Higher Education in Afro-Arab Islamic Africa

Y. G-M. Lulat

NOTE: This reading comprises Chapter 3 ("Afro-Arab Islamic Africa") of a book titled *A History of African Higher Education from Antiquity to the Present: A Critical Synthesis* by Y.G-M. Lulat (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005) For more on the book click here: http://bit.ly/hedbook

Chapter Contents

3

Afro-Arab Islamic Africa

INTRODUCTION

There is a tendency in much of Western writing on Africa to divide the continent into North Africa and sub-Saharan (or black) Africa, even in the absence of a geographic division, and then proceed to deny that North Africa can be legitimately considered as part of the African continent; rather they assert that it is part of the Middle East (which itself, of course, as already noted, is a misnomer—although for the sake of convenience this term is retained in this work). The most obvious example of this approach has been, until very recently, the highly unwarranted excision of the Egyptian civilization from African history (see Chapter 2). Such are the times we live in that there are those within Africa itself (both north of the Sahara and south of the Sahara) who would concur with this artificial bifurcation of the continent.[1] The truth is that just as Eastern Europe is both part of Asia and part of Europe, North Africa too belongs to both sides, the African side and the Middle Eastern Side. It is not simply that geography dictates that North Africa be considered part of Africa, but culture and history as well. For if *modern* African culture is a fusion of Western and African cultures, then the only differentiating factor that separates modern North African culture from modern sub-Saharan African culture is that modern North African culture incorporates a third culture: Arabic Islamic culture. Yes, it is true that Arabic is not an indigenous African language, any more than English, French, or Portuguese is, even though its arrival in Africa precedes the others by over 1,000 years—a long enough period to shed its tramontane status. On

the other hand, one could challenge this statement by suggesting, as Mazrui (1986) does, that from a geographic point of view the Arabic peninsula ought to be considered part of Africa; and therefore from this perspective Arabic is not a foreign language. However, the fact that this is not how the peninsula is usually seen today is a function of Western engineering (the Suez Canal) and Western domination of world cartography.

Anyhow, as this chapter proceeds to consider those countries that together constitute that part of Africa that we may legitimately label today as Afro-Arab Islamic Africa because of a common linguistic (Arabic—with the exception of one or two countries) and religious (Islamic) heritage, it is necessary to begin by delineating a number of points of prolegomenous significance that are applicable, to varying degrees of course, to the history of higher education across this entire region. But first we need to dispense with three issues of methodological import: (a) While for the purposes of this work, Afro-Arab Islamic Africa refers to that part of Africa comprising these countries: Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sahrawi (Western Sahara), Sudan, Tunisia, and United Arab Republic (Egypt), not all of them will receive individualized treatment here for reasons of space—see Teferra and Altbach (2003) for those countries that are left out of this work.[2]

(b) Any suggestion of unrelenting cultural homogeneity throughout the region is unintentional; for, as Abun-Nasr (1987: 5), for example, reminds us: the *general* linguistic and religious unity of Afro-Arab Islamic Africa should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it is a region with highly diverse ethnic populations given not only the presence of ethnicities from much further south of the coastal hinterland (Berbers, Sudanese, Somalis, etc.), but also the infusion/assimilation of ethnicities and/or long-lasting cultural imprints from across the Mediterranean and the Red Sea (north, east, and west); represented by, in addition to the Arabs, the British, Byzantines, French, Greeks, Italians, Jews, Persians, Phoenicians, Romans, Spanish, Turks, and so on. Furthermore, there continues to exist to this day sizeable minority populations in this region who adhere to non-Islamic faiths, principally: animism, Christianity, and Judaism. Yet on the other hand, notwithstanding this fact, from the perspective of a history of higher education in the region, one can still acknowledge that these countries are in possession of a common cultural heritage that while in relative terms is recent, it extends well over one 1,000 years; ergo, giving it a level of durability that has helped to significantly *reduce* (not necessarily eliminate) those *differences* among the countries of the region that have ensued from even more recent and continuing but disparate influences of the variegated European colonial mantle thrown over them during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the British, the French, the Italians, and the Spanish.

(c) Given that these are countries that were once part of the vast global Islamic empire, they all possessed some form of the *madrasah* system, but to varying degrees of development obviously. Some, such as Egypt, Morocco, and

Tunisia had institutions of higher learning that at one time were of sufficient international repute as to attract students from all across the Islamic empire; while others, such as Djibouti, had a more rudimentary system. Since the madrasah system has already been discussed at some length in Chapter 1, attention in this chapter is directed principally to higher education during the European colonial and postcolonial eras.

On the basis of the foregoing methodological backdrop, among the factors that have had a significant impact on the history of higher education in Afro-Arab Islamic Africa there are a number that emerge as being of sufficient universality—in terms of the region—to deserve their delineation here as part of this prolegomena (before we go on to look at the region from a geographic country-by-country perspective, beginning with Egypt). There are at least five factors that are worthy of mention.

The first concerns the specific elite configurations that have marked this region throughout its recent history. The development of higher education and the quantitative/qualitative forms it took was, as one would expect, primarily the handiwork of the elites *(linked together in various permutations)* at a given moment in time. During the precolonial period the principal elites comprised (1) a praetorian foreign, but Muslim, ruling elite (e.g., Ottomans, Mamluks, sultans, amirs), (2) the landed aristocracy, (3) the indigenous and foreign mercantilist class, and (4) the traditional religious elite (the *ulama*). In the colonial period the same configuration existed except for three major changes: the ruling elites lost their position, with one or two exceptions, to an externally imposed non-Muslim elite, the foreign Western colonial elite; a new subordinate comprador administrative elite recruited from among the traditional elites (as well as non-elites) was created by the colonialists to staff the colonial bureaucracies at the ground level; and all the indigenous elites, new or old, were rendered subordinate to the foreign colonial elite.[3] With the end of colonialism and the exit of the colonial administrative elite, a new elite emerged to take its place. This new postindependence elite was made up entirely of either an emergent nationalist elite (which itself grew out of the colonial comprador administrative elite), or it was a combination of remnants of the precolonial ruling elite and the colonial comprador elite. In some cases (as in Egypt, Libya, or Sudan, for example), after some time had elapsed following political independence, yet another new elite arrived on the scene, the praetorian bureaucratic elite, to which all other elites became subordinate (at least in political terms).[4] Now, several related points flow from the foregoing: (a) the role of the ulama as the principal architects of higher education began to erode with the arrival of, first, colonialism and thereafter the secular postindependence era (though it never was and has never been completely obliterated). (b) With the arrival of European colonialism all the indigenous elites (with the exception, for the most part, of the ulama) soon bought into the colonialist approach to Islam in general and the madrasah system, specifically: that it was irrelevant to a "modernizing" society.

