbanding of cattle had more to do with social (e.g., status) than primarily economic functions. (2) The acquisition and herding of cattle was the responsibility of the male members of a homestead. (3) Any economic activity outside the homestead (e.g., long-distance trade) was usually a male preserve, and it had as its ultimate goal the acquisition of more cattle (and the expansion of the homestead by means of polygyny). (5) Almost all African societies were connected with the rest of the world through "relay" long-distance trade long before the arrival of the first European whalers on the coasts of Southern Africa.[40] (6) The amount of land available to a homestead was directly proportional to the number of adult members of the homestead. (7) Food production (planting, weeding, and to some extent harvesting as well) was generally the responsibility of the women (and children) of the homestead. Not surprisingly, therefore, polygamy (in terms of plurality of female spouses) was sought after by the homestead. (8) Land-clearing and other similar arduous agricultural tasks, was the responsibility of the male members of the household. (9) The daily standard of living of the poorest was not fundamentally very different from that of the richest. In fact, a casual visitor would have been hard-pressed to spot the differences. (10) Such human-degrading features characteristic of capitalist societies as destitution, unemployment, homelessness, and so on, were generally absent in these societies.[41]

A question that has not been addressed and which legitimately arises is this: Why did the aboriginal peoples of Southern Africa (and elsewhere too on the African continent) come to possess a socio-economic system characterized by the BMP? Any number of factors may be suggested for consideration, but the most plausible one may be that of the presence of a vast, natural, resource-rich environment with a relative abundance of products, against the backdrop of a comparatively low population–to–environment ratio. However, contrary to Eurocentrist perceptions, this does not imply that Southern Africa was mired in stasis; that is, in time, the African societies could have evolved past this configuration, to acquire the more typical characteristics of societies dominated by the capitalist mode of production. The opportunity for such a natural development, however, did not arise in Southern Africa (as in many other parts of Africa), thanks to the arrival of colonialism (with its distorted forms of capitalism).

Those familiar with the literature will immediately spot the source of the line of reasoning pursued in the foregoing paragraphs: the so-called *articulated modes of production* theory that was first advanced in the late 1970s and the early 1980s in response to the work of the world systems and dependency theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank, by, primarily, French neo-Marxists (the articulationists).[42] As they will recall, the theory had provoked much commotion, mainly due to the failure on the part of the critics to see the theory as nothing more than a heuristic device (and also as a result, perhaps, of a knee-jerk reaction in the positivist circles against the theory because of its Marxist lineage). Representative of the rancor was the debate, for

example, in the pages of a special issue of the *Canadian Journal of African Studies*.[43] For our purposes it is not necessary to go into the arcane details of the controversy generated by the theory, constituting as it is the not so atypical controversies that have marked, over the decades, the effort to comprehend the extremely difficult circumstances of the African ecumene in the post–1492 era of world history (e.g., Afrocentrism, Eurocentrism, modernization theory, Hamitic theory, dependency theory, world systems theory, and so on).[44] Consequently, what has been presented above will suffice for our purposes.

NOTES

1. In keeping with the general purpose of this Appendix, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that it is generally common among works that deal with European colonialism (as it unfolded around the world) as an event that was a given; that is, something not requiring any explanation of its genesis. The subtext of this approach being a Eurocentric reading of history; namely, if the world was fated to experience colonialism than who else but the Europeans (a superior people) would be entrusted by fate with this project? Consequently, in a work of this kind, it behooves one to provide an exegesis, even if only a briefest one (given the tyranny of inadequate page-space) on the historical antecedents of the European imperial project of which the U.S. and South Africa, as presently constituted, are permanent living legacies. A briefest overview of the subject may begin by first calling to attention that the "rise of Europe," termed by Hodgson (1974) in Volume 3 of his brilliant magnum opus in the typical Hodgsonian vocabulary as the "Great Western Transmutation"—which, as he explains, "was not merely, or perhaps even primarily, that the Europeans and their overseas settlers found themselves in a position to defeat militarily any powers they came in contact with," but it was far more profound than that because "both occupied ('colonial or settled') areas and unoccupied ('independent') areas were fairly rapidly caught up in a worldwide political and commercial system, the rules of which were made by, and for the advantage of, the Europeans and their overseas settlers"—was not an autarkic European development ("European exceptionalism"). To suggest otherwise is to engage in a highly distorted and abbreviated construction of European history: "a progression," in the words of Amin (1989: 90–91), "from Ancient Greece to Rome to feudal Christian Europe to capitalist Europe." In fact, writing more than three decades ago, Hodgson (1993: 86), had taken to task this type of shallow and distorted history by pointing out its fallacious roots thusly: "All attempts that I have yet seen to invoke premodern seminal traits in the Occident can be shown to fail under close historical analysis, once other societies begin to be known as intimately as the Occident. This applies also to the great master, Max Weber, who tried to show that the Occident inherited a unique combination of rationality and activism. [Yet]… most of the traits, rational or activist, by which he sought to set off the Occident either are found in strength elsewhere also; or else, so far as they are unique (and all cultural traits are unique to a degree), they do not bear the weight of being denominated as so uniquely 'rational' as he would make them." Moving on to specifically address Weber's views on Western law and theology, he points out that that Weber "partly mistook certain sorts of formalism for rationality, and partly simply did not know the extent among Muslims, for instance, of a probing rational drive."

