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The Antiapartheid Movement in the U.S. During the Reagan Era

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NOTE: This reading comprises Chapter 10 ("The U.S. Antiapartheid 'Movement' versus Reagan") of a book titled *United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present* by Y.G-M. Lulat (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2008). For more on the book click here: http://bit.ly/sabook

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The U.S. Antiapartheid "Movement" versus Reagan

By the end of Ronald Reagan's second term it was increasingly becoming clear to many in the United States (except to the Reaganites) that his policy of "constructive engagement" had failed to encourage meaningful change in South Africa. Botha's much-touted reform exercise upon which people like Chester Crocker, the architect of the Reaganite version of the old Nixon/Kissinger policy of "constructive engagement," had built their faith, turned out to be what all who were truly familiar with the nature of the apartheid system had always known all along: that the reform exercise would be a thinly disguised charade in as far as the majority of the black population was concerned.[1] This view among the knowledgeable was especially strengthened with the outbreak of yet another round of rebellions among blacks in 1984/85 during a period that we may legitimately label as the second "decade of antiapartheid rebellion" (1976–1986) and the consequent declaration of a state of emergency by Botha, with all its implications for further, more widespread, and intensive violations of their human rights.[2] The black revolt, and the consequent repression by SAAG would in turn rejuvenate the antiapartheid movement in the United States (and in the rest of the world generally); the result would be pressure on the U.S. Congress to act and it in turn would eventually force the hand of Reagan in the direction of imposing economic sanctions on South Africa.[3]

Since the internal events relating to the antiapartheid struggle within South Africa itself were so crucial to the development and effectiveness of the antiapartheid movement abroad—giving it the platform from which the movement could mount campaigns of publicity, activism, and the like—it is necessary to begin this chapter with a brief description of the key factors and events that marked the resurgence of this struggle.[4] This was a period that was marked, perhaps not unlike that of the *intifada* in Israeli-occupied Palestine in the late 1980s to early 1990s, by an almost rolling wave of antiapartheid activities throughout black South Africa (in which school-age children, often as young as seven, were important actors), ranging from demonstrations to strikes and boycotts to bombings of military and other strategic targets—and a counter-response by the SAAG security apparatus taking the form of violent reprisals, indiscriminate shootings of demonstrators, extra-judicial killings, imprisonment without trial, torture, bannings, and so on. The bookends of this decade of antiapartheid rebellion was the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Southern Africa that involved the psychologically significant defeat of the SAAG expeditionary force in Angola by the FAPLA/Cuban forces in 1976 and the passage of the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* of 1986 by the U.S. Congress. The most important distinguishing characteristic of this rebellion was the development of a political consciousness among blacks in South Africa, especially the young, that rested on the belief that not only was the apartheid state mortally assailable, but that it was the duty of all black South Africans to work toward this end, even if at great personal cost. This is also the decade

that renders false the characterization of the demise of the apartheid state, by some white South African liberals, as the "miracle."[5] Far from a miracle, it was the product of the tremendous sacrifice of countless black South Africans (together with some white allies) in terms of loss of lives, limbs, and liberty. (Moreover, this sacrifice would be exacted by SAAG from the citizenry of a number of neighboring countries as well.) At the same time, consideration of the rebellion—brief though it will be—places in proper perspective the antiapartheid movement in the United States in light of what appears to be an unwarranted romanticization of its importance that one discerns subtextually in some of the recent literature on the movement.

THE SECOND "DECADE OF ANTIAPARTHEID REBELLION"

Dissatisfaction with the extent and pace of change in South Africa that promised no end to the intense poverty, misery, political marginality, and degradation in a land that was originally theirs (coupled with other factors discussed elsewhere in this work), had created within the black population, especially the young, a reservoir of deep resentment against the apartheid system and an impatience that would no longer brook counsels of moderation. Beginning with the wave of "illegal" strikes by black workers in 1973, moving on to the Soweto Uprising of 1976/77, and culminating in the 1984/85 revolts in the black townships, SAAG would face the most prolonged and widespread opposition from blacks in its entire history; it would respond in the only way it knew how: the wholesale massacre, imprisonment without trial, and torture of hundreds upon hundreds of blacks—many of them school-age children.[6] The following chronology of key events beginning from 1976 provides a glimpse of the state of affairs in South Africa that would eventually lead to the passage by the U.S. Congress of the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* of 1986.[7]

Beginning on June 16, 1976, and going on for the subsequent months into November, some one million students, workers, and parents dispersed in over 200 black communities in Cape Province, Natal and Transvaal would become participants in a spontaneous series of rebellions (involving boycotts, demonstrations, marches, work stay-aways, attacks on apartheid institutional structures within the black townships, and so on) that would first emerge in Soweto among school-children. The immediate cause of the rebellion would be SAAG's decision to force black schoolchildren to use Afrikaans for half of their school studies.[8] Grievance against this measure would eventually expand to encompass the highly discriminatory educational system for blacks, and later the entire apartheid system itself, as strands of the "Black Consciousness" ideology promulgated by Steve Biko and others would grip the minds of the young.[9] In the SAAG orchestrated police terrorist riot that the rebellion provoked, hundreds would be killed, a large number of whom were mere schoolchildren armed only with stones and sticks, and many of them, in a replay of the Sharpeville Massacre, would be shot in the back.[10] At the same time, hundreds more would be severely wounded, and thousands—again many of them schoolchildren—would be arrested, tortured, and interrogated. The rebellion would also precipitate a large-scale migration of students to neighboring countries to escape imprisonment and police harassment; many of them would join the ANC.

In 1977, sporadic student uprisings continued but, compared to the preceding year, on a less intense and sustained scale. More were shot to death, imprisoned without trial, tortured and interrogated. During the same year, the much-respected young black leader, Steve Biko, was murdered by the security police while in their custody. His death would be only one among many to have occurred before and since at the hands of the South African security police as a result of torture and beatings.

In 1980, after a couple of years of relative quiescence, from April 21 to May 1, the Colored students, and later South African Asian students, organized a series of class-boycotts in Cape Province, Natal, and Transvaal. African students, for the most part, would remain unaffected by these boycotts. Also during this year another round of "illegal" strikes would be organized by black workers in the Durban/Pinetown, the Eastern Cape, and the Vaal Triangle region and they would continue into 1981. Among the more prominent of the strikes would be one organized by the unregistered (hence not recognized by SAAG) Black Municipal Workers Union against the Johannesburg City Council. These series of strikes would meet with less success than did the 1973/74 strikes as employers, and SAAG, would coordinate a more effective response involving mass dismissal of workers, deportations to homelands, imprisonment without trial of leaders, and so on.

1980/1981 would also see the re-activation of the "internal-wing" of the long-banned ANC, despite the vigilance of the security police, on a wider scale than ever before. For SAAG the chickens had come home to roost: some of the thousands of young blacks who had fled the terror inflicted on them by SAAG in the 1976/77 crackdown had returned, after receiving ANC organized training, to avenge the death and imprisonment of their comrades. In a series of spectacular (by South African standards) sabotage acts aimed less at generating terror within the white population than "showing the flag" within the black population, the ANC was able to show that it was no longer moribund. The sabotage activities would include rocket and grenade attacks on police stations; a bomb attack on the SASOL coal-to-oil refinery (an important symbol of the economic pride and joy of SAAG) in July 1980; bomb attacks on power stations in the Eastern Transvaal in July 1981; and a rocket attack on a large military base outside Pretoria in August 1981. Unlike in the case of groups such as the IRA in Northern Ireland, ANC violence was aimed primarily at either the military or economic infrastructure rather than civilian populations (though this is not to say that a number of innocent civilians would not get inadvertently caught in some of the violence—as when a Beirut-style car-bomb attack took place on military offices of the South African Air Force, the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the South African Navy in downtown Pretoria on May 20, 1983). Despite this "humane" approach to revolutionary violence by the ANC, SAAG would respond with even greater indiscriminate terror against suspected ANC members and sympathizers than before, and mount retaliatory attacks and assassinations against the ANC in neighboring countries.

Among the annual crop of people tortured to death by the security police while being interrogated was Dr. Neil Aggett (a white trade union activist for the multiracial Food and Canning Workers Union). He died on February 5, 1982. His death would provoke a well-supported nation-wide strike by predominantly black unions on February 11 in his honor. 1982 also saw strikes for other reasons too: for example, in July the largest black miners' strike since 1946 would take place in the Transvaal and Natal gold and coal mines. The strike would provoke police intervention culminating in a number of miners being shot dead and the dismissal of 3,000 miners.

In 1983, African students again instituted a series of boycotts, though on a much-limited scale than before. Some of the school boycotts were precipitated by commuter boycotts of buses (because of crippling fare increases) in the Ciskei homeland and the subsequent repression by the Ciskei police in which a number of commuters would be wounded, some fatally. (The commuter boycotts had begun in July 1982 and would continue into 1984). During this year an important human rights group would be formed by black parents (to assist the burgeoning number of children imprisoned without trial in whatever way legitimately possible): the *Detainees' Parent Support Group*. Another significant group to emerge in 1983 would be the *United Democratic Front*. It would be set up following a meeting in Cape Town of representatives of hundreds of diverse community-based organizations (but all united in their opposition to apartheid) on August 20–21, 1983. Adopting the strategy of nonviolence, and maintaining a loosely-knit organizational style, in the tradition of the Congress Alliance of the 1950s that had brought together a heterogeneous multiclass, multiracial, and multidenominational community groups, the UDF set as its immediate goal the task of organizing national resistance to the new constitutional proposals announced by Botha as part of his reform package. The formation of the UDF was of historic importance given the fact that it had been three decades since a similar antiapartheid united front, the ANC-led Congress Alliance, had emerged (and then later crushed by SAAG). Moreover, its formation was essentially an outcome of internal developments and not externally-mediated efforts (in the shape of initiatives from the exile liberation movements, such as the ANC).[11] Among the groups that would become part of the UDF were the Azanian Students Organization, the Catholic Bishops Conference, Congress of Unions of South Africa, NUSAS, United Women's Organizations and the South African Indian Congress. Not surprisingly, the UDF would proclaim its allegiance to the ANC, not so much overtly but covertly: for example, it would adopt the *Freedom Charter* as its guiding platform. (Open allegiance was, of course, impossible, it would have provoked swift retribution from SAAG.)[12]

Still in 1983, another antiapartheid group, the *National Forum* would be established by some 800 representatives of about 200 or so antiapartheid organizations meeting from June 11–12, 1983 at Hammanskraal, near Johannesburg. Compared to the UDF, the National Forum would be more radical given its adherence to the ideology of Black Consciousness. Closely associated with the Na-

tional Forum would be AZAPO, the *Azanian People's Organization* (established on October 1, 1979, to replace the Black Consciousness organizations banned in 1977 by SAAG), which had firmly adopted the Black Consciousness ideology and rejected the ANC strategy of forging a broad multi-class and multi-race national front to fight the apartheid system. Hence the ideological platform that the National Forum would produce as its version of the Freedom Charter, a document that they would call *Manifesto of the Azanian People*, would be a codification of the ideology and strategy espoused by AZAPO and which is summarized thus by Murray (1987: 227): "antiracism and antiimperialism, noncollaboration with the oppressors and their political instruments, independent working-class organizations, and opposition to all alliances with ruling-class parties…." Although the two organizations displayed clear differences in their ideological positions (and hence to that extent they were rivals), in terms of practical politics the differences between them was minimal—except in a few instances.[13] It should be noted that this upsurge in antiapartheid activity at the organizational level that the formation of these various organizations indicated, should not lead to the perception that SAAG had drastically modified its draconian laws prohibiting even peaceful antiapartheid activities. Rather such activity was an indication of how deep and widespread it had become to the point where the security apparatus of the neofascist apartheid state found it difficult to institute the kind of political clampdown it had so effectively engineered during the first decade of antiapartheid rebellion.

In 1984, sporadic school boycotts would continue, as would the transportation boycotts. These would be joined by boycotts against rent and service charge increases in a number of townships (e.g., those of Lamontville and Chesterville near Durban) and strikes by miners. As usual some participants in these incidents would be shot to death by the security forces (including the army) and many imprisoned without trial. However, a large number of Africans would also die at the hands of fellow Africans in the townships; they (the victims) would be accused of being apartheid quislings, which of course, sadly, they were given the nature of their work. (Such people included officials who ran the apartheid-instituted township councils, police and security personnel, informers and spies.) As 1984 was the year when elections were held for Botha's new tricameral parliament, considerable political opposition in the form of boycotts would also take place over the farcical elections (held on August 24, 1984) that not only denied voting rights to the majority of the population, the Africans, but were based on a segregated voter roll. Many of the Coloreds and Asians eligible to vote would boycott the elections; only 18% of Colored voters and 13% of Asian voters participated. Student participation in school boycotts over the elections, as well as issues relating to education per se, would become so widespread that by October nearly a million students had been affected.

Unlike in 1976/77, however, the rebellion in 1984 (which would continue on through 1985, and into 1986) would not be a predominantly student affair: workers and adult township residents would also become involved on a massive scale for a variety of apartheid-related reasons. The following examples provide some indication of the nature and extent of the rebellion: Beginning on August 30, 1984 (when the inaugural meeting of the new tricameral parliament took place) widespread protests involving pitched battles with security forces engulfed the Vaal triangle townships (Sharpeville, Sebokeng, Bophlelong, Boipatong, and Evaton). The protests continued into September as other issues such as rent and service charge increases became the target of attention. On September 12, rebellion broke out once more in Soweto as thousands of youths attempting to commemorate the day of the murder of Steve Biko were assaulted by security forces. Also in September, beginning on the 17th, black miners belonging to the National Union of Mineworkers staged a series of wildcat strikes in support of demands for wage increases. The next day a confrontation between the paramilitary police and the miners at one of the mines, Western Areas, left a number of miners dead and hundreds injured. Beginning on October 23, the Vaal triangle townships would become the focus of a massive army and police security operation—it would be a culmination of a nearly two-month confrontation with township residents that had left almost 150 people confirmed dead. From November 5–6, black trade unions, supported by numerous UDF organizations, staged a massive work stay-away in Transvaal in protest against police and army occupation of the townships, rent and service increases, imprisonment without trial, and other grievances. The president of one of the largest black trade unions: Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), Chris Dhlamini, best articulated the motivation for the stay-away:

> It is crystal clear to us that our members and other workers are being sucked dry by blood-thirsty industrialists and the government. How can we be silent when the children of our members are killed like animals in the

> streets of the townships? How can we be silent when our children tell us they cannot take the educational inferiority any longer? How can we be silent when we are forced to pay high rents for houses that are mere sleeping dungeons? How can we be silent when we are denied basic human rights in the land of our birth? How much longer must we be silent when our very dignity as human beings is questioned? (From Murray 1987: 260)

Nearly 400,000 students would also join this most successful stay-away in 35 years by boycotting classes. As usual the stay-away would be marked by army/police actions in the townships that would leave many dead and scores wounded. The stay-away provoked further retaliation from SAAG: beginning on November 8 the security police raided offices of trade unions and other organizations and imprisoned without trial key leaders of principal organizations involved in the stay-away. As Christmas approached, FOSATU (joined by numerous antiapartheid organizations) called upon blacks to observe a "Black Christmas" where there would be no celebration, and purchases would be restricted to essentials. The objective was to honor the hundreds of victims of security operations (those killed, injured, imprisoned without trial, tortured and murdered in prison) as well as to hit the apartheid system where it hurt most: in the pockets of white businesses.

1985 would begin with an announcement in parliament, in response to the growing "Free Mandela Movement" inside and outside South Africa, by State President Botha on January 31, 1985, that SAAG would free Nelson Mandela on condition that he "unconditionally rejected violence as a political weapon."[14] SAAG probably knew all along that Mandela would not accept the offer. Mandela's response, publicly conveyed via his daughter Zinzi, would come on February 10. At a mass meeting in Jabulani Stadium in Soweto, beginning with the preamble: "On Friday my mother and our attorney saw my father at Pollsmoor Prison to obtain his answer to Botha's offer of conditional release…," she read out Mandela's eloquent, uncompromising and courageous statement of reply; it said inter alia: "I am a member of the African National Congress. I have always been a member of the African National Congress and I will remain a member of the African National Congress until the day I die…. I am surprised at the conditions that the government wants to impose on me. I am not a violent man." He then went on to explain how repeated efforts since 1952 by ANC leaders to request SAAG to meet with them and peacefully negotiate an end to apartheid and full political rights for all was equally repeatedly rejected by successive leaders of SAAG: D. F. Malan, J. G. Strijdom, and H. F. Verwoerd. He continued:

> It was only then, when all other forms of resistance were no longer open to us, that we turned to armed struggle. Let Botha show that he is different [from] Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd. Let him renounce violence. Let him say that he will dismantle apartheid. Let him unban the people's organization, the African National Congress. Let him free all who have been imprisoned, banished or exiled for their opposition to apartheid. Let him guarantee free political activity so that people may decide who will govern them. I cherish my own freedom dearly, but I care even more for your freedom. Too many have died since I went to prison. Too many have suffered for the love of freedom. I owe it to their widows, to their orphans, to their mothers and to their fathers who have grieved and wept for them. Not only I have suffered during these long, lonely, wasted years. I am not less life-loving than you are. But I cannot sell my birthright, nor am I prepared to sell the birthright of the people to be free.… Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into contracts. (Mandela 1986: 195–96)

Clearly, those who had imprisoned Mandela never thought that imprisonment, far from breaking and destroying him, would transform him into a man of great political stature, or that he would become a hero to millions of young blacks who had never seen him—as well as a symbol of the struggle against the evil forces of racism and oppression to millions of others (of all races) around the world.[15]

As if in response to Mandela's statement, the 1984 round of rebellions would continue with even greater ferocity in 1985; examples abound: Early in the year the rebellion spread to small cities and towns in the countryside, i.e., (the platteland) of the Eastern Cape and the Orange Free State, where whites had long felt secure in their ability to exact slave-like submission from blacks to their intensely racist rule. Hence whites in places like Cradock, Fort Beaufort, Virginia, Odendaalsrus, and Ikageng received a rude awakening when blacks began to rebel against apartheid oppression; the whites had thought that black discontent was only an urban affair. At about the same time (February-March) the rebellion spread from the Vaal triangle area to the urban townships of the Eastern Cape. Hence beginning on March 16 a three-day successful work stay-away and consumer boycott of white-owned businesses was organized. As usual the "Black Weekend" stay-away was not without confrontations with the police; some seventy people would die as a result. A few days later, on March 21 (the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre) more people would die as a result of police violence: at

least twenty people would be mowed down in cold blood by automatic weapons and shotguns in the township of Langa outside Uitenhage. The victims were part of some 500 or so mourners on their way to a funeral at a place called Kwanobuhle. Not surprisingly, the townships of Langa and Kwanobuhle erupted in rage at the massacre; government buildings were burned, and some town councilors and black policemen were fatally attacked. The security forces responded by laying siege to the townships. Protests against the Langa massacre were not restricted to the Uitenhage area: many townships elsewhere in the country also became involved; thereby further ratcheting up the cycle of violence, with blacks attacking black quislings on one hand, and on the other, security forces attacking blacks, provoking more deaths, more injuries and more violence.[16] On the same day as the Langa killings, black mine workers numbering some 42,000 went on strike at South Africa's largest gold mine: the Anglo American-owned Vaal Reefs complex; it would be the beginning of another long period of labor unrest in which strikers would be attacked by police and many, by the thousands, would be dismissed.[17] In retaliation, the ANC would explode bombs in two offices of the Anglo American corporation in Johannesburg on April 30.

Faced with this latest cycle of unprecedented popular rebellion within the black population in 1984/85 that left none of the four South African provinces untouched, and after failing to quell the rebellion with army and police attacks involving indiscriminate shootings and massacres, coupled with mass arrests—some 10,000 had been arrested in the period September 1984 to March 22, 1985) and charges of treason, punishable by death, levied against 50 or so of them by May of 1985—(and add to all this the torture and murder by the security police of their suspects and the escalating right wing vigilante violence), SAAG decided to go one step further in its repression by declaring a *state of emergency* on July 20, 1985 in selected areas, those it deemed most affected by the rebellion. This step meant that in addition to the already existing highly repressive apartheid laws that gave enormous powers of coercion to the security forces, the state of emergency would now permit the security forces to:

- imprison people without charging them with any specific offense;
- imprison people indefinitely without permitting them access to legal assistance;
- search homes, premises, etc. without warrants;
- seize property without warrants;
- prohibit the media from reporting on events taking place in designated areas by denying them access to these areas;
- censor all news relating to these areas;
- declare curfews; and
- where necessary take charge of essential services (e.g., water and electricity supply).

At the same time, to add insult to injury, the state of emergency made identification by the media of persons imprisoned under the emergency illegal and rendered immune all security personnel from any legal claims that could be made by victims of the emergency powers of the security forces.

The State of Emergency: 1985–1990

If SAAG thought that these fascist measures would suppress the rebellion, then they quickly found out that they were mistaken. To be sure, through mass arrests and intimidation with massive fire-power they were able to, eventually, break the following cycle of rebellion and violence: mass protests against apartheid grievances—lead to confrontations with security forces—lead to fatal shootings by the security forces and murders of black apartheid quislings by protesters—lead to mass "politicized" funerals that include antiapartheid rhetoric and symbols (such as flags of banned organizations like the ANC and SACP)—lead to confrontations with security forces—and so on. The rebellion continued, but it would increasingly depend on a wider incorporation of previously less used tactics; such as widespread consumer boycotts against white businesses that occurred in the Eastern Cape and elsewhere.

However the old pattern of rebellion and violence was not entirely eliminated everywhere. Hence among the places that would witness protests and rebellion of the "traditional" kind in the post-emergency period would be the Durban area and the Western Cape.[18] With the declaration of the state of emergency, the security forces would now respond with even greater brutality: throughout the emergency areas their targets would now be schoolchildren, particularly those associated with the country's largest organization for black high-school students: the Congress of South African

Students (COSAS). (COSAS would be banned in August 1985.) Reasoning that much of the unrest in the townships was the work of schoolchildren, they proceeded to subject them to all kinds of harassment: including searches, forcible attendance of classes, arrests, torture, and so on. The security forces would also be aided by right wing African vigilante death squads—some organized by them, and some organized by apartheid quislings (including African authorities in the "homelands"). These death squads would be made up of paid ex-convicts, police informers (some of them criminals who agreed to be informers in lieu of being imprisoned), paid migrant workers (who tended to be politically more conservative than their resident urban brethren given their desperate dependence on maintaining continuous employment to avoid deportations to their ultra-poverty-stricken homelands), off-duty African security force personnel, and so on.[19] Yet the unrest continued throughout 1985 and into 1986.

The new slogan, perhaps tragically, among the schoolchildren would be "liberation before education!" Meanwhile, adults (supported by their children) continued to engage in strikes and various types of boycotts: rent boycotts, consumer boycotts, transportation boycotts, and so on. (Needless to say, inevitably such action cost some participants their lives as security forces would move in to crush the protests.) Among the places affected by such activities in the post-emergency period included: the Eastern Transvaal townships of Barberton, Breyton, Piet Retief, etc.; townships in the Witwatersrand area, such as Alexandra, Cradock and Soweto; townships in the Western Cape, such as Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, Langa, etc.; townships in the Eastern Cape, such as Lingelihle, KwaNobuhle, and so on. The list would grow ever longer. Consumer boycotts were implemented in such places as Aliwal North, Molteno, East London, and Port Elizabeth. Strikes by workers also remained a persistent feature of the ongoing rebellion: one of the major ones was organized on the occasion of the 1986 May Day. Some 1.5 million workers stayed away from work on that day making it the largest national strike ever held by blacks—and of course it would not be without the usual quota of security police violence. Perhaps the greatest significance of the strike was that it was an indication of the extent of political consciousness and militancy that had permeated the psyche of ordinary blacks, without which a strike of such magnitude would not have been possible.

On June 12, 1986, SAAG would announce that the state of emergency would now be expanded to include the entire country, not just the traditional "hot" spots as was the case with the previous emergency which was terminated on March 7. This action was taken, it appears, in order to forestall what was suspected to be the imminent launching, on June 16th, of mass nation-wide protests by blacks to mark the tenth anniversary of the Soweto Uprising. Besides re-imposing the previous emergency regulations new regulations were also added: for example, all "illegal" strikes were forbidden and all forms of boycotts were made illegal. Shortly after the state of emergency was declared, leaders of numerous antiapartheid organizations would be exposed to the full force of it: they would be imprisoned without trial by the hundreds. Within a period of roughly thirteen to fourteen months following the declaration of the emergency, some 25,000 people altogether would be imprisoned without trial, and of them 20% would be children; but even more tragic: 2000 of these imprisoned children—some as young as five!—will be murdered as a result of torture and mistreatment (West 1987: 27). The enormous toll on the lives of the children was in part a function of the elusive search for "ring-leaders"—usually there were none—by the security police (coupled probably with inexperience in how far to go when torturing children).[20] Blacks would, however, remain undaunted: another major nation-wide work stay-away would be organized to mark the June 16th uprising. Moreover, antiapartheid protests and rebellions would continue, marked by sporadic violence, in subsequent years—all the way into the early 90s. Indicative of this persistence of rebellion would be the decision by SAAG to ban the UDF in 1988.

THE U.S. ANTIAPARTHEID "MOVEMENT"

In presenting the foregoing chronology of the second "decade of antiapartheid rebellion" in South Africa, the intention is to show that as in the previous cases of major outbreaks of black political protest (e.g., at the time of the Sharpeville Massacre during the first decade of antiapartheid rebellion) the second decade of rebellion as well would coincide with a resurgence of antiapartheid activity in the United States, not unexpectedly.[21] The hitherto relatively dormant "movement" would be re-galvanized and become quite active as apartheid would be brought once again to the attention of

the U.S. public by the media (via front-page news stories and national television news broadcasts of the almost daily scenes of rebellion and the attendant violence of the security forces), especially during the months of late 1984 and early 1985.[22] The movement, consequently, would launch an attack on Reagan's morally bankrupt policy of "constructive engagement" employing a variety of strategies and tactics that were aimed at the twin objectives of isolating and delegitimating the apartheid state, and in the eventual passage of the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* of 1986, it would find a symbolic, but significant victory.[23]

Which groups, then, among the politically active together constituted the "movement" in the United States? The key categories of civil society groups that were involved in the movement were civil rights and community-based national groups; white church-based groups; black church-based groups; university and college students; philanthropic organizations; and cultural sector groups.

Civil Rights and Community-Based National Groups

Of all the groups who participated in the "movement," these community-based groups had the longest and most consistent history in campaigning against apartheid in the United States. In fact, as early as 1912, at the time of the formation of one of the world's oldest nationalist liberation movements, the ANC, one of these groups, the NAACP, would become involved in ANC's formation in an advisory capacity (Hauck 1983: 8). The activities of these organizations—which included The American Committee on Africa (ACOA), Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Southern Africa Project), The American Friends Service Committee, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), TransAfrica, Washington Office on Africa, and so on—would span the widest range of activities befitting a movement with a major foreign policy agenda: from organizing speaking tours, conferences and seminars, to demonstrations and sit-ins, to conducting research and producing publications, on to providing financial, legal and material aid to victims of apartheid (inside and outside South Africa).[24] At the same time, relative to all other groups, these groups did expend some effort to situate the problem of apartheid as properly belonging to the entire Southern African region and not just South Africa alone. (Though of course much more needed to be done regarding this matter.)