(One must never forget that ultimately the success of the colonial project depended on the collaboration of existing and emerging elites with the colonial elite in the administration of the colonies.) [5] This was expressed in three principal ways: demanding that the colonial regime provide secular higher education for their children; sending their children abroad to obtain Western higher education; and working toward the establishment of secular higher education institutions within the country—with or without the cooperation of the colonialist regimes (see also the next item.) (c) It would not be farfetched to view the struggle for independence from colonial rule as essentially a struggle between a foreign and the indigenous elites over the resources (human and natural) of a given country; rather than a struggle between colonialism and authentic and democratic independence. In other words, for the masses political independence simply entailed, in the most fundamental sense, exchanging one set of oppressors with another (to describe the countries that make up Afro-Arab Islamic Africa, with one or two possible exceptions, as essentially police states would not be far from the mark); and higher education, *at the level of practice*, was enlisted to help legitimate this circumstance. (d) Where the new praetorian bureaucratic elite is dominant, the central avenue of elite reproduction is access to elite private or overseas education; one function of which is to enable a bilingual facility among the elite that is not generally available to the masses. ("Arabization" has almost always been reserved primarily for the masses, notwithstanding the nationalist rhetoric of the elites.)

The second is about the ulama. Any inference from the account that follows below that the ulama were (and are) a homogenous group is invalid; for, as with all *intellectual elites* (those of the present-day West included) they were often riven by a variety of considerations, depending upon time and place: political, economic, doctrinal, personal ambition, and, yes, even petty jealousies of the most mundane variety. Not surprisingly, their response to the colonial presence was often contradictory; in some instances they collaborated with the colonial power (e.g., some of the *shaykhs* and *sufi* leaders in Morocco and Algeria), while in others they carried out oppositional activities, primarily on the ideological plane.[6] In this regard they were, of course, continuing an ancient tradition where some sections of the ulama had found it in their own personal interest to cooperate with the ruling authorities of the day irrespective of the openly abysmal record of the authorities regarding civil and human rights, not to mention the matter of adherence to the *Shari'ah*; while others took on the more difficult and dangerous task of fomenting opposition to such authorities. (The former, to justify their stance, usually took cover behind the Islamic injunction to Muslims to obey authority—by omitting the qualifier "just and God-fearing.")

The third concerns the concept of "Western" higher education. Whatever the Islamic roots of *Western* higher education (see Appendix I), by the time of European imperialism it had (like so much else, economy, society, military, state, etc.), diverged from Islamic higher education far beyond any immediately rec-

ognizable presence of common origins, so that the term *Western* higher educa-
tion does have some limited significance for our present purposes. Leaving
aside such matters as organizational forms, calendrical and diurnal structures of
programs of study, pedagogy, course content, and so on, the most important dif-
ference was that Western education was by and large secular in orientation—
even that provided by missionary education (in relative terms). For the national-
ist-oriented elites that emerged this divergence was seen in evaluative terms:
Western education was superior and Islamic education was inferior—it had to
be jettisoned.[7] Yet, had colonialism not intervened, it is not at all clear that the
madrasah system would still have been marginalized in favor of a secu-
lar/Westernist education that the indigenous elites (leaving aside the ulama)
quickly took to, like ducks to water, under the aegis of the colonial mantle, ra-
ther than the alternative: *the system eventually evolving to meet new challenges*.
(Reminder: no society will retain for long an educational system that is com-
pletely irrelevant to its needs.) The structural informality of the system and its
apparent "disorder" (itself a problematic concept since disorder is only manifest
against an externally mediated juxtaposition of externally rooted, hence foreign,
"order") does not mean that the madrasah system did not serve the needs of
their communities; it is only as a consequence of foreign threats and invasions
in the post–1492 world that their relevance for the sudden changed circum-
stances of their societies became moot. A related issue that emerges here is that
given their stated objective to "civilize" the Muslims, Why didn't the colonial
powers, such as the French with their explicitly articulated ideology of *mission
civilisatrice,* simply abolish the madrasah system altogether? There are several
reasons why they (to turn to the French again) refrained from doing this: (a) It
would have gone against their assurance to the Muslims that they would not in-
terfere with their religion—an assurance designed to buy their acquiescence
(even though in practice it was a promise not fully kept). (b) The French felt
that the madrasah system could be useful for ideological purposes if they could
staff if with vetted ulama who would help in legitimating French rule—an ap-
proach that did have some success in the early years of colonial rule. (c) Main-
taining the madrasah system was in keeping with their actual (if not stated) aim
of keeping the masses of the Muslims from becoming too educated to pose a
potential threat to the French presence in terms of both colonial rule as well as
competition for jobs. (d) It would have been simply too expensive to provide
secular education to all the Muslims; the French were not willing to release the
necessary resources for such an endeavor. (e) In the specific case of Algeria,
there was the issue of racist settler resistance to any effort at improving the lot
of the Muslim Algerians from any perspective to ensure their own settler su-
premacy within the social order. (This last point speaks to the conflict that often
emerged throughout colonial Africa wherever there were settler colonies (Alge-
ria, Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and so on) between the metropole and the
settlers regarding how best to govern a settler colony—a conflict that more of-

ten than not went in the favor of the settlers until the indigenous, following the growth of nationalism, took matters into their own hands.)

The fourth is about the colonial educational policies. Colonialism was not implemented on the basis of a one-size-fits-all template by a colonial power; there were always adjustments made in terms of strategy depending on what forces were encountered in a given context. Hence, if one compares the educational policies of the French with respect to Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, for instance, this fact becomes self-evident as will be shown in a moment. First, however, this preliminary observation: unlike in Algeria where a foreign colonial elite was brought in to supplant the traditional elite (the Ottoman Mamluks), in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, the French chose to deliberately develop an indigenous compradorial elite. However, here again there was some difference between Morocco and Tunisia for the reason that Tunisia, unlike Morocco, had a "foreign" traditional elite, the Ottoman Mamluks. Consequently, and especially with an eye toward the future, in the case of Morocco the objective was to cultivate a compradorial elite from among the preexisting traditional elite (the urban Arab elite) whose legitimacy would not be an issue compared to that of an Ottoman Mamluk elite (had one existed) in the eyes of the masses; whereas in the case of Tunisia, a new secular/Westernist elite was created/emerged out of the Arabs and Berbers drawn from the urban as well as the rural populations; the Ottoman Mamluks, were for the most part, sidelined (after all, in the eyes of the masses, they had forfeited their right to rule in a future independent Tunisia for failing to prevent the arrival of European colonialism). What then did this imply for colonial educational practice in these countries? In Algeria, educational provision for all Algerians (elites or the masses) was not of a primary concern to the colonial authorities, at least not in practice and definitely not to the same extent as was the case in Tunisia and Morocco. In the latter two, the French accepted their responsibility to attend to the education of the Tunisians and the Moroccans by, on one hand, strengthening rather than weakening the existing madrasah system; and on the other, ensuring that educational provision for the elites and the masses was not identical since the former were to be groomed for positions of some authority, even if compradorial. Yet, even here there was some difference: unlike in the case of Morocco, in Tunisia, the French chose to support local initiatives for alternative secular/Westernist education for the elites—especially in the face of ulama intransigence to reform the al-Zaitouna mosque-college; whereas in Morocco they chose to use the existing mosque-college, the al-Qarawiyyin, to continue training the elite, until it was no longer practical. This was possible since the existing Moroccan elite was not to be transformed or substituted; it would be allowed to continue to draw on traditional avenues of legitimacy. Therefore, to the French the *preservation* (which implied no reforms) of the existing avenue for elite training and recruitment, al-Qarawiyyin, was considered desirable (the ulama would cooperate because they were not being threatened with any kind of major reforms that would undermine

their power).[8] In other words, then, French educational policy was not absolutely uniform throughout its colonial empire in Africa. There was some difference that flowed from the so-called "assimilationist" (e.g., Algeria) versus the "associationist" (e.g., Morocco) colonial policies. However, any effort to identify and delve into all the nuances of difference would simply extend the scope of this work beyond the space permitted. Moreover, for our purposes, it is not even clear if this approach is necessary considering our interest in broad strokes rather than fine lines. Still, those interested in this line of inquiry may wish to look at, for example, Porter (2002), and Segalla (2003).