Observe also that the mythological basis of a Eurocentric reading of history, as Blaut (1993: 59) reminds us, occurs in both senses of the word: a patent untruth and as a widely accepted false belief by a culture regarding the history of its own genesis. Further, note that the concept of Eurocentrism, as Amin (1989) has pointed out, embodies two senses: one signifies values (in the form of racism, bigotry, prejudices, etc.), while the other refers to a presumed empirical reality (embodied in the notion of European exceptionalism or historical priority as constituting a historical actuality). While it is possible that not all Eurocentrists are guilty of subscribing to the concept in both senses in that theoretically one can believe in the empiricism of European exceptionalism without holding any racist prejudices, it is difficult to imagine that the two can be separated in practice because subscription to the first is bound to seduce one into subscription to the other. In other words, to believe in the myth of European exceptionalism and simultaneously believe in the equality and dignity of all human beings does not appear to be a viable project in practice; certainly those from outside the West who interact with Westerners generally, going by anecdotal evidence, see this to be the case. Additionally: it may also be pointed out (as Blaut [1993] does) that Eurocentrism does not refer to a love of things European, but of believing that things European are inherently superior to things elsewhere; for example, to be a lover of European cuisine does not in of itself make one a Eurocentric, but on the other hand the belief that European cuisine is superior to that of others, does.

Now, while the economic and social transformations of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries that preceded the rise of European global hegemony are familiar to even schoolchildren (such as: the bourgeois revolutions toward the end of the sixteenth century—of which the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England is an epitome—that allowed the ascendant mercantile and protocapitalist classes to seize effective state power from the traditional monarchal-led landed aristocracies; the bourgeoisie engineered erosion of the feudal order; and toward the end of the eighteenth century the industrial transformation itself), the fundamental truth is this: that if one were to cast one's historical gaze back to the eighth-century (when the Muslims arrived in Europe) one has no difficulty whatsoever in categorically stating that there was nothing that one could read in the entrails of Europe then—comparatively backward as it was in almost all ways—that pointed to anything that could predict its eventual rise to global hegemony. What is more, even after fast forwarding 700 years, to arrive in the fifteenth century, a different reading would still not have been forthcoming.

At the point in time when Christopher Columbus left Europe in what would eventually prove to be a portentous journey for the entire planet—and recall that the Columbian project (the quest for an Atlantic sea route to the Eldorado

of the East) was itself born in a crucible of historical events in which Islam and the East had no small part to play—the cultures of many developing parts of the Afro-Eurasian ecumene outside the European peninsula (the conventional term "continent" is a clear misnomer as even a fleeting glance at a child's atlas will reveal) were no less rational, achievement-oriented, materialistic, predatory, belligerent, ambitious, scientific, capitalistic, technologically innovative, urbanized, capable of ocean navigation, and so on, than were the cultures of developing parts of Europe of the period (nor should it be difficult to accept that the opposites of these qualities, for that matter, existed at comparable levels of magnitude in both areas of the world). In fact, on the contrary, in some respects they were more advanced than those of Europe. This issue, to drill home the point, can be presented in another way: all human progress, in the civilizational sense, may be explained either on the basis of structural factors (both contingent and conjunctural—see below) or ideational factors. Now, if one accepts the former then it becomes easy to explain, for example, the rise and fall of civilizations and empires throughout history (including the collapse of the British and the Russian empires most recently). Moreover, one can enlist the support of science here in that it is now an incontrovertibly established scientific fact that there is no fraction of humanity (whatever the social structural criteria for the division: ethnicity, sex, age, class, etc.) that holds a monopoly over intelligence and talent. If, on the other hand, one privileges the latter, then one must be content with ethnocentrically driven historiography unsupported by evidence, other than fantastical conjectures. (Yes, yes… of course, ideas do matter; but only when placed within the context of structures. This applies even to religious ideas—at the end of the day the metaphysical and the transcendental are still rooted in the material; for, how else it can it be as long as human beings remain "human," that is biological entities.)