Like most of the other antiapartheid groups they depended for their financial support primarily on donations from individuals and other similar fund-raising activities; in other words, they did not receive, except with rare exceptions, financial support from sources such as business corporations and the U.S. government. One outcome of this fact was that relative to organizations and businesses that were pro-apartheid—almost always covertly rather than overtly (i.e., publicly they were never reluctant to voice the obligatory denunciation of apartheid)—they had very limited financial resources. Consequently, their ability to directly influence USG policies relating to Southern Africa was extremely limited. For, as groups seeking to change U.S. foreign policy have discovered over the years, it takes large sums of money to achieve their objective. Hiding behind First Amendment rights (relating to freedom of speech), U.S. capital has over many decades managed to stealthily, but quite legally, steer the United States steadily toward the cultivation of one of the most "corrupt" procedural democracies to be found in the Euro-North American ecumene, where the adage "he who pays the piper calls the tune" is truly the sine qua non of almost all major executive and legislative decision making at both state and federal levels. Hence, money is needed to pay the professional "influence peddlers" (or lobbyists as they are commonly called)—these are often people who have held high-level government jobs and who, upon leaving office, become "consultants" (that is, for usually exorbitantly high fees they help plan influence strategies and help open "doors" to top government officials). Money is also needed in a context where lobbying Congress requires enormous amounts of funds to "bribe" Congresspersons for favors in exchange for donations to their campaign coffers, and to finance unethical (but not necessarily illegal) activities similar to the ones that the pro-SAAG U.S. lobby, for example, engaged in (e.g., sending Congresspersons on "study-trips" to Southern Africa, and so on).[25]

Compounding the problem of inadequate financial resources, mention should also be made of the fact that for a long time many of these groups suffered from a grave misperception as to where policy on Africa was really formulated: in the White House (or, from the perspective of blacks, historically and up to the present, White's House) and in Congress, but not in the State Department

where most of their lobbying efforts were often concentrated. However, in fairness, it is only with the increase in the numbers of black Congresspersons over the two decades following the civil rights achievements of the 1960s—and the subsequent formation of a group like TransAfrica (a U.S. African American lobbying group with ties to the Congressional Black Caucus)—would it become possible to lobby Congress more effectively than before.

The majority of the community-based groups were organized, staffed, and run by white liberals. Consequently, another weakness that would afflict most of these groups was their inability (and/or unwillingness—residual influences of the ideology of whiteness?), by and large, to draw active participatory support for their work from U.S. African Americans and other blacks (such as U.S. Asian, First, and Latino Americans). The fact that they were white liberal organizations was not in itself the problem, but rather it was a problem in a context where there were so few black antiapartheid organizations. One would assume that all groups among the U.S. citizenry victimized by white racism would have thrown up large numbers of activists engaged in the antiapartheid struggle; sadly, this would not be the case. The struggle against apartheid was, by and large, isolated from the struggle against racism in the United States itself. The indifference that many white liberals demonstrated toward racism in the United States served not only to make a mockery of their antiapartheid work, but also weakened it. Conversely, the indifference that many blacks (though not all of course) opposed to white racism in the United States displayed toward participation in building a strong U.S. antiapartheid movement (largely because of ignorance of the dialectical relationship between racism in the United States and racism in South Africa), only undermined their own U.S. struggles. Many blacks failed to understand and act upon the fact that the forces responsible for perpetuating racism in the United States were the same forces that were also involved in helping to perpetuate apartheid in South Africa.[26]

White Church-Based Groups

Many conventional church groups (that is those not affiliated with evangelicals) would become active in the antiapartheid movement as a result of their investment links with U.S. businesses operating in South Africa.[27] Hence groups such as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (New York) and the American Friends Service Committee—Southern Africa Program (Philadelphia), would seek to influence U.S. businesses to disinvest from South Africa. As a result of the publicity work of the community-based groups like those mentioned above, church groups began to realize that some of the money they were making from direct or indirect investments in U.S. businesses operating in South Africa was money being made from the racist exploitation of black labor there. In other words, as it slowly began to dawn on some of them that it was not only whites in South Africa who were benefiting from the evils of apartheid, but others like them in the United States were benefiting too, they began to become active in the antiapartheid movement. At the same time, as the tempo of the liberation struggle began to pick up in Southern Africa itself, many church groups in the United States (black and white) were also affected positively. This was especially true for those churches that had relations with counterpart church groups in Southern Africa—in some cases going over a century back (e.g., Lutherans in Namibia, and Methodists in South Africa and Zimbabwe). At the same time, bilateral links between ecumenical institutions (such as the National Council of Churches, the South African Council of Churches, and the World Council of Churches) would further help to raise consciousness among many white U.S. churches regarding the antiapartheid struggle.

In terms of practical action, white U.S. church groups began initially by introducing share-holder resolutions at meetings asking businesses to ameliorate the conditions of their black workers in South Africa (e.g., by enforcing the Sullivan Principles). Later, they became bolder by asking U.S. businesses not to export strategic items (oil, computers, and so on), or in the case of banks they asked them not to loan money to SAAG. However, some went even further by asking that the businesses pull out of South Africa completely (disinvestment). Such share-holder activism, as is to be expected, was not usually successful considering that the foremost responsibility of capitalist enterprises is to make profits however and wherever they can. Though, on the other hand, there was value in this activity from a different perspective: it helped raise consciousness in local communities regarding apartheid and the role played by U.S. capital in buttressing it. Later, many church groups, in the face of predictable management intransigence, began to take the route of simply divesting their

own investments in these businesses; while a few went even further by not only calling for U.S. disinvestment from South Africa but the imposition of economic sanctions on that country. Via their bilateral connections with church groups in South Africa, U.S. churches also helped to assist them materially in their struggles against apartheid.

The range of antiapartheid activities that many U.S. churches formally took upon themselves—at least in principle if not always in practice—following the Soweto Uprising was best summarized by a document produced by a consultative conference between the National Council of Churches and the U.S. Catholic Conference held to consider the issue of "The Church and Southern Africa," convened from March 7–11, 1977, at Marcy, New York, in 1977.[28] The document identified a number of key strategies by which U.S. churches could meet their responsibility in the struggle against apartheid; they included:

- *Critical Evaluation of Structures*. North American churches were asked re-examine the nature of their structural connections with South Africa (e.g., via investments) to determine what role they were playing in support of apartheid and how they could eliminate that role.
- *Education about the Struggle*. Using a variety of sources (church leaders in South Africa, media, liberation movements, independent research, etc.) facts were to be collated to generate truthful relevant information (updates as well as background interpretative analyses) on South Africa for widest dissemination possible to the church community, the general public and the media. "In addition, demonstrations and protests in the United States against apartheid are both appropriate and effective."
- *Influence on Public Policy*. The churches were asked to do all they could to convince all the three branches of government to develop policies withdrawing existing forms of government support for the apartheid system, as well as encourage change. One such policy for example would be to deny tax credits to businesses paying taxes in South Africa; by subjecting businesses to double-taxation in this way they could be persuaded to stop investing in South Africa.
- *Influence on Economic Forces*. Working from a premise that rejected "the claim of corporations that investments, changes in corporate wages and working conditions act as a force for the fundamental social change that is necessary in South Africa," churches were encouraged to campaign to get businesses that operated in South Africa and Namibia to reveal the full extent of their involvement and to pressure them to withdraw from South Africa. The document argued that this involvement only served to support the apartheid system directly (e.g., via the taxes they payed and some of the services they provided) and indirectly (e.g., by creating a vested interest in maintaining the status quo).
- *Support of Persons and Organizations in South Africa Directly Involved in Liberation Struggle*. Via their extensive bilateral contacts with South African churches, North American churches were in a position to (and were obliged to) provide support (spiritual, moral, and humanitarian material aid) to the South African churches, as well as others engaged in the liberation struggle.
- *Foster International Support for Victims of Oppression*. North American churches were to do everything they could to galvanize international opinion against human rights violations of specific victims of apartheid when their victimization took on intensely virulent form at particular moments and occasions.
- *Support for Reform of Refugee Laws*. Churches were asked to work toward getting immigration laws and regulations in the United States changed so as to permit political refugees from Southern Africa to seek asylum in the United States
- *Conscientization of Mission Boards*. "North American Churches have a responsibility," the document stated, "for the conscientization of their mission boards regarding the appropriate role of expatriate missionaries in South Africa, in order to avoid unconscious complicity in apartheid in South Africa." It went on to suggest that, "[i]n this connection North American churches should support the indigenization of the churches in South Africa so that power is neither in the hands of the expatriate missionaries nor the South African white minority in the church."[29]

While, quite clearly, the range of antiapartheid activities that North American churches were called upon to undertake was wide, conspicuously missing, however, was a call to assist directly and specifically the nationalist liberation movements (e.g., the ANC)—that is, organizations that included in their efforts to further their cause the use of revolutionary violence. While it is understandable that no religious group, in principle at least, would want to encourage violence anywhere there was still the problem of honestly confronting the continuing absence, created by the apartheid laws, of opportunities for peaceful means to oppose systemic or institutional violence intrinsic to the apartheid system. Following in the footsteps of the WCC—which about a decade earlier had launched, in 1970, its *Program to Combat Racism* that began providing through its Special Fund to Combat Racism humanitarian aid to nationalist liberation movements, such as the ANC and SWAPO—at least one white U.S. church, however, that did begin to grapple with this problem was the United Presbyterian Church of the United States. The following excerpt from a declaration on South Africa and Namibia

made by the General Assembly of the Church on the occasion of its 193rd convocation in 1981 was illustrative:

> 5. Recognizing the importance of perceptions influencing public policy: (a) Condemns the implicit racism that assumes that black movements are unable to succeed unless controlled or inspired by Communist forces, or that black-ruled societies would automatically be antithetical to the interests of the United States; (b) Condemns the theological perversion that equates white-dominated structures and societies with Christian civilization; (c) Condemns the ideological blindness that cites black violence aimed at achieving political change in South Africa as evidence of barbarism or as an attribute of communism, ignoring the political, economic, and social pressures that have, in the past, driven other societies, including our own to violence; and (d) Rejects the ideological gymnastics that condemn "totalitarian" governments or systems as evil and supports or condones "authoritarian" systems as necessary to world stability and U.S. interests. (United Presbyterian Church of U.S.A. 1981: 65)

While the church did not specifically sound a call to bear arms against SAAG, it did reject hypocritical and hoary arguments, put forward by friends of SAAG in the United States, which aimed to legitimate the repressive violence of SAAG but at the same time sought to condemn the revolutionary violence of the victims of apartheid. By their very nature, religious groups in general have a proclivity for a nonviolent strategy of social change (except of course in circumstances where religious differences overlie incendiary ethnic/national differences as in, to give examples from the past as well as the present, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Hungary, India, Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Azerbaijan and Armenia).[30]

Given the continuing importance (to varying degrees) of the Christian religion in the lives of many in both the United States and South Africa, perhaps some of the most significant antiapartheid work that some U.S. churches would undertake was to confront the issue of racism in its generic sense (and to some extent the issue of revolutionary violence as well)—at least at the ideological level. Throughout most of their history, white churches in both countries had never really taken a strident and clear-cut position on where they stood on the question of racism. In fact, on the contrary, the very existence of separate black and white churches in both countries was (and is) a testimony to the very regressive role the Western European version of Christianity had played, in terms of racism, historically throughout the world.[31] In other words, Westernized Christianity was not only silent on the matter of white racism, but in actuality, as we have already indicated, was one of its major sources.

Formal condemnation of racism, among U.S. churches began slowly from roughly around the time when the World Council of Churches (WCC) started to speak out forcefully on the issue, as it did in 1954 at its convocation in Evanston, Illinois where, in the same year as the ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that segregation in schools was unconstitutional (*Brown v. Board of Education*), the WCC would declare that "any form of segregation based on race, color or ethnic origin is contrary to the Gospel and is incompatible with the nature of the Church of Christ" (from Deats 1981: 109). At the same time though, there was still considerable reluctance to openly and forcefully take a stand on the matter; especially if it meant endorsing the WCC's Program to Combat Racism because right wing conservative forces in the United States had, most bizarrely, come to portray the WCC as a cold war Trojan horse for the Communist world.[32] One must not forget that the general tendency, with rare exceptions, of the Christian churches throughout history all across the world—ever since the Roman Emperor Constantine I transformed Christianity in the fourth century from what was then a cult religion to a state-supported religion—has been to, by and large, side with the state on most political matters of major import. Consequently, even in the United States, the white churches tended to follow the lead of USGs in foreign policy matters (including on the matter of the South African question), "mirroring," to borrow the words of Smith (2006a: 4), "the government's vacillations between goodwill and self-interestedness, compassion and callousness."

It is with the outbreak of the Soweto Uprising, however, that the white U.S. churches would begin to issue strong condemnations of racism. For example, the report of the consultative conference on "The Church in Southern Africa," would state inter alia: "[T]here are certain clarities we must affirm and support as being in conformity with the Gospel of Jesus Christ. (a) All persons, regardless of color, are of equal worth in the sight of God. (b) Human institutions, political or otherwise, which deny human worth on the basis of race, are sinful. (c) Christians are to risk themselves on behalf of their fellow human beings by seeking a just social order in which the dignity of every person

is affirmed" (p. 59). On the question of apartheid South Africa specifically, the report would state among other things:

> 1. The people of South Africa need liberation, in order that the human dignity which is the birthright of every human creature of God may be respected and honored. 2. Liberation means a radical change in the present situation in South Africa to eliminate all structures, laws, institutions and patterns of conduct that oppress human beings for reasons of race or any other condition.… 4. The Christian churches, in faithfulness to Jesus Christ, must support and participate in the struggle on behalf of and with the oppressed, and in South Africa this means support of the liberation struggle carried on both inside and outside the churches.… 8. As we struggle for justice we do so in the understanding that the entirety of human life and relationships is of concern to God and hence the Christian community must confront any forces that deny human dignity, in whatever realm of life that may occur. This implies that the easy distinction some would make between the "spiritual" tasks of the church and the "political" responsibilities of citizens is untenable. (1978: 59)

Today, most *mainline* U.S. Churches are firmly on record in their opposition, in principle at least if not in deed, to racism in the United States and elsewhere. One cautionary note, however: not all white church groups supported the antiapartheid movement. A group of white churches that turned their backs on the antiapartheid struggle were those that are part of what is sometimes called the Religious Right (RR)—of which a dominant component are white churches associated with the Protestant U.S. *Evangelical movement* (which include such strains as Southern Baptist, Christian Identity, Pentecostal, Reconstructionist, Charismatic, and Revivalist churches, and which we have already met in passing). Comprising denominations that often depend for their membership primarily on radio/television broadcasts ("televangelism") in which preachers pound out fire-and-brimstone sermons as a backdrop to their money-raising efforts, the Evangelical movement (with rare exception) is also distinguished by a more open and forthright alliance, ironically, with right wing political conservatism.[33] This theologically reactionary approach—recall that Christ, according to Biblical teachings, was a revolutionary who spoke truth to power by siding with the downtrodden, the dispossessed, and the marginalized—has included making a cornerstone of its views on church-state relations the *non*separation of the church and state (in direct opposition to the intent of the U.S. Constitution on this matter). It should not be surprising, then, that when it came to the apartheid question a number of prominent leaders of RR chose to publicly side with the apartheid state. One such leader, for example, was Reverend Jerry Falwell, one of the founding members of an absolutely reactionary multidenominational organization that he helped launch in 1979 and came to lead; he called it the Moral Majority (later revived as the Moral Majority Coalition)—a most cynical play on words. Under his leadership, this organization would assist with providing the theological justification for many of the right wing domestic and foreign policies that the Reagan Administration would pursue (as well as claiming credit, perhaps legitimately, for being instrumental in Reagan's election to the presidency in the first place). Not surprisingly, at the height of the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa, Falwell would visit that country in late 1985 to lend his support to SAAG; and in line with Reagan's so-called constructive engagement policy, he would come away opposing any measures aimed at economically isolating apartheid South Africa globally, while at the same time praising SAAG for its supposed moves toward dismantling apartheid. To add insult to injury, he not only did not find time to meet with any of the black leaders on his trip, but declared that the Nobel laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu was, in Falwell's words, "a phony" who was "no more a spokesman for the black majority than I am," and he would later similarly dismiss Nelson Mandela, labeling him as nothing more than a communist (from Smith 2006b: 143-44).[34] At the same time, to counter the activities of the U.S. antiapartheid movement, and joined by such others of his ilk as the televangelist Reverend Pat Robertson (founder of the Christian Broadcasting Network), Falwell would campaign to delegitimate the message of the movement.[35] Clearly, as elsewhere in the world, religion in the United States can be both a force for progress and a force for reaction.

Black Church-based Groups

White church-based groups were not the only ones involved in the U.S. antiapartheid movement, of course. Many black church-based groups were also participants, however their participation was often part of a broader African-American-led antiapartheid effort (such as the "Free South Africa Movement") which we will consider shortly below. Meanwhile, we should note here that participation by some black church groups in the antiapartheid movement in the United States had a fairly

long history even before the onset of the second "decade of antiapartheid rebellion." In fact, the arrival of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in South Africa in the 1890s (discussed elsewhere in this work), could, at some stretch, be portrayed as the beginning of the U.S. African American church involvement in the "struggle" against the racist supremacy of the white minority (which at the time had not yet formally jelled into what came to be known as the apartheid system) in that country. However, an overt political campaign against white minority rule in South Africa by U.S. black church-based groups would have to await the emergence of the U.S. civil rights movement on the heels of the 1955–1956 Montgomery Bus Boycott—which would quite serendipitously coincide, roughly, with the beginning of the first "decade of antiapartheid rebellion" in South Africa.[36] Under the leadership of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. (MLK), who was also the head of the predominantly black church-based umbrella organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, founded in 1957 to spearhead the civil rights movement, the agenda of the movement was broadened, most especially after 1965, to include other national and international issues of pressing concern (poverty, the Vietnam War, and of course the issue of apartheid).[37] As the movement gained ground, MLK had already begun to recognize the interrelatedness of, on one hand, issues of race and class nationally, and on the other, domestic racism and U.S. foreign policy internationally.[38] However, it is important to stress here that MLK's interest in the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa, as Baldwin (1995) has shown in his seminal work on this subject, long predated his involvement with the civil rights movement—though not yet in the activist sense, which would only begin with the commencement of the movement. With the serendipitous launch of the movement he simultaneously turned toward an activist involvement, as exemplified by such activities as: corresponding, either indirectly or directly with ANC leaders (e.g., Walter Sisulu and Albert Luthuli); engaging in self-education on the similarities and dissimilarities between apartheid and Jim Crowism; becoming an active executive member of ACOA in 1957 (he, for example, was one of the sponsors of the 1957 *Declaration of Conscience* issued under the auspices of the organization);[39] joining with ACOA and other U.S. organizations to condemn the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre; helping to form the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa that would become active for a while in championing the antiapartheid struggle); joining with Chief Albert Luthuli of ANC, issuing under the sponsorship of ACOA a follow-up on the 1957 *Declaration* with an *Appeal for Action Against Apartheid*;[40] delivering addresses specifically on the subject of apartheid South Africa;[41] including a reference to the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech;[42] lending his name to various antiapartheid campaigns when other commitments on his ever-crowded calendar would not allow him to become personally involved (for instance, he readily agreed to be associated with the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners upon the request of its director, Dennis Brutus); and his unsuccessful effort to persuade SAAG to give him a visa to visit South Africa at the invitation of the white liberal student organization the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS)—which had asked him in the fall of 1965 to be a participant at its 41st Annual Congress at the University of Durban the following year.[43] In this activism, MLK was guided by his particular vision of the "beloved community," which among its principles included a universalistic idea of community that he explained this way: "We have inherited a large house, a great 'world house' in which we have to live together—black and white, Easterner and Westerner, Gentile and Jew, Catholic and Protestant, [Muslim] and Hindu—a family unduly separated in ideas, culture and interest, who, because we can never again live apart, must learn somehow to live with each other in peace" (from Baldwin 1995: 2).[44] Consequently, with the dawn of post-Sharpeville era MLK was confronted with a major dilemma: as a neo-Gandhian, he was an ardent nonviolent activist, whereas the ANC had just commenced its move toward armed revolutionary struggle in 1961 with the formation of its military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation). Now, what to do? The solution he found was to ignore ANC's announced turn to armed violence, but to simultaneously call upon the United States and the world community to exert nonviolent pressures on SAAG, in the form of international sanctions. For example, at its first major conference held at Columbia University from November 23–25, 1962, where MLK was also an active participant, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa issued a clear and forthright statement on South Africa, firmly calling upon the Kennedy Administration, as well as the country as a whole, to implement a series of specific actions aimed at isolating apartheid South Africa in every way possible:

- We deplore our government's opposition to the United Nations resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa. We urge the United States to support such action.…
- [W]e call upon the government to undertake a total embargo of war material to the South African Republic.…
- We call upon the United States business firms to cease lending money to South Africa and to withdraw investments from that country.…
- We urge the United States Government to actively discourage any public or private economic aid to South Africa.
- We urge the State Department to include opponents of the apartheid policy among the South African recipients of leadership grants.
- We call upon individual Americans to join the growing international boycott of South African goods.
- We demand that the United States Armed Forces cease military maneuvers in cooperation with South African forces and the use of South African waters or bases.
- We urge that the United States abandon the practice of excluding American Negroes from its missions to the Republic of South Africa and Africans from affairs sponsored by the American Embassy and all other United States Missions in that country.
- We urge the American Olympic Committee to fight for the exclusion of South Africa from the coming Olympic games unless that nation permits all South African athletes to compete for places on its team without regard to race or color.[45]

There is absolutely no question that had MLK's life not been tragically cut short, his involvement in the U.S. antiapartheid movement would have waxed even further. Eventually, many of the actions he and his contemporaries had called for, such as those just listed, would be implemented in some form, but it would take decades and a concerted and relentless effort on the part of antiapartheid activists in the United States and elsewhere.[46]

University and College Students

Historically, student antiapartheid activism in the United States can be traced back to the days of the anti-Vietnam War campaigns and the Civil Rights struggle.[47] In fact, say Hauck et al. (1983: 9), the first protest organized by the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society)—a student organization that would come to play an important role in the anti-Vietnam War movement—was against the renewal of bank loans to South Africa in March 1965; they protested outside the Wall Street headquarters of Chase Manhattan Bank in New York by staging a sit-in.[48] The student campaign against bank loans expanded enough to draw support from other activist groups, including some church groups (for instance, the Protestant churches withdrew approximately $23 million of their deposits from the U.S. banks involved in the loans). In response to the widely publicized protests, the banks were forced to announce in 1969 that they were not going to renew their loan arrangements with South Africa (which since 1959 had permitted South Africa a $40 million line of credit renewed every two years from a group of ten U.S. banks: Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan, Chemical, Citibank, Continental Illinois, First Chicago, Irving Trust, Manufacturers Hanover and Morgan Guaranty). The reason they gave, however, was that South Africa did not really need the loans after all. This victory proved to be short-lived because a few years later it was discovered that other banks (numbering nine and including mainly smaller regional banks) were involved in a secret loan arrangement to South Africa via a consortium: the European-American Banking Corporation. This discovery in 1973 by activists, provoked another round of anti-bank loans campaign. Perhaps due to the greater vulnerability to community pressure because of their small size, a number of the regional banks, such as Maryland National, Merchants National of Indianapolis undertook not to make any more loans to South Africa until apartheid was eliminated (see Vogel [1978] for more on the anti-bank loans campaign).

The Divestment Campaign. As a result of this early campaign against bank loans to South Africa, student groups on some campuses also, from time to time, extended their anti-Vietnam war campaign to not only support for the ongoing struggles of the civil rights movement but efforts to bring attention to other U.S. business connections with apartheid via what would, a couple of decades later, come to be called the "divestment campaign."[49] For instance, students at Princeton in April 1968 protested against Princeton's investments in U.S. companies that were doing business in South Africa, and they called upon the university to divest its stocks in these companies. During the same year, in May, students at the University of Wisconsin at Madison took up the call for divestment when they occupied the university's administration building in support of their demands that

the university sell its shares of stock in Chase Manhattan. The following year, students at Cornell would also become involved; they would organize a number of protests aimed at getting the University to divest its shares of stock in all banks that lent money to SAAG.

These relatively isolated antiapartheid protests in the sixties, associated with the first "decade of antiapartheid rebellion" in South Africa, were, as just hinted, a logical extension of the protests against the Vietnam War, as well as protests in support of the civil rights movement.[50] Greater interest in the antiapartheid struggle per se, however, would have to await the Soweto Uprising and the murder of Steve Biko. In the wake of the uprising, and later Biko's death, a spate of demonstrations by students in support of divestiture would break out at a number of university and college campuses. For example: in late spring of 1977, nearly 300 students would be arrested at the University of Stanford during a "sit-in" organized to demand the divestment of Stanford's stock in companies doing business in South Africa. Soon many other campuses would become involved in the divestment campaign: Cornell, Wesleyan, Amherst College, and Harvard; Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and Oregon; Illinois, Hampshire College, Smith College and Yale. The response to the demands for divestment by the colleges and universities was occasionally positive: Vassar College Trustees would unanimously decide to withdraw their investments in five major banks lending money to SAAG; explaining their decision, the Trustees stated that while under ordinary circumstances "only economic reasons will be the basis for investment of Vassar funds, rare instances may occur in which overriding social concerns will lead to a moral consensus of such intensity in the Vassar community that treatment of investments must take into account that concern in addition to economic returns" (from Magarell 1978: 10). A number of other institutions that would also completely withdraw their South Africa-related investments would include Hampshire College, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Ohio University, and University of Wisconsin. Partial divestment would be the route that some other institutions would take; e.g., Amherst College, Ohio State University, Smith College, Tufts University, and Columbia University. However, the vast majority of the U.S. higher education institutions would cling to their South African related investments; they would become the target of the third cycle of U.S. antiapartheid student protests that would emerge during the course and in the wake of the 1984/85 black rebellion in South Africa.[51] The third cycle would be marked by very intense involvement in the divestment campaign relative to the earlier protests of the 1960s and the late 1970s. This would be a result, perhaps, of a combination of three factors: a better coverage of the rebellion in South Africa than in the past (given the ferocity of the rebellion itself) by the U.S. broadcast media—at least until the declaration of the state of emergency by SAAG—the re-assertion by the liberal activist faction of students (still and always a minority) of their presence on college campuses, as their courage slowly returned in the wake of the waning influence of the Reagan demagogic "mystique" that had held in thrall vast sections of the U.S. public, including the young; and the catalytic effect of the activities of other antiapartheid groups in the country.[52]

Perhaps among the more well-known confrontations between students and the university administrations in the third cycle was the one that began on April 4, 1985 (anniversary of the assassination of the civil rights leader, Martin Luther King, Jr.). at Columbia University in New York. The students gathered on the steps of the administration building (Hamilton Hall) that day and would remain there for the next three weeks. Organized by a multiracial group on campus called the "Coalition for a Free South Africa" the student encampment drew considerable publicity and support for their divestment cause from outside the campus. They were also able to obtain a restraining order from Justice Bruce Wright preventing the university administration from bringing the police onto the campus to oust the students. Since the protest had been preceded by a fast begun on March 25 by seven members of the coalition in support of divestment, the fast itself had begun to draw wider media attention. Soon outsiders became involved; labor unions came in and provided logistical support (such as tents, blankets, food, etc.); messages of solidarity came from groups such as the ANC as well as U.S. antiapartheid groups; moral support and food would come from black people living in Harlem nearby; and in mid-April a sizable rally would be addressed by Reverend Jesse Jackson. Some of the student leaders involved with the encampment would also be invited to be guests on a popular television show hosted by Phil Donahue. The "blockade" of Hamilton Hall in the end did produce tangible results. Columbia University trustees would eventually announce in October a commitment to full divestiture.

Other institutions that would experience antiapartheid protests during the third cycle included the University of Hawaii, Smith College, Brown University, Colorado College, Stanford University, University of California at Berkeley, Dartmouth College, University of Texas at Austin, Harvard, University at Buffalo, etc., etc. They would all be affected by pro-divestment protests of one form or another, ranging from demonstrations, petitions, sit-ins, fasts, to construction of shacks to symbolize the awful housing conditions found in South African shanty towns. Moreover, the student divestment campaign would help mobilize activist "troops" for the antiapartheid movements' community protests. One example was the March on Washington on the weekend of April 25, 1987 (termed by the community organizers as "A Mobilization for Justice and Peace in Central America and Southern Africa"). Many students were involved in the March and they also organized a special event for themselves: a demonstration at the CIA suburban headquarters in Langley, Virginia. This infusion of student numbers and enthusiasm into the antiapartheid campaign organized by community, church, and other groups helped to make 1985 and 1986 memorable antiapartheid protest years in the United States.