The fifth relates to the general history of the part of Islamic North Africa west of Egypt—referred to as the Maghreb. Any consideration of the history of the nations that make up the Maghreb forces one to confront the observation that in the phantasmagoric twists and turns of human history is to be found this twist: When the French colonized Algeria one of the myths they attempted to foist on the Algerian people (to be repeated on others all across Africa, and not only by them, but by the other colonial powers as well) is that they did not have a history until the French arrived on the scene (Naylor 2000). For the Algerians this utterly ridiculous fallacy must have been a bitter irony. The French were obviously patently ignorant of their own history; for, many centuries before (as noted in Chapter 1) the French in their barbaric state had encountered within their own borders, in southern France, the ancestors of the very people whose history they now wished to obliterate. A few centuries later, following that confrontation, they would have occasion to meet them again, by way of the Crusades. Yet, at the time of both these encounters, by almost any measure, the Muslims, compared to the French, were agents of an advanced civilization. Now, in 1830 the French had the audacity to proclaim themselves as the "Greeks of the world" who had come to bring civilization to the benighted! (p. 16). In fact, contrary to French essentialist propaganda, Algerian and other Maghrebi peoples had a history that went back not hundreds, but thousands of years! There is evidence of hominid presence (c. 200000 B.C.E.) and Neanderthal presence (c. 43000 B.C.E.) in North Africa, and the beautiful cave paintings found at a number of locations in that region (e.g., at Tassili-n-Ajjer in southern Algeria) speak to a Neolithic hunting people who lived from around 8000 B.C.E. to 4000 B.C.E. in a pre-desiccated (hence pre-Sahara) environment of the savannah—complete with lakes, rivers and a variety of animals from giraffes to elephants to hippopotami. From around 3000 B.C.E. onward the region became the domain of a single human-type but fragmented across the vast North African terrain into a number of ethnicities; these in turn fused to become, over time, the Berber peoples. By the time the Canaanites (or more commonly the Phoenicians) arrived from the region that we now call Lebanon to settle on the Maghrebi coast (approximately 900 B.C.E.)—to establish a century or so later (814 B.C.E.) a settlement at a place occupied by today's Tunis that they appropriately named Carthage (meaning new town)—the Berbers were

now a well established linguistically and culturally unique African people organized into tribes and states. In 146 B.C.E. the Romans destroyed the city of Carthage as a terminus in a series of wars (beginning from 264 B.C.E. to 241 B.C.E.—which we know as the First Punic War) they had fought with the Carthaginians who had over time expanded to give rise to the Carthaginian state (with armies that included Berber soldiers and at times vacillating Berber allies, Numidians).

The French were simply one more group of invaders of the Maghreb in a long history of invaders that included the Romans too (approximately 24–429 C.E.); the Vandals, led by their king, Gaiseric (429–533 C.E.); the Byzantines (533–642 C.E.); and the Arab Muslims (from 642 C.E. onward) with their various dynasties: Umayyads (661–750); Abbasids (750–909); and the Fatimids (909–72). After the Fatimids withdrew eastward to Egypt, Berber dynasties would now takeover, such as the Zirids (972–1148); the Hammadids (1011–1151); Almoravids (1106–47); and the Almohads (1125–1271).[9] Then would come a number of lesser dynasties ruling different parts of the Maghreb (the Merinids, Zayanids, and Hafsids), to be followed finally by the Ottomans in 1516.

In outlining this highly condensed history of the Maghreb on the eve of the arrival of European imperialism three additional points may be noted: (1) When Islam arrived in the Maghreb the Berbers especially those living on or near the coast, were Christians (conversion to Christianity had begun in the second-century C.E. and would continue over the next 200 years). However, by the end of the eighth-century, most of them had converted to Islam while continuing to retain much of their language and culture. (Today all Berber communities are Muslims, though vestiges of pre-Islamic beliefs and practices may still be found among some of them and despite efforts to Arabize them, most still speak their own languages.) (2) The invasion of Europe in the eighth-century by Muslims and the subsequent colonization of parts of southern Europe (see Appendix I) was a combined Afro-Arab-Berber affair, and both the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties ruled Muslim Spain (from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries) when it was their turn to occupy the stage of Maghrebi history (the import of this fact can be assessed by reading Appendix I). (3) Initially, Islamic North Africa as a whole was a single Islamic polity; however, with the rise of various autonomous dynasties (e.g., the Hafsids in Tunisia), this polity fragmented to eventually become the basis for the independent countries that we recognize today.[10]

EGYPT

When Napoleon and his army disembarked in the small Egyptian fishing village of Marabou (located a short distance west of Alexandria) on July 1, 1798, his primary motivation for this Egyptian adventure was the circumscription of the growing British commercial interests in the Mediterranean/Red Sea region

as part of his ongoing efforts to cripple Britain. However, this small framed man, whom women had nicknamed Puss-in-Boots on account of his hat and boots appearing to overwhelm his frame, had other megalomaniacal ambitions as well. Harking back to the exploits of other conquerors of Egypt centuries before him (Cambyses, Alexander the Conqueror, Gaius Octavius, etc.), he believed that under French colonial tutelage Egypt had the economic potential to become one of the crown jewels of his empire.[11] What was required was for the French to extricate Egypt from the grip of the Ottoman Mamluks and commence the process of restoring it to its former glory (and, quite remarkably, to this end he had actually brought along with him a large 167-person contingent of top French scientists, artists, engineers, and scholars to study the Egyptian past and present, as a first step in the project).[12] Unquestionably, the Ottomans (specifically in the guise of the resurgent Ottoman Mamluk rulers—the rather lackluster descendants of the original Mamluk dynasty that had ruled Egypt from 1250 until its defeat by the Ottomans in 1517, but who by the 1600s had managed to win back from their Ottoman overlords considerable, though not complete, autonomy), were presiding over an Egypt that was no longer as vibrant as it used to be.[13] The very fact that Napoleon had met so little *credible* resistance from the Ottoman Mamluks (who, recall, were in a sense heirs to the Abbasid dynasty, whose founder, Salah Ad-din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, Saladin, had once been the scourge of Crusader Europe) was in itself telling: Egypt, on the cusp of the nineteenth-century, as most of the rest of the Ottoman Empire, now lagged far behind Europe, from almost any perspective one cared to consider— economically, politically, and militarily.[14] Ergo, the arrogance of the French notwithstanding, there was some truth to Napoleon's view that Ottoman Mamluk rule had not bode well for the fortunes of Egypt—of course this was not entirely of their own making, for (as indicated in the preceding chapter), some of the same post–1492 forces that had been propelling Europe toward global hegemony were also responsible for taking the wind out of Ottoman sails all across its empire, including its North African provinces.[15]