Now, of course, it is true that when one considers where Europe was some 700 years earlier (at the time of the Islamic invasion), the rapidity of the European cultural advance is nothing short of miraculous! No, this is not in the least a hint, even remotely, of the much-vaunted "European miracle." Rather, it is to state that this progress was not achieved by the Europeans independently; they did not do it alone (on the basis of their own intellectual uniqueness, inventiveness, rationality, etc.) that the Eurocentrists are so fond of arguing. Rather, it was an outcome of nothing less than a dialectical interplay between European cultures and the Islamic and other cultures of the Afro-Eurasian ecumene from across time and space. Hodgson, for instance, is adamant that one must cast ones historiographical gaze across the history of the entire ecumene, for, as he explains, "most of the more immediately formative elements that led to the Transmutation, both material and moral, had come to the Occident, earlier or later, from other regions," (p. 197). In other words, as he puts it: "[w]ithout the cumulative history of the whole of Afro-Eurasian ecumene, of which the Occident had been an integral part, the Western Transmutation would be almost unthinkable" (p. 198). Or in the words of Frank (1998: 4): "Europe did not pull itself up by its own economic bootstraps, and certainly not thanks to any kind of European exceptionalism of rationality, institutions, entrepreneurship, technology, geniality, in a word—of race." Consequently, one must accept as axiomatic (unless one continues to insist on being a pseudo-historian) the fact that the elucidation of a major societal transmutation of global import that took centuries in the making in a small corner of the world that had never known isolation in most (if not all) of its entire history, must rest on a multivariate transgeographic and transtemporal explanation; that is, one that analytically disentangles, to the extent possible given the magnitude and complexity of the phenomenon at hand, the conjuncture of fortuitously propitious historical factors—both contingent factors (in the sense of being outside human agency) and conjunctural (of human agency, but not in itself purposive)—which refers to the historical process analogous in mechanism to that which accompanied, say, the demise of the Greek civilization and the ascendance of the Roman, or the demise of the Roman Empire and the ascendance of the Islamic. In fact, those who study history, especially comparative history, are burdened by the constant and sobering reminder that no matter how intelligently purposeful human beings may consider themselves, at the end of the day, social transformations are as much a product of chance and circumstance as directed human endeavors (in the shape of "social movements"—broadly understood). To put the matter differently: any teleological order that may appear to exist in the history of social transformations is in reality a figment of the historian's imagination. History is, ultimately, a selective chronicle of a series of conjunctures of fortuitously "propitious" factors where the role of human agency, while not entirely absent (hence the qualifier: ultimately), is, more often than not, far from pivotal to the social transformation in question. Stephen K. Sanderson, in his book *Social Transformations: A General Theory of Historical Development* (1995), makes this point with even greater clarity:

> Individuals acting in their own interests create social structures and systems that are the sum total and product of these socially oriented individual actions. These social structures and systems are frequently constituted in ways that individuals never intended, and thus individually purposive human action leads to many unintended consequences. Social evolution is driven by purposive or intended human actions, but it is to a large extent not itself a purposive or intended phenomenon. (p. 13)

For more on the broad thrust of this entry, see also Pomerantz (2000) and Appendix I and II of Lulat (2005). For an overview of the theoretical premises involved from the perspective of historiography see Abu-Lughod (1995).

2. For a descriptive overview of the rise of capitalism in Europe one would not go wrong by plowing through Fernand Braudel's volume 2—titled the *Wheels of Commerce* (1982 [1979])—of his magnum opus trilogy: *Civilization and Capitalism*.

3. In the South African context, at least, weapons alone were not the only deciding factor in who gained the upper hand; there was also the equally important matter of technological superiority in the matter of logistics. In other words, if the battlefield proved indecisive, or if the settlers did not wish to do battle, they were still able to vanquish the aboriginal peoples by wiping out their food supply: stealing their cattle, destroying their granaries by burning down their villages, and laying waste their fields. A strategy that the aboriginal peoples could not usually resort to was to decisively interfere with the supply lines of the settlers (thanks to the settler's ox-wagons and horses).

4. See also, but as a basket: Curtin (1984), Pomeranz (2000), Subrahmanyam (1997), and Velho and de Sá (1963 [1898]).

5. The name Khoena is to be preferred because, as Wells (1998: 417) explains, "it is grammatically gender inclusive, simply denoting 'people,' whereas Khoikhoi translates as 'men of men.'"

6. Going by Ehret (1998: 213) the Khoena-speaking peoples, who had come to occupy Southern Africa by the first half of the second millennium BCE, belong to the Wilton archeological tradition of the more ancient Eastern African Microlithic tradition that goes back some seventeen to twenty thousand years back in East Africa. These societies included not only the proto-Khwe heirs of the Khoena but also the Ju of the northern Kalahari region, from whom are descended the !Xu (Kung). Further to the South were the Southern Khoena heirs of the San, and such other groups as the !Xoo of the southern Kalahari.

7. For more on the Khoena at the time of the European intrusion see Elphick (1985), Elphick and Giliomee (1989b), Marks (1972), Penn (1994), and Raven-Hart (1967, 1971). (The last two items, by Raven-Hart, are particularly interesting because they are a compilation of excerpts from original historical documents—ship logs, diaries, journals and the like). Their origins as an ethnic group is best covered by Ehret (1998).