At the immediate tangible level, the fruits of the student divestment campaign would be fairly impressive: according to Vellela (1988: 20–21): "By February 1987, student political action had brought 128 schools to pledge to fully or partially divest holdings connected to South Africa. Schools ranged from Ivy League giants such as Yale and Harvard, and large state systems such as California and Wyoming, to Berea College in Kentucky, Spelman College in Georgia, Saint Augustine's in North Carolina, Ohio Wesleyan and Grinnell College in Iowa. Nearly $4 billion in investments [would] be affected." However, like many other socio-political movements, there would also be a number of intangible, but still very important, goals that the divestment campaign as part of the broader U.S. antiapartheid movement, would achieve; among them: (i) Permit opponents of racism and apartheid to take a public principled stand against deriving benefits from the racist exploitation of others. (ii) Permit the expression of solidarity with the antiapartheid struggles going on in South Africa itself. (iii) Contribute to the international effort at the economic isolation of South Africa in order to bring about positive change in that country. (iv) Assist in raising the consciousness of the university community and the public regarding the immorality of the apartheid system and the role played in its maintenance by foreign capitalists from the United States and other Western countries. Yet this was not all.

Achievements. There were three other very significant areas in which the student divestment campaign made very important political contributions. These were areas in which students of an earlier generation (in the 1960s) had made similar contributions, but which were now all but forgotten, and hence required to be made anew: one concerned the role of the university in society, another concerned the matter of ethical responsibilities of businesses to society, and the third had to do with expanding the domain of foreign-policy-making.

The Role of the University in Society. The student divestment campaigners raised once more, as their predecessors did in the 1960s over the question of university research in behalf of the military and the CIA, the issue of the political role universities and other institutions of higher learning play in democratic societies. For, as in the previous cycles, during the 1985/86 cycle of protests there were objections by many universities to divestment, not only on grounds of fiduciary responsibility (the "prudent investor" rule that requires trustees to manage investment portfolios in such a way as to obtain optimum returns on investments), or on grounds that foreign capital in South Africa could play an ameliorative role in terms of the working conditions of black workers, but also on grounds that the university, as a corporate body, could not or (should not) adopt any position at all on apartheid because, it was argued, it fell outside the purview of the university as a supposedly politically neutral institution.[53] The argument was that to adopt a corporate stand on apartheid was to contravene a convention that all universities have found prudent to abide by: they must remain politically neutral if they are to function efficiently as universities. Among the chief proponents of this argument was the president of Harvard University, Derek Bok. He would state:

> Much as I oppose apartheid, I strongly believe that universities should not attempt to use their power to press their political and economic views on other organizations and individuals beyond the campus. This is essentially what Harvard would be doing by divesting—boycotting the stock of American companies to bring the pressure of this institution to bear against them to have them cease doing business in South Africa. My views on this matter are not casual: they involve the essential purposes of the university and the terms on which it exists and does its work in our society.… In order to protect the process of learning and discovery, universities

> must maintain a reasonable autonomy in the conduct of their internal affairs. They must persuade the outside world to refrain from exerting pressure that would limit the freedom of their members to speak and publish as they choose.… We cannot expect individuals and organizations to respect our right to speak and write and choose our members as we think best if we insist on using institutional sanctions to try to impose on them those policies and opinions that we consider important.[54]

In making this argument, Bok was reiterating the view of many others before him. For example, some two decades before Richard Hofstadter, in his "214th Columbia University Commencement Address" (1968), had argued that "it is in fact of the very essence of the conception of the modern university that… no one is authorized to speak for it." He further explained: "A university is firmly committed to certain basic values of freedom, and to its own internal order; but it does not have corporate views of public questions." Similarly, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, in its report on the state and future of higher education in the United States published in 1973, would argue against institutional involvement in political and social action at the corporate level (1973: 99–100). On the face of it, this argument in favor of the political neutrality of the university makes sense. Given that universities function on the basis of "intellectual authority" rather than "political power" (the difference between the two is that the former lacks a significant ingredient that the latter possesses: the element of coercion), it makes good political sense for universities to avoid corporate involvement with deeply controversial social and political questions. Consistent failure to do so, as Taylor (1973: 395) points out, runs the risk of jeopardizing the university's claim to authority—an authority without which the academic freedom of the university (upon which all its functions: teaching, learning, research, and dissemination of knowledge) ultimately depend, cannot be legitimated. To put the matter differently: the argument is that if the university keeps its hands off society, then society will keep its hands off the university, and seeing that the latter lacks "power" it is in its interest to pursue this course of action. Even those who reject the concept of institutional neutrality, such as Wolffe (1969: 75), are persuaded by the force of this argument to caution those with a radical turn of mind against "politicizing" the university:

> [T]he greatest danger which the politicization of the university invites… is the ever-present threat of pressure, censorship, and witch-hunting by conservative forces in society at large. The universities at present are sanctuaries for social critics who would find it very hard to gain a living elsewhere in society. Who but a university these days would hire Herbert Marcuse, Eugene Genovese, or Barrington Moore, Jr.?… Let the university once declare that it is a political actor, and its faculty will be investigated, its charter revoked, and its tax-exempt status forthwith removed. How majestic and unassailable is the university president who protects his dissident faculty with an appeal to the sanctity of academic freedom!

Thus explicated, the concept of institutional neutrality, on balance, is without credible counterposing argument. Yet, there is something here that does not sit right: surely (and leaving aside the point that when institutions such as universities remain silent on crucial social and political questions they are not being neutral but are in fact supporting the status quo), there must be some issues upon which the university must, as a corporate body, make its opinion felt. Social issues that often indirectly, and usually in the long-term, will negatively affect the very thing that the university wants to protect: its intellectual authority, and on which rests, dialectically, academic freedom. One such issue is racism; it is an issue that concerns the very purpose of the university as an institution ultimately dedicated to the pursuit of truth and knowledge. That is, if one accepts that at the core of the universalistic academic ethos that circumscribes the basic academic functions of research, teaching, and knowledge dissemination in universities, is the demand that there be no tolerance whatsoever of, in the words of Eric Ashby (1974: 86), "arrogance, insincerity, prejudice, intolerance, and failure to ascertain facts," then it behooves universities not to engage in action that undermines this ethos. It is an ethos that firmly rests on a normative pattern of academic behavior that ensues from the elevation to axiomatic status, in the words of Murphree (1977: 106) "the constructive and enriching potentiality of rationality." A rationality that includes the normative principle that the social origins of a person (be it defined in terms of race, gender, class, nationality, religion, ideology, and so on) will not be a barrier to the person's entry into an institution of higher learning in pursuit of truth and knowledge—as long as the person demonstrates the capability to "operate effectively and competitively in the rationalistic mode." Investing in companies that did business in apartheid South Africa was action that directly undermined this ethos: it not only indicated support for racism but even worse, profited from it; for, every dollar of profit made by businesses in South Africa was a dollar derived from the brutal racist exploitation of South African black labor and the denial of equitable eco-

nomic and educational opportunities to all blacks (made possible by the denial of democratic political and human rights to the majority via the Western supported and supplied well-armed might of SAAG). For, as has been shown at length above, the entire edifice of the apartheid system had been built and nurtured with massive infusions of foreign capital. No institution of higher learning could carry out its functions on the basis of financial support derived from the practice of such racism without also in the process undermining the integrity of its intellectual authority—thereby damaging its functional capacity. To be sure, the issue here was not that U.S. universities themselves were guilty of practicing racism but that the investment policies of some of them indicated tacit support for racism—no matter that it was being practiced elsewhere—and a willingness to profit from it.

Therefore, while there is no question that universities are not political parties and hence cannot and should not immerse themselves, as corporate entities, in all matters of political and social import, it is also true that universities do not exist in a vacuum, completely isolated from the rest of society. There are some matters that cannot be ignored because they directly challenge the intellectual authority of the university and thereby undermine its functional capacity. The universities in Nazi Germany refused to become involved by declining to take a stand against racism and authoritarianism; they were eventually consumed by Nazism.[55] The universities in the United States refused to become involved during the McCarthy Era; they were eventually consumed by McCarthyism.[56] But, even some of the universities in apartheid South Africa itself would be conscious of the need to put aside the concept of institutional neutrality on the matter of racism: as a joint publication in 1974 of the academic freedom committees of two of the English-medium universities would state, inter alia:

> Unlike many institutions and much of the White population, the open [English medium] universities have not remained mute while individual liberty in South Africa has been whittled away. They have protested loudly and vigorously in protest marches, picket protests, and public meetings and in deputations to the government.… The open universities do not claim to have a perfect record; they concede that survival as a liberal institution in South African society often demands compromises that they view as necessary in the circumstances but which may be seen by others as weakness. The record speaks for itself. The generations to come cannot but conclude that our open universities did not withdraw like the German universities in the 1930s, when Western values were destroyed.

To have refused to take a corporate stand on such a fundamental matter as racism, therefore, by opposing divestment, was a shameful abdication of responsibility on the part of those U.S. universities and colleges that continued to resist divestment. Institutions of higher learning have an ethical and functional responsibility to invest endowment funds in a manner that does not undermine the values that undergird universities as institutions of higher learning. (Compare here the current student campaign at some universities against industrial sweatshops, which in reality are nothing less than protoslave institutions, in the United States and overseas.) Moreover, it was time that university administrators conceded the fact that throughout history, the university community—especially students—have, from time to time, served as among society's agencies of conscience.

Business and Ethics. The student divestment campaign (together with other antiapartheid groups) brought into focus an issue that had hitherto been generally ignored: ethical responsibilities of capital to society—even if the capitalist laws of production do not permit intrusion of such considerations in the business of making profits. The campaign for divestment and disinvestment, brought to the fore the question of whether capital had any responsibilities toward society beyond the pursuit of their selfish profit-making interest. Businesses create jobs, which is not a selfish interest; they and their right wing apologists will interject at this point. However, creating jobs is not the purpose of businesses; profit-making is the only purpose. An investor does not invest his/her capital in order to create jobs; rather the purpose is to use the capital—itself a commodity in a capitalist system—to make money for its owner(s). Consequently, jobs are created only as a by-product of the profit-making process. If this were not so, U.S. transnationals would not be exporting U.S. jobs to countries where wages are low; nor would U.S. businesses be involved in computerizing and automating jobs that can be done by workers. That the only goal of U.S. businesses should be and must be to make profits is, it must be emphasized, logical and acceptable within the context of the capitalist system. Businesses are not charities. Without a continuous drive toward profit-making no business can survive for long in a capitalist economic system. A capitalist enterprise that refuses to expand its profit-intake will soon find that other competitors (be they at local, regional, national, or international levels) will drive the business out of the market. Because of competition from other

businesses, the necessity for profits is ensured—independent of the will of the owner. In order to succeed, every capitalist must succumb to the dictates of the iron law of accumulation (continuous profit making on an ever-expanding scale); otherwise the business will fail. Yet there is a dialectical process at work here: competition creates the drive toward making more and more profits, but the drive toward greater profit-making creates competition. It is in pursuit of profits then that businesses create jobs.[57]

It follows from all this that since the only reason for the existence of businesses in capitalist systems is profit-making, can they really be asked to take on other responsibilities that interfere with their profit-making "duty": responsibilities such as not to pollute the environment, or not to contribute to climate change, or not to exploit (in the everyday sense of the word) their workers, or not to defraud consumers? Increasingly, the citizenry is beginning to respond to this question in the affirmative—regardless of the "legitimate" protests of the capitalists. There is of course a contradiction here. If the citizenry wishes to accept the capitalist system then it must be willing to live with its consequences: one of which is that profit-making supersedes everything else. But the citizenry (at least the progressive sections of it), however, refuses to see the logic of this argument and instead has pushed forward the notion that there are areas where capitalists must be willing to curb their profit-making activities. One such area, of course, has been the area of racist business practices. Consequently, even if it may have been highly profitable to exploit black workers in South Africa, U.S. businesses were being asked to disinvest. The fact that there is some degree of democracy—established centuries ago by the capitalist class itself to gain the necessary freedoms from the feudal monarchs and nobility (the landed gentry) that would permit the development of capitalism—has made it possible for the citizenry to campaign for both legislative and voluntary brakes on profit-making in some areas; this is what is meant by ethical responsibility. The divestment campaign asserted that U.S. and other businesses had an ethical responsibility to desist from profiting from naked racism of the type found in South Africa.[58]

Ethics and business within the confines of the capitalist economic system are of course contradictory terms; therefore, ethical responsibility is not something that is intrinsic to the capitalist enterprise; it is a concept that must be fought for by consumers at the political level. The student divestment campaign, as part of the broader antiapartheid movement helped to expand the area of ethical responsibility of U.S. businesses—an area that had first begun to be established via efforts, on a major scale, by people such as that indefatigable consumer advocate Ralph Nader in the 1960s and others concerned with weapons production for the Vietnam War—to include the matter of naked racism and other areas of social injustice.[59]

Expanding the Domain of Foreign-policy-making. The student divestment campaign, via its ability to broaden the resource base of the general antiapartheid movement, in terms of persons available for specific protest actions, and in terms of assistance with research, dissemination of information, etc. (considering the large student population in the United States the value of this kind of contribution cannot be underestimated), would assist in taking the antiapartheid campaign beyond the confines of the corridors of campus administration buildings to the halls of legislative chambers of local and state governments.

The U.S. antiapartheid movement did not only target U.S. businesses and universities and colleges, it also focused attention on local and state governments. For example, Massachusetts would be the first state to divest completely in 1973. Soon other states would follow, to varying degrees, such as New Jersey, Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico and so on. At the city level, cities such as New York City, Washington, D. C., Boston, Philadelphia, Jersey City, etc. would become part of the divestment drive.[60] Divestment activities at the state and local government levels, as at the Congressional level, would be greatly helped by the increasing presence of U.S. African American elected officials—both as mayors and councilors (see Massie 1997). To a considerable degree, without any doubt, the U.S. antiapartheid movement was benefiting from the fruits of the Civil Rights struggle. In a case study of the states of Connecticut and Michigan, Love (1985) provides a picture of the complexity, perseverance, and dedication that the drive for state divestment represented. The antiapartheid legislative effort would be initiated by university-based activist organizations and would come to include the cooperation and assistance, to varying degrees, of a wide array of organizations and community groups: e.g., the Congressional Black Caucus, labor unions and labor community groups, church organizations, black community organizations, antiapartheid community groups,

community groups involved with other political issues, such as human rights, and so on. What is more, via their concerted effort, the time and energy consuming process of achieving the divestment of state funds (worth billions of dollars)—a process that involved educating the public, neutralizing opposition propaganda from U.S. businesses and their pro-apartheid allies, holding legislative hearings, formulating bills, introducing bills, enacting the bills into law—would also become a vehicle for dragging state (and local) governments into the U.S. foreign-policy-making arena (and thereby turning the right wing's penchant for so-called "states' rights" on its head).[61]

Therefore, while the enactment of the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* of 1986 (see below) was without any doubt a major victory—even if to some extent only symbolic (because it did not go far enough)—for the U.S. antiapartheid movement, the Act, together with antiapartheid legislation that numerous state and local governments would pass, constituted the reiteration of another kind of victory: the ability of ordinary citizens, harking back to the anti-Vietnam War era, to have a direct impact on foreign policy, even though over the course of many decades it had in practice come to be almost the exclusive preserve of the executive branch of the federal government, supported by a conservative elite foreign-policy-advising think tank establishment. The antiapartheid movement was in practice articulating a position to the effect that when the foreign policy of USGs no longer reflects the responsibility of U.S. citizens to promote and defend justice abroad (and in the United States too) then the citizens have the right to work toward democratically changing that foreign policy, and in the process make it clear to the international community that the U.S. foreign policy in question is not supported by all within the United States.[62] (See also, on this matter, the related discussion in Appendix II on the nature of the state in modern capitalist democracies.)

Weaknesses. Despite the relative success of the student "divestment campaign" in the third cycle, however, as with the previous cycles it was not without its weaknesses—of which two need to be looked at: First, there was a failure to fully understand the implications of the demand that the students were making and to act upon it. It was not enough to simply call upon the universities to dump their stocks in U.S. companies doing business in South Africa; the demand should have been expanded to include a consumer boycott of U.S. businesses doing business in and with South Africa. Had this demand been made the students would have quickly realized that such a boycott was impractical because almost all manufactured products consumed by U.S. consumers were made by corporations that had some form of economic links (investment, trade, and so on) with South Africa. This point was not lost on the opponents of divestment, such as Harvard's President Derek Bok. He would observe:

> We should also recognize that far more than divestment would be needed to sever all our links to South Africa. If it is wrong to hold stock in an American company doing a tiny share of its business in South Africa, one would suppose that it is also immoral to hold shares in the many companies that buy goods from South Africa or sell goods to it, since they too benefit from the South African economy and presumably help to sustain it. … How many of us have examined the purchases we make to see whether they come from companies that do business in or with South Africa? How many students have inquired whether their tuitions are paid in part from the dividends of companies with a South African subsidiary?[63]

An answer to this problem of the seeming "hypocrisy" about the divestment campaign would have been to suggest that the divestment demand constituted the first step in a long series of steps toward the total economic isolation of South Africa. Unfortunately, not many student activists stated this, and in fact the disappearance of the apartheid issue from the agenda of student activists on most U.S. campuses toward the end of the 1980s suggested that this strategy was not considered by most. The demand for economic sanctions against South Africa would be left to other groups in the U.S. antiapartheid movement. Therefore the "single-issue" approach to the antiapartheid struggle by U.S. students was a weak strategy—the consequences of which were visible by around 1987 in the form of the absence of almost any activity relating to apartheid on most campuses, once the narrow goal of divestment had been met.

The second major weakness of the movement was the failure to expand its agenda to include the struggle against racism within the United States itself. The fact that on a number of campuses there were counter-activities by right wing ultra-conservative students supporting apartheid South Africa—manifest, for example, in their destruction of the symbolic shanty-town shacks (as at Dartmouth college) constructed by antiapartheid activists—was indicative of a more ominous sign: the resurgence of overt racism on U.S. campuses during the 1980s. While covert racism had always been

present, the installation of a leadership in Washington in 1980 that made little pretense of its dislike for the gains made during the era of the civil rights movement—symptomatic of which was the gutting of the Civil Rights Commission, an attack on the legitimate concept of affirmative action, erosion of social and welfare programs to assist the poor, and so on—provided a signal to the rest of the whites in the country that the election of Reagan marked the declaration of an "open season" on blacks and the celebration of the ideology of whiteness. At the same time, latent racism within the faculty and the administration itself meant that not only were white students encouraged in their racist behavior, but on many campuses (though not all) there was a singular failure by the administration and faculty to take a forthright and uncompromising stand on the issue.

From the perspective of the divestment campaign, part of the problem, of course, was that the number of student activists who participated in the divestment campaign were, to start with, a very tiny proportion of the student body on most campuses. (This fact also applies, interestingly, to the black student body. Clearly, the progeny of those who fought for the Civil Rights struggle some two decades earlier had not only forgotten the sacrifices made on their behalf but had little understanding of the constant need for vigilance against the ever-present dark forces of racist reaction.) If the rest could not be mobilized on the issue of apartheid, there was little question that they could be mobilized on the issue of racism on their own campuses and communities. Another part of the problem was the ever-present moral weakness of most liberals in the West who campaign against racism: their inability to extend their work into their own lives and local settings, preferring instead to concentrate on racism practiced elsewhere, e.g., in South Africa (liberals, and those on the left, have also been known to get involved in antiracist campaigns for reasons less to do with their opposition to racism than with their effort to further their own political agendas.) Campaigning for moral causes on behalf of people living usually thousands of miles away, seems to be the safest way to work out inner guilts relating to local everyday manifestations of the same injustices, in which the activists themselves are also participants.

The fact that covert racism was increasing among the students was, of course, not in question; the symptoms were everywhere: ranging from physical assaults, verbal abuse, hate-stares, and cold indifference to cross-burnings, racist graffiti, racist articles in student publications, abuse of foreign teaching assistants, and subtle racist harassment of the type where often the only person conscious of it is the victim. The institutions affected ranged from large to small, private to public, and were located in the north, south, east and west; examples of institutions affected by overt racism included: Brown University, University of Southern California, Oklahoma State University, Arizona State University, University of Wisconsin at Madison, Tulane University, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Citadel Military College, University of Michigan, Wayne State University, City Universities of New York, University of Pittsburgh, Columbia University, University of California at Berkeley, Cornell University, Syracuse University and the list goes on and on.[64] Yet, there appears to have been little effort on the part of the activists involved to broaden the divestment agenda to include racism at home and on their campuses. In fact, in some instances, the situation would become really bizarre: there would be a white student group and a black student group working independently of each other on antiapartheid issues, as at University of California at Berkeley, and at University of Pittsburgh. At the latter university, shacks symbolizing shanty towns were built separately by black and white groups, but the ones built by blacks were vandalized! At Columbia University problems arose between Jewish and Black antiapartheid activists when the question of Israeli support of South Africa was raised by Blacks. More often than not, however, but equally deplorable, was the fact that most student antiapartheid groups were generally white-led and dominated, with the exception of a few most black students showing little or no interest in the antiapartheid movement—to them it was a "white issue," in practice, if not in principle. In other words, an issue (the campaign against racism in South Africa) that should have brought students from different racial backgrounds together, itself became a source of division—or more accurately, brought to the surface latent racism among the white activists. Considering that the forces of rabid conservatism and reaction had been ever ascendant on U.S. campuses since the end of the 1960s, echoing a similar development in society at large, this was perhaps not surprising. As Vellela (1988: 86) so accurately observed:

> Racism is the single greatest threat to the emergence of a progressive student movement in the United States. Racism continues to inject itself into nearly every attempt at unifying college students for political change. While the manifestations of racism in the larger society provide ample cause to organize students who want to

> change those attitudes and behaviors, relations between students of different races pose at least as big a threat. … Increasingly, white and non-white students find themselves distanced, separate, and unpracticed in how to come together. Blacks have grown suspicious of whites in meeting situations, where white students gravitate toward leadership positions. Whites are unfamiliar with and insensitive to the alienation minority students feel.

Similarly, consider this retrospective observation by longtime antiapartheid activist Rachel Rubin about her experiences: "Given the white power structure on campus and in society at large and some bitter experiences—on both sides—there seemed little ground for working together. African American students feared white paternalism and insensitivity while white students feared black anger, saying the wrong thing and then rebuke [sic]. Unfortunately, I think most groups doing antiapartheid work during that time were as segregated and separated as the communities that its members came from." However, it should also be pointed out that although she and a small group of other like-minded whites did make a conscious, valiant (and successful) effort to build a genuinely multiracial antiapartheid coalition, they ran into opposition from some African American cultural nationalists who found the very fact that it was a multicultural coalition problematic. In other words, the problem was not always on the white side. Nevertheless, she is absolutely correct when she concludes that "we still need to overcome the continued racial segregation within progressive, left political work and we need to continue to confront the difficulties overcoming internalized white racism if we are really going to tackle racism in this country" (Rubin 1996: 46–47).

Philanthropic Organizations

Among the civil society organizations also worthy of mention in the context of this chapter are various U.S. philanthropic organizations, such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation. Although some may question the validity of including them as part of the antiapartheid movement in the United States (given some of the earlier less than positive connections of these foundations with apartheid South Africa indicated elsewhere in this work), in a very *broad* sense they could be considered as part of the movement. Especially in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, by funding educational scholarships, conferences, lecture visits, and the like—all aimed at contemplating the nature of a post-apartheid South Africa (minus a radically progressive vision, it goes without saying)—they helped to create an "infrastructure" in South Africa necessary for the establishment of procedural democracy that would prove to be considerably handy in effecting a smoother transition to democratic rule in that country when the time came than, perhaps, would have been the case (Lyman 2002). Equally importantly, they had also funded a number of low-key but significant antiapartheid activities within South Africa itself during the apartheid era; such as in the areas of legal-aid assistance and trade union building. An example of such activity was the funding by the Ford Foundation of the Legal Resources Center (headed by the South African lawyer Arthur Chaskelson) that sought to exploit South African law wherever feasible in support of victims of apartheid. The Center was also involved in the training of black lawyers. In the area of labor, the Ford Foundation presciently took the view that a vibrant black trade union movement would not only help advance the interests of black labor (as well as capital of course) but would also become an important pillar of civil society. To this end, it helped to sponsor the training of such labor leaders as Cyril Ramaphosa, the head of the eventually powerful National Union of Mineworkers.

Here are three telling statistics, going by Lyman (2002: 36–40): in 1987 there were a total of more than twenty U.S. philanthropic foundations involved in providing financial assistance for a variety of projects; by 1989 over a thousand South Africans had received university-level scholarships within South Africa and in the United States under the auspices of the South Africa Education Program—established in 1979 and managed by the Institute of International Education in the United States, and funded by a variety of sources, including the U.S. government (from 1982); nine of the eleven justices who made up the South African Constitutional Court, appointed in 1995, had had an opportunity to attend legal seminars on international human rights at the Aspen Institute in the United States.[65] Among them would be judge Richard Goldstone who would come to play a pivotal role in helping to curb the violence that rocked South Africa in the period immediately leading up to the first democratic elections.[66]

Now, it is true that given their fundamentally conservative role in U.S. society, as pillars of *capitalist democracy* (that is, a democracy that rests on eschewing the corporeal for the procedural, thereby privileging the particularist interests of capital over that of the masses), the U.S. philanthropic founda-

tions were not usually in a position to provide any assistance that *directly* challenged apartheid in a manner that say organizations such as TransAfrica would have desired (e.g. imposing comprehensive sanctions and providing aid to the liberation movements, such as the ANC—compare here the role played by the Scandinavian countries in funding the ANC).[67] However, in their belief by the late 1970s following the Soweto Uprising that apartheid would eventually end, sooner or later, they used some of their resources to work toward that end by concentrating on an essential aspect of the coming new future: presciently providing assistance with the creation of the infrastructure necessary for procedural democracy without which corporeal democracy is simply not possible. Yes, of course, in this matter they were hardly guided by unalloyed altruism—their overriding concern was the preservation of a capitalist order in South Africa, but one shorn of the excesses of white supremacy. Nevertheless, to the extent that there is political stability in South Africa today that rests on procedural democracy (compared to what is going on in many other parts of Africa something that cannot be sneezed at)—of which respect for the rule of law is among its most necessary attributes—U.S. philanthropic foundations can justifiably claim some credit for it.

Cultural Sector Groups

We must begin by defining what one means by "cultural sector groups" (CSGs). For our purposes, CSGs refer to all those who work in the fields of intellectual endeavor, entertainment, sports, and the like; they would include groups such as filmmakers, writers, journalists, academics, artists, actors, sportspersons, scientists, musicians, and so on.[68] In the broad antiapartheid effort, very early on activists targeted CSGs in their campaign to isolate and delegitimate the apartheid state internationally.[69] However, as Rob Nixon (1994: 132) has pointed out, from the perspective of the U.S. antiapartheid movement this effort was, to some extent, stymied by the fact that in the one area with the greatest payoff, in terms of international attention, the two countries do not share a passion for the same type of mass "team" sports (compare here the case of Britain for example). Whereas soccer, rugby, and cricket are without question the most popular sports attractions for the South African public, in the United States the equivalent positions are occupied by U.S. football and basket ball. Nevertheless, there were occasions when opportunity did arise for the movement to exploit this part of cultural relations. So, for instance, when the all-white South African rugby team, the Springboks, arrived in the United States in 1981 for a tour, they were greeted with intense publicity-seeking opposition from a wide coalition of antiapartheid groups known as SART (Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour). SART was able to bring to its side, besides large sections of the U.S. public, many city mayors and other local government officials, as well as many members of the U.S. Congress, who all expressed support for a cancellation of the tour. The denouement of this effort was that the tour organizers had to cancel almost all the matches (and the remaining couple of matches took place in secret). Of course, the most dramatic sporting boycott of apartheid South Africa was when it was prevented from participating in the 1964 and 1968 Olympic games, followed by expulsion altogether from the Olympic Movement in 1970 (here the 1968 resolution of the U.N. General Assembly calling on member nations to suspend cultural and other exchanges with SAAG followed by another resolution in 1980 that enjoined CSGs to boycott South Africa made things easier to achieve these outcomes).[70]

If the sporting arena could not be effectively mined by U.S. activists, at least there was one other area with the potential to garner considerable publicity they could target, that of music and entertainment, and which they did. Here, many entertainers and organizations lent their support to the cultural boycott—names that surface include: The Boston Ballet, Tony Bennett, The Commodores, Kool and the Gang, Lena Horne, Phyllis Hyman, Millie Jackson, The Jacksons, Quincy Jones, Gladys Knight and the Pips, The Newport Jazz Festival, Diana Ross, Ben Vereen, Dionne Warwick, Barry White, and Stevie Wonder. The effort to isolate apartheid South Africa culturally received a further boost with the formation in 1989 of Artists for a Free South Africa by Danny Glover, Robert and Donna Brown Guillaume, CCH Pounder, Roderick Spencer, Mary Steenburgen, Blair Underwood, Alfre Woodard, and others. As the names suggest, the organization derived most of its support from the film industry and the media, trading on the celebrity status of many of its supporters to help with the antiapartheid effort.[71] Four years earlier, in 1985, another group of musicians led by musician and activist Steven Van Zandt (also known as Little Steven) established Artists

United Against Apartheid, comprising a range of musical talent (including Miles Davis, Kool DJ Herc, Bob Dylan, Herbie Hancock, Jimmy Cliff, Nona Hendryx, Pat Benatar, Ringo Starr, Run DMC, Little Steven, Peter Gabriel, Afrika Bambaataa, U2, Bonnie Raitt, Hall & Oates, Pete Townshend, and Bruce Springsteen) who together performed and released the antiapartheid song and album *Sun City*, to publicize and boycott Sun City—an apartheid playground, which its organizers used to lure performers from abroad to come and perform in South Africa, located in Bophuthatswana, one of the apartheid "homelands."