As the French team looked around, the educational landscape they beheld was one that was characteristic of most of Islamic Africa at that particular moment in history: namely, *in view of the times*, a medieval moribund madrasah-based educational system (see Chapter 1 for details of this system) that through years of neglect had been rendered quite incapable of fully meeting the challenges of a rapidly changing and modernizing world—albeit in this regard, Egypt was still slightly better off compared to the other parts of Islamic Africa (for Cairo had managed to retain vestiges of its former role as among the major centers of learning in the Islamic empire). The fact that the Ottomans were custodians of a civilization that at one time in its history had been at the forefront of intellectual and scientific achievement and at whose feet a medieval Europe had once learned much (as was shown in Appendix I), appears not to have detracted them from imposing an intellectual insularity in their empire that was

quite unbecoming of those who had been enjoined by their religion to seek knowledge to the ends of the earth (Massialas and Jarrar 1983: 8–9). The problem, perhaps, was misplaced arrogance that ensues from military might; or maybe it was the lack of a pre-Islamic tradition among the Ottomans of venerating the written and the spoken word (that the Arabs, for example, had possessed in their pre-Islamic days); or possibly it was the idea that anything coming out of the lands of their Christian enemies was not only unworthy of emulation, but its incorporation into a culture that saw no separation between the spiritual and the material spheres of life, would smack of heresy; or it was a combination of all three.

Or then again, perhaps, Bernard Lewis (1982) has a point. He begins by stating the problem: "It may well seem strange that classical Islamic civilization which, in its earlier days, was so much affected by Greek and Asian influences should so decisively have rejected the West." Why? A possible answer he says is that "[w]hile Islam was still expanding and receptive, Western Europe had little or nothing to offer but rather flattered Muslim pride with the spectacle of a culture that was visibly and palpably inferior. What is more, the very fact that it was Christian discredited it in advance." This view, he argues, had in time become ossified to eventually produce this result: "Walled off by the military might of the Ottoman Empire, still a formidable barrier even in its decline, the peoples of Islam continued until the dawn of the modern age to cherish—as some of us in the West still do—the conviction of the immeasurable and immutable superiority of their own civilization to all others. For the medieval Muslim, from Andalusia to Persia, Christian Europe was a backward land of ignorant infidels." However, he continues: "It was a point of view which might have been justified at one time; by the end of the Middle Ages it was becoming dangerously obsolete." Whatever the reason, what is certainly true is that the Ottoman Muslims never felt compelled, at any time up to this point, to *consciously and systematically* send missions to the land of the infidels to seek new knowledge in a manner that earlier Muslim rulers had done (recall the effort of the Abbasids to import Greek works from Byzantium as part of their translation projects), or in a manner that the infidels had undertaken centuries before at the time of the Reconquista (see Appendix I)—or what one Muslim ruler of Egypt was about to do now (see below).

Although the French presence proved to be, thanks in part to the British, of extremely short duration, a mere blip in the 5,000-year history of the country (Napoleon fled back to Europe the following year, leaving his troops marooned; though they would hang on to the country until their defeat on June 27, 1801, by a combined British and Ottoman expeditionary forces). For the Egyptians, and the rest of Islamic Africa, however, it was pregnant with implications: for it was a wake-up call to the fact that the invasion marked the inauguration of a completely new type of imperialism—a type that the Muslims (or any other peoples on the planet for that matter) had never experienced before—it was one

that was powered by the relentless economic, political, and technological forces unleashed by the post–1492 emergent industrial capitalism in Western Europe (described in the preceding chapter). In other words, these were not your typical European Crusaders of yesteryear who had ravaged the Levant from time to time and against whom the Muslims had been more than an equal match. The Napoleonic invasion represented nothing less than the thin end of the wedge of modern Western European imperialism on the African continent; and it would not be long before, under its aegis, the fabric of Islamic cultural unity, and even Ottoman-inspired political cohesion, of Islamic Africa would be torn asunder forever, leaving in its wake distinct new national entities in the form of Algeria, Djibouti, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sahrawi (Western Sahara), Sudan, and Tunisia, which have survived to the present day.[16] (Note: while the account that follows begins by considering Egypt first, being the largest and oldest nation among this group, the rest of it has been structured around these national entities in the alphabetical order just indicated.)

Now, if there was one person who quickly understood what the Muslims were facing in these changed times then it was the highly ambitious Muslim Albanian military officer in the employ of the Ottoman expeditionary force sent to deal with the French, Muhammed Ali (1769–1849). When the Ottomans withdrew their force, they left behind the Albanian contingent that Ali had headed as second in command; and Ali, who until his arrival in Egypt was a person of nonentity, found himself in some position of influence as one of the officers in charge of it. Perhaps drawing upon his background as the son of a commander of irregulars in the employ of the Ottoman governor (of the port city of Kavalla in Macedonia), and who beginning from childhood had become involved in his father's (Ibrahim Agha) moonlighting enterprise (trading in tobacco), he quickly became enmeshed in the political intrigues that arose with the sudden exit of the French.[17] Following a revolt against the Ottoman viceroy in 1805, Mohammed Ali got the Ottomans, who in practical terms had little choice in the matter, to install him (with the blessing of the Egyptian ulama—a decision that they would soon come to regret) as governor of Egypt.[18] He would quickly commence a program of placing Egypt on the long road to modernity (but it would be a modernity in the North African-style: one that comprises an unstable fusion of Islam, secular Westernization and praetorian absolutism).

Though not an Egyptian by birth, he would earn himself the appellation of a patriot more than a century and a half later from those modern Egyptian historians with less than an eye for accuracy of historical facts. For while he did much to prepare the groundwork for the secular Western transformations to come, they were largely by default—his primary objectives were always those of personal ambition and self-aggrandizement.[19] Consider this, for instance: he embarked on a massive program of expropriating the landed aristocracy and thereby effectively converted Egypt into a single, gigantic "plantation," producing cotton (the highly profitable long-staple variety) and sugarcane, complete with

near slave-like conditions for the peasantry, that he and his progeny would henceforth own. Although he was aware of the need to industrialize as a means of accumulating more wealth, as well as facilitate the modernization of his new conscript army (unlike the Mamluks, his armies did not depend entirely on military slaves), a project that was very dear to his heart having seen at first hand what a modern army could do on the battlefield, his efforts at industrialization foundered on the rocks of lack of adequate human and financial capital, mismanagement of national resources (he embarked on a number of military adventures abroad, including the conquest of Sudan), and spirited opposition from Western powers (principally Britain—see, for example, Marsot 1984).[20]

The dynasty that he gave rise to, called the *Khedive*, lasted until its overthrow in 1952—though from 1822 to 1922 it was in power only nominally and at the pleasure of a Western occupying power, the British.[21] The higher education legacy of this dynasty and its British overlords was characterized by these principal developments: the marginalization of the madrasah system; the dispatch of foreign student missions to the West; establishment of modern military schools; and the creation of the first secular university (albeit, initially, a privately-funded institution), the University of Cairo.