8. A hundred years on since Dias first doubled the Cape in 1488 a glimpse of the kind of transactions that were effected on the shores of the Cape is provided by this description: "The eleventh [November 1598] we anchored in the Bay of Saldania… where there are three fresh Rivers. The people came to us with Oxen and Sheep in great plenty, which they sold for pieces of Old Iron and spike Nailes. The best of what we bought, cost us not more then the value of one penie in old Iron. Their Catell are large, having upon the backe by the fore shoulders a great lumpe of flesh like a Camels backe" (from among the documents compiled and edited by Raven-Hart [1967: 19] and written by John Davys, a pilot on the ship *Lion* owned by the Moucheron Company).

9. One may note here that, interestingly, Southern Africa provides empirical support for both the "guns and germs" theory, and the counter "immigration" theory (to explain European global expansion from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries). See Raudzens (2001b) for an overview of these two related but competing theories.

10. For an introduction to the early history of the Cape, see together: Elphick (1985); Elphick and Giliomee (1989b), Giliomee (2003), Marks (1972), Penn (1994), Raven-Hart (1967, 1971), Volume 1 of Wilson and Thompson (1969–1971), and Terreblanche (2002). The official journal kept by van Riebeeck is also illuminating in this regard (van Riebeeck 1952–1958). Those wishing access to an easily accessible narrative overview of South African history may do well with Thompson (2001)—however, the one by Welsh (1999) should be ignored (it's poorly researched and unbalanced).

11. History books tend to gloss over the fact that the introduction of slavery by Europeans to the Cape did not rest only on importation of slave labor from abroad, but also the enslavement of the indigenous (in a replay of developments in the Americas). See Eldredge and Morton (1994) for a seminal work on this subject.

12. Interestingly, the name San was applied by the Khoikhoi to their ethnic compatriots derogatorily in view of their stereotypical perception of the San as livestock raiders. Some, therefore, have suggested going back to using the colonial term "bushmen" to describe them.

13. See glossary for a description of the "commando."

14. A universal law derived from the condition of being human (in contrast to the sources of positive law) that postulates that those who have occupied a particular territory before all others are naturally entitled to that territory; consequently, they have prior claims over it against all interlopers. The concept of citizenship by birth, for instance, derives its legitimacy from this law. One of the most infamous of the ceremonies of possession was the 1513 document known as the "Requirement" (or *Requerimiento*) issued by the Spanish to their officers that authorized them to assert possession on the basis of a self-derived Christian notion of a "just war" to be inflicted on the aboriginal peoples they encountered should they dare to resist colonization. Commencing with such drivel as that the islands and the mainland of the Americas belonged to the king and queen of Spain (King Don Fernando and Queen Doña Juana) by virtue of their divine right to rule passed onto them by God through the intermediary of Saint Peter the first pope, and therefore all its inhabitants were to pay homage to them, the document then concluded by chillingly spelling out the most "Christian" consequences that would befall all those who refused to submit:

> I certify to you that, with the help of God, we shall powerfully enter into your country, and shall make war against you in all ways and manners that we can, and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of their Highnesses; we shall take you and your wives and your children, and shall make slaves of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of them as their Highnesses may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do you all the mischief and damage that we can, as to vassals who do not obey, and refuse to receive their lord, and resist and contradict him; and we protest that the deaths and losses which shall accrue from this are your fault, and not that of their Highnesses, or ours, nor of these cavaliers who come with us. And that we have said this to you and made this Requisition, we request the notary here present to give us his testimony in writing, and we ask the rest who are present that they should be witnesses of this Requisition. (From the text in Parry and Keith [1984, Vol. 1: 288–290])

However, as if the tyranny that underlay the promulgation of Requerimiento on a people on the other side of the world that had wished or done the Spanish no harm was not enough, its promulgation was often accompanied by a charade befitting a Punch-and-Judy show, though its consequences on the aboriginal peoples was of course anything but child's play. It wasn't simply the insanity of European hubris that required the use of a document written and pronounced in a language (Castilian Spanish) that the aboriginal peoples did not speak or comprehend, or the promulgation of utterly and completely alien concepts, but even the mode of its delivery was often marked by a complete mockery of its supposed intent. As Diaz Polanco (1997: 26–27) explains: "There are many accounts

of instances in which indigenous people, who could not comprehend the exact contents of the document, did not have to show that they would not comply with it or even display any sort of hostility toward the recently arrived foreigners for violence to fall upon them. Peaceful aboriginal groups who accepted the foreigners and who wanted to please them were assaulted, captured on the pretext of having "resisted," and, finally, enslaved." He continues: "Often the military did not even concern themselves with communicating the message. … The Spanish read the document as a great distance from Indian villages and even in the loneliness of the fields, where they had no visible interlocutor." (For an analogous "legal" basis of the dispossession of U.S. First Americans in the United States—enshrined in the ideology of so-called *Manifest Destiny*—see Miller's work [2006] on this subject.)

15. A thought experiment: imagine that the Dutch had decided to concentrate their commercial maritime efforts in the Western hemisphere, thereby leaving the Cape without a Western intrusion (in our scenario the English would have continued to rely on St. Helena and the Portuguese on bases on the East African coast), would U.S. Americans have set up a base there for their ships when they opened their Asia trade? The answer is, most probably, yes; after all they had already "colonized" in a manner of speaking, a portion of east Africa when U.S.-domiciled pirates set up their base in Madagascar. Plus, of course, their treatment of U.S. First Americans and the enslavement of Africans would have been sufficient precedents to pave the way for such an eventuality even in the face of the Khoena presence.