Leaving aside the white right wing with its pathological racist proclivities, the cultural boycott of South Africa was not without its controversy, that is even among those who fully supported the antiapartheid struggle. The problem is highlighted by, for example, this quote from a message by Paul Robeson to the 42nd Annual Conference of the ANC in 1954: "I have been very happy to learn that my recorded voice is heard among you, and has perhaps contributed in some small way to your great courage and strength in carrying forward your banner in the face of the most cruel persecution and oppression. But I wish that my contribution, that the contribution of all of us here in the United States who support your just cause, could be much greater."[72] Years later, to give an example from another period, the making of the *Graceland* album by U.S. singer Paul Simon in 1985 that involved going to South Africa and collaborating with Afro-South African musicians, even while the cultural boycott was still in place, raised the recurrent problem of how the cultural boycott was to be implemented.[73] From the perspective of black South Africans, contact with the outside world was necessary for their "spiritual" well-being and the affirmation of their struggle. However, from the perspective of the antiapartheid movement outside the country, even such limited contacts that were specifically aimed at (and desired by) black South Africans simply constituted the thin end of the wedge and, therefore, had to be opposed. The solution, of course, would have been a selective boycott, as indeed a 1987 Amsterdam conference of artists on the matter recommended, but a U.N. conference on the same subject organized in Athens the following year sounded this warning that became essentially the theme song of the conference: "boycotts are a rather a crude weapon—once you start to make them sophisticated, you might as well forget it"; "to advocate a flexible boycott is like being half pregnant. There either is or there isn't a boycott" (from Nixon 1994: 168). Fortunately for the antiapartheid movement, the whole problem became moot within a couple of years or so as F. W. de Klerk inaugurated his version of *glasnost* in the same year that Mikhail Gorbachev began his: 1990.

THE "FREE SOUTH AFRICA MOVEMENT"

It will be evident on the basis of the foregoing discussion that the catalytic effect of the black rebellions in South Africa was a new life for an old, but almost moribund U.S. antiapartheid movement. However, given the impact that the movement eventually had of practically reversing Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" despite stiff opposition from his administration, a fuller comprehension of the forces that were at work must include further consideration of the impact of one other group within the U.S. antiapartheid movement; one that by the mid-1980s was increasingly becoming very important: U.S. African Americans. Given their own experiences with domestic racism, coupled with their historical links with Africa, they formed a natural constituency (albeit not necessarily a self-conscious one) in the United States for the antiapartheid struggle. The escalating black struggle within South Africa in the 1980s would find a sympathetic echo among many U.S. African Americans, and its organizational embodiment would be the "Free South Africa Movement" launched in late 1984 by a hitherto little known Congressional lobby group called TransAfrica—organized and led by U.S. African Americans.[74]

Although, as has been shown elsewhere in this work, U.S. African Americans had a long history of involvement with the struggles of blacks in South Africa, significant practical impact of this involvement at the U.S. foreign-policy-making level would have to await the maturing of the legislative fruits of the civil rights movement: the *Civil Rights Act* of 1964 and the *Voting Rights Act* of 1965.[75] Together, these Acts by 1985, had had the effect of bringing onto the national political stage a sizable number of elected and re-elected black Congresspersons, accompanied by a more vigorous and a legislatively seasoned Congressional Black Caucus.[76] Under the leadership of Randall Robinson, an able and articulate Harvard law school graduate and former aide to the U.S. African American Con-

gressperson, Charles Diggs of Michigan, TransAfrica would join hands with the Congressional Black Caucus to help in correcting a major weakness that had long plagued the U.S. antiapartheid movement: the inability to influence Congress in taking a significant interest in the apartheid question such as to legislatively push the White House in the direction of adopting a consistent foreign policy stance on South Africa that was independent of cold war priorities.[77]

In starting the "Free South Africa Movement," Robinson would borrow a tactic from the days of the civil rights movement: to peacefully protest (but while breaking some law) until one were arrested, and in the process generate publicity for the movement. To launch their movement, they strategically chose the eve of a popular holiday in the United States, Thanksgiving Day (which, according to popular lore, commemorates the occasion when U.S. First Americans also threw in some turkeys with the rest of the land they lost to the early European settlers in the seventeenth century) because, according to Congressperson Walter Fauntroy, around that time the U.S. media has usually "nothing to report except turkeys." The strategy involved contravening trespass laws at the South African embassies and consulates until one were arrested. It would be the beginning of a chain of ritual arrests that would dramatically draw the attention of the country; within six to seven months over 3000 persons, both black and white, would be arrested from all walks of life—including a number of prominent Democratic and Republican Congresspersons.[78] By September 1985, antiapartheid sentiment had escalated in the country to the point where even those not traditionally known for publicly and forcefully opposing apartheid, such as many prominent Republicans, were now joining the antiapartheid bandwagon. Images of the brutality of the repression in South Africa beamed into U.S. living-rooms via the television networks; the accelerating divestment campaign; the lecture-tour of the United States by Nobel Laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu in May 1985; the activities of the Free South Africa Movement; and pressures from the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica, would all eventually combine to influence nearly the entire Congress (with the exception of a number of dyed-in-the-wool racists) to begin a serious legislative effort to impose some economic sanctions on South Africa. In the same month, as the Senate prepared to pass a moderate sanctions bill that the House had already passed with an overwhelming majority the preceding month (on August 1), the Reagan Administration panicked and quickly moved to forestall passage of the bill; it issued an Executive Order (No. 12532) followed by another one in October (No. 12535) imposing its own set of sanctions. The strategy was to preempt Congressional legislation with a much watered-down sanctions package; it worked, but only temporarily.

The two orders together restated existing prohibitions (such as a ban on computer exports to South African government agencies and the ban on some nuclear exports), and added others, such as completely banning the import of South African gold coins (Krugerrands) and requiring that all U.S. firms employing more than twenty-five workers in South Africa adhere to a code of fair labor practices modeled on the "Sullivan Principles." Although the sanctions imposed were mild and would be a minor irritant to South Africa, they were symbolic of an important victory for the antiapartheid movement. To begin with, it meant an admission in all but words by the Reagan Administration that the "constructive engagement" policy was now practically dead. The administration would call the sanctions initiative "active engagement." More significantly: it would be the first time in U.S. history that an administration had imposed general economic sanctions on South Africa (compared to the extremely limited piecemeal sanctions of the past, such as the arms embargo). It would set the stage for further congressional action on the matter.

THE COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF 1986

Fully conscious that the Executive Orders had been a ploy to defang the Congressional antiapartheid initiative and hence did not go far enough in the context of the continuing conflagration in South Africa (which now, a year later, included the imposition of a state of emergency by SAAG), Congress finally passed the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* of 1986; it would even involve overriding Reagan's veto of the legislation. The purpose of the Act, in its words, was to "set forth a comprehensive and complete framework to guide the efforts of the United States in helping to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and lead to the establishment of a nonracial, democratic form of government." It contained the following principal provisions:

- *Imports from South Africa.* The Act prohibited the import of all products produced by South African parastatal organizations (i.e., organizations owned or controlled by SAAG). It, however, excluded minerals that the president could determine as strategically important to the United States from this ban. In addition, a ban was imposed on these products (regardless of who produced them in South Africa): Krugerrands, military equipment, uranium, coal, iron and steel, food and agricultural products (including sugar) and textiles.
- *Exports to South Africa.* These products were illegal to export to South Africa: computer products if they were destined for government end-use; crude oil and petroleum products, nuclear materials, and military items appearing on the U.S. munitions list.
- *Investments and loans.* New U.S. investments and loans (broadly defined to include credit extensions and transfers, credit guarantees, debt and equity purchases) to both the private and government sectors were now prohibited.
- *Taxation.* The convention that permitted avoidance of double taxation of individuals was now to be terminated. Hence, for example, South Africans living in the United States could no longer claim certain tax-benefits. Of even greater significance, on this matter, however, was the extension of this provision the following year (via the *Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act* of 1987) to U.S. businesses as well. Not only were certain tax benefits on South African-derived investment income rolled back, but U.S. businesses were not in a position any more to avoid double-taxation. They could not claim tax-credits for taxes paid in South Africa. In addition, U.S. businesses could no longer defer their South African-derived income from taxation by not distributing dividends. The imposition of a higher tax cost on U.S. businesses in South Africa would eventually reduce profit margins to levels sufficient to force many of them to withdraw from doing direct business there. Examples of U.S. corporations that withdrew after 1986 in some form, included: Black and Decker, Eastman Kodak, Firestone, Ford, Goodyear, IBM, ITT, Mobil, Pepsico, Westinghouse, Xerox, and so on.
- *Landing rights.* Planes from the United States could no longer land in South Africa and South African planes could no longer land in the United States.
- *Intelligence-gathering.* Except in certain circumstances, cooperation between the intelligence gathering agencies in both countries was no longer permitted. This prohibition also extended to general military cooperation between the two countries.
- *Sanctions and other countries.* The Act enjoined the president to encourage other countries to impose sanctions on South Africa. It also authorized the president to impose import restrictions on products from countries that were deemed to be taking advantage of the U.S. sanctions. Additionally, the president was mandated to report to Congress within 180 days which countries were contravening the U.N. arms embargo.
- *Assistance to blacks in South Africa.* The Act authorized disbursement of funds not to exceed $40 million annually beginning with fiscal year 1987 for the purposes of assisting blacks in such areas as education, trade union organization, housing, community development programs, and human rights related activities.[79]
- *Penalties for law violators.* Fines of up to $1 million for businesses and $500,000 for individuals could be levied for violating the sanctions. Individuals could also be imprisoned up to a maximum of five years in addition to or in lieu of fines. Those found guilty of importing Krugerrands could be fined up to five times the value of the contraband.
- *Congressional oversight.* The president was mandated by the Act to make an annual report to Congress on progress in South Africa toward dismantling the apartheid system, and in the absence of such progress to suggest additional measures that could be taken against South Africa.
- *Ending sanctions.* All sanctions against South Africa could be terminated if the president reported to Congress that South Africa had done the following: (1) Freed Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners; (2) repealed the state of emergency and freed all those imprisoned under its regulations; (3) normalized political life in the country by permitting the formation of democratic parties and permitting full freedom of association and freedom of speech; (4) repealed the cornerstones of apartheid: the *Group Areas Act* and the *Population Registration Act*; and (5) undertook good faith, no-preconditions negotiations with representatives commonly accepted by the black community as its leaders ("truly representative" black leaders).

When considered from the perspective of Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy, as well as the policies of the previous U.S. administrations, the 1986 Act undoubtedly represented the strongest blow yet struck against apartheid by the United States.[80] Still, for many within the antiapartheid movement, the Act did not go far enough. The Act did not, for example, mandate U.S. corporations to completely pull out of South Africa, nor completely prohibit trade in all commodities (with the exception of life-supporting essentials such as medicines) with that country, nor did it direct the president to forcefully negotiate with other major investors in South Africa (Britain, West Germany, Japan, etc.) to impose similar economic sanctions on South Africa, or terminate arms sales to all countries (such as Israel and France) that contravened the U.N. arms embargo, or negotiate with the

Soviet Union for an air and naval economic blockade of South Africa. Nevertheless, the belated acceptance of the validity of the principle that economic sanctions against South Africa was an appropriate tool to help bring about change, arrived at after much concerted pressure from the U.S. antiapartheid movement, constituted a very significant step forward in U.S. foreign policy toward that country. For, hitherto, all U.S. administrations had vigorously resisted all efforts at getting them to impose general all-embracing economic sanctions.[81] For the Reagan Administration with its more than usual affinity for big business interests, coupled with its racist proclivities, and its commitment to the bankrupt policy of "constructive engagement," economic sanctions against South Africa had been simply taboo. In fact, to gain some idea of how far Reagan was forced to go when he issued his Executive Orders in September/October 1985, consider this: only a few weeks earlier, on August 24, in a telephone interview with a radio station in Atlanta (WSB Radio), from his ranch in California where he was taking a vacation, Reagan would say among other things that South Africa was now a nonracist society, much like the United States: "[South Africa] had eliminated the segregation that we once had in our own country—the type of thing where hotels and restaurants and places of entertainment and so forth were segregated—that has all been eliminated. They recognize now interracial marriages and all" (Reagan 1985: 1004). Reagan was so opposed to the stiffer sanctions contained in the 1986 Act that, not surprisingly, he had refused to sign the legislation. Explaining this action in a letter to Congress he would state inter alia:

> But while we vigorously support the purpose of this legislation, declaring economic warfare against the people of South Africa would be destructive not only of their efforts to peacefully end apartheid, but also of the opportunity to replace it with a free society.… By prohibiting the importation of food and agricultural products, the measure would invite retaliation by South Africa, which since June [1986] has purchased over 160,000 tons of wheat from the United States.…

Congress, however, as already indicated, overrode his veto—thanks to the relentless work of the Congressional Black Caucus and its allies. Another feature of the bill would have required the administration to publicly identify within six months any and all nations that had chosen not to observe the U.N. arms embargo against South Africa, "with a view to terminating U.S. military assistance to those countries." Here, again, Reagan was steadfast in his opposition, arguing that "the United States will not revert to a single-minded policy of isolationism, with its vast and unforeseen effects on our international security relationships, that would be dictated by the unilateral decision of our allies.…" "Not only does this legislation contain sweeping punitive sanctions that would injure most the very people we seek to help," he continued, "the legislation discards our economic leverage, constricts our diplomatic freedom, and ties the hands of the president of the United States in dealing with a gathering crisis in a critical subcontinent where the Soviet Bloc—with its mounting investment of men and arms—clearly sees historic opportunity" (Reagan 1986: 35–36).

Congress, however, was in no mood to heed Reagan's arguments. Moreover, to some, perhaps, the hypocrisy of the administration over the sanctions issue was a little too much to take: all of a sudden the administration was now concerned with the welfare of South African blacks; yet, not only had it shown marked insensitivity toward their needs in the past, but in his veto letter Reagan had bemoaned the effort to strengthen the arms embargo because of his cold war priorities. The administration did not seem to care that the continuing flow of arms to South Africa from a number of Western nations was instrumental in the repression of blacks in not only South Africa but the entire Southern African region. In any case, considering that the entire apartheid structure depended on income that was derived in a significant measure from the activities of transnationals and the export of commodities, surely the fear that sanctions would jeopardize the employment needs of a fraction of blacks (the employed) but while promising freedom for all blacks—eventually, and as a result of a combination with other antiapartheid strategies—was a hollow argument for opposing sanctions. (In a sense, as the U.S. African American Congressperson Ronald Dellums reminded Congress, it would have been like saying to the abolitionists that slavery could not be ended in the United States because the slaves would have nobody to look after them.) And if the administration was so concerned about not hurting the very people sanctions were meant to help, why did it not apply the same reasoning in the case of other countries that were targets of U.S. sanctions: such as Cuba and Nicaragua? In any case, since when did an administration that consistently allied itself with those who were profiting from the exploitation of blacks in South Africa, and which at the same time was busily engaged domestically in subverting the gains of the civil rights movement in every

way possible, become a bona fide champion of the welfare of blacks in general—whether in South Africa or the United States?[82] In the face of concerted pressure from the antiapartheid movement coupled with the deteriorating human rights situation inside South Africa as repressive terrorism was intensified, Congress moved to simply override Reagan's veto, and passed the legislation. The Act became law as PL 99-440 on October 2.[83]

There is absolutely no question that PL99-440 represented one of the highpoints of Congressional legislative action in the twentieth century in the effort to build a better world for all—perhaps standing on par with the Civil Rights legislation of the 1960s. However, lest we get carried away in our praise of PL99-440: it did not go far enough in terms of what was really needed from the perspective of decisive economic pressure on apartheid South Africa (full-blown economic sanctions akin to the one, for example, the United States has imposed, and continues to impose, unjustifiably, on Cuba). At the same time, paradoxically, it was an indicator of the relative failure of the U.S. antiapartheid movement considered as a whole. For its passage in the very last waning days of the cold war was a painful reminder of a major weakness of the movement: its inability to *continuously* keep the apartheid question at (or near) the top of the foreign policy concerns of the U.S. public, and thereby influencing USG policy on apartheid South Africa, over the years—independent of cold war concerns; that is, on its own merits (as an imperative of what one may call "civilizational decency").

It must be remembered that apartheid had been around for decades before 1986. In other words, the strength of the movement seemed to derive less from the inherent moral (and even pragmatic) correctness of its mission than from the ebb and flow of violent resistance in South Africa, and the resultant global media attention. There were many factors that explained this weakness; we will consider some of them not only because it provides a better assessment of the movement, but also because it allows us an insight into the kinds of hurdles that have to be overcome when organizing a mass social movement for change within civil society in the United States.[84]

Racism. The issue of racism (and its variant, the ideology of whiteness) has never really been a top priority for the majority of whites in the United States, considering that until not too long ago *overt* white racism was common and acceptable. And of course even today—as blacks so well know from their daily life experiences in offices, hospitals, classrooms, supermarkets, departmental stores, garages, gas stations, on factory floors, etc., etc.—it is still present, but usually in a covert form, constantly lurking beneath the thin veneer of civilized conduct of most (though not all) whites wherever they may live, or whoever they may be: whether they live in the north or in the south or in the mid-west, whether young or old, whether Jew or Gentile, whether on the left or the middle or the right of the political spectrum, whether working class or middle class, whether Christian or atheist or agnostic, and whether male or female. Centuries of racist discrimination against blacks, dating from the time when the first white rapine settlers arrived on the north American continent to rape, rob, maraud and pillage the land, the owners of the land, and everything else above and below it has, sadly, left its mark permanently on successive generations of whites. The pervasiveness of racism in the United States (and in the West generally) was such that even antiapartheid activists themselves (though not all) were not immune from it! To be sure they may have been opposed to racism and apartheid ideologically, but their daily lives and thoughts continued to remain tainted, often in ways that even they themselves may not have been aware of. Under these circumstances, organizing for change in attitudes, perceptions, and policies of the U.S. public and politicians was extremely difficult—and until the outbreak of the 1984/85 rebellions in South Africa—became almost impossible during the period of the Reagan Administration, which was never known for championing antiracism (or any of the other related issues, such as human rights and concern for the poor, etc. that civilized societies associate with being "civilized").

Ignorance. There is an abysmally low level of knowledge of world history and geography (as well as U.S. history and geography for that matter) within the U.S. population, compared to populations of other industrialized countries. This, combined with residual racism among many whites, has tended to make African affairs among the least of informed concerns in the minds of the U.S. public and politicians.[85] The paradox of profound ignorance of world affairs in general, and African affairs in particular, in the age of satellite television and the Internet, and in a country that has one of the world's finest *higher* education systems and library networks, and which seems to value complete and unhindered access to information, rests on a variety of reasons. They include: the misguided

elimination of core subjects (general science, geography, history, and so on) from the high-school curriculum; the penchant for oversized over-populated schools where teacher and pupil anonymity breeds distrust, truancy, indiscipline, and general anomie in the teaching/learning process; the refusal to compensate teachers adequately in a society with misplaced priorities (e.g., it has no lack of money to reward entertainers and the like with unconscionably exorbitant sums—itself an indication of the priorities of the ignorantsia in expenditures of disposable income and time); the breakdown in family life with the resultant negative consequences for a child's learning needs;[86] the "corruption" of that media form with the greatest educative and edificatory potential for the largest number of people, prime-time television, by burdening it with programs that are, more often than not, incredibly banal, vulgar, and cerebrally soporific (taking place against a back-drop of the only worthwhile non-cable television service, that of Public Broadcasting Service, being shamefully forced to go out to the public with a begging-bowl in hand to underwrite its survival); and the inordinately wealthy life-style of the majority of the U.S. public (*relative* to most other countries in the world) that produces a misguided sense of superiority vis-à-vis the rest of the world, but which in turn generates incredible ignorance—clearly, absolute wealth breeds absolute hubris, and absolute hubris breeds absolute ignorance. Under this circumstance of much ignorance, where images of Africa in the minds of the U.S. public are still typical of those characteristic of the period of David Livingstone and Henry Morton Stanley, it is little wonder that the antiapartheid movement had tended to be issue and/or moment specific, and even worse, had completely failed (assuming it ever tried—see Cooper 1988) to contextualize apartheid in its regional setting: Southern Africa. Apartheid was destroying not only the lives of blacks in South Africa but the lives of blacks in the entire Southern African region!

The Weak Foreign policy Role of U.S. African Americans. The *relative* (to repeat: *relative*) failure of the "natural" constituency for Africa in general and South Africa in particular, that is U.S. African Americans, to extend their struggle for civil rights into other domains of public life, such as foreign policy, had a retarding effect on the growth of the antiapartheid movement. As long as U.S. African Americans themselves were not involved—to the extent that they could have been even within the constraints of a racial state—with foreign policy issues (at the level of both interest, discussion, and decision-making) it was that much harder for the antiapartheid movement to organize and succeed in the face of the counter right-wing-led pro-SAAG efforts. This assessment, it must be stressed, is from the perspective of organizing the masses, and not necessarily elite interest. For at the elite level, U.S. African Americans (as Plummer [1996] and Anthony [2006], for example, have demonstrated in their work) were not entirely absent from the foreign policy scene. Though, even here, in terms of effectiveness in influencing policy they were hardly able to make a credible dent.[87]

Part of the problem, to some degree, was that the U.S. antiapartheid movement in its early years was essentially the preserve of white liberals (though not entirely of course, as will be indicated below and elsewhere in this work)—conspicuously missing were U.S. African Americans, most especially after the rise of McCarthyism (coupled with the onset of the cold war) which posed a special danger for blacks at a time when the country was still under the sway of Jim Crowism.[88] Of course, their lack of representation in Congress until the modest successes of the civil rights movement in the 1960s was also an important explanatory factor here. After all, without the legislative successes of the civil rights movement there would have been no Congressional Black Caucus, or even the U.S. African American lobbying group TransAfrica for that matter, who together would emerge as important players in spearheading the antiapartheid effort in Congress in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The Media Strength of the Conservative and Ultra-Conservative Forces. The pro-apartheid racist forces were very well-funded and organized in the United States as discussion of the "Muldergate" scandal above has shown. Armed with powerful resources (that ranged from the ability to sow disinformation in the corporate media, to funding university seminars and conferences, on to ownership of units of mass-communication media), not surprisingly, they usually had the upper hand in the struggle to mold U.S. public opinion. At the same time, these forces were enthusiastically assisted by the right wing media, less for reasons of monetary gain from the South African propaganda largess than for reasons of their own ultra-conservative agendas. Examples of such media units included *Barron's, Conservative Digest, Forbes, Washington Times, Reader's Digest, Saturday Evening Post, National Review, Commentary, Human Events,* and publications put out by the Panax Corporation. However, even the supposedly censorship-free and "unbiased" units of the corporate media (newspapers such as

the *New York Times*, television services such as ABC and CBS, and so on) became unwitting tools of pro-apartheid propagandists because of their penchant for relying on official or government sources for information. With all the sophisticated news-gathering technology at its command, the U.S. corporate media was unable (or more correctly unwilling) to wean itself from depending on "canned" and carefully orchestrated lies, distortions, and propaganda that often emanated from Pretoria and Washington.[89]

Writing more than a decade ago in a slightly different context, specifically the domestic context, Bagdikian (1989: 34) put his finger on the problem (a problem that, incidentally, is as much relevant today, as it was then):

> The effect of the homogenized, narrow spectrum of information and context in American news is profound. A country whose major news media are oriented around the centers of power will soon have national politics also homogenized around centers of power. That is what we have today. Our national political discourse is sterile in ideas for necessary change, deficient in its confrontation with the realities of social justice, and therefore narrow in plausible alternatives held out to the public.

The homogenization of information and news—which of course leads to shallow and distorted understanding of foreign (and even local) affairs—was further buttressed by the narrow choice of "experts" that the mainstream television media units (such as ABC, NBC and CBS) turned to for background information and interpretation of news events. Cooper and Soley (1990) state that in a study they did during the period January 1987 to through May 1989, revealed that television producers of evening newscasts went time and again to the same set of "experts," people such as William Schneider, Ed Rollins, Kevin Phillips, David Gergen, and Fouad Ajami.[90] More importantly, they found that there was a common pattern to these experts: "They tend to be men rather than women, East Coasters rather than from the West, and Republicans (along with a few conservative Democrats) rather than critics of the political establishment. Also favored by television news are ex-government officials (mostly from the Republican administrations), and "scholars" [pseudointellectuals] from conservative Washington, D.C. think thanks who appear to be more steeped in political partisanship than in academic credentials" (p. 20).

Is it a conspiracy that leads to dependence on such a narrow spectrum of so-called experts? Not really. Rather, against the backdrop of a relentless drive toward the concentration of media ownership in fewer and fewer hands, it is an outcome of the operation of a phenomenon that Antonio Gramsci described as "ideological hegemony" in which the ideas, beliefs and values of those who wield real power in capitalist societies, the wealthy, become accepted over time by the rest of society via such agencies of socialization as schools, the media, government, the churches, etc. as their own, so much so that these ideas achieve the axiomatic status of "common sense."[91] Needless to say the role of the pseudointellectuals in the formation and maintenance of this hegemony is crucial.[92] There is, therefore, a dialectical process at work here: pseudointellectuals (themselves victims of ideological hegemony) help in the further elaboration and maintenance of the hegemony, which in turn creates a situation where the television producers (and others in the media), as victims of the ideological hegemony, see them as the experts and consequently turn to them for information and interpretation; thereby permitting them (the pseudointellectuals) to transform the media into an agency of ideological hegemony.[93] In practice, the way the process works was explained by some of the producers, to Cooper and Soley (1990: 48), thusly:

> [Producer A:] It is not so much that you are told who to use or not to use. There's just that Golden Rolodex that everyone goes to and everyone knows is safe. What I would call the "brainwashing" is just too good to permit many violations.…[Producer B:] No one ever tells me don't use X. It's just that most of your field producers don't even know who the dissidents, who the leftists, are. And if they do, then they have already made a decision that they are not "credible," not "authoritative.…" [Producer C:] Correspondents have to maintain a beat. You do that by maintaining an ideological stance that is more or less consistent, more or less acceptable to the people you are covering. Look at the three network Pentagon or national security correspondents. It's hardly a coincidence that Fred Francis is a known contra-lover, that David Martin's father was a veteran of the intelligence community, and that John McWethy is so prodefense that he is known around ABC's halls as "General McWethy." [The three work, respectively, for NBC, CBS and ABC.]