As part of his program of monopolizing the country's resources, Ali also practically abolished the *waqfs* (the educational trusts) of the madrasahs, including those of al-Azhar, by looting their resources. Ali was fully cognizant of the fact that if he was going to effect the modernization of his army (the first priority) and develop the country's resources generally to finance it, he needed personnel trained in what he felt were modern Western ways. He, however, chose to pursue this project by going outside the madrasah system. (This was a strategy that would also be emulated by the colonial powers whenever they came across madrasahs elsewhere in Africa.) Several factors lay within this approach: lack of a coherent educational policy (since all policy was determined on ad hoc basis, as is typical of autocracies); lack of resources to modernize the madrasah system (which, recall, regardless of its numerous defaults, was still a mass, relatively democratic, educational system that would have required enormous resources for its modernization); his disdain of education for the masses (Ali was no populist); his narrowly conceived education goals (to be explained in a moment); and an astute perception that forcing change on the system (which invariably implied significant secularization) ran the risk of so completely alienating the ulama that they would be tempted to mobilize mass opposition to his regime. Clearly, then, whatever modernization that Ali felt was necessary required alternative secular higher education institutions. To this end, Ali embarked on a two-pronged approach: a program of sending foreign students to study abroad while simultaneously importing Western expatriate intellectual labor; and the construction of an ad hoc inverse secular educational pyramid—beginning with single-school "militarized" colleges and then, as an afterthought,

to overcome unforeseen bottlenecks in student recruitment, lower-level institutions (hence the term "inverse pyramid").

As far as records show, the first foreign student to be sent abroad, according to Heyworth-Dunne (1939) was Uthman Nuraddin, who left for Italy in 1809 and after five years there went on to study for two more years in France; he returned in 1817. Another of the earliest foreign students whose name has not been erased from history (most of the relevant student records were destroyed, it is thought, by a chance fire in the Citadel in 1820) was Nikula Musabiki. He was sent to study printing in Italy. By the time of the first much-celebrated *major* foreign student mission (sent in July of 1826, comprising initially 42 students, with 2 joining the group later), a total of some 28 students had been sent out sporadically to various parts of Europe (e.g., England, France, Germany, and Italy) to study the technical and military arts and sciences (engineering, shipbuilding, printing, and so on). The historical fame of the 1826 mission, however, is not entirely undeserving: it was distinct from earlier efforts in that it involved not only the dispatch abroad of a fairly large contingent at a single moment (with all the attendant national publicity), but it was sent to just one European country; in this case, France—one must hasten to add here that as far as Ali was concerned, this choice was determined on purely pragmatic grounds. It was certainly not for the purposes of building cultural ties with Egypt's former enemy, but for reasons of convenience in that the French appeared to have been more than enthusiastic (for obvious reasons) about hosting this large contingent of foreign students.[22]

Typically, Ali took a personal interest in the education of these students, so much so that he would regularly send them letters of exhortation, enjoining on them discipline and diligence. Heyworth-Dunne observes that Ali even took to demanding monthly reports of progress, including an indication from them of all the books they had read; and he would reprimand them in no uncertain terms if their progress was not up to his standards. Once, a group of students returned with their medical qualifications, but due to an administrative error, without having pursued doctoral-level studies. Ali promptly sent them back to Paris the same year (1836) to complete their doctorates, while at the same time imposed on each of them the responsibility of translating into Arabic all the textbooks they covered in their studies (his aim here was to create a supply of textbooks for domestic educational needs). Rarely in the history of higher education had a nation's leader followed the education of the country's foreign students with such diligent advertence—but perhaps this was to be expected of an autocrat like Ali who was not only a man in a hurry, but was ever mindful of returns on investment, especially given the large financial outlays involved in the foreign student project.

In subsequent years, the flow of Egyptian foreign students at the behest of Ali (and his successors) continued apace both individually as well as in small and large groups, so that by the time of Ali's passing (in 1849) Heyworth-

Dunne calculates, a total of 349 students had been sent to Western countries to study. The clock had gone full circle; it had taken 1,000 years: those who were once producers and transmitters of knowledge were now its recipients; and those who were once the recipients were now the producers and transmitters; such are the ways of history. Since these foreign student missions to the West were the first ever sponsored by an African state (and possibly even in the entire Islamic world), they bear further scrutiny along several axes:

Student background: The selection process was, as one would expect, generally arbitrary, where academic merit was certainly not paramount, if at all. Instead, they were chosen from within the upper echelon of the country's social structure (hence with Turko-Egyptians predominating). In terms of sex they were (it would appear) all male; and regarding age they tended to be older (early to mid-twenties), falling outside the normal age range for those pursuing undergraduate studies. Contrary to what many have thought (see for example Vatikiotis 1991: 97) the majority of the students were not from the madrasah system, as is indicated by the fact that very few of them were graduates of al-Azhar (Eccel 1984). Upon reflection this should not be surprising: to be sent to study abroad was in itself a prestigious assignment, hence the sons of the elite were most likely to receive preference over others.

Fields and subjects of study: Their specialties were primarily aimed at assisting Ali with the development of a praetorian industrial state; the following sample listing of what the 1826 mission studied is telling: agriculture; arms-making; chemistry; civil administration; diplomacy; hydraulics; mechanics; medicine; military administration; military engineering; mining; naval administration; naval-engineering.[23] In later years the list would be expanded to include such vocational subjects as: calico-printing; candle-making; cloth-dyeing; furniture and carpet-making; gun-making; jewelry-making; pottery-making; silk-weaving; shoe-making; and watch-making.

Educational success: To what extent were these first wave of foreign students successful in achieving their academic goals? It appears that on balance not very much—for several reasons: lack of adequate prior academic preparation because they were generally not selected on the basis of academic merit; the fact that the secular part of the educational system within Egypt was not yet developed enough to permit sufficient preparatory training; and the students had to first learn a foreign language upon arrival in the host country, which interfered with the overall efficiency of their education (and their age in this regard did not help matters). However, one can surmise that in later years, by learning through hindsight, the success rate must have improved.

Efficiency of employment: Upon their return the students were not always placed in occupations commensurate with their qualifications. Heyworth-Dunne gives examples: a naval graduate found himself in the finance department; a student who had studied diplomacy was assigned to a job completely unrelated to diplomacy; a hydraulics engineering graduate was asked to teach chemistry; some who had studied military administration were placed in the civil administration; and so on. Misemployment (or *under-employment* to use a better term) appears to have been the order of the day.