16. From an account by Merklein excerpted in the two-volume anthology of other early European accounts of the Cape edited and translated by Raven-Hart (1967, 1971)—this quote is from pp. 8–9 of volume one (1971). In fact, as Elphick (1985) reminds us: "The [Khoena] became a symbol for all that was raw and base in mankind, not only because many aspects of their culture were repellent to Europeans, but because their territory, the hinterland of the Cape of Good Hope, lay along the sea route which Europeans traveled on the way to the Orient." "Thus," he continues, "of all the nonliterate peoples in the eastern hemisphere, they were the most frequently observed and intensively discussed, and for a while their supposed savagery was a focal point in learned speculation about the nature of the human race" (p. xvi).

17. See also the longer discussion below on the dispossession of the U.S. First Americans.

18. He, in fact goes so far as to insist that "[c]apitalism without colonialism and racialism never did and does not and cannot exist (p. 11)." See also Lulat (2005; Appendix Two) for a discussion of the origins and role of racism in the European imperial project.

19. The late Professor Edward Said, in subjecting an important cultural artifact, the European literary discourse on the imperium, to his ruthlessly incisive razor-sharp analytical scalpel, came away with the conclusion: "What are striking in these discourses are the rhetorical figures one keeps encountering in their descriptions of the 'mysterious East,' as well as stereotypes about 'the African [or Indian or Irish or Jamaican or Chinese] mind,' the notions about bringing civilization to primitive or barbaric peoples" (1993: xi; parenthetical material in the original). To turn to a different source, to the horse's mouth as it were: In his advocacy of a Western (British) form of education for India, that nineteenth-century British Parliamentarian Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay (already a legend in his day for his oratory) would comment: "I am quite ready to take the Oriental learning at the valuation of the Orientalists themselves. I have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia…. It is I believe, no exaggeration to say, that all the historical information which has been collected from all the books written in the Sanskrit language is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry abridgements used at preparatory schools in England" (1935 [1854]: 349).

20. The process of seeking out new lands for pasturage and/or meeting the requirements of a shifting agricultural system in an environment of extremely low population to land ratios may be referred to as "agrarian-creep." Note: the shifting agricultural system rested on the practice that entailed the clearing of a patch of uncultivated land; the burning of the cleared vegetation on the patch; and the sowing of the cereal seeds in the resultant wood-ash. This method of cultivation did not require much tilling and it was ideally suited for the physical and cultural environment in which it was practiced because it allowed fertilization, albeit modest, of relatively nutrient-poor tropical soils—moreover, it did not make a heavy demand on labor and time beyond what a household could supply. Needless to say, this practice put a low ceiling on the population-carrying capacity of the cultivated land, because it required movement of the cultivators to new patches of land as the soils of the existing patches were exhausted after a few years of continuous cultivation.

21. It is important to indicate a word of caution here; while studies that meticulously examine the intricacies of the dynamics of the settler/African relations on the frontier are welcome, providing a much-needed perspective on the agency of the Africans, one should at the same time be wary of the danger of failing to see the forest for the trees—a major symptom of which is the inability to understand the organic connection between agency and structure. (See, for example, Murray [1989] who makes a similar point in relation to the rise of the "social history" perspective in South African historiography.)

22. For an overview of the Hundred-Year Cape Frontier War, as well as other wars of dispossession fought by the European interlopers against the Africans, these sources, considered together, will suffice: Crais (1992), Debroey (1989), Etherington (2001), Galbraith (1963), Giliomee (1989, 2003), Macmillan (1963), Peires (1989b), Thompson (2001), and Wilson (1969–71). In case an eyebrow or two is raised as to why Mostert (1992), which explicitly deals with the nineteenth-century Xhosa, is excluded from this list, the answer is simple: the work, despite its length, is not serious history but "pop-history" and it bears all the marks of such a genre (omission of facts, commission of errors, misinterpretation of events, and so on).

23. Interestingly, as we have already noted elsewhere, the *Battle of Isandlwana* in January 1879 where the Zulus defeated the 24th Regiment of the British army had its counterpart in the United States, the *Battle of Little Bighorn*, where George Armstrong Custer's 7th Cavalry met defeat at the hands of the Sioux on the Little Bighorn River.

24. For more on the early period of the colonization of that part of Southern Africa that would eventually come to be called South Africa see Davenport (1987: 123–83), Debroey (1989), Elphick and Giliomee (1989b), Giliomee (2003), Thompson (1969: 405–23) and (1971: 245–88), and Wilson (1969: 233–55).