Organizational Atomization of Progressive Forces. There was (and continues to be) a tendency to approach issues of social justice and morality, from the perspective of strategy, on the basis of a single-issue approach. While this is to be expected considering the variety of issues that demand attention from the politically and socially active—e.g., (at the time) U.S. imperialism in Latin America

and elsewhere; apartheid; domestic classism, racism, sexism, and ageism; Palestinian self-determination; the homeless and the poor; endangered animal species; environmental degradation; state terrorism and the CIA; nuclear disarmament; international human rights; and so on—considering the limited number of people and resources available to work on these ever-pressing issues, cooperation between people, groups, and organizations working on them was (and remains) absolutely essential. There was another reason for cooperation too: to raise consciousness among the activists themselves first, and later the public, regarding the interrelatedness of all these issues. A person who was concerned about U.S. support of right wing neofascist regimes in Latin America could not afford to remain unaware and uninterested in U.S. support of SAAG, and in turn could not afford to remain unaware and uninterested in domestic racism, sexism, and ageism. Yet, despite the inherent "organic" linkage between these different manifestations of social, political, and economic injustices, the tendency was toward an atomistic strategic approach in campaigns against these injustices—which also had the very deleterious effect of promoting ignorance among activists, sometimes producing very troubling contradictions. For example, it was evident on a number of college and university campuses that student activists campaigning for divestment of South Africa-related investments organized themselves along racial lines—as if they were organizations created by the apartheid system. To take another example: blacks concerned about domestic racism or apartheid South Africa were often not concerned about anti-Semitism, and in the same breath Jewish-Americans concerned about anti-Semitism often refused to deal with the issue of Israeli support of apartheid South Africa, or with the issue of domestic racism, or with the issue of Palestinian rights. Similarly, there was a very disappointing level of cooperation between the different organizations and groups that separately concerned themselves with racism, sexism and ageism. A person who is antiracist must of necessity be antisexist and vice versa—otherwise her/his positions are nothing less than hypocritical, and strategically self-defeating. The permutations of linkages between the different issues were unending, but they point to one fact: there was an unmet need for antiapartheid activists to become involved in other struggles and those involved in other struggles to become involved with the antiapartheid movement.

Organizational Atomization of the Antiapartheid "Movement." The antiapartheid "movement" in the United States was not really a "movement" in the organizational sense—unlike the one in Britain, for example; it was a patchwork of activist groups with widely varying levels of consciousness and commitment that in the words of Cooper (1988: 182) "[was] very decentralized, predominantly segregated by race, and without nationally-recognized leaders."[94] In other words, the struggle to organize against apartheid became that much more difficult in the context of a movement that was fragmented at all geographic levels of organization (national, regional, local); that had a politically and racially (ironically) fragmented support-base, and which had a fractured agenda in terms of goals and strategies. Though this much has to be conceded: because of the nature of the political system in the United States (which on balance, appears to provide greater constitutional protection to the rights of individuals from the ravages of the state than in most other places on the planet, including Britain—though as a result of the ongoing so-called "war on terror" this circumstance has perhaps changed), coupled with the presence of a relatively large black population with significant congressional representation by the late 1970s, the U.S. antiapartheid movement probably managed to achieve greater concrete results, it would appear, compared to the British antiapartheid movement—however one must concede that such comparisons are somewhat invidious.

Opposition to Sanctions

Coming back to the limitations of PL 99-440, in fairness to the Reagan Administration, opposition to the imposition of economic sanctions on South Africa was not the exclusive preserve of far right reactionaries. The Reagan Administration was not alone on this matter; many liberals who had had a long record of speaking out against apartheid, both inside and outside South Africa, opposed the strategy of economically isolating South Africa.[95] They included politicians like Helen Suzman (Suzman 1987) and Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi (Buthelezi 1987) in South Africa, journalists like Sanford J. Ungar from the United States (Ungar and Vale 1986), U.S. African Americans like Andrew Young and Leon Sullivan, and U.S. academics like Robert I. Rotberg (Rotberg 1988).

What were the reasons that opponents of sanctions adduced in support of their position, even in the face of a clear and valid argument that apartheid was a crime against humanity and that profiting from it was highly immoral? Among the reasons offered, these three received constant reiteration: sanctions would hurt most those they were meant to assist—black South Africans;[96] sanctions would not work; and sanctions would undermine the very force that was working to destroy apartheid: capitalist economic growth and prosperity.

Victimizing the victims. Given the peripheral location of blacks within the South African economy, in terms of the distribution of wealth, this was a hollow argument. To begin with a very large proportion of blacks at any given time were simply not part of the modern economy in the sense that they were unemployed (unemployment among blacks could range anywhere from 20% to 50% depending upon their region of residence), or they lived in the countryside engaged in a subsistence economy. Unemployment among blacks was not only a result of discrimination but also the fact that the South African mining and industrial sectors were (and are) highly capital-intensive, thanks in part to the dominating presence of transnationals. Even the white agricultural sector had over the years experienced considerable mechanization. Among the minority of blacks with jobs in the modern economy, there was the problem of highly skewed wages in favor of white workers. As a result of apartheid-related discrimination blacks were invariably relegated to the lowest levels of the labor hierarchy, be it in terms of wages or work conditions and responsibilities. Sanctions would, of course, have hurt blacks to some degree, but the degree of hurt was highly exaggerated. In fact, one could have put forward a reasonable argument to the effect that the movement from capital intensive to a labor intensive production techniques that sanctions would have forced on employers would have worked to benefit black workers (Farina 1981). Sanctions, however, would have hurt the artificially maintained (as a result of apartheid) high standard of living enjoyed by the Euro-South Africans—as a black South African once put it, when falling off a ladder, it is the person at the top rung rather than at the bottom who experiences the most hurt. Writing in opposition to sanctions, Suzman (1987: 191) would state:

> "But blacks say they don't care. They say they are suffering so much already, that more suffering, more unemployment, will not matter." Well, generally blacks who say they don't care either have nothing to lose, or they will lose nothing, or they want everyone to have nothing. Those in the first category have no jobs to lose; they are already unemployed. The second category—those who will lose nothing—are in sheltered employment: their jobs are not in jeopardy. And those in the third category—those who want everyone to have nothing—hope that unemployment will spur on the revolution and will lead to a swift transfer of power to the black majority.

While Suzman's observations were somewhat simplistic, her basic point was correct, and yet it is precisely for that reason that sanctions had to be encouraged and not opposed! That Suzman (and other Euro-South Africans like her) wanted to ignore the wishes of blacks on this very important question of direct material interest to them was also in itself indicative of much that was wrong with South African liberals: their well-meaning but racist paternalism, but which, as victims of the ideology of whiteness, they failed to recognize. There was no doubt that the majority of blacks supported some form of sanctions, contrary to pronouncements of such black darlings of SAAG and transnational capital as Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi and Lucy Mvubelo (general secretary of the National Union of Clothing Workers), as researcher Mark Orkin found in his nation-wide study of the issue. In his study (Orkin 1986), which was designed in such a way as to overcome the methodological weaknesses of earlier surveys on the subject, he found that "seventy-three percent of metropolitan blacks actually favor one or the other form of disinvestment"—that is, either total or conditional disinvestment (1986: viii).[97] He explains further:

> Instead of just polling disinvestment attitudes, we set them firmly in the context of fundamental social transformation. We located economic pressure along the range of prevalent strategies for dismantling apartheid, from peaceful to violent. We then observed the differing responses to these strategies among the followers of various political tendencies. According to the [statistical] figures, the noteworthy black political leaders and organizations are (in descending order of popularity) Nelson Mandela and the ANC, Bishop Desmond Tutu, the UDF, and Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi and his Inkatha movement. We discovered that only a small proportion of urban blacks nation-wide still support Buthelezi, and that Buthelezi's is the only one of these four tendencies in which there is a majority backing for investment. Among the other three tendencies the feeling is massively in favor of conditional or total disinvestment. (1986: viii)

An Ineffective Instrument. Here the argument was that past experience has shown that sanctions are not an effective method of bringing about change because the targets of the sanctions find ways to elude them; plus sanctions precipitate patriotic fervor against the external threat, motivating the target nations to develop a greater resolve not to give in. This issue is discussed further, below.

Undermining Economic Growth. This is a hoary argument much beloved by capitalists and their allies the world over where capitalism is constantly touted as a cure-all for everything; e.g.: by permitting the rich to get richer everybody (including the poor) and everything (including the environment) benefits. Examples of such arguments in the South African context abound in various guises: here is a sample:

> Wherever blacks seek equal opportunity, higher wages, better working conditions, their strongest allies are the American, British, French, German and Dutch businessmen who bring to South Africa ideas of social justice formed in their own countries.… Our own experience teaches us that racial progress comes swiftest and easiest not during economic depression but in times of prosperity and growth. Our own history teaches us that capitalism is the natural enemy of such feudal institutions as apartheid. (Ronald Reagan, U.S. president [1986: 1])

> Caterpillar is aware of demands that U.S. companies withdraw from South Africa as a protest against governmental policies in that country. We do not believe that such a withdrawal by Caterpillar from South Africa would serve any useful purpose. Withdrawal would be harmful to our employees of every race and would eliminate the opportunity to work for peaceful change. (Caterpillar Tractor Co. 1985)

> When we hear the suggestion that we disinvest from South Africa, we answer with two questions. First, should we try to destroy the South African economy, cause a holocaust and hope that justice and prosperity return to benefit those who survive? Or on the other hand, should we try to work within the system to accelerate the economy, improve workplace conditions, and develop and train black workers and use the pressure of a healthy economy to break down oppression. (Dow Chemical Co. 1985)

> The central issue is not the acceptance or rejection of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. U.S.-based corporations and their critics alike are opposed to these policies. Rather, the issue centers on how to bring peaceful and constructive change in South Africa and the appropriate role of corporations in this effort. We at Union Carbide are convinced that through a continued presence in South Africa, American business can best promote constructive change. (Union Carbide 1985)

> Why does a black South African oppose divestment? Why, in the face of the overwhelming support many prominent Americans are giving this antiapartheid tactic, am I saying thanks but no thanks? The answer is really quite simple. The majority of black South Africans don't want divestment. They see investment as a strategy for liberation. They know that jobs will give them economic and political muscle. (Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha movement [1987: 165])

> The fundamental principle that South African business leaders adhere to is the importance of individual freedoms and of a free enterprise economy. This view brings them into conflict with apartheid on both moral and pragmatic grounds. Apartheid, after all, seeks to restrict such fundamentals of the free enterprise system as labor mobility, the ability to choose where to live and educate one's family, and one's ability to participate freely in the country's political life.… But business leaders oppose apartheid for another important reason—it has become an ethnic, quasi-socialist system of government pursued by an Afrikaner oligarchy not hitherto imbued with free enterprise principles. In this respect, apartheid has incorporated some of the worst features of other centralized, bureaucratic, socialist systems. (Gavin Relly, chair of the Anglo American Corporation 1987: 491)

Despite all these assertions, the truth is that in reality economic growth in South Africa, resting as it did on undermining the precapitalist self-sustaining economy of the Afro-South Africans and via the brutal exploitation of their labor, had not and could not have really benefited them. Moreover, given the host of economic (and socio-political) disabilities imposed on blacks, it is doubtful that the level of economic prosperity that the opponents of sanctions were so keen to preserve, could have, as was shown earlier in this work, ever materialized in the first place—especially against the backdrop of the political necessity to preserve the hegemony of whiteness. That is, the sanctions opponents were either unaware or deliberately chose to overlook it that in the endless capitalism-driven quest for economic growth, a racially-determined economic and socio-political regime had emerged over the course of South African history—against the backdrop of sometimes conflicting and sometimes converging interests of different sections and classes of Euro-South Africans (the mining capitalists, the agricultural capitalists, the industrial and manufacturing capitalists, the working class, and so on) vis-à-vis blacks—characterized by circumstances where blacks (specifically Afro-South Africans, more than any other group): (a) had, under brutally forced conditions, lost much of their primary source of economic well-being, land and cattle; (b) had been forced to become tenant farmers and

squatters; (c) had been forcibly evicted from European "owned" farms and transformed into cheap agricultural labor; (d) had suffered imposition of heavy taxes to encourage outmigration from the reserves to the mines; (e) were being paid abysmally low wages; (f) were being prevented from bringing their families from the reserves, thereby permitting employers to pass labor reproduction costs onto the reserves; (g) were being forced to become migrant workers; (h) were being prevented from forming trade unions; (i) were being prevented from obtaining higher wage-paying skilled jobs; (j) were being prevented access to schooling and higher education; (k) were being denied basic human and civil rights; and so on, and so on.[98] Consequently, to put it extremely mildly, apartheid was at all times highly beneficial to capitalists, but to differing degrees of course depending upon their sectoral location. It is only until around the mid-1980s, in the changed economic (due ironically to the initial economic successes of the capitalists) and political circumstances (due to the black antiapartheid protests and rebellions) that such capitalists as Gavin Relly, Chairman of Anglo American Corporation, began to bemoan the constraints apartheid imposed on continued economic expansion in some sectors of the economy—especially industry and manufacturing.[99] Yet, the fact still remains: as in every other part of the world, politically unbridled capitalist economic growth benefited (and benefits) primarily a minority privileged elite, in the South African case the whites. On both key measures of supposed advantages of capitalist economic growth to society: employment and income, blacks would be criminally shortchanged by apartheid. The figures speak for themselves: in 1917 three quarters of the total population (blacks) received one fifth of the total personal income, while whites comprising about one seventh of the total population received over three fifths of the total personal income! In 1936 this situation remained the same, as it did in 1960 and in 1980. In 1987 the position was still the same. This constancy in total income distribution over a seventy-year period was also replicated at the level of average annual per capital income where the ratio has been around 11 to 1 in favor of whites (Cooper et al. 1988/89: 423). What is also of interest to note is that the reason why the disparity between black and Euro-South African incomes did not widen even further is that in the early seventies black wages did increase; yet the increase took place not as a result of a booming economy but as a result of political action, that is strikes. (In fact, as Greenberg 1981, points out, at the time when the higher wage concessions were extracted by black workers, economic growth had slowed down considerably!) While reliable figures for black employment are difficult to come by, it is generally accepted that whereas European employment had nearly always been close to 100% since 1948, black employment had fluctuated but never even remotely approached that of Euro-South Africans. In the urban areas it had been anywhere from 10% to 30%, whereas in the reserves it had ranged from 20% to 50% over the period 1960 through 1980s (Greenberg 1981; Cooper et al. 1988/89). Considering that the highly skewed income and employment distribution pattern had persisted even during periods of high economic growth rates (notably in the 1960s and early 1970s) the future did not hold out a promise of better times for blacks.

Therefore, quite clearly the assertion that capitalist economic growth *in itself* would lead to prosperity for all and the dissolution of apartheid was simply not supported by evidence.[100] However, there was an indirect way by which capitalist economic growth had the potential to undermine apartheid: through its ability to foster social structural change. Consider: as a result of capitalist economic growth, especially after 1948 when the Afrikaners came into power, two important changes would occur by the late 1980s among the two of the key players in the South African drama: the Afrikaners and the Africans. Among the Afrikaners there arose a significantly powerful capitalist class based in industry, mining and manufacturing whose interests would now necessarily coincide with those of the traditional mining and industrial capitalists, the English, and not the other Afrikaner classes: the agriculturalists, the working class, and the small business capitalists. This fragmentation of the Afrikaner ruling bloc meant the possibility of an important re-alignment of forces among the Afrikaners such as to destroy their unanimity on the political future of South Africa—a precondition for revolutionary change. Simultaneously, among the Africans the process of full proletarianization of a significantly large number of Africans moved rapidly apace, so much so that by the end of the 1980s almost a third of the total African population were permanent residents in the urban areas. The political consequence of this urbanization was that it became possible for blacks to organize urban antiapartheid rebellions on a scale not possible before. Beginning in the early 1970s and going all the way into the early 1990s, protests and rebellions by urban blacks would be a never-ending nightmare for SAAG, such that the Afrikaner big-business capitalist class would find it necessary to jetti-

son its old allies and joining with the English capitalist class, announce their desire to see the end of apartheid. But notice, however, that it is political activity on the part of blacks, and not economic growth per se, that would lead to the demise of apartheid. The black rebellions would spawn worldwide international antiapartheid pressures and together with their own activities accelerate the bifurcation of interests within the structurally transformed Afrikaner ruling bloc. Against the backdrop of a genuine fear, as already noted earlier, that black resistance to apartheid would morph into resistance to capitalism itself (as had happened in the case of the former Portuguese colonies) the newly emergent (relatively speaking) Afrikaner capitalist class was no longer willing to accept the economic costs that had always been associated with the maintenance of the apartheid system, but which were now on an ever-spiraling increase under the triple pressures of internal black resistance, internal economic contradictions, and external international pressures. Sanctions, therefore, would have an important role to play in the demise of apartheid in two ways: in rendering SAAG malleable, and in encouraging internal black resistance. Those who had advocated sanctions all along had always been aware that sanctions by themselves would not bring down SAAG, but that dialectically, acting in combination with internal black resistance, they would have a major impact.

By 1986, there is no question, that many antiapartheid activists in the United States and elsewhere were smelling apartheid blood. However, it would be another four years before consummation of the kill would actually begin—with the unbanning in early 1990 (February 2) of political parties such as the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, and the freeing of key jailed leaders such as Walter Sisulu, and Ahmed Kathrada (on October 15, 1989),[101] to be followed by Nelson Mandela (on February 11, 1990); together with the repeal the following year of key apartheid legislation, such as the *Group Areas Act*, the 1913 *Native Land Act*, and most significantly, the reversal of nearly fifty years of apartheid legislation comprising as many as sixty different apartheid laws, with the passage of the omnibus *Abolition of Racially-based Measures Act* (Act No. 108 of 1991).

EPILOGUE: SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Many governments throughout human history have resorted to sanctions in the hope of furthering their foreign policy goals. In fact, even the ancient Greeks used economic sanctions. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1985: 4) draw attention to the Megarian decree issued by Pericles in 432 B.C.E. ("Megarians shall not be on our land, in our market, on the sea or on the continent") in response to the kidnapping by the Megarians of three Aspasian women. In fact, Aristophanes suggested that it is the imposition of sanctions by means of this decree that helped to launch (possibly in the sense of the straw that broke the camel's back if one is to include Thucydides' version here) the nearly two decade and a half long Peloponnesian War that pitted Athens and its empire against the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League in fifth-century B.C.E.

In modern times sanctions have been a weapon of choice where armed hostility has been found undesirable or impractical. This reasoning was well-explicated by President Woodrow Wilson in 1919: "A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist" (from Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 1985: 8). Not surprisingly, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1985) have been able to document over a hundred cases of sanctions since the First World War that they found worthy of study in the effort to determine whether sanctions work. Their conclusion regarding effectiveness of sanctions was that it depends (as common sense would suggest) on specific circumstances of a given case. In many instances sanctions have failed to appreciably change the behavior of the country in the desired direction.[102] Yet sanctions, they concede, have continued to remain popular. The reason is that sanctions are, sometimes, successful. Under right circumstances they can be effective. Would sanctions have been effective in the South African case however? Going strictly by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1985) the answer is definitely no. According to them, successful sanctions require adherence to what they call their "nine commandments," and in the case of South Africa sanctions would have abrogated many of these commandments, thereby nullifying the success potential of the sanctions.[103] Yet there is a serious weakness with their position in that they fail to adequately take into consideration two other factors:

One that is internal to target countries: success of sanctions must be considered in the context of supporting measures being undertaken simultaneously by state-opponents within the target countries where such opponents exist. (It is surprising that they do not consider this factor in their study, considering that they do look at that other internal factor: state-behavior of the target country as an important diffuser of sanctions.) And the other is external to the target country: the nature of the motivating factor of sanctions—specifically whether it is one that is universally supported, at least in principle if not in practice. If the entire international community is united or nearly united on the desirability of forcing change in the domestic policy of the target country then surely it becomes that much easier to morally convince or diplomatically persuade members of the international community to adopt the sanctions strategy. To take the South African case specifically, sanctions against it stood the chance of succeeding because of not only these two factors acting together but also because of a third factor: international economic dependence. To elaborate, beginning with the first factor:

Sanctions will most likely succeed, when imposed in a context of widespread internal resistance (armed resistance, civil disobedience, and so on) and in the absence of a major ally to help counter them. The Rhodesian case is a good example: when international sanctions were continued in the context of an ongoing internal armed conflict, and in the absence of South African assistance (towards the end) in countering the sanctions, a situation was reached where it became possible to force the Smith regime to the negotiating table. In South Africa there was already a sustained internal resistance (mainly at the level of civil disobedience but marked from time to time by sporadic armed resistance) that SAAG had been unable to squelch in a manner akin to that accomplished following the Sharpeville Massacre. What was needed to push SAAG in the direction of negotiations was a collapse of the faith of the key capitalists in the continued viability of the apartheid system (which by 1986 had occurred as a result of the internal resistance), and on the other, imposition of sanctions by the international community. As Kaempfer, Lehmen and Lowenberg (1987) correctly observed in an otherwise weak and unconvincing article (by arbitrarily isolating only one dimension of sanctions for consideration, disinvestment, they come up with the not-so-surprising conclusion that disinvestment will lead to short-term apartheid-reinforcing consequences because white South African capitalists will buy up the foreign-owned businesses), sanctions can increase system-maintenance costs to SAAG indirectly by encouraging and supporting internal black resistance:

> Foreign campaigns of disinvestment from South Africa might well encourage more active resistance by raising blacks' expectations of successful opposition. Thus apartheid would be diminished because greater black South African political participation in antiapartheid movements would make apartheid costly to sustain at any level. Furthermore, black opposition would be increased not because of the market impact of sanctions but because of the inclusion of sanctions on the political agenda in the United States and elsewhere. In fact the adoption of a strong antiapartheid moral position by interest groups in the sanctioning country would provide utility to members of those groups precisely because it is perceived as a way to signal solidarity and encouragement to South African blacks (1987: 536)

One point about the market impact of sanctions: contrary to what Kaempfer, Lehmen and Lowenberg (1987) state, it is quite possible that a negative impact on black unemployment rates ensuing from sanctions would have acted as an accelerator for greater opposition to apartheid by blacks. It is reasonable to assume that most blacks would have very likely vented their anger arising from the sanctions-induced hardships against SAAG, rather than the international community.

Second, when there is universal or near universal consensus within the international community on the undesirability of a given domestic policy in a target country then the goal of forcing change away from such a policy need not necessarily be considered as over-ambitious. Again, as in the Rhodesian case, in the South African situation there was near universal unanimity across the planet on the abhorrence and condemnation of apartheid—regardless of whether the countries were from the nonaligned bloc of nations or whether they were from the Communist bloc or from the Western bloc.[104] Even nations with horrendous human rights records of their own (such as some of those in the Communist bloc) did not seem to be averse to lending their voice in condemning apartheid. To be sure, this did not necessarily imply that all nations were willing to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on South Africa. Many among the Western bloc nations were vigorously opposed to sanctions (especially those who stood to lose the most economically: Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the United States and West Germany—and Japan too).[105] Note: the communist nations and a

number of nonaligned nations had always had de facto sanctions of sorts against South Africa in place.)

Third, common sense would suggest that the vulnerability of the economy of the target country to sanctions is directly proportional to the degree of its dependence on foreign economic relations. Like Rhodesia, South Africa was vulnerable to international economic pressure because it was highly dependent on foreign capital, technology, management, and energy sources. While quantitative data is almost impossible to compute and in fact does not as yet exist, it is nevertheless clear that even as early as 1980, extant sanctions on a piecemeal basis imposed by various countries around the world had had palpable negative impact in almost all areas of South African international, economic and other relations, such as: import of military and para-military technology, equipment and supplies; import of nuclear technology and supplies; access to foreign markets for exports of military equipment, raw material commodities such as coal, agricultural commodities such as sugar, and manufactured goods and commodities such as iron, steel, and so on; foreign finance and credit; access to oil at normal world market prices; diplomatic, cultural, educational and scientific relations; and international communication and transportation links. But this is not all; Clarke (1981: 22–23) draws attention to costs of piecemeal economic sanctions that were beginning to be felt in other ways too, such as:

> on legislative changes in consequences of sanctions but initiated by South Africa; on the sensitivity of international corporations to their continued long-run investment plans for the Republic; on air and shipping links for South African registered carriers; on the access of South African-based organizations to licenses and technical assistance; on employment practices in South Africa; on the direct presence of diplomatic and commercial attaches of foreign governments in South Africa; on export credit guarantee, finance and insurance; on the freedom of decision of certain South African-based enterprises to place discretionary funds in Defense Bonds; on the degree of international protection afforded investments, notably in Africa, of transnationals operating in South Africa; on the worldwide assets of South African-owned transnationals with regional and international portfolios; on new investment flows from a few countries; and in controls over existing foreign capital stock deployment and growth in South Africa for corporations domiciled in sanctions-applying countries.

By 1980, therefore, while it would be true to say that the South African economy was not yet in a state of siege, it was inching closer to that condition as international pressures for sanctions grew. As Lewis (1990: 114) observes, while the combined effects of all the various types of sanctions are almost impossible to measure, by 1990 they must have been "in the neighborhood of several billion dollars annually in losses, from higher prices paid for imports, or lower prices received for exports, or lack of access to capital inflows to finance investment." Not surprisingly, the situation that would emerge by 1990 was such as to almost completely tear apart the supposedly permanent and indivisible alliance between the Afrikaner capitalist class and the rest of the old Afrikaner ruling bloc alliance; which is all that was needed to push SAAG to the negotiating table. In fact, writing in 1988, at least one economist, Khan (1989), would accurately predict the collapse of the resolve of the Afrikaner ruling class to maintain the status quo, in part because of the sanctions:

> While it is correct to argue that economic sanctions are not likely to lead to long-lasting extremist and nationalistic political responses, it is not clear what positive effects they will have in terms of eradicating apartheid. One possibility is that, faced with increased unrest at home, dire economic consequences, and political isolation resulting from sanctions, the responsible segments within the South African state *will be forced to negotiate an end to apartheid*. (Emphasis added [p. 76])

Thus four years after the imposition of sanctions in 1986 by the United States and a number of other countries, SAAG reached a point when it had to give in and accede to negotiations—hence de Klerk's 1990 "WOW" speech.

There is a subtext in the foregoing discussion that demands explicit articulation, by way of a concluding word. In the debate about whether international economic sanctions work or do not work, what is often forgotten by opponents of sanctions is that when the movement in support of sanctions achieves a critical mass—in which grassroots-level involvement (as was the case with the divestment/disinvestment movement in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere) is central—it is not only the imposition of specific economic sanctions that is of significance but what is also of critical importance is the general economic climate that is engendered, by calls for such action, in which the target country achieves the status of an economic pariah where the cost of doing business with the country can no longer be measured strictly in monetary terms alone but must also include such intangible but meaningful costs as the soiling of corporate image, the tarnishing of

positive customer perceptions, the undermining of customer goodwill, and the like (that is indefinables that together create customer valence and which almost all business corporations so ardently try to purchase through, for example, their massive investments in commercials across all media platforms). In other words, it is not the individual raindrops alone that matter but rather that even in the absence of actual rain itself, the gathering of dark clouds that shut out the sun for prolonged periods of time become equally important in deflating fun at a picnic such as to even encourage participants to curtail its duration or possibly even abandon it altogether.

NOTES

1. The reforms, it should be stressed, were not entirely without any meaning for one very tiny but slowly expanding section of the black population: the emerging African elite (the petite bourgeoisie) comprising, on one hand, people in the professions (doctors, teachers, lecturers, nurses, executives, and so on) and in business, and on the other, the administrative elite comprising people who ran the apartheid institutions that served the black populations (such as the township councils and the homeland governments). This elite, constituting the most privileged section of the African community, while still hampered in many ways in their effort toward upward mobility by apartheid laws, had been given some "breathing space" in recent years as a result of the Botha reforms. While their relatively well-off economic status was the most obvious characteristic that marked them off from the rest of the African population they were also differentiated by their ideological outlook which was ably summarized by Dreyer (1989: 155) thus:

> They reject the ideology of group differentiation and prefer a system that does not reflect racial and ethnic divisions because of the African community's bad experience of the present system…. [T]hey support the free enterprise economic system because of the benefits the White community has been seen to derive from it and want to be included in it. They can, therefore, not be regarded as political radicals. They merely want to be meaningfully included in the Western-type societal system that the White community has established in South Africa on an equal basis with Whites, as they have already adopted most of the White community's Western-oriented values.