Overall impact on society: Regardless of whether or not they had completed their studies with thunderous success, or whether they were employed with due regard to their specialties upon their return, this much is incontrovertible: the fact that this was the first generation of Egyptians who had been sent out to obtain secular Western education

their impact on Egyptian society would, in time, prove to be profound; and this was no-where more so than through their employment in the various educational institutions that Ali set up with the assistance of not only the returned foreign students, but also im-ported Western expatriates (see later). However, their impact can not be measured simp-ly in terms of the overall goals of Ali's limited military dictated modernization program, but also in terms of the unintended consequences (which are intrinsic to any large-scale educational effort of this kind), of which these two stand out for mention: (1) It led to the development of a deeply bifurcated elite social structure: a new elite (transmuted out of the old Turko-Egyptian aristocracy, which would be combined later with an emergent Arabized Egyptian elite) comprising a Westernized, militarized, and *secular* stratum (wherein all power resided) sitting atop a religious establishment of the ulama. In the context of a country with an Islamic tradition on one hand, and on the other an economy that may be labeled as a *dependent economy*, this development would have serious re-percussions for the course of Egyptian history in the decades to come.[24] (2) Besides the matter of birth, there would henceforth be a new coin of the realm in terms of elite membership and legitimacy; and it would be two-sided: on one side, possession of a secular higher education qualification and, on the other, the requirement that the qualifi-cation be of Western provenance—ergo: for the elite, "study abroad" would become for-ever a fixture of Egyptian higher education (and for that matter in the rest of Africa and in many other parts of the PQD world as well) without any rational regard to national human capital needs.

In addition to the immediate human capital needs of the agricultural and military-industrial enterprises that Ali hoped to satisfy by dispatching the for-eign student missions, he was also aware of the necessity, for cost-effective rea-sons, of providing similar education and training within Egypt itself for the same purpose. However, what this also meant is that the education agenda he conceived was an extremely narrow one, where, as Heyworth-Dunne (1939: 152) explains, "[n]ot a single institution was set up philanthropically or for the sole purpose of improving the intellectual outlook of the people." Therefore, in keeping with his strictly utilitarian approach to the educational effort and given that Ali's educational goals were overwhelming dictated by his military and en-trepreneurial needs, the first secular higher education institutions to be set up were of the single specialty vocational-type, usually modeled on Italian or French institutions, and which were attached to the military in one way or an-other. The following list of schools (which were usually named "School of… followed by the name of the specialty—as in *Madrasat at-Tubjiya*, School of Artillery, or *Madrasat al-Jihadiya,* School of War), with an indication of the year in which they were established, is illustrative: 1816: military training; 1820: mathematical sciences; 1821: surveying; 1819–23: military training (schools or more correctly camps established in Aswan, Cairo, Farsut, and An-Nakila); 1825: two schools, school of war, and school of navy; 1827: three schools, martial music, medicine, and veterinary medicine; 1829: two schools, civil service, and pharmacy; 1830: signaling; 1831: five schools, artillery, cav-alry, chemistry, industrial arts, and irrigation; 1831–32: maternity; 1832: infan-

try; 1833: establishment of ten schools of war munitions in upper Egypt. The list goes on (see Heyworth-Dunne (1939) and Eccel (1984) for more examples going up to 1911. Anyhow, one gets the picture of the new secular but narrowly circumscribed higher education landscape that Ali created.

A mere listing such as this one does not, however, tell us in any way what the establishment of these institutions entailed and what were their general characteristics; therefore a few observations in this regard are in order. In the early years, ideas for the establishment of the various institutions often came from expatriates that Ali had hired, though later some of the foreign-student returnees would also take the initiative in this respect. The teaching staff for the schools were initially recruited from abroad (principally France and Italy, and after 1882, England). However, with the return of foreign student missions some of their members were also recruited for this purpose. The language of instruction varied from institution to institution depending on the nationality of the instructors, but the predominant languages were Turkish, Arabic, and French; later of course English would be added.[25] The students came from within the ruling elite stratum, but in circumstances where there was a shortage of students, recruitment was broadened to coerce capable students from the lower strata of society to go to these schools.[26] Since these were state schools, students did not pay any tuition and in many instances free board, lodging, clothing, and stipends were also provided. Upon graduation students were for the most part immediately taken into the employ of the armed forces or government administration.

While the development of these institutions experienced the usual teething problems that one would expect in any circumstance where educational enterprises modeled on alien teaching and learning practices were being established, there were some problems that were specific to the extant Egyptian culture; of which the following five stand out for mention: One, the Islamic culture in Egypt (and perhaps this was true throughout the Islamic world) had seen so much intellectual retrogression that there was resistance to the study of some subjects. For instance: a special edict (fatwa) had to be sought from the ulama to permit the study of anatomy when the school of medicine was founded. Or consider this: in 1831–32, when the school of maternity was first established (as a division within the school of medicine), it failed to attract any students at all because Egyptian parents would not permit their daughters to attend it. The school then resorted to a novel solution with Ali's encouragement: it recruited its first students forcibly by purchasing Ethiopian and Sudanese slave girls in the Cairo slave market! Later, it would augment its student body by turning to a group of orphan girls who had been under treatment at the Cairo hospital (and who upon discharge would have come under government care) as well as purchasing more slave girls. (See Heyworth-Dunne (1939: 132); he also notes that upon graduation—which in itself was a commendable achievement since the

first step in their education had entailed teaching them literacy—the midwives were given the same rank as the male graduates of the medical school.)

Two, there was the problem of language. That is, the importation of learning from non-Arabic sources always involved grappling with the linguistic barrier. Whether it was expatriate instructors (who for the most part did not speak Arabic) or textbooks written in foreign languages, the end result was always that much greater educational inefficiency. The problem is highlighted by Heyworth-Dunne, for instance, in his description of the effort to establish the first veterinary school in Egypt: the instructor, a Frenchman, was assigned an interpreter who could speak Arabic, Italian, and Turkish but not French, thereby spawning "the usual intrigues between teachers, interpreters, students, and officials" (p. 133). [27] Now, it is true that in the matter of expatriate instructors it was a temporary problem because in time trained Egyptians were hired to replace them; however, the problem of books in a foreign language was never fully resolved and in fact in successive decades as modernization progressed with dizzying speed in the West (especially after the Second World War) and the flow of books there became a torrent, it simply got worse and worse—this circumstance was of course not unique to Egypt only, other Arabic-speaking Islamic countries were also equally affected. The difficulty initially was lack of resources, coupled with the absence of an imaginative leadership, to permit a *systematic* (the key word here is systematic) translation of books. Years later, with the oil boom the resource constraint was eased considerably, but the leadership issue did not disappear and has not disappeared. The result is that to this day the Islamic world in Africa and the Middle East remains starved of books published in the Arabic language commensurate with its higher and general education needs. At the same time, as if the books problem is not enough, in most Egyptian universities, as in almost all universities throughout North Africa, the languages of instruction tend to be dual: Arabic in some faculties, while in others usually either English or French or even both. One can only surmise the educational inefficiencies involved as a result, especially when the rest of the educational system at the lower levels is, for the most part, monolingual (mainly Arabic).