25. For a basket of sources, and they should be approached as such if one is to get a reasonable grip on the controversy surrounding the *Mfecane*, see, besides Etherington (2004): Cobbing (1988), Eldredge (1992, 1994a), Etherington (2001), Hamilton (1992, 1995, 1998), Omer-Cooper (1978, 1993), Peires (1993), and Wright (1989).

26. See Templin (1984) for a study of the theological basis of Afrikaner nationalism as it evolved over the course of their history from the time their forebears first arrived at the Cape.

27. For more on the Great Trek see Etherington (2001), Giliomee (2003), Peires (1989a), Templin (1984), and Terreblanche (2002).

28. For more on this awful tragedy, which however irrational it may appear to outsiders, especially from the vantage point of today, rested (as is usually the case with millenarian movements in general) on its own internal logic, see also Stapleton (1993); and Galbraith (1982) who provides a comparative overview of the *Ghost Dance*, the *Xhosa Cattle-Killing*, and the *Pai Marire movement* among the Maoris of New Zealand in the 1860s. It may be also instructive to draw parallels, in so far as religious visions of an adolescent girl are concerned (but nothing more), with the nineteenth-century French girl Marie-Bernarde Soubirous who claimed to have had visions in a grotto of the Virgin Mary (between February 11 and July 16 in 1858) that would lead to the founding of the shrine of Lourdes, a pilgrimage venue for millions to this day, and her canonization by Pope Pius XI as Saint Bernadette of Lourdes in 1933. Compare also the British colonial response to that horrifying tragedy of the Irish that has erroneously come down to us as the Irish Potato Famine, but is now known as either the *Great Irish Hunger* or the *Great Irish Famine* and which occurred only a few years earlier (1845–49). A quick and ready purchase on this tragedy is to be had through a combined reading of Donelly (2001), O'Grada (1999), and Poirteir (1995).

29. A question that may be posed here is why did the aboriginal peoples not perceive the newcomers, on initial contact, as a threat? As Raudzens (2001a) points out, the U.S. First Americans the English colonial settlers encountered at Jamestown, the Algonquian-speaking Powhatans, in the early years, while numerically far, far superior than the settlers, however, did not attack them, but instead fed them. Later, of course, things would turn sour when the incessant demand for food by the settlers unable or unwilling to grow their own corn began to be resisted by the Powhatans, thereby precipitating the first fatal skirmishes between the English interlopers and the Powhatans. Moreover, the ability of the settlers to construct forts for self-defense in itself speaks volumes about the initial peaceful encounters (compare here the similar experiences of the Dutch under Van Riebeeck at the Cape). In fact, as Stokes and Brown (1966: xxv) have observed, to turn to the South African example, it was very uncommon for Africans to approach the European, on their first meeting, with "instinctual aggression." There are cases in South African history, for example among the Nguni on the east coast, where European survivors of early shipwrecks were allowed to settle among the Africans to eventually become full members of the community. Survivors of Portuguese shipwrecks in 1554 (the *Sao Bento*) and 1635 (the *Nossa Senhora de Belem*) met some of these "Africanized whites," and were surprised to find that they would not join the Portuguese in their search for coastal settlements to the north to find ships to take them home (Wilson and Thompson 1969–1971 [Vol. 1]: 78–84, 233). See also the lengthy discussion by Taylor (2004) on the fate of some of the survivors of the shipwreck the *Grosvenor* (1782) in which he describes the absorption of them by the Africans into their communities, culminating in the eventual rise of a mixed-parentage clan known to this day as the abaLungu. So, what then is the answer? Essentialist notions of the inherent goodness of the "noble savage" will definitely not do. Instead, the answer is to be found in the dialectic between the communitarian social life and the common ownership of property (land) that produced a non-self-aggrandizing culture, which, therefore, was prone to be hospitable to strangers (as long as they appeared to be nonthreatening). Had the aboriginal peoples come to know, somehow, what was in store for all of them in decades to come for permitting the European interlopers to settle in their lands, then there is no question that the world would most likely be a very different kind of place today.

30. Population numbers at the time of first European colonial encroachment of U.S. First Americans are generally thought to have been around five million, but by 1900 they had sunk to a small fraction; a mere quarter of a million. Today, in contrast, they number over a million.

31. Roughly over the past two and a half decades, a burgeoning literature on the history of the colonization and dispossession of U.S. First Americans has emerged; and it is marked to a significant extent by a positive sea-change in the perspective adopted—permitting their "voices to be heard" (to use contemporary jargon) much more clearly than ever before. The following sources, considered together (and reflecting this new perspective) should provide an adequate gateway into this literature: Anderson (1991); Banner (2005); Braund (1993); Calloway (1995, 1999); Calloway and Salisbury (2003); Deloria and Salisbury (2004); Dowd (1992); Glasrud (1982); Green (1982); Josephy (1991, 1994); Kawashima (1986); Mancall and Merrell (2000); Ostler (2004); Prucha (1994); Rozema (2003); Sale (1990); Salisbury (1984 [1982]); Satz (1975); Skaggs and Nelson (2001); Thornton (1987); Thornton, Snipp and Breen (1990); Wallace (1999); Williams (1990); and Wright (1999 [1981]). Those desirous of a comprehensive survey of U.S. government policies toward U.S. First Americans (as they were played out from the perspective of Washington: assimilation, removal, reservation, freehold tenure, and so on, cannot do better than consulting the compendious Prucha [1984]; though his thesis of paternalism as the overarching framework of this policy is questionable viewed from the vantage point of U.S. First Americans). To those who may raise an eyebrow or two at including the late Alvin M. Josephy's 1994 publication: yes, it is primarily targeted at the general public, but