While it can be argued that any "reforms" that have a positive impact on the life chances of even a small number of specific individuals are welcome—who would honestly decry the reforms as totally worthless if s/he was in their shoes—from the point of view of the majority of blacks (the workers and the peasants) the reforms constituted one of the most potently dangerous weapons that had been unleashed upon blacks. As will be noted below this emerging black petite bourgeoisie is set to rise under the banner of African nationalism to join with white (foreign and domestic) capitalists to become a new class of exploiters of the black majority in post-apartheid South Africa—not unlike what has happened in other independent African states where the African elite has made a mockery of the struggle for independence by colluding with imperialists to exploit their people in a manner that, in some countries (like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Kenya, and so on) was not known even under colonialism.

2. The first "decade of antiapartheid rebellion" was that of the early 1950s to early 1960s (that is roughly from the time of the launch of the Defiance Campaign to the Rivonia Trial).

3. The term "movement," from an organizational perspective is being used loosely here. A question of theory that this chapter raises subtextually is the matter of the provenance of social movements (broadly understood generically to include political movements such as in this case the antiapartheid movement); that is, why and how do they arise. There have been a number efforts to answer this intriguing question and the more salient of which are summarized by Culverson (1999) in the course of his critique of them in order to provide an alternative and therefore, he feels, a better theoretical explanation by way of what he calls the "revised political process model." To begin with, he identifies three main categories of theoretical explanations culled from the literature in political science and sociology that he labels "classical theory," "resource mobilization theory" and "new social movements theory." Classical theorists, he states, view social movements as expressions of "deviant" political behavior (because they take place outside of conventional institutionalized participatory channels) on the part of citizens precipitated by an unusual social circumstance that has society-wide structural implications—such as, for example, wars, major economic transformations, and so on. The problem for classical theorists here is to find an explanation for the breakdown of extant functionalist mechanisms for political expression, rather than seeing social movements as legitimate avenues by which civil society reinforces democratic processes. (Perhaps a more descriptive and therefore better label for classical theorists would be "functionalist theorists.") It ought to be noted that such theorists tend to take a social psychological approach to the problem where the task is to bring under theoretical scrutiny the motivations and behavior of participants of social movements. (The focus here then is primarily on agency, rather than structure and those familiar with this theoretical approach will quickly recognize its roots: the effort to explain the rise of the student movements of the 1960s.) Resource mobilization theorists on the other hand, posit that it is the marriage of the desire for change among politically marginalized groups seeking redress for their grievances with their ability to command organizational resources that lead to the rise of social movements. Consequently, their analytical focus is not on social movements viewed broadly, but rather on the specific organizational expressions of these movements (e.g., ACOA or TransAfrica in contrast to the amorphous antiapartheid movement considered as a whole). Two well-known advocates of this approach are McCarthy and Zald (1977) and they explain that this approach "emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena." That is,

"[i]t examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements." In other words, "the new approach depends more upon political sociological and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behavior" (p. 1213). However, in their emphasis on organizational resources their approach seeks to go a step further by suggesting that social movements can also arise even in the absence of an articulated desire for change among participants because "grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" (p. 1215). In the 1980s, there emerged a considerable resuscitation of political activism in a number of Western European nations and the attempt to explain this phenomenon is referred to as "new social movements theory." However, this approach shares at least one aspect of the functionalist theories: the view that such activism is rooted in structural discontinuities in society that breed alienation among some segments of society. As Culverson explains: "[t]hey emphasize the way structural changes in advanced democracies have undermined the capacity of such societies to produce basic levels of satisfaction for many segments of their population." He continues, "[e]conomic instability; unemployment and underemployment; rapidly diminishing levels of natural resources; rising economic, social, and psychological costs of production; and a reduced capacity for crisis management and problem solving serve as catalysts in the formation of social movements" (p. 8). It would appear, then, that the "new social movements" approach is a case of pouring old wine into new bottles. Culverson concludes his overview by suggesting that these three theoretical approaches are problematic given their narrow focus in the types of social movements they attempt to explain and/or the variables they rely on—thereby severely compromising their heuristic value when it comes to offering an all-encompassing explanation that is applicable to all social movements regardless of temporal and spatial boundaries. In response to this problem Culverson turns to a fourth theoretical approach, one that is called the "political process theory." Culverson argues that this approach, with modification, however, holds out the promise of getting the best handle on why and how social movements arise. (It ought to be pointed that the social movement he is particularly concerned with, to serve as a case study for his approach, is the U.S. antiapartheid movement.) What the political process approach attempts to do is to bring together insights from the other approaches into a coherent theoretical whole; that is, it "focuses on three factors crucial to the generation of social movement activity: the structure of political opportunity, organizational readiness, and the level of consciousness and confidence within the movement" (p. 10). Culverson is not entirely happy even with this fourth approach because he feels that it is too state-centered, so he adds a wrinkle to it by introducing the variable of insurgency into the equation and proprietarily calls his approach the "revised political process model." To take the example of the U.S. antiapartheid movement, he feels that a theoretical approach that does not allow consideration of the motivational influences stemming from the conjuncture of such developments as the rise of African studies programs in U.S. universities, the emergence of human rights advocacy groups, the increased political participation of racial minorities brought about by the U.S. civil rights movement, and so on, fails in its task. So, what is a historian to make of all this? While it is difficult to resist the seduction of an all-encompassing (one size fits all) theoretical approach to explain the rise of social movements at the generic level (that is going beyond the specifics of time and place), the truth is that it is practically impossible to come up with such an approach because as any one who studies world history knows the range of social movements that exist across time and space is vast indeed. No single theory can cover them all. Therefore, a much simpler approach would be to simply state that social movements originate out of a matrix of "alienation" (very broadly defined) and a "conjuncture of fortuitously propitious historical factors." (Compare here the discussion in Chapter 7 of the U.S. civil rights movement and the impact of the Second World War on its genesis.) From this perspective, it becomes clear that Culverson's revised political process model is simply a souped up version of this basic approach.

4. Among the sources mentioned, this section on the second "decade of antiapartheid rebellion" draws extensively from these sources considered together: Brewer (1986), Davis (1987), Meredith (1988), Murray (1987), and Van Kessel (2000), TRC (1999). Note: The last provides a detailed (and often gruesome) account of the myriad forms of state terror that was perpetrated by SAAG on the antiapartheid activists in South Africa—see specifically volumes 2 and 3. See also Price (1991) whose analysis of the overall political significance of the rebellion complements these sources well.

5. See, for example, Sparks (2003) and Waldmeir (1998).

6. Following Brewer (1986) two points should be kept in mind when considering these events. (1) That the numerous episodes of rebellions by blacks were not a result of a systematic organizational effort on the part of a given organization(s). Hence not only were traditional organizations such as the ANC and PAC caught by surprise at the intensity and pervasiveness of the rebellions, but even SAAG (always on the lookout for conspiracies) was never able to identify an organization that it could blame for masterminding the rebellions. To some extent this was a boon to antiapartheid activists in general: it meant that the repressive machinery of SAAG was never able to crush the endemic character of the rebellions—which would have been relatively easy had they been organized by one or two or more specific organizations. (This is not to say, of course, that SAAG would not find scapegoats among community-based organizations and ban them and imprison their leaders). Yet at the same time the episodic and spontaneous character of the rebellions—in both geographical and chronological terms—meant that there were severe limitations to the pressure they could exert on SAAG. (2) Despite the large numbers of people who suffered grievously (from extra-judicial killings, imprisonment without trial, torture, and so on) as a consequence of the repressive acts of SAAG provoked by the rebellions, this form of collective action—mindless and anarchic though it may appear on the surface—would be crucial in the struggle against the apartheid system after more than a decade of almost no serious challenge to it: in Brewer's words: "[it had] become effective in expanding the constituency for change, in winning people over to direct action, and in facilitating the expansion of their immediate concerns into a more generalized challenge to apartheid" (p. 99).

7. Although our chronology rightly begins in 1976—because with hindsight we see that year as marking the beginning of the end of apartheid—it is important to draw attention to the significant role in the demise of the apartheid that

was played by the black trade union movement, commencing with the pre-unionization black labor strikes of 1973/1974. Beginning on January 9, 1973, black workers in Durban and environs would go on a series of strikes in support of better wages and working conditions that would come to involve more than sixty thousand factory workers, but with no visible leadership or organization (to forestall quick and targeted retribution from the authorities that would have decapitated their industrial action)—though the workers did receive important support from organizations such as the white students union NUSAS and its *Durban Wages Commission*. These strikes, which would lead to the formation and official recognition of black trade unions about a decade later, made four important direct and indirect contributions to the second "decade of antiapartheid rebellion": first, they reawakened a palpable sense of self-esteem and self-confidence necessary to work for major social change; second, they helped to re-establish the lesson that even in the environment of a seemingly invincible neofascist political order it was possible to challenge this order; third, the strikes provided lessons in spontaneous and collective political mobilizations; and fourth, following the formation of the trade unions, the unions provided both organizational skills and material support to the various issue-specific antiapartheid organizations that emerged and which would coalesce into the United Democratic Front. (In other words, SAAG's objective to depoliticize the black workers by finally permitting them to have their own trade unions turned out to be an utter failure.) For more on the 1973/1974 black labor strikes, the formation the black trade union movement, and its role in the antiapartheid struggle see Friedman (1987), Hemson (1982), Houston (1999), Kraak (1993), Lewis (1997—plus the associated documents in the anthology of which it is a part), Maree (2006), Marx (1992), Murray (1987), and Seidman (1994). Seidman is also an interesting comparative study of workers' movements (compares with Brazil), and Maree focuses on the not so insignificant role played by white officials in the early years of the black trade union movement. (Note: for the Defiance-Campaign-era role of the multiracial SACTU see Luckhardt and Wall [1980].)

8. Afrikaans, which is also sometimes called Cape Dutch, is the language of Afrikaners and the Coloreds. Its origins lie in a combination of the Netherlandic language (Dutch), German, the languages of the aboriginal Africans living in the Cape region (mainly the Khoena peoples), and the languages of African and Asian slaves and indentured labor. It had diverged sufficiently from Dutch by about the middle of the eighteenth century to become a distinct language in itself. To the African people Afrikaans in time came to be associated with apartheid oppression, therefore they came to prefer English instead as their second language. (The common use of English among aboriginal Africans, as opposed to Afrikaans, was also, however, facilitated historically by English-speaking missionaries—the Afrikaners did not believe that black people had a soul to convert.)

9. Steve Biko would come to play a very important role in the resuscitation of the antiapartheid struggle within South Africa. He was born in 1947 at a place called King William's Town. While attending medical school at the University of Natal he would begin developing the ideology of Black Consciousness. The organizational outlet for the Black Consciousness ideology would be the South African Students Organization (SASO)—a breakaway group from the liberal white led National Union of South African Students (NUSAS)—which he helped form in 1968. In 1972 Biko decided to give up his medical studies altogether to become a full time political organizer; he would help to form the adult version of SASO: the Black People's Convention (BPC). This political activity was being undertaken by Biko at a time when a severe economic downturn, bringing in its wake skyrocketing food prices and other difficulties for black workers associated with a steeply spiraling inflation, would shortly precipitate a wave of strikes (despite their "illegality" in the context of the apartheid system) by black workers that was unprecedented in the history of South Africa. At the time of the strikes most black workers were not permitted to belong to any trade unions and past strikes had often been met with severe repressive brutality from SAAG. During the period 1973 to mid 1974 thousands upon thousands of workers would participate in hundreds of mostly spontaneously organized strikes in the Durban, East London and Rand areas—though the hand of organizations like NUSAS and BPC was also present in encouraging the strikes. (The workers would manage to win important concessions from their employers.) One of the negative fallout of the strikes, however, not unexpectedly, would be heavy reprisals from SAAG: Biko and a number others in the Black Consciousness Movement would be scapegoated and served with banning orders in March 1973. If such action was intended to stop the strikes then SAAG failed; the strikes would continue, albeit much more sporadically, until 1976. (In any given year over the three-year period the average number of black workers on strike were not less than 10,000 [Murray 1987: 146].) Moreover, Biko's banning did not prevent activists from SASO and the BPC from organizing the "Viva Frelimo" rallies in celebration of independence (achieved in part through armed revolutionary struggle) in Mozambique in 1974. Now restricted to his hometown, Biko would spend his time working on black community welfare projects. SAAG would find even this community activity threatening and he would be forbidden in 1975 from continuing with such work. Two years later the BPC would be banned, and in September 1977, Biko would be arrested for breaking his banning order: he would be stopped at a police road-block 70 miles away, near Grahamstown. By September 12, Biko was dead: he had been brutally beaten to death while being interrogated by the security police. The martyrdom of Biko would provoke another round of student rebellions; while the so-called "Minister of Justice," James Kruger would voice the feelings of most whites in South Africa: "[his death:] It leaves me cold." For more on the Black Consciousness Movement, as well as Biko's death, see discussion elsewhere in this work, and these two sources Biko (1986) and Woods (1978). The Motion picture *Cry Freedom* also provides (Hollywood style of course) a glimpse into the events surrounding Biko's death.

10. The best portrayal of what the Uprising really signified is that of McKoy (2001: 75) who observes: "The Soweto riot heralded a new era in antiapartheid resistance movement not only because the black bodies at the center of the violence were unarmed black schoolchildren, but also because of the government's response to the violence. The South African government, using both the police and defense force, turned the machinery of white supremacy against these children whom the white press characterized as "rioters." Soweto, however, was an incidence of *white riot*…" (see Chapter 14 for a description of the concept of "white riot."). Note: following on McKoy, while the characterization of

the Soweto *Uprising* with terminology ("uprising") that masks what the event really represented (a "white riot") constitute nothing less than a gross injustice to the memory of the children who were killed, imprisoned, tortured, and sexually assaulted, the use of the phrase Soweto *riot* (meaning the *white* Soweto riot) is unsatisfactory in a world dominated by the discourse of a white-owned media with its potential to reinforce the very thing that the phrase seeks to unmask—hence the most reluctant retention in this work of the term "Soweto Uprising."

11. Though this is not to suggest that the ANC, for example, had not been consulted at any point as the Movement's formation was being contemplated by its organizers.

12. See Houston (1999), Seekings (2000), and Van Kessel (2000) for more on the critically important role the UDF came to play in hastening the demise of the apartheid state.

13. One such occasion was the invitation extended by some UDF leaders (specifically Bishop Desmond Tutu and Reverend Allan Boesak) to Senator Edward M. Kennedy to visit South Africa in January 1985. During his 8-day anti-apartheid visit, AZAPO caused the UDF much embarrassment by hounding and castigating UDF's guest. At nearly every public appearance Kennedy made there were National Forum supporters to greet him with chants of "Yankee Go Home" and to brand him an agent of U.S. neoimperialism (the security police, it may be noted, proved very obliging to the Forum). The Forum was very cynical about Kennedy's visit: they suggested it was an effort to gain publicity for himself in the hope of making another bid for the U.S. presidency. The sentiment of the Forum supporters was best captured by one of the AZAPO leaders, Saths Cooper (prison graduate of Robben Island): "The manner in which he went around, like a great white god coming to offer hope and salvation, is just the kind of WASP arrogance that makes blacks here reject anything that smacks of Uncle Sam" (from Murray 1987: 267). Ironically, in their opposition to Kennedy's visit, the National Forum and the Afrikaner ultra-right groups were one. However, even more troubling—to those supporters of constructive engagement who had eyes to see—was that Kennedy's visit was a barometer of the extent of damage done by the policy of "constructive engagement" to the once, almost universal, high regard Africans had had for the United States in general. The fact that there was a significant body of blacks willing to condemn Kennedy (who not only opposed "constructive engagement," but was also the brother of Robert F. Kennedy who had made a similar but triumphant visit to South Africa some 19 years earlier), was indicative of how radicalized many blacks had become.

14. A brief biography of Mandela is called for here: Mandela was born on July 18, 1918 (in Umtata, in the then Cape of Good Hope). His father, Henry Mandela, was the chief of the Tembu, a Xhosa-speaking people. In a country where higher education opportunities for black people were few, this privileged background allowed him to eventually graduate from the English-speaking University of Witwatersrand to become a practicing lawyer by establishing South Africa's first African law firm, in partnership with Oliver Tambo, in 1952. Some years earlier, in 1944, he had joined the ANC, becoming one of its leaders in 1949. As a flamboyant man who loved fancy clothes, women and fast cars, and given his privileged background and highly educated status (there were relatively few African professionals in his day), it is perhaps surprising that he became a very active and militant ANC member, since he had so much to lose. Anyhow, as a rising star within the ranks of the ANC leadership he had the opportunity to travel abroad in 1961 (following his acquittal in the infamous Treason Trials of 1956-61) to be wined and dined by a number of African leaders (such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Leopold Senghor of Senegal), as well as leaders of the Labor and Liberal parties in England. On his way home, he stopped over in Ethiopia for a few months to undergo rudimentary training in guerilla warfare. However, only a few days after his return he was already sitting in jail, he was arrested on August 5, 1962, charged with illegal political activity and leaving the country without a passport. While he was still on Robben Island serving a five-year prison sentence, he was brought back for trial in 1963 on another more serious charge, of plotting to overthrow the apartheid state by armed rebellion (treason). At that trial, which came to be known as the Rivonia Trial (see glossary), Mandela (together with others) was sentenced to life imprisonment on June 12, 1964. From 1964 to 1984 Mandela and his colleagues spent their years at the notorious maximum security prison on Robben Island. In April 1984 they were transferred to Pollsmoor Maximum Security Prison in Cape Town for fear that their presence on Robben Island was helping to further politicize other younger political prisoners pouring into the prison in the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising. Following a medical operation, Mandela was separated from his colleagues, and moved to more comfortable surroundings at Victor Verster prison near Paarl. He would not gain freedom until February 11, 1990. In 1991 he was elected to the presidency of the now unbanned ANC, and three years later, with the overwhelming election victory of the ANC, he would become the first black president of South Africa. He stepped down from the presidency of the ANC in 1997 (to be replaced by Thabo Mbeki), and of South Africa, in 1999. He is no longer involved with active politics. For their efforts in bringing about a relatively peaceful transition to a new democratic South Africa, Mandela and F. W. (Frederik Willem) de Klerk shared the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize. (For more on Mandela, see Barber [2004], Lodge [2006], Meredith [1998], and Sampson [1999].)

About de Klerk: He was, like Mandela, a lawyer; he entered national politics in 1972 when as a National Party candidate he won a seat in parliament. Born on March 18, 1936, in Johannesburg, de Klerk's family background was saturated with politics (his father Jan, for instance, had been the head of the Transvaal National Party, and a minister in the 1954-58 government of J. G. Strydom). Given this pedigree and his own legal and political talents, he would be selected by Botha for a place in his cabinet—he would serve in various posts for the next ten years, beginning in 1979. In the same year that he connived with his fellow cabinet colleagues to force the resignation of Botha from the presidency, de Klerk had won the election for the leader of the National Party. He would formally become president upon the mandate of Parliament on September 14, 1989. By the time he became president, secret talks with Mandela had already been under way, and his release a foregone conclusion, except for the actual date. It would come the following year, accompanied by the release of other important political prisoners, and a few days later (February 20, 1990), the unbanning of all political parties—including the Communist Party of South Africa on the left, and the neo-Nazi parties (like Terre-

blanche's AWB) on the right. Between 1991 and 1994 when the first multiracial national elections were held in which the ANC won with a landslide, de Klerk's government undertook a series of negotiations with the ANC for a new political order based on universal suffrage against a backdrop of considerable internecine violence among black people involving, among others, ANC and Inkatha supporters. Sadly, and to the horror of many inside and outside South Africa, it proved to be the required catalyst to speed up the negotiations and break the various impasses that arose. Following ANC's electoral victory in 1994, de Klerk for a short time served as the second deputy president in the government of national unity that Mandela established. In 1997, de Klerk retired from active politics. De Klerk was essentially a backroom wheeler and dealer, and a pragmatist rather than an ideologue. (For more on de Klerk see de Klerk [1999] and Ottaway [1993].)

15. Or who among his jailors would have thought that by 1986 he would be the most important political prisoner in South Africa—so much so that SAAG would fly in specialists from overseas to attend to Mandela's prostate operation that he had to undergo that year; it was terrified of being accused of "murdering" Mandela had something gone wrong (Leach 1989: 250).

16. In 1985 violence of another kind would also escalate: right wing vigilante violence involving white and black right wing death squads aided and abetted by gangs of migrant laborers hired by black quislings; their targets would be leaders and members of the UDF and the National Forum. Consequently unexplained fire-bombs, mysterious disappearances, murders, and so on would become widespread (See Haysom 1989).

17. Interestingly, amidst all the turmoil a curious media event would take place during the Easter weekend: the Zion Christian Church, the largest black separatist church with an estimated membership of some 4–5 million devoted followers would invite State President Botha to address a convocation marking the Church's 75th anniversary at a farm in northern Transvaal. Botha would use the occasion to show the country that not all blacks were against apartheid. The Church, ideologically disposed to enjoin obedience to all political authority, had a long history of cooperating with the apartheid regime.

18. Sadly, the rebellion in the Durban area would also be marked by much internecine fighting among rival black groups—principally the right wing Inkatha led by South Africa's most well-known quisling, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, on one hand, and on the other, the UDF and the National Forum members and supporters. Violence would also break out between the economically better-off Asian shopkeepers and poor Africans in the Durban area. The Asians, forgetting that they themselves were victims of apartheid too (though they would soon be reminded of it when the white security forces would refuse to intervene and protect them from African violence), had over the years developed a sub-apartheid system of their own in which they exploited the Africans living around them: charging them excessively high prices for essentials and exorbitant rent for shacks built on their land (sold to them by whites who had stolen it from the Africans centuries before). In August of 1985 hordes of unemployed, hungry, and destitute Africans living in the Inanda township area decided to take advantage of the growing unrest in the Durban townships precipitated by the brutal murder of a well-known UDF civil rights lawyer, Victoria Mxenge, by a right wing death squad and turned upon the South African Asian "shacklords" with a vengeance. The security forces stayed back and "smiled" at the ensuing rioting, looting and violence—since the victims were only blacks, and not whites. This was one time when they did not feel compelled to re-establish order. Ironically, the looters and arsonists did not even spare the Phoenix settlement (established years before by Mahatma Gandhi who had brought to South Africa his strategy of nonviolent struggle against apartheid), whose executive director, Mewa Ramgobin, was one of the 16 UDF leaders facing treason charges in Pietermaritzburg. Fortunately for the Asians, Buthelezi's Inkatha would come temporarily to the rescue by organizing vigilante groups to attack the rioters and looters, most of whom were UDF supporters (either actual or potential); it would also mean, sadly, a widening of the rift between Africans and Asians. It may also be noted here that when it was convenient for him, Buthelezi would also turn on the Asians—especially if they were too vociferous in their support of the UDF and the ANC.

19. In addition to the terror and violence perpetrated by the security forces and the vigilante groups, in the post-emergency period especially, the township residents were burdened by another kind of violence: hooligans began committing grisly murders of people they disliked via primitive kangaroo courts that they called the "people's courts." (A commonly used method was "necklacing," which involved burning the victim alive by draping the victim's shoulders with a burning automobile tire.) Although the security forces accused the UDF and AZAPO of masterminding these publicly executed murders, the leadership of these organizations denied the accusation vehemently and condemned the kangaroo courts and the murders. (See pp. 387–92 of Volume 2 of TRC [1999] for a description of necklacing, together with other forms of black vigilante violence, and related facts.)

20. The motion picture *A Dry White Season*, provides a glimpse (albeit Hollywood style) of the torture and death that SAAG inflicted on these young children. (See also Rob Nixon's [1994] discussion of the film.)

21. The sources behind this section on the U.S. antiapartheid movement, include Baldwin (1995); Culverson (1999); Hostetter (2006); Love (1985); Massie (1997); Minter, Covey and Cobb (2008); Nesbitt (2004); and Sanders (2000).

22. U.S. media coverage would sharply diminish thereafter because the state of emergency convinced Western news bureaus and journalists in South Africa—traditionally, with some exceptions, never known to be as daring as in other parts of the world, perhaps because they became "soft" from the good life that apartheid guaranteed all whites (foreign and domestic) who cooperated with the system—that it was not in their material interest to continue reporting on the rebellion. A study done by the Canadian Department of External Affairs, says Bunting (1989: 13), found that U.S. media network air time on South Africa was cut by two-thirds following the state of emergency declaration which prohibited "any person from photographing, filming or recording, as well as broadcasting or distributing within or outside South Africa, any film or recording of any public disturbance, strike or boycott, or any damage to property, or any

assault or killing, or even any person present at any of these activities." The ready capitulation of the U.S. media, in the face of these restrictions, was a testimony to the sub-standard foreign news reporting characteristic of much mainstream U.S. media (especially when considered within the context of its phenomenal news-gathering technological capabilities). (See also Sanders [2000] for more on apartheid South Africa and the international media.)

23. The kinds of activities that were involved in the antiapartheid struggle are summarized by Love (1985) in the table below.

Type of Activity	Primary Targets of Activity	Activists' Strategy/Tactic	Type of Group Involved
Sanctions	*Governmental organizations*—mainly legislatures: National, State and Local *Businesses*—as direct and indirect targets: financial corporations, nonfinancial corporations *Nongovernmental institutional investors:* universities, churches, labor unions, private individual trusts *Sports organizations and individual athletes* *Entertainers and artists* *Academic associations and scholars*	Lobbying; Letters and calls to decision makers; Negotiations with decision makers; Extended discussions between groups of activists and groups of decision makers; Provision of testimony, research, and expertise to decision makers; Press conferences, public statements, and other media work; Victory celebrations; Gaining access to and publicly releasing secret documents; Attendance at important events, such as shareholder meetings; Demonstrations, picketing, and other direct action: shareholder resolutions; boycotts (of businesses, sports, and entertainers)—including withdrawing funds (from banks).	*Churches:* local, regional, national *University groups:* students, faculty/staff *Labor unions:* local, national *Black organizations:* local, regional, national *Other community groups* (such as women's groups) *Groups organized specifically for antiapartheid work:* local, national
Direct Aid	*Governmental organizations:* international, national (executive and legislative) *Nongovernmental groups and individuals:* blacks, churches, students, neighborhoods/communities	Lobbying; Letters and calls to decision makers; Demonstrations; Full-raising benefits (such as concerts); Direct solicitation of funds; Harboring and relocating refugees; Sponsoring teams of observers for trails, other proceedings in southern Africa	*Groups organized specifically for antiapartheid work:* local, national
Education	Those being mobilized into antiapartheid campaigns Leaders of campaigns Decision makers in some of the targeted organizations	Show films Provide speakers (from local, community, or national organizations, or southern Africa) Teach-ins Seminars Leaflets Demonstrations Distribution of publications	*Groups organized specifically for antiapartheid work:* local, national
Research/ publication/ media	Those being mobilized into antiapartheid campaigns Leaders of campaigns Decision makers in some of the targeted organizations	Publication of pamphlets, newsletter, magazines, books Production of audio-visual media Research on: economic, military, political, and social conditions in southern Africa; business relations between southern Africa and the West; other kinds of relations between southern Africa and the West; and antiapartheid strategies and tactics	*Groups organized specifically for antiapartheid work:* local, national

Reproduced from Love (1985: 16–18)

24. See Culverson (1999), Hostetter (2006), Houser (1989), and Nesbitt (2004) for an overview of the work of some of these groups.

25. A visit to the website www. opensecrets. org should provide an adequate window on the corruption of the democratic process in the United States; however, Birnbaum (2000) is also worth looking at.

26. U.S. African American involvement with the antiapartheid struggle is examined in greater detail elsewhere in this work.