Three, Ali's new higher education institutions created resistance to them among Egyptian parents (until long after he had passed from the scene). The reason is that parents rightly associated these institutions with service in his armed forces, which they dreaded (even to the point, on occasions, of acquiring self-inflicted injuries). The conditions of service were such that parents did everything they could to shield their children from being recruited into the armed forces either directly, or indirectly—through Ali's education institutions. (There was also, however, the "small" matter of the near certainty of having to participate in Ali's military adventures abroad.)

Four, in the absence of a secular general education system, the new higher education institutions were initially accompanied by instructional facilities be-

fitting primary and secondary school levels (where, as already noted, sometimes illiteracy itself had to be dealt with as the first order of business). It wasn't just the lack of secular institutions, however, that created additional hurdles for these new institutions to overcome. There was also the problem of the rapid decay of the only extant education system in the country to which Ali was forced to turn for his students: the traditional madrasah system. Yet it was a decay accelerated by Ali's own policies. To explain: unless parents were severely destitute, their general inclination was to avoid sending their children to the madrasahs (already on their knees because of the waqf expropriations) for fear that their children would be available for recruitment into the new higher education institutions *and thence into Ali's armed forces* (Heyworth-Dunne 1939: 153).[28]

Five, given the state ownership of all the major means of production and considering the militaristic ambitions of Ali, the employment of the graduates of the secular higher education institutions (including those who had been sent to study abroad), was not only primarily in the government sector, but such employment was almost guaranteed. In consequence, it set a bad precedent for generations to come where Egyptian graduates would come to regard employment in government bureaucracies virtually a birthright unless a better remunerative private sector employment was available.

At the age of eighty Muhammed Ali relinquished his grip on the ship of state (and a year later, on August 2, 1849, he died as a result of natural causes). It is doubtful if any of his enemies had ever thought that the old lion would last that long as the ruler of Egypt. Anyhow, What can one say then of the educational legacy that Ali left to the Egyptians? It was, in a nutshell, a mixed one: on one hand he had helped to open the door to secular/Western education, yet on the other the opening was merely a crack given the autocrat's highly circumscribed vision of the future of the country that he had inadvertently come to rule, coupled with the constraints placed on him by Europe in terms of his ambitions for the autonomous industrialization of Egypt. The fact that his rise to power was itself a consequence of a European invasion was perhaps a portent of the future that Egypt was destined to pursue: never independent enough to build on past glories. Within a mere three decades or so of his passing, the infidels would takeover Egypt once more (this time it would be the British). He would have been apoplectically outraged beyond words. He may not have been a good practicing Muslim; but he was a Muslim never the less (no, he was not a nationalist; the rise of Egyptian nationalism was yet to come).

In 1882, a variety of factors emanating from within Egypt (coalescing around one word, misrule) and in Europe (which could be boiled down to one word as well, imperialism) conspired together to bring about the loss of Egyptian independence, marked by the arrival of British protectorate rule. In the period up to that point, commencing with the death of Muhammed Ali in 1849, Egypt, which had seen the reigns of successor Khedives in the persons of Abbas I (1849–54), Sa'id Pasha (1854–63), Ismail Pasha (1863–79), and Taufik Pasha

(1879–83), was more or less adrift rudderless in a sea of ever mounting political and economic machinations of European powers as they relentlessly jockeyed with each other to chip away at the shrinking Ottoman Empire. Only a Muhammed Ali incarnate could have, probably, saved Egypt from the fate of 1882, but none would arise from among his Khedival progeny—such was the cost of hereditary rule that befell one of the crown jewels in the House of Islam.[29]

Anyhow, from the perspective of higher education during this period (1849–82), the following were the principal developments: (1) Initially, there was a basic retrenchment of the system that Ali had left; many schools were closed for financial, political, myopic, and other reasons (for example: school of languages and accounting closed in 1851; schools of accounting, architecture, civil engineering and war closed in 1861)—even the *Diwan al Madaris* was abolished in 1854, though it would be reestablished some years later in 1863. (2) The practice of sending foreign student missions to Europe, however, continued—though on a limited scale. (3) A few schools were reorganized and some new schools were started (for example, the school of medicine was closed in 1855 and reopened the following year after its reorganization; the school of military engineering was opened in 1858 and in 1866 its curriculum would be expanded to include irrigation and architecture; in 1880 the Khedival Teachers College was set up to produce secular oriented secondary school teachers; in 1868 the schools of administration and languages, surveying, and accountancy, and egyptology were established). (4) The principle of providing free education, which included the provision of clothing, food, lodging, and stipends, continued—albeit at varying levels of adherence as one moved away from the cities. (5) The fortunes of the madrasah system improved considerably, relative to what they had been during Ali's rule, as a modest but credible effort was made at expanding and rationalizing the system for the first time in its history. All in all, the fate of higher education by the end of this period of Egyptian history, considering the initial retrenchment, could be characterized as one of some, but still very limited, developmental progress—when viewed purely in quantitative terms. Qualitatively? Well, that was another matter. For as a state-of-the-art report on the entire education sector submitted on December 19, 1880, by an education commission set up for that purpose (under the leadership of Ali Pasha Ibrahim) clearly indicated, it left a great deal to be desired.[30]

The British remained in Egypt until 1956, but their formal protectorate rule ended in 1922. During the protectorate phase of their presence the development of higher education (in quantitative terms came almost to a standstill), for the uppermost guiding principle in Egyptian affairs under the English was financial austerity. However, there were two major developments that occurred during this period that were of considerable significance to the higher education sector, though they did not arise out of specific British initiatives, but from initiatives of the Egyptians themselves. First, was the initiative by the Egyptians to set up a secular university, the University of Cairo. Second, was an unforeseen conse-

quence of the British presence in Egypt: it created, on one hand, a tripartite power struggle between the Khedives, the British, and the emerging secular government elite over control of the wakfs, with resultant implications for the finances of al-Azhar; and on the other a duopolistic political struggle between the Khedives and the government elite for influence in the country, as a consequence of which al-Azhar became a focus of their attention. The long-term outcome of both these factors was that al-Azhar was propelled in the direction of two major sets of much needed reforms: one dealing with the internal efficiency of the institution and the other relating to the broader relevance of the institution within the changing Egyptian socioeconomic landscape (there is more later about these changes).

Cairo University was inaugurated in 1908, though it began its life as the Egyptian University, a private university. As this was the first secular university in Egypt, the circumstances of its birth deserves attention. Among the earliest proponents of the idea of a university in Egypt were, as would be expected, among the foremost persons of influence of the day outside the ulama. They included the brothers Ahmad Zaghlul (judge) and Saad Zaghlul (judge and later education minister); J. E. Marshall (the British Judge on the Court of Appeals); Yaqub Artin (an Armenian civil servant who first proposed the idea in 1894); Qasim Amin (judge on the Court of Appeals); Jurji Zaydan (the Syrian editor of the magazine *al-Hilal*); Mustafa Kamil (the founder of the Watani Party and a staunch anti-imperialist); Ahmed Manshawi (a wealthy landlord); and Muhammed Abduh (the religious reformer and later Mufti). While each may have had different motivations, they were all united in their belief that a country desirous of Western modernity needed a secular institution of higher learning to train the modernizing elite. Sending students to study abroad was not, they felt, the most efficient way of achieving this goal. It wasn't simply the utilitarian factor at work, however; there was the nationalist factor too, that is, the perception among some that a country as large and prosperous as Egypt deserved a *secular* university as a symbol of its march toward modernity. As for al-Azhar, some consciously, and others unconsciously, had written it off as not a viable basis for the creation of the kind of university they had in mind; unwieldy, recalcitrant, traditional, and too democratic in its enrollment base, they felt that it was better to continue with the practice begun almost a century earlier by Muhammed Ali—simply bypass the institution (at least for the time being) by creating alternative institutions, of which the *Dar-ul-Uum* (teacher training college), the School of Law *(Madrasat al-Qaada al-Shari'ah)* and the Egyptian Military Academy were the latest examples.