its assembly of an amazing collection of images in its pages merits its inclusion here—dear reader you are encouraged to take a look at them, and ponder their significance. Note: For the select chronology that follows, these sources must also be added to the foregoing: Champagne (1994), Rogin (1991), Sonneborn (2006), Sturtevant (1978–various years), and Van Every (1966).

32. From his address reproduced in Volume 2 of the ten-volume United States (1896–1899: 519–21).

33. For an introductory overview of the historical processes involved, from the fifteenth century onwards, in the incorporation of the world into the European-dominated global capitalist order, see Wolf (1997 [1982]).

34. Though, on the other hand, one must also be cautious in how we read the past. There is the constant danger of reconstructing it in the image of the present on the false assumption that the past is always a mirror of the present. To avoid this danger requires one to be cognizant of one's ideological framework that one brings to historical research. (Yes, absolutely, we all have an ideological framework, regardless of whether we are consciously aware of it or not—see Saunders [1988] for examples.)

35. See Eldredge and Morton (1994), Elphick and Giliomee (1989b), and Marks and Atmore (1980b) for accounts of the different types of servitude visited upon the Africans.

36. Interestingly, even the much discredited application of this concept to Asian societies, called the Asiatic Mode of Production, is making a comeback—see an overview of the literature by McFarlane, Cooper and Jaksic (2005, parts 1 and 2).

37. One of the best definitions of a homestead is by Kuper ("the house" in his parlance) who defines it as "a residential site, a base for crucial kinship and domestic institutions, and an economic unit. It provided a physical crystallization of family history, and the geography of the houses in a locality mapped the nodes of contemporary social networks. In its layout it modeled—displayed, one might say—ritual values and ideas about the organization of the world" (1993: 472–73). Additionally, to quote him once more: "The social group which occupied the homestead is in the ideal case a polygynous family, and the various wives are distributed about the homestead in accordance with their relative status" (p. 474). The distribution of the huts in the homestead was usually according to a universalized pattern that, according to Kuper, archeologists have come to call the "Southern Bantu Cattle Pattern."

38. It may be noted here that the system could only work if the elders of the different homesteads formed an alliance to ensure that the payment of the dowry, fixed by them at a level beyond the normal reach of the youth, was always adhered to by all the elders. To elaborate on this point, it is worthwhile to quote Meillassoux (1978: 141), who states: "Of the goods produced for the community and handed over to the seniors as prestation some will not be redistributed but kept over at the level of the seniors to sanction access to wives." He continues: "Since in self-sustaining economies young men are those who produce these goods, they would be in a position to deal directly with the guardian of the woman they want to marry. It is, in fact, their ambition to achieve such a position. But any senior who would accept such a transaction with an individual without the required status would be weakening his counterpart's authority and consequently his own. It is in the joint interest of all seniors to respect established order."

39. Here it is necessary to define what precisely is meant by luxury goods—a definition that is not merely in terms of pointing to the trade-goods of beads, cloth, guns, ivory and so on as luxury commodities because a minority (such as the kings and their courtiers) was involved in their consumption, but one that links these goods to the production process. One such definition is that given by Pierro Sraffa; he defines luxury products thus:

> Luxury products have no part in the determination of the system. Their role is purely passive. If an invention were to reduce by half the quantity of each of the means of production which are required to produce a unit of a "luxury" commodity of this type, the commodity itself would be halved in price, but there would be no further consequences.… What has just been said of the passive role of luxury goods can be readily extended to such "luxuries" as are merely used in their own reproduction either directly (e.g., racehorses) or indirectly (e.g., ostriches and ostrich-eggs) or merely for the production of other luxuries. The criterion is whether a commodity enters (no matter whether directly or indirectly) into the production of all commodities. (From Wallerstein 1985: 36–37)

40. See Pouwels (2002), Sundstrom (1974), and von Oppen (1993), to gain some idea of the nature of both intra–and inter-continental trade that African societies (such as those in Southern Africa) engaged in.

41. For sources on the nature of the precolonial socio-economic systems of Southern African societies see, among others, Duminy and Guest (1989), Elphick and Giliomee (1989b), Hall (1990 [1987]), Marks and Atmore (1980b), Peires (1982), Switzer (1993), and Wilson and Thompson (1969–1971).