27. See Livezey (1989) for an introduction to the theological basis (and related issues) of U.S. church involvement in matters of international human rights (of which apartheid was one facet).

28. See National Council of Churches and the U.S. Catholic Conference (1978).

29. From National Council of Churches and the U.S. Catholic Conference (1978: 64).

30. That it is not so much religion but other differences that are truly at the root of the conflicts in these areas can be demonstrated by a simple thought experiment: if all the Armenians (who are mainly Christians) were to embrace Shiite Islam tomorrow the conflict between them and the Azerbaijanis (who are mainly Shiite Muslims) would not necessarily disappear. In other words, in all these conflicts religion serves to simply mask more fundamental differences—confusing not only outsiders looking in, but often the participants themselves involved in the conflicts! The failure of religion to serve as a permanent binding force between Bangladesh (when it was part of Pakistan prior to the civil war in 1971 and called East Pakistan) and Pakistan, and the failure of the Shiite Muslims in Iraq from coming to the aid of the Iranians (who are mainly Shiite Muslims) during that eight-year (1980–88) Iraq-instigated, barbarically gruesome Iraq-Iran war are examples of further evidence to support this point. (Compare here also the near-genocidal ethnic cleansing going on in the Darfur region of Sudan where all share the same religion, Islam, in the conflict—and the deafening hypocritical silence of the mainly Muslim League of Arab States on this awful tragedy instigated by the Sudanese government.)

31. While this phenomenon would be hardly surprising in the context of apartheid South Africa, in fairness it should be noted that most South African churches at the formal level (if not at the level of laity) would come to condemn racism and apartheid by unequivocally stating that apartheid was a sin and that those who used the scriptures to defend it were committing a heresy. The exception, however, was the Afrikaner wing of the Dutch Reformed Church (which traces its lineage to the Geneva Society and John Calvin—a sixteenth-century Protestant reformer): the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK). For a long time the NGK would cling to racist beliefs refusing to not only condemn apartheid but, on the contrary, arguing that it was the will of God that the churches and society should be racially segregated! Leach (1989) states that the beginning of racial segregation within the Dutch Reformed Church itself in South Africa (that later gave rise to the Afrikaner, the African, the Colored and the Asian wings), dates back to the 9th synod held in 1857 which passed a resolution that, in practice, permitted this segregation: "The synod deems it desirable and scriptural that our members from the heathen be received and absorbed into our existing congregations, wherever possible; but where this measure, owing to the weakness of some, should prove to be an obstacle in the furtherance of the cause of Christ among the heathen, the congregations from the heathen shall enjoy Christian privileges in a separate building or institution" (From Leach 1989: 114). It is with the 1948 victory of the Nationalists that the NGK would show to what extent it had forsaken the original teachings of Calvin; it would provide the theological justification for the apartheid system that the Nationalists would now proceed to erect. The 1974 general synod would produce a document titled "Race, People and Nation," which would formally set out the NGK's belief that apartheid was ordained by God. Recently, however, there are signs that indicate that the NGK is moving in the direction of opposing racism in principle, though not yet in practice. Hence a document titled "Church and Society" produced by an NGK commission for general synod of the Dutch Reformed Church meeting in Cape Town in October 1986, would state: "Whoever in theory or by attitude and deed implies that one race, people, or group of people is inherently superior, and another race, people, or group of people is inherently inferior, is guilty of racism. Racism is a sin which tends to take on collective and structural forms. As a moral aberration it deprives a human being of his dignity, his obligations and his rights. It must be rejected and opposed in all its manifestations because it leads to oppression and exploitation" (from Leach 1989: 120). Since contradiction had always been the name of the game in NGK's theological positions, it was not surprising that once again it would produce yet another major contradiction; as Leach (1989: 122) explained it at the time: "Discrimination can no longer be condoned but the national structures under which blacks are distanced from real political power can still be tolerated." The Church and Society document, while still very conservative by the standards of most other South African churches, proved too much for some hard-core super-conservatives within the NGK. Hence, on June 27, 1987, meeting in Pretoria, they founded a new dissident wing under the leadership of a professor Willie J. G. Lubbe, called Afrikaanse Protestantse Kerk (APK), sub-titled "Church of Christ among White Afrikaners." While the membership of the APK would still be small relative to the NGK all indications were that it was growing as it proceeded to attract hard-core, super-conservative racist Afrikaners to its ranks.

32. See Hulsether (2006: 31), and Lefever (1979). For more on the antiracism work of the WCC, see Sjollema (1982), van der Bent (1986), and Webb (1994). A general discussion of the Church and racism is available in Baum and Coleman (1982).

33. For an overview of the politics of the U.S. Religious Right see Diamond (1989), Martin (1996), Posner (2008), and Wilcox and Larson (2006). Note: The Evangelical movement also includes black denominations, such as the AME and African Methodist Episcopal Zion churches. However, in this particular discussion they are being excluded because their position on matters of race (apartheid, civil rights, multiculturalism, etc.), for obvious reasons, differs fundamentally from that of the white Evangelicals—and to that extent they are, relatively speaking, much more progressive than the white Evangelicals. See Smith (2003) and (2004) for more on the political orientations of the black churches in the United States.

34. A brief biographical note on Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who undoubtedly towers as among the most exemplary leading lights ever thrown up by the African continent in the twentieth-century and who would come to play an important role in the demise of apartheid—and besides whom the likes of Falwell pale into nothing more than ignorant nonentities—is necessary here. Desmond Tutu was born on October 7, 1931 in Klerksdorp. His ambition was to become a doctor, but unable to afford medical education he became a teacher and later a cleric when he was ordained a parish priest of the Anglican Church in 1961. Using his moral authority, and advocating nonviolent strategies of resistance to apartheid, Tutu, a highly articulate man, would become in time a prominent South African cleric. In 1978 he assumed the post of the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, and several years later, in 1985, he acquired the distinction of becoming the first black bishop of Johannesburg. (In apartheid South Africa this was, indeed, a major achievement.) A year later, he achieved a similar distinction when he was elected as the first black

archbishop of Cape Town. Among his other achievements would include receiving the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1984, and his appointment by Mandela as the head of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)—a commission of inquiry set up to investigate human rights abuses during the apartheid era, and whose mandate included the controversial device of amnesty from prosecution for those who confessed and repented for their crimes.

In retrospect, there is absolutely no question that if one were to look for the human personification of the moral certitude of the antiapartheid struggle both inside and outside South Africa, then undoubtedly Archbishop Desmond Tutu fills the bill admirably. However, his contribution to the struggle rested on more than this; he was a shrewd politician too (but in the most positive sense of the term). Combining his deep integrity, piety, and knowledge of the Scriptures with an uncanny ability to build meaningful transnational alliances at the highest levels of the ecclesiastical world, against the backdrop of a gregarious and vibrant personality, he was not only able to fruitfully steer the South African Council of Churches into the maelstrom of the antiapartheid struggle in the face of immense destructive pressures from what would increasingly become a praetorianized SAAG (as when, in 1982, SAAG established a Commission of Inquiry headed by Judge C. F. Eloff [Eloff Commission] in the hope of finding an excuse to shut down the operations of the SACC), but through his willingness to meet international political leaders willing to listen, he helped to keep the antiapartheid struggle on the front burner of world opinion to an extent perhaps unmatched by the efforts of any other single individual. (For more about Archbishop Tutu see Allen [2006], Gish [2004], and Tutu [2000] which documents his work with the TRC.)

35. It is instructive to note that the white RR wing of the U.S. Evangelical movement has also been associated with championing the cause of some of the most unsavory regimes in Africa (e.g., Charles Taylor of Liberia, and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire), though it appears that motives of pecuniary gain were also instrumental in this regard—on this score, however, some of the blacks Evangelicals have not been entirely innocent. (See Smith (2006a) for more.) For purposes of contrast, see Hulsether (1999) on the political views of the progressive wing of the mainline Protestant churches in the United States.

36. Consider, for instance: in the same year (1955) that the antiapartheid organizations in South Africa convened their "Congress of the People" that would produce the historic *Freedom Charter*, U.S. African Americans launched the Montgomery Bus Boycott under the leadership of MLK.

37. There is a tendency in the literature, as well as in the popular imagination (among both blacks and whites), to view the U.S. civil rights movement (CRM) in a highly circumscribed manner: as nothing more than simply a movement that had the limited objective of restoring to blacks their civil rights by abolishing "Jim Crowism." While there is some truth to this perception, there is a failure to comprehend on the part of many that the CRM was much more than that: it was also a project for enhancing democracy for all in United States, and not just blacks—this becomes clear when CRM is viewed from the perspective of its long-term effects on U.S. polity. Consider that the CRM helped to, among other things,

- institutionalize (not invent) the principle that in a democracy, the citizenry can take to the streets (by means of boycotts, sit-ins, marches, etc.) and call upon their political leaders to heed their demands. This principle would later be used effectively by the anti-Vietnam War movement.
- create a legal and political environment in which the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution was taken more seriously than before.
- refocus, on an unprecedented scale, some of the energy of the government on taking care of the interests of the working classes as a whole, rather than being almost exclusively concerned with the interests of the rich.
- reignite the U.S. Women's Movement, which for decades had been moribund following its success in gaining for women the right to vote. As a result, opportunities in public life (in terms of education, jobs, elected offices, etc.) exploded for women; and at the same time forced society to pay greater attention to the issue of women's human rights (freedom from sexual violence, etc.)
- precipitate movements for civil rights of other racial/ethnic minorities (Latinos, U.S. First Americans, etc.).
- create a political, economic and social environment in which society as a whole would have the potential to reap enormous benefits arising out of *optimum* contributions of intelligence, talent, skills and energy from huge sections of previously marginalized populations (women, the white working class, and racial minorities), that was not available before.
- raise the stature and leadership potential of the United States on the world stage as it moved in the direction of upholding democratic principles long enshrined in the U.S. Constitution.
- create a social and political environment in which the potential for violent internal self-destructive conflagrations in the United States based on race and ethnicity (of the type we have witnessed in such places as Liberia, Ruanda, Sudan, Kosovo, Bosnia, and East Timor in recent years), would be greatly reduced.

38. Of course, many among those sympathetic to the Civil Rights struggle (especially white liberals) would have preferred that MLK circumscribe his agenda narrowly by concentrating only on the procedural aspects of democracy—that is, civil rights. They may have even been grudgingly willing to bring themselves around to tolerating his Poor People's Campaign launched in December 1967, but his opposition to the Vietnam War, which was a strictly foreign policy issue in their eyes, was simply unforgivable. Their view, usually expressed sotto voce (and which lingers to this day within the U.S. foreign policy establishment—despite the tenures of Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice as U.S. secretaries of state) was that after all what did blacks know about such weighty issues as foreign policy? It was a view that ignored the long history of involvement of the U.S. African American leadership in international matters going all the way back to Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, and W. E. B. Du Bois. In fact, one can go even further back: to the time of that great abolitionist, humanist, and intellectual Frederick Douglass. Recall that Douglass had also championed

the Irish cause when he visited Britain and Ireland from 1845 to 1847 (even though he was fully conscious of the racism of the Irish against blacks in United States), while at the same time entreating his hosts to exert influence on the United States on the matter of the abolition of slavery. And one must not forget his diplomatic appointments: consul-general to Haiti (1889–1891), and chargé d'affaires for the Dominican Republic. But one can go even earlier, by legitimately positing that the successful campaign by the American Colonization Society, with support of some U.S. African Americans, to establish Liberia as a place for those freed from enslavement, in 1822, marks the beginning of U.S. African American interest in U.S. foreign relations. For more on Douglass and his Irish sojourn see Douglass (1923 [1846]), Ferreira (2001), and Hardack (1999). As for his Caribbean experiences, see Brantley (1984). For an overview of the years between the Second World War and the Vietnam War of U.S. African American interest in U.S. foreign policy, especially in matters relating to colonialism and imperialism, see Von Eschen (1997) and the anthology by Krenn (1999), while the anthologies by Henry (2000), Minter, Hovey and Cobb (2008), and Plummer (2003) and provide an overview of the post-Vietnam War period up to the recent present. For the period prior to the Second World War, see Skinner (1992).

39. See Hostetter (2006) for more on the role of ACOA in the antiapartheid struggle.

40. As with the earlier *Declaration,* more than a hundred leaders in all walks of life around the world signed the Appeal (including James Baldwin, Ossie Davis, George Houser, Adam Clayton Powell, A. Philip Randolph, Ahmed Ben Bella, Simone de Beauvoir, and so on). Again, as with the *Declaration*, the *Appeal* also called for a number of specific actions:

- Hold meetings and demonstrations on December 10, Human Rights Day;
- Urge your church, union, lodge, or club to observe this day as one of protest;
- Urge your Government to support economic sanctions;
- Write to your mission to the United Nations urging adoption of a resolution calling for international isolation of South Africa;
- Don't buy South Africa's products;
- Don't trade or invest in South Africa;
- Translate public opinion into public action by explaining facts to all peoples, to groups to which you belong, and to countries of which you are citizens until *an effective international quarantine of apartheid is established.* (From Baldwin 1995: 37, the document is also available in its entirety at the ANC website [www. anc. org. za].)

41. For example, on December 7, 1964, in London he delivered his "Address on South African Independence," and a year later at Hunter College in New York City he was one of the main speakers at the Human Rights Day event (which was attended by more than three thousand and included performances by the singers Miriam Makeba and Pete Seeger) organized by ACOA on December 10, 1965 where in his "South Africa Benefit Speech," (also sometimes referred to as the "Let My People Go" Speech) he would among other things take to task USG's foreign policy on apartheid South Africa stating: "our protest is so muted and peripheral it merely mildly disturbs the sensibilities of the segregationists, while our trade and investments substantially stimulate their economy to greater heights. We pat them on the wrist in permitting racially mixed receptions in our Embassy, and by exhibiting films depicting Negro artists. But we give them massive support through American investments…" (from Baldwin 1995: 49, the speech is also available in its entirety at the ANC website [www. anc. org. za]).

42. Hence in his *Acceptance Speech*, delivered in Oslo, December 10, 1964, he would state among other things: "I am aware that this prize is much more than an honor to me personally. Every time I take a flight, I am always mindful of the many people who make a successful journey possible—the known pilots and the unknown ground crew. So you honor the dedicated pilots of our struggle who have sat at the controls as the freedom movement soared into orbit. You honor, once again, Chief Lutuli of South Africa, whose struggles with and for his people, are still met with the most brutal expression of man's inhumanity to man" (from the speech reproduced at the www. nobelprize. org website).

43. In accepting the invitation, MLK had written to NUSAS: "I am extremely honored by your invitation. … I have long been concerned about the situation in South Africa and have developed tremendous admiration for the students, leading churchmen and African leaders who have been able to maintain a nonviolent spirit in the present situation. … I will begin immediately to make the necessary contacts to secure a visa from your government" (from Baldwin 1995: 58). By his decision to visit South Africa, it may be noted, MLK was also hoping to honor his acceptance of invitations from at least two other (mainly white) groups of South African students: those associated with the Students Visiting Lecturers Trust Fund of the University of Cape Town (who wanted him to deliver the T. B. Davie Memorial Lecture—in August of 1966) and the Anglican Students' Federation (who wanted him to be a guest speaker at their annual conference in the preceding month). However, it soon became clear that SAAG would not give him a visa; the uproar among whites in South Africa (excluding the liberals) against his visit saw to that. Ironically, he was even accused of being a communist sympathizer and an unworthy Christian, so distorted was their world view (though, here, of course, they were only parroting sentiments held by U.S. white supremacists).

44. It should be pointed out that for MLK, apartheid was, as he came to see it, more than just a social evil; it was, in his estimation, nothing less than a Christian theological heresy because it violated at least four basic principles (as summarized by Baldwin 1995: 2):

> (1) The impartiality of God in creating and dealing with human beings; (2) a sacramentalistic idea of the cosmos as echoed by the psalmist, 'the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof—the world, and they that dwell therein'; (3) a belief in the dignity and worth of all human personality; and (4) a solidaristic view of society and the world, which holds that each person is a distinct ontological entity who finds growth, fulfillment, and purpose through personal and

social relationships based on the agape love ethic.

45. From Baldwin (1995: 40)—the conference document is also available in its entirety at the ANC website (www.anc.org.za).

46. It would not be out of place to also mention here that MLK did not see his involvement with the antiapartheid struggle as a "one-way street." As he explained in his "South Africa Benefit Speech" at Hunter College in New York City in 1965:

> In this period when the American Negro is giving moral leadership and inspiration to his own nation, he must find the resources to aid his suffering brothers in his ancestral homeland. Nor is this aid a one-way street. The civil rights movement in the United States has derived immense inspiration from the successful struggles of those Africans who have attained freedom in their own nations. The fact that black men govern states, are building democratic institutions, sit in world tribunals, and participate in global decision-making gives every Negro a needed sense of dignity. … The struggle for freedom forms one long front crossing oceans and mountains (from his speech available at the ANC website (www. anc. org. za).

47. In addition to sources mentioned in the text, see also these for more on the issues covered in this section on students: Franklin (2003), Hirsch (1990), Lloyd and Mian (2003), Martin (2007), Soule (1997), and Van Dyke (2003).

48. Interestingly, the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, and later the arrests of many ANC leaders in 1963 in Rivonia, did not draw much attention (in terms of protests) on U.S. campuses despite the fact that the events were fairly well reported in the media. The explanation, Stevens and Lubetkin (1981) surmise, lie in the misperception among student activists of the magnitude and permanence of racist repression that the massacre represented. They erroneously likened the peaceful protest (that provoked the massacre) to acts of civil disobedience in the ongoing Civil Rights struggle in the United States, i.e., they thought it was part of a struggle against racism that was not dissimilar from the one under way in the United States at that time. Had students realized that the massacre represented a special form of racist brutality (permanent and arrogantly unyielding) characteristic of SAAG, then they may have expressed greater activist interest in the event.

49. In the context of the antiapartheid movement, "divestment" referred to the withdrawal of investments in companies doing business in South Africa, whereas "disinvestment" referred to the withdrawal of investment by foreign companies doing business in South Africa.

50. See Chapter 3 of Culverson (1999), Chapter 5 of Massie (1997), and Chapter 3 of Nesbitt (2004) for highlights of U.S. antiapartheid activism during this early phase.

51. The first cycle comprised the anti-bank loan protests that took place in the 1960s, and the second cycle (1977–79) constituted the protests catalyzed by the Soweto Uprising.

52. Reagan's second term would be marked by noticeable public disillusionment with his administration—though the man himself would continue to be held in awe by the ignorantsia for reasons that are not easy to fathom—as a result of the escalation of the unnecessary conflict against tiny Nicaragua (population 3.5 million!), the outbreak of the Iran-Contra scandal (ironically, the masses, unable to comprehend the seriousness of the issue in the context of the U.S. Constitution, the laws of the country, etc., considered it as merely a tempest in a tea-pot), the ever-rising accusations of economic corruption among top-level government officials, and so on.

53. The prudent investor rule, in the context of the economics of the U.S. university, was best explicated in a statement by the chancellor of the University of Texas system, Hans Mark, when rejecting a recommendation by the faculty-dominated University Council that the university divest: "[I]t is my considered conclusion that the sale of the securities we own in companies doing business in the Republic of South Africa would cost us very substantial amounts of money in the coming years. It would inhibit our freedom to invest and to maximize the income and the growth potential of the funds available to the Regents of the University for investment. Divestment of these assets would therefore ultimately reduce the quality of higher education available not only at the University of Texas but at other institutions that benefit from the investment of the Permanent University Fund. We must think very carefully about any step that permits this to happen. To me, speaking as the chief executive officer of the University of Texas system, this is the overriding issue"(Mark 1985: 201). Perhaps the University of Texas system ought to have divested its South Africa-related funds and reinvested them in even more lucrative business ventures—such as drugs or prostitution or loan sharking—since money-making was the "overriding issue."

54. See Bok 1985: appendix B, page 1 of statement.

55. The words of the German novelist Thomas Mann, written in the form of a letter in 1937 to the dean of the faculty of philosophy of University of Bonn in response to the university's decision to deprive him of an honorary doctorate that it had bestowed upon him, are as relevant to day as they were then, even if the contexts have changed: "The German universities share a heavy responsibility for all the present distresses which they called down upon their heads when they so tragically misunderstood their historic hour and allowed their soil to nourish the ruthless forces which have devastated Germany morally, politically, and economically" (from Marcum 1982: 57).

56. See the illuminating study by Schrecker (1986) on McCarthyism and the U.S. institutions of higher learning.

57. This, however, does not mean that if there were no capitalists there would be no jobs. Workers could get together and create their own jobs by developing their own businesses, even in the absence of capital, through other cooperative arrangements—barter of services and inputs, and the like.

58. Of course, businesses in the West continue to profit from covert racism; specifically the racism of white workers against blacks. For, while white and black workers remain disunited—at each others' throats—the capitalists are laughing all the way to the bank. See the appendix for more on this issue.

59. There is an excellent work by Lydenberg et al. (1986) titled *Rating America's Corporate Conscience*, that provides a comprehensive picture of the issues that many (not all) U.S. consumers were beginning to consider as part of the ethical responsibilities of businesses. They included, besides the apartheid issue: not profiting from conventional weapons research and production; not profiting from nuclear weapons research and production; contributing to charitable causes, not polluting the environment, not buying legislative power in Washington (indirectly via contributions to so-called "PACS" or political action committees); possessing an effective nondiscriminatory labor-hiring policy, and so on. The book had been produced with a view toward allowing consumers to make an informed judgment when they purchased a company's products and/or services. The overall objective, in the absence of legislative support, was to assist in tying profits to ethical business practices by influencing the consumer market. The assumption—well reasoned—is that a company that begins to lose its market share for its products and/or services because of its poor record in the area of, say, the environment will be forced to change strategy. Interestingly, the concern with ethical business practices, also gave rise to the practice of "ethical" or "socially-responsible" investing via ethically-minded institutional investors such as the group called "Working Assets Money Fund," based in San Francisco. Working Assets (recently renamed Credo) avoided investing in South-Africa-related businesses, as well as those that were involved with nuclear power and armaments, manufacture of conventional weaponry, supporting repressive regimes, and so on. They also over time came to operate a credit card service and a long-distance phone service where part of the income derived from these services was used to assist activist groups involved with peace, hunger, and environmental projects. In the absence of a "revolution" to establish an economically just society, where those who produce would also be the owners of the means of production, such ethically responsible capitalist enterprises are perhaps the next best thing.

60. See, for example, the account in Massie (1997: 541–45) of one of the biggest victories scored by antiapartheid activists, in this case ACOA, in getting a major U.S. city to get on board, albeit reluctantly, the divestment bandwagon. With the help of such key figures as city council president Carol Bellamy and city comptroller Harrison Goldin the organization overcame the resistance put up by the mayor, Edward Koch (considered by some as little more than a closet racist), and got New York City to not only move toward divestment in 1984, but the following year to also stop doing business with companies with South African operations that did not adhere to certain standards.

61. In the United States, the right wing has often used the mantra of support for states' rights as a ruse to weaken the Bill of Rights. From a constitutional perspective, obviously foreign policy is by and large the prerogative of the federal government—or at least that is how the courts have tended to rule (see for example *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation*, 299 U.S. 304 [1936]). However, because over the centuries the U.S. presidency has acquired for itself (often at the behest of capital) enormous powers in the foreign policy arena, mainly by deliberate and unseemly accretion by virtue of its monopoly over resources and information, leaving almost no meaningful room for the people's representatives (in the shape of Congress) to check these powers—vide the current circumstance under the Bush-Cheney presidency—the responsibility has fallen to the citizenry to do what they can to bridle these undemocratically acquired powers through the creative use of state/city resources at the local level. (For a quick overview from a U.S. perspective of what is sometimes referred to as "subnational diplomacy" or "paradiplomacy" see Kincaid [1999] and Guay [2000]. Hobbs [1994], who looks at the matter from the perspective of city governments, and includes consideration of the antiapartheid divestment campaign, is also worth looking at.)

62. Compare here the current effort by some sections of the citizenry—albeit still nascent—to get the Bush-Cheney Administration to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq and thereby bring its disastrous military adventure in that country to an end.

63. See Bok (1985: appendix B, third page).

64. In the period 1986/87 alone, the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence (located in Baltimore, MD) counted 175 colleges and universities that had been mentioned in the media as affected by some form(s) of overt racism. (See page A28 of the *Chronicle* in the bibliographic list that follows.) For more on the rise of campus white racism in the 1980s see: cover stories: "Fraternities Under Fire," in *Newsweek on Campus* (April 1988), "Missing Persons: After Years of Growth, Black Enrollment Is Dropping Sharply. Why?" in *Newsweek on Campus* (February 1987), and "Blacks and Whites on the Campuses: Behind Ugly Racist Incidents, Student Isolation and Insensitivity" in *Chronicle of Higher Education* (April 26, 1989); Altbach and Cohen (1989); (Shenk 1990); Steele (1989); Vellela (1988); and Wiener (1989).

65. In the area of legal training, an organization with a long history of interest in South Africa going back to its founding in 1958, the United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP—funded by the foundations as well as U.S. businesses) would also come to play, beginning in the 1970s, an important role—in alliance with the American Bar Association and the South African Black Lawyers Association. (See also the report by John Marcum [1982] for USSALEP, produced following a visit to South Africa in August 1981 by a USSALEP study team under his leadership, that documents its role in fostering educational development in that country as well making a series of policy recommendations. Here, the critique by Davies [1985] of U.S. educational assistance as the handmaiden of U.S. foreign policy during the Reagan Administration era is of course relevant too.)

66. Other prominent South Africans, going by Lyman (2002), who also benefitted from programs in the United States that were sponsored by the U.S. foundations included Dingang Moseneke of the PAC, Penuel Maduna of the ANC who would later become the minister of justice in the ANC-led government, and Albie Sachs (together with Chaskelson) who both became members of the newly created South African Constitutional Court. Many of those who became journalists and editors of note, such as Aggrey Klaaste, were also beneficiaries of foundations-sponsored training in the United States.

67. It is only in the late 1970s that some of them began to seriously challenge the various versions of "constructive engagement" that USGs had pursued hitherto—even if not always explicitly labeled thus. Hence, for example, in a direct challenge to the Reagan Administration, the well-funded Rockefeller Foundation sponsored *Study Commission on*

U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, appointed in 1977 under the chairmanship of U.S. African American Franklin Thomas of the Ford Foundation, in its report called for a moratorium on further U.S. investments in South Africa, cessation of nuclear cooperation, and a widening of the arms embargo (Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa [1981]). Though, of course, the report was in the main a conservative document infused with a subtle but palpable whiteness-laden cold war logic notwithstanding its "liberal" credentials; for example, it failed to call for disinvestment and sanctions—at the very minimum. One ought to note here that in many ways, the report was a major disappointment (perhaps not unexpectedly given the source of its funding). Produced on the basis of inputs from an army of consultants, coupled with an extensive study trip to South Africa, against the backdrop of an ample multimillion dollar budget, the fact that this was the best it could come up with by way of foreign policy recommendations simply reemphasized the limitations of its source. Ironically, given the ideology of the Reaganites, the report's recommendations were deemed too radical by the Reagan Administration—consequently, as a foreign policy document it died a quite death. (Had the report been produced when the Carter Administration was still in office it may have possessed some traction.) For an analysis of the ideological underpinnings of the report, as well as the general role of the foundations in working toward the highly circumscribed future they envisaged for South Africa (a capitalist multiracial "democracy" *but* minus majority rule—an oxymoron if ever there was one) see Davies (1985).

68. For more on the cultural boycott of apartheid South Africa by U.S. CSGs see: Booth (1998), Culverson (1999), Hostetter (2006), Edgar (1990—specifically the two chapters by Mbulelo Mzamane and Larry Shore in the section titled "The Cultural Boycott of South Africa," pp. 381–412); Lapchick (1975); and Nixon (1994). The documents section of the ANC website (www. anc. org. za) should also be consulted.

69. As Shore (in Edgar 1990) points out, one must make a distinction between a cultural boycott that targets incoming cultural relations (e.g. musicians coming from abroad) and outgoing cultural relations (e.g. South African sports teams playing abroad). In the case of the latter, antiapartheid activists were careful to be selective: they did not call for a boycott of South African CSGs if they were deemed to be of a liberal bent or explicitly antiapartheid in intent. So, for example, no one ever called for the boycott of works by such South African literary giants as John M. Coetzee, André Brink, Athol Fugard, and Nadine Gordimer (compare the decision, perhaps misguided, by the U.S. African American writer Alice Walker forbidding the sale of her books in South Africa during the apartheid era).

70. In any discussion of sporting contacts between the United States and South Africa, the name of the legendary and greatly admired U.S. African American humanitarian, activist, and tennis player, Arthur Ashe, who we met earlier in a another context and who over the course of his short career totaled more than thirty single and nearly twenty double career titles, is bound to come up. (Ashe turned professional in 1969 and retired in 1980 for health reasons, as indicated elsewhere in this work—he passed away at the age of 49 on February 6, 1993). In 1969, a year after he won the first U.S. Open (Tennis Tournament), making him the first U.S. African-American male to win a national tennis competition, Ashe applied to SAAG for a visa so that he could participate in the South African Open, but SAAG turned him down. He would try again but with the same result. This prompted Ashe to begin a campaign to have South Africa blacklisted by tennis professionals, one consequence of which was the exclusion of South Africa from the Davis Cup competition in 1970. However, he was eventually given a visa and he visited South Africa in 1973, thereby becoming the first black professional to be permitted to play in the national championships there. He would revisit South Africa in 1977. It appears that fame and money were not the principle motivating factors in his desire to go to South Africa, but his belief in the essential goodness of human beings regardless of their color. He hoped that his visit would do good for both blacks and whites, showing them that racial integration worked. However, his faith in the possibility of guiding Euro-South Africans toward a democratic society through reason began to wane in the face of SAAG intransigence, prompting him to accept the desirability of a cultural boycott of the country, as when he took part in the protest against the South African Davis Cup team in 1978. Greatly shaken by the magnitude of the SAAG crackdown in the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising and the ensuing rebellions, he, together with U.S.-domiciled Jamaican actor and performer Harry Belafonte, founded and co-chaired Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid in 1983 to encourage U.S. athletes, actors, performers, etc., to boycott apartheid South Africa. He would also be among those who were arrested outside the South African embassy in Washington (on January 11, 1985) as a participant of the Free South Africa Movement. Ash lived long enough to see the beginnings of the journey toward the birth of an apartheid-free South Africa, visiting the country with other U.S. African American celebrities in 1991. For more on Ashe see his biography (Ashe and Rampersad 1994). The article by the prominent U.S. antiapartheid activist who helped organize many protests against sporting contacts with apartheid South Africa (and a friend of Ashe), Richard E. Lapchick, on Espn. com titled "A Legacy of Change and Hope" (dated February 7, 2007), is also worth looking at—as is the article by John Martin, titled "A Dream Restored" in the *New York Times* of August 25, 2007. (Martin's article is about the rebirth of a tennis center for Afro-South Africans built in 1976 in Soweto that Arthur Ashe helped fund, but which in the dark days of the antiapartheid struggle was vandalized.)

71. It ought to be noted that the organization continues to live on as Artists for a New South Africa (ANSA), with the objective of helping in the effort to erase the social, economic and other legacies of apartheid. From helping to raise funds in the United States for the ANC at the time of Mandela's first U.S. visit following his release from prison to helping in the voter education effort during the first national democratic elections and onto such currently ongoing projects as the effort to combat HIV/AIDS, ANSA members have shown, in a most exemplary fashion, that the energy and effort originally mustered for the antiapartheid campaign need not be extinguished, it could also be directed toward a campaign for building a new future. (On the Internet they are located at www. ansafrica. org)

72. From "Paul Robeson's Message to the Conference of the African National Congress" (published in the New Age [Cape Town, December 23, 1954] and available at the ANC website, www. anc. org. za).

73. See the discussion by Rob Nixon (1994) of the controversy surrounding the *Graceland* album.

74. The organization began its life in September 1975, following efforts of a number of African American U.S. foreign policy activists (such as Goler Butcher, Charles Diggs, and Willard Johnson), as Black Forum on Foreign Policy. However, the following year the name was changed to TransAfrica and lawyer and activist Randall Robinson was appointed its executive director to help develop it into a credible African American foreign policy lobbying group. Under his able leadership the organization would grow to become, compared to the past, highly influential in shaping U.S. foreign policy on South Africa during the period of South Africa's second "decade of antiapartheid rebellion." (See Massie 1997 for more on the origins of the organization.) It ought to be noted, that Randall's increasing involvement with U.S. foreign policy would eventually produce a level of disillusionment of such depth that he would retire from the leadership of TransAfrica and take the drastic step, in 2001, of going into exile by moving to the Caribbean island of St. Kitts where his spouse comes from. Describing this decision, chronicled in his dramatically titled book *Quitting America: The Departure of a Black Man from His Native Land*, he would explain: "The reasons [for the departure] are not easy to organize and write about, scattered as they are in sobering, disillusioning bits and pieces across the changing fields of a lifetime. All societies have ugly sides to them, I suppose…." However, his well-justified complaint is that the United States is hobbled by the "seemingly unconscious habit of denying that [U.S.] society is, like all other societies, flawed in the least." He continues: "The refusal to examine, to look at itself at all, as would virtually the rest of the world, has produced, or perhaps is produced of, a collective national psychosis, accommodated and protected by layer upon layer of an orchestrated self-adoration that only great power could insulate from effective critical assault." The problem, however, he argues is even deeper and wider: "Since the age of Christopher Columbus, exemplar extraordinaire, wealthy white Western societies have employed the exploit, dump, and bury method as the principal modus operandi for engaging a red, brown, and black world they, over a period of more than five centuries, enslaved, slaughtered, suppressed, and stole from.… Were whites in critical mass even minimally inclined to honesty, where would truth begin its reconstruction of so sordid a past?" However, he does not see any such "Grand Apologia" coming soon, if ever. The result, from his personal perspective is that, in his words: "In [United States], I do not exist… not even fully to myself. This has nothing to do with money or prominence or social station. Those are the facile exterior conditions of a black person's unimportant fortune.… It is the important fortune, the interior defining condition, the ageless, unfed black self that cannot flourish within the culturally intolerant space of self-absorbed white [United States]" (Robinson 2005: 138, 139, 145; emphasis in the original).

75. There are growing number of sources now available on the role of U.S. African Americans in the arena of U.S. foreign affairs, of which the following, in terms of this work, are worth consulting (besides the classics by Noer [1978, 1985]): Borstelmann (1993, 2001), Culverson (1999), Hostetter (2006), Nesbitt (2004), Plummer (1996, 2003), and Stanford (1997).

76. To gain an impression of the impact of the civil rights legislation on U.S. African American representation in the U.S. Congress, look at these figures: in 1870 there were three representatives (prior to that there had been none); from 1901 to 1929 there were no representatives because of the Jim Crow laws that effectively prevented U.S. African Americans from exercising their constitutional rights; in 1945 there were two; in 1965 there were six; but in 1985 there were twenty-one!—their names: Augustus F. Hawkins, John Conyers Jr., William L. Clay, Louis Stokes, Ronald V. Dellums, Parren J. Mitchell, Charles B. Rangel, Walter R. Fauntroy, Cardiss Colins, Harold Ford, George Crockett, Julian Dixon, William Gray III, Mickey Leland, Mervyn Dymally, Gus Savage, Katie Hall, Charles Hayes, Major Owens, Edolphus Towns, and Alan Wheat. (Source: *Point of View* (Winter 1987): 24–25, published by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Washington, D. C.)

77. This is not to suggest by any means that Congress had not taken any interest in the apartheid question. In fact, as a legislative review by Walters (1985) on the subject shows, Congressional interest in the apartheid question went as far back as 1966 when the first major hearings on U.S. policy on South Africa were held in the months of March, April and August. Thereafter, over the years, hearings were held on a variety of South Africa-related topics. Here is a sampling: landing rights for South African Airways (hearings held in 1969); renewing the sugar import quota for South Africa (1969); job discrimination by U.S. businesses in South Africa (1971); nuclear relations with South Africa (1971, 1976, 1977, 1982), the arms embargo (1973); the Namibian question (1974); mineral imports from South Africa (1976, 1980); general business relations (1976, 1977, 1980); repression in South Africa (1977, 1983); limited economic sanctions (export controls) (1982); constructive engagement policy (1983, 1985); broader economic sanctions (1985, 1988); loans to South Africa (1989) and so on. The problem, however, was that while the Congressional Black Caucus, together with assistance from a number of white Democrats, was able to prod Congress to hold hearings on many occasions, until 1985 its success in translating these hearings into concrete legislation had been minimal. It would require a number of factors (discussed above) to come together before the Caucus could begin chalking up concrete legislative achievements, of which the *Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act* of 1986 would be a major accomplishment, that is when compared to previous legislative history on the subject.

78. Among the prominent individuals who offered themselves for arrest outside the embassy were: Lowell Weicker (Republican senator), Patricia Schroeder (Democratic representative), Gerald McEntree (president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees), Mark Stepp (vice president of United Auto Workers), Theodore R. Mann (president of the American Jewish Congress), Rosa Parks (of the Montgomery Bus Boycott fame), Sister Mary O'Keefe (national director of the Association of American Nuns), and Ramsey Clark (former attorney general of the United States)—source: see Payne 1986.

79. For an evaluation of how this part of the Act would fare in practice see Clarizio, Clements and Geeter (1989).

80. Mention should also be made here of the fact that 1986 was a banner year for pro-sanctions activists throughout the world. Besides the United States, many countries imposed or re-imposed various types of sanctions on South Africa—they included: the Commonwealth of Nations—Australia, the Bahamas, Britain, Canada, India, Zimbabwe,

Zambia, etc.—(who, with the exception of Britain, banned new investment or reinvestment of profits, banned new bank loans, banned imports of agricultural products, coal, iron and steel, military equipment, Krugerrands and uranium, terminated export credits and other assistance to trade with South Africa, and banned air links with South Africa, and so on); European Economic Community—Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, etc.—(who, with the exception of Britain, banned new investment in South Africa, banned import of iron and steel and military equipment, stopped oil exports to South Africa as well as export of para-military and other "strategic" equipment for military and police end-use, stopped undertaking new cultural and scientific agreements and froze existing ones, and so on); and Japan (which banned import of iron and steel and banned export of computers to South African agencies concerned with enforcing apartheid laws, suspended air links with South Africa, and so on.)

81. Sanctions on a limited basis had been applied by various administrations in the past as the account in the preceding chapters and the following chronology show: August 1963: United States agrees to a limited voluntary U.N. arms embargo against South Africa; December 1963: United States agrees to a U.N. ban on supply of equipment and material for the manufacture of weapons to South Africa; 1964: direct loans by the Exim bank are terminated and the United States persuades the IMF not to purchase South African gold for a temporary period; February 1967: U.S. naval vessels would cease to visit South African ports for refueling and recreation; June 1968: United States persuades the IMF not to purchase South African gold at prices above $35 per ounce; 1975: nuclear fuel shipments are halted by the Ford Administration; March 1977: a number of U.S. corporations adopt the so-called Sullivan Code of Principles (see below); November 1977: United States agrees to a mandatory U.N. ban on arms supply to South Africa; 1978: the 1975 nuclear fuel shipment still remains on hold; February 1978: Executive order issued by the Carter Administration prohibiting supply (directly or via other countries) of any item destined for police and military end-use; 1979: Congress prohibits Ex-Im Bank loans to all government firms and to private firms with discriminatory labor practices; December 1984: a number of U.S. firms in South Africa issue a joint statement calling for an end to apartheid.

82. Sanctions, in the form of a trade embargo, were imposed on Nicaragua by the Reagan Administration on May 1, 1985, on grounds that this small and wretchedly poor country, with a total population (3.5 million) equal at that time to half of that of New York City's, was a threat to the national security of the United States! Sanctions against Cuba, another small country, were imposed in 1960 and have never been lifted since by the United States. According to Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1985: 7) the United States has applied sanctions (acting either alone or in conjunction with others) some 68 times since the First World War against a host of countries—principally PQD nations—for a variety of reasons. (The latest target, albeit for justifiable reasons, is Burma or Myanmar as it is also-called.)

83. See the 1986 *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, pp. 359–71 for an account of the politics behind the Congressional veto.

84. From this broader perspective, the latest movement of relevance, still in its nascent stages, is the Anti-Iraq War Movement. (Though given the absence of the draft, unlike during the Vietnam War era, suggests that the movement will be difficult to broaden.)

85. Three books from three different time periods, while to some degree polemical, perhaps not unexpected given the nature of the subject, should nevertheless suffice to corroborate this point (which, at its root, is symptomatic of the deep-seated anti-intellectualism of the U.S. ignorantsia—also reflected in the U.S. media): Hofstadter (1963), Postman (1985), and Jacoby (2008).

86. Consider this: every three years, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), through its Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), conducts an international comparative study of the performance fifteen-year olds in over fifty countries (including the United States and most of the industrialized countries) in the areas of reading, mathematical, and scientific literacy. As one can surmise, the average performance of U.S. students in all the three areas is *consistently* and shamefully below that for other industrialized countries. (Visit the PISA website at www. pisa. oecd. org to access their reports.) Note, however, that this is not a surreptitious plea for dismantling the public educational system (throwing out the baby with the bathwater) in favor of the mythical panacea of so-called "school choice" advanced by the likes of Neal (2006).

87. There may be a temptation here to compare, say, the role of Jewish Americans and their pro-Israel allies to decisively shape U.S. foreign policy with respect to the Middle East, or the role of the Cuban exiles in determining U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba (even long after the dissolution of the cold war), it is important to register a strong word of caution. As Lemelle (1978) pointed out three decades ago in an insightful rejoinder to Weil (1978)—who had asked "Can the blacks do for Africa what the Jews did for Israel?"—any comparative assessment of the U.S. African American foreign policy role must recognize that, unlike the white ethnic groups, U.S. African Americans were lumbered with the burden of race. In other words, in the context of a society governed by the ideology of whiteness, the foreign policy role of U.S. African Americans was going to be severely circumscribed. Hence, LeMelle, quite correctly, suggested that a better question to ask was "Can a subordinate racial group in a racially stratified system maximize its transnational racial interests within the established or acceptable framework with a view to influencing foreign policy?" (p. 328)

88. Though in the case of the U.S. South, McCarthyism alone was not the only problem blacks had to contend with. For as Woods (2004) has shown, the whiteness-inspired paranoia of the white southerner equated the civil rights struggle with communism independently of McCarthyism. The contextual factor here was the waxing cold war. (See also Horne [1986].)

89. The problem, of course, does not only lie here. As Bagdikian (1988 and 1989) so well demonstrates, the ever-increasing concentration of ownership of the U.S. media in fewer and fewer hands has had some very negative consequences for the public. The most obvious has been a tendency toward self-censorship: Editors and producers begin to be wary of dealing with subject matter that may offend the owners of their media. There are too many examples of editors and producers who have been fired (or more often eased out of their jobs) because they dared to publish material

that the owners of the media did not find to their liking. In any case, it is rare for owners to appoint editors and producers who will offend them in the first place. In fact Windrich (1989: 58) draws attention to a 1986 survey of seventeen editorial writers of U.S. newspapers by the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Journalism which revealed that while all made the usual obligatory denunciation of apartheid, only a small fraction was willing to endorse any kind of U.S. action (disinvestment, sanctions, and so on) to encourage change in South Africa; the rest simply parroted the usual propaganda myths put out by Pretoria and Washington. (See also Sanders [2000] and Fair and Astroff [1991]. The study by Merrett [1995] that explores SAAG's logical penchant for censorship and secrecy from the regime's inception up to its demise, should also be consulted.) Consequently, the situation that is increasingly prevailing in the U.S. mass media today (as then) is not that there are widescale efforts to deliberately publish distortions and lies but rather that much of the news that ought to be reported is not. And even when it is reported it will often be "sanitized" by putting on it the gloss of official interpretation. (For example, news reports on the outbreaks of violence in black townships in South Africa often had attached to them official explanations from apartheid officials to the effect that the violence was begun by the blacks, whereas the truth was usually the other way round.) Moreover, the tendency to avoid continuous reporting from areas undergoing revolutionary struggles often ends up producing disjointed and distorted information. The pathetic failure of United States and Western news media to meet the challenges of censorship imposed by SAAG following its declarations of states of emergency was indicative of not only cowardice, but also of where their true sympathies lay—with SAAG. Consider these two quotes that capture the sentiment of much of the Western press in South Africa during the apartheid era that appear in Sanders (2000) whose well-researched study examines the nature of the relationship that existed between the international media and South Africa in the 1970s:

> If we in the West as a result of a bovine obsession with racial equality pressurize South Africa and Rhodesia into a debased form of our own democracy, we will see not liberal democracy but a black tyranny replacing a white one. … The truth is that South Africa, for all its faults, is part of the West. And its enemies are after a system which will take South Africa out of this community.

> I found all the [correspondents] without a single exception, to possess either a rank colonialist outlook or a rank [U.S.] American racist outlook.

Of course, the pressure to support the status quo (from which media owners and political conservatives benefit) by reporting mainly on news events that do not rock the boat also comes from the well-funded and well-connected powerful right wing "media vigilantes" such as an outfit that names itself "Accuracy in the Media," based in Washington. As a result of this pressure, where journalists are falsely (and most ironically) accused of being biased against the conservatives, the tendency increasingly has been toward "objective" reporting in which much truth about the reality of the status quo simply does not get reported. A reality that the media owners and their conservative supporters do not want the public to see—e.g., the one in the United States where, in the words of Bagdikian (1989: 34),

> millions sleep in doorways; where most children can no longer expect to live in families with one income or buy a house or go to a university; where the poor are getting poorer and the rich richer; where ever-more-lavish skyscrapers and luxury hotels cast shadows on deteriorating schools and libraries; where air and water are increasingly unhealthy; where thirty-seven million people have no health insurance coverage; where millions of children in hopeless neighborhoods with hopeless schools and no hopes for good jobs are killing themselves with drugs—drugs often imported from countries we favor because their governments call themselves anti-Communist.

Yet, even where there may be no *direct* pressure from right wing organizations, their influence is still palpable by virtue of their ability to dominate the field of so-called "experts" who are voluntarily called upon by the corporate media to comment on current news events. Outfits like the Brookings Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, the Hudson Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, and so on, are always available to trot out pseudointellectuals by the dozens to the media. In fact, the ubiquity of their presence on the media scene has become such that even fairly reputable news organizations such as the BBC are now regularly turning to them for input—but without identifying their ideological leanings. Needless to say, true experts (who, not surprisingly, are often from progressive organizations or are associated with universities, are usually marginalized or even, as in the case of people like Noam Chomsky, simply blackballed). (A website worth visiting that throws light on the pernicious media influence of these right wing organizations is that of the media watch group called Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting [www.fair.org].) Under these circumstances of a monopoly-controlled and co-opted media it is not surprising that one frequently hears such statements by overseas visitors to the United States as "the U.S. public are like mushrooms: they are kept in the dark and fed manure," nor is it surprising that Soviet journalists used to correctly point out that the Soviet public was better informed than the U.S. public about world affairs. (It appears that in societies where *official* censorship and information control prevail the appetite of the public for news and information grows proportionately greater.)

90. They did not include in their study the morning news shows and such television "newsmagazines" as *This Week with David Brinkley*, *Nightline, Face the Nation*, etc.

91. Perhaps the clearest example, in more recent times, demonstrating the moral, intellectual, and professional bankruptcy of the U.S. corporate media was its almost complete capitulation before the onslaught of the Bush-Cheney propaganda machine in the run-up to the Iraq War—a war that was launched on the basis of essentially deception for nefarious ends. What is more, this criticism has been leveled by, among others, the very person who was once part of that propaganda machine, the press secretary Scott McClellan (see his recently published memoir, McClellan [2008]). On the deeply deleterious effects on press freedom and information access of the concentration of media ownership

see, for example, Bagdikian (2004). The anthology by Berry and Theobald (2006) is also a worthy read on this subject given its broader historically-rooted theoretical focus.

92. See Gramsci's *Selections from Prison the Notebooks* (editors and translators: Hoare and Smith [1971]).

93. Some have suggested that the process has become even more insidious than what is being suggested here; that is, there is a palpable campaign in the United States on the part of media-owning monopoly capital, working hand-in-glove with right wing think tanks and government officials, to deliberately censor, distort, and fabricate news and information. See, for example, Alterman (2003), McChesney (2004), and Nichols and McChesney (2005). An excellent but at times terrifying resource—based on actual case studies—on the nature and extent of censorship in the U.S. media (almost always in favor of capital and its right wing supporters, and against the interests of the citizenry) are the annual anthologies produced by Project Censored and published by Seven Stories Press (New York, NY). Their latest volume, as of this writing, is *Censored 2008* and quite a few of the studies in it (as in previous volumes) are directly pertinent to a number of issues raised (albeit some tangentially) in this work. But whether relevant to the present work or not, no one interested in key issues of our day and how corporate media marginalizes them, as well as in the antidemocratic character of this media, can afford to ignore these anthologies.

94. See Fieldhouse (2005) for one of the most comprehensive accounts of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, which was formally launched on March 30, 1960 by fusing together a couple of organizations that were already involved with antiapartheid activities in Britain.

95. The discussion here concerns general broad economic sanctions across all sectors of international economic relations: trade, finance, investments, etc. together with sanctions in such other areas as military and intelligence, sports, and cultural links. Many countries had imposed limited economic sanctions on South Africa up to this point; examples of such sanctions include: arms embargo, general trade sanctions, restrictions on imports and exports of specific commodities, cultural exchange sanctions, disinvestment, divestment, financial sanctions, and transportation and communication sanctions. It is around 1985/1986, however, that countries in the West began to seriously grapple with the idea of a general economic isolation of South Africa, and not just on a piecemeal basis, under the twin pressures of deteriorating human rights situation in South Africa and a rejuvenated international antiapartheid movement.

96. Note that a variant of this argument also appeared in the form that since other independent African countries in Southern Africa were economically tied in with South Africa they would also become victims of sanctions. There were two responses that one could make here: first was that given the extent of economic damage done by South Africa's destabilizing activities in almost all the countries in question, any hastening of the downfall of SAAG would have been in the best interests of these countries—even in the face of additional hardship arising out of the sanctions. Second, most of these countries either individually or collectively had called on the international community to impose sanctions on South Africa, fully aware of the consequences they themselves would face as a result of such action.

97. On the methodological weaknesses of the previous surveys and the generally reactionary role of social science in South Africa where it "[had] become a means whereby the government and business [could] advance (white/reformist) social scientists as spokespersons for the (black/progressive) working classes," see Sutcliffe (1987).

98. For more information see Greenberg (1981), Marks and Trapido (1988) and Murray (1982) as well as the sources mentioned above.

99. See also the discussion by Lewis (1990) in his chapter on "Apartheid, Economic and Political Change" where he argues that "leaving aside the effects of international pressures, the essential economic drawbacks inherent in apartheid [had] long been taking their toll on the South African economy."

100. It is strange that this myth had found so much support amongst capitalists and some liberals in the West when even Western experience had shown that capitalist economic growth had not led to a lessening of racism, but rather had intensified it many ways. (See also the discussion on race and racism in Appendix II.)

101. A brief biography of Kathrada would not be out of place here for reasons to be indicated in a moment: Kathrada, the son of South Asian Muslim immigrants, was born on August 21, 1919 in Schweizer Reineke, a small town 240 miles from Johannesburg. He became involved in the political activities of the Transvaal Indian Congress from the age of 12 and was first sentenced to prison as a result of these activities at the age of 17 (he lied about his age to the police). As he grew older, his political activities expanded to a wider national level so that on more than one occasion he would be placed under banning orders. More significantly, however, three times, in 1955, in the Treason Trials of 1956-61, and the Rivonia Trial of 1963-64 he would be tried together with Mandela, Sisulu and others, and with them he was eventually given life imprisonment and banished to Robben Island. He was freed with Sisulu and others from Polsmoor in 1989. In 1991 he was elected to the national executive committee of the ANC and became head of its Public Relations department. Kathrada, it ought to be noted, is among the many antiapartheid activists who emerged from the South African Asian community—quite out of proportion, in terms of their numbers, to the community's small percentage of the total population (about 3%). One possible explanation for this was the presence within the community's intelligentsia of a political tradition that combined in a unique amalgam the influences of "Gandhism," Marxism, and African and South Asian nationalism (and for some, even Islam).

102. Reasons include: (i) Inadequate planning and implementation: "[T]he sanctions imposed may simply be inadequate to achieve the objectives sought—the goals may be too elusive, the means too gentle, or cooperation from other countries, when needed, too tepid" (p. 10). (ii) Generation of successful counter-measures: Sanctions may not only help to generate sufficient patriotic fervor to unite the citizenry of the target-country in support of its government, but may also spur it onto developing alternative economic measures ranging from sacrifice and discipline to diversification of the internal economy and external commercial sources. (iii) Allies: Powerful allies may come to the rescue of the target country and shield it from sanctions. (iv) Backlash from allies: Allies of the country imposing sanctions may not be will-

ing to go along with the sanctions for their own political and economic reasons. The backlash may also come from economic interests within the country imposing sanctions.

103. Briefly stated they are: (1) Don't bite off more than you can chew: The goal of the sanctions must be modest. A goal such as forcing a drastic change in the domestic policy of the target country is bound to fail because economic relations with the target country are seldom at or near monopoly level such as to cause severe economic hardship within the target country. (2) Do pick on the weak and the helpless: Countries that are economically strong should not be targeted; sanctions are more likely to succeed when the targeted country is experiencing economic distress. (3) Do pick on the allies and trading partners; but remember, good friends are hard to come by and even harder to lose: Sanctions tend to succeed more in cases where the target countries are allies rather than enemies because of the willingness of allies to give in on specific issues in order to preserve the overall economic and political relationship. (4) Do apply sanctions decisively and with resolution: Sanctions when applied should be applied decisively and quickly so as to prevent the target country from mobilizing counter-measures. (5) Do impose the maximum cost on your target: Where heavy costs would ensue to the target country as a result of sanctions, there is a greater probability that the sanctions will succeed. (6) Don't pay too high a price for sanctions: Conversely, if the costs are equal or greater on the sanctioning country then there is less likelihood that a full effort will be made to carry out the sanctions. "Countries that shoot themselves in the foot may not mortally wound their intended targets." (7) Don't suppose that, where sanctions will fail, covert maneuvers or military action will necessarily succeed: When other measures such as covert military operations are used in association with sanctions the success of the sanctions is not necessarily assured. (They do not explain why; this finding defies common sense and it points to a central weakness of their study: excessive reliance on statistical devices such as multiple regression.) (8) Don't exaggerate the importance of international cooperation with your policies and don't underestimate the role of international assistance to your target: The larger the number of countries involved in implementing sanctions the less likelihood the sanctions will succeed because it points to the over-ambitiousness of the goal of the sanctions. If a modest goal was the object than presumably there would be no need to ask other countries to join in the sanctions effort. (Again this point does not really make sense; surely universal isolation of a targeted country is bound to increase the probability of success.) (9) Do plan carefully: economic sanctions may worsen a bad situation: It is essential that careful evaluation of consequences precede any attempt at undertaking sanctions. (Common sense alone would suggest this.)

104. The struggle to reach this consensus on the immorality and unacceptability of racism itself was one that had to be won first before apartheid could be targeted. Almost until the 1960s (when the numerical balance tilted in the favor of PQD nations in international fora such as the United Nations) the West had operated on a double standard: German racism against European Jews was considered a crime against humanity, hence the Nuremburg trials, yet white racism against blacks was considered acceptable to all intents and purposes.

105. However, once sufficient pro-sanctions pressures had built up because of factors discussed in this chapter and a decision was made by a number of key Western nations to impose some economic sanctions on South Africa around 1985/86, the way was open for a greater international coordination of the effort to isolate South Africa economically. Therefore, the goal of forcing the dismantling of the apartheid system—that is forcing a drastic change in domestic policy (see "commandment 8" in the note above)—was not an over-ambitious one.