42. To be more specific, while the theory can trace its intellectual heritage to the work of Karl Marx in his various writings (e.g., his preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*; *The Communist Manifesto*; and *Grundrisse*) as well as V. I. Lenin's early writings on Russian capitalism, and of course Leon Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* with its thesis of the "Law of Uneven and Combined Development," in terms of its more immediate origins the theory comes out of the work of French anthropologists working within the Althusserian structuralist tradition (see, for example, the collected work put together by Seddon [1978]). Note: the influence of Louis Althusser on Marxist scholarship is succinctly and ably covered by Benton (1984).

Their formulation of the articulated modes of production theory, it must be stressed, was not a Marxist theory in its orthodox sense—given that it was a response to the inadequacy of Marx's treatment of precapitalist social formations specifically, and the situation of PQD countries generally. To be sure, Marx's work abounds with methodological pointers, but nowhere in his writings does the precapitalist mode receive anywhere near the kind of treatment that he gave the capitalist mode of production. As Meillassoux, one of the more well-known precursors of the theory, emphatically states:

> Marx's approach to the study of precapitalist formations is mainly centered around the demonstration of the historicity of capitalism. His foremost purpose is to show that capitalism is a product of history, that it was preceded by other types of economic formations and that it is bound to give way, in turn, to a different one. But while Capital is thorough investigation into the mechanisms and laws of capitalist development, Marx's approach to precapitalist formations is a relatively superficial one. Let us emphasize that this contribution is, among Marx's works, the least elaborated and probably the least "Marxist." (Meillassoux 1980: 192)

Marx's notion of the "Asiatic Mode of Production" mentioned in the preface to his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, but not really described or analyzed, bears out Meillassoux's judgment. In other words, Marx, as Avineri (1969) also points out, fails to logically weave into his dialectical theory of history with its three principal modes of production (the ancient, feudal and capitalist), this "new" mode of production that he introduces for the first time—unlike the other three that he had already mentioned in the *Communist Manifesto*. The end result is that, in Avineri's words, "(d)espite the explicit dynamism of Marx's dialectical model, it seems to be an uneasy combination of two sets of disparate elements: a sophisticated, carefully worked out schema describing the historical dynamism of European societies, rather simple-mindedly grafted upon a dismissal of all non-European forms of society under the blanket designation of a mere geographic terminology of the 'Asiatic mode of production,' which appears static, unchanging, and totally non-dialectical" (pp. 5–6). Furthermore, as is well-known, Marx's study of the impact of capitalist countries on the development of PQD countries (in his period, via the agency of colonialism) is both sketchy and extremely weak. In fact his thoughts on the situation of PQD countries are generally to be found more among his newspaper articles—an excellent collection of these are to be found in Avineri (1968)—than in his major academic writings. Moreover, in a strange twist of irony, given the fascination with Marxism among many intellectuals in PQD countries, many of these thoughts were very racist indeed.

Clearly Marx's materialist theory of economic development was relevant only to the experiences of the Western European nations, and in fact it appears that he himself was probably aware of this. He, for example, had warned readers of a Russian socialist journal, in a letter, not to "metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico–philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread." Later in the same letter he hints at the geographical specificity of his major work, *Capital*: "The chapter on primitive accumulation does not pretend to do more than trace the path by which, in Western Europe, the capitalist order of economy emerged from the womb of the feudal order of society" (from Avineri 1968: 6). It is in response therefore, to this weakness in Marxist political economy, regarding the situation of PQD countries that the French neo-Marxist anthropologists emerged with their theory, the "Articulation of Modes of Production."

Note: A situation of articulated mode of production exists when there is an interpenetration of the different modes, but yet each retains at the same time a sufficient degree of autonomy to render its identification possible. The articulation of the modes of production therefore is more than simply the co-occurrence of different modes of production in a given society (or social formation to be exact).

43. To provide a flavor of the commotion, two or three quotes from the journal should do the trick:

> The concept of modes of production was originally hailed with excessive enthusiasm; having now failed, like structuralism, to lead us into the Promised Land of total human self-understanding, it is now being widely abandoned, often with a sigh of relief. It is paradoxical that anthropology, proclaiming itself a science, should apparently proceed by a series of religious movements. (Macgaffey 1985: 51)

> The mode of production concept helps identify the questions that must be considered in interpreting gaps in data; but the concept should not seduce us into so stretching our evidence as to disguise or completely fill them. Neither a comprehensive theoretical approach, nor a complete empirical record can reproduce the historical experience of an earlier social formation. But just as we do not discard empirical data because it does not completely reconstruct reality, we should not totally reject theoretical tools such as the mode of production concept because they have limitations. (Cordell 1985: 63)

> The fashion for modes of production swept through African studies like a bush fire, which seems now to have burnt itself out. One can only breathe a sigh of relief at the disappearance of much of the jargon of the 1970s.… (Clarence-Smith 1985: 19)

44. In addition to the sources already mentioned, for more on the relations of production versus dependency/world systems theories, see Chilcote and Johnson (1983); Van Binsbergen and Geschiere (1985); and Wolpe (1980). Note that while all are worthy of perusal, Van Binsbergen and Geschiere is especially helpful.