At a fund-raising meeting (catalyzed by a pledge a few months earlier of some 500 Egyptian pounds by a Mustafa Kamil al-Ghamrawi), called on October 12, 1906, at the house of Saad Zaghlul, a group of twenty-six Western-oriented Egyptian persons of consequence collected over 4,000 Egyptian pounds in pledges, formed a steering committee and launched the university

project. It would take another two years before it actually saw fruition. At this point one would be remiss not to mention the fact that the project was born without the blessing of the British. In fact, with the exception of one or two individuals (e.g., Marshall), it was staunchly opposed by them through the person of their first Consul-General (1883–1907), the all but in name khedive and autocratically arrogant Orientalist, Lord Cromer (peeraged in 1892, therefore his real name until then was Sir Evelyn Baring), who not only felt that it would be a drain on the education budget, but feared creating potential nationalist malcontents, as had occurred, he felt, in India where he had served for a while.[31]

Anyhow, the British notwithstanding, under the patronage of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi II (his control of the waqf department allowed him to allocate an annual grant out of waqf funds to the university project), and the energetic leadership of Prince Ahmed Fuad I (who was always on the look out for opportunities to enhance his influence), the project got to a promising start by raising respectable amounts of donations from members of the royal family and other members of the Egyptian elite. It became a reality in a rented mansion owned by a Greek tobacco merchant on December 21, 1908.

Initially, the university only had part-time hires who taught such subjects as literature, history, and philosophy. Later, while the university awaited the return of students it had sent abroad for training (on staff development fellowships), it recruited its teachers from the only two acceptable institutions in town: the *Dar-ul-Ulum* and the School of Law; they did not come from al-Azhar (which the new university, perhaps understandably, looked at askance).[32] Other hires, mainly Orientalists, came from Europe, principally France, Germany, and Italy. Incidentally, the United States was not represented (since at the time the Middle East was not yet one of its stomping grounds) either in the founding of the university or in teaching.[33] Depending on the courses, the university engaged in multiple languages of instruction, primarily Arabic, French, and English (which must have produced considerable difficulties for the students one may surmise here). Its students, as long as they could pay the tuition fee (which had the effect, even if unintentional, of essentially rendering the institution a preserve of the elites), were recruited without regard to ethnicity, nationality, religious affiliation or even sex. About the last, the thirty-one female students enrolled in the first year of the university's operation spoke to the fact that for the first time in the history of modern Egypt, women had access to what may be called a regular secular university education within the country.[34] As for enrollment numbers, in its second year of operation (1909–10) the university had a total of 415 students enrolled in a program comprising all of eight courses taught by eight professors (Reid 1990: 45). On the curricular side, the university was deliberately conceived to be a corrective to what was perceived by Egyptian intellectuals as a tradition (established by Muhammed Ali) within the secular education sector that placed too much emphasis on education of a utilitarian value (economics, law, engineering, etc.) The university wished to be an arts and humanities insti-

tution where the watch word in the university's mission was, according to its architects, "knowledge for the sake of knowledge." From the perspective of general student life, this was not a full university in the sense we understand it today. For one thing, there was no campus with student residences (which reinforced its orientation toward students from elite backgrounds—for a student from rural Egypt student campus accommodation, then as today, was an absolute necessity); institutionalized extracurricular activities (like sport) were absent; and such student support services as guidance and counseling did not exist.[35]

Although the creation of the Egyptian University represented a cherished dream come true for the Western-oriented Egyptian elite, its early years were not easy ones notwithstanding the depth of goodwill that the institution commanded from most of the elite; the main problem was financial, which got worse with the onset of World War I and thereafter. At one point there was even talk of canceling classes altogether so dire had the situation become. Fortunately for the institution, history had a rosier future planned; it began with one event: the playboy prince had become king. That is, the university found a lifeline in the shape of its first rector (1909–13), Prince Fuad I, who was crowned king in 1922 (and ruled until his death in 1936). Within three years, with his help, the Egyptian University would cease to be a private university; it was reincarnated as a state university. Three years later still, it would move to a new campus with Western (and many can legitimately argue, ugly) utilitarian architecture so as to make, as Reid (1990: 79) observes, "a clean symbolic break with the Islamic past." The "new" university began with four faculties: arts (based on the absorption of the old university), science, medicine, and law. Ten years later, in 1935, engineering, commerce, and agriculture would be added. A year later, it would incorporate the venerable *Dar-ul-Ulum*. (As if to emphasize the transformations, a few years after the death of the king it was renamed Fuad I University.) Expansion would continue in succeeding years to include more faculties, as well as institutes (oceanography, African studies, research, cancer, etc.), and thereby becoming a full-fledged modern secular university. However, another historical event would be instrumental in pushing the transformation along: the abolition of the monarchy in 1952. (Symbolically, the university would experience yet another name change as a result to become what it is today: the University of Cairo.) In 1955, the university would expand abroad by being among the earliest institutions in the world to inaugurate a practice that is beginning to be commonplace today: a branch university *in another country*: specifically the establishment of three faculties in Khartoum: arts, law, and commerce.

While the University of Cairo is the oldest secular university in Egypt, at about the time when the university was being conceived, there was talk in some circles (mainly by non-Egyptians) of creating another private university. Few, perhaps, among the Egyptian elite would have been interested in the idea, given

the source of the plans. Still, within only about a decade of the establishment of Cairo University, this other private university came into being too—and what is more, history would contrive a historical linkage, albeit tenuous, between the two. In other words, the next oldest secular university founded in the modern period in Egypt is the private American University in Cairo (AUC). Its creation had been suggested as early as 1899 by its U.S. founders, the United Presbyterian missionaries, but the idea was shelved because of British opposition, as well as the intervention of World War I.[36] However, even in the face of such discouragement, in 1919 an opportunity arose that the AUC board of trustees felt compelled not to pass up: a dramatic drop in Cairo's real estate prices presented them with an opening they were astute enough to grab. It permitted them to purchase a home for their new institution at a fire-sale price; it was none other (such are the ways of history) than the very building owned by the wealthy Greek tobacco merchant, Nestor Gianaclis, that had been the first home of Cairo University; and which it had had to vacate in 1914 because it could no longer afford the rent (Reid 1990).[37]

The American University in Cairo began operations in 1920 (opened for classes on October 5), but in its first years it was essentially a secondary school (as noted below); only later it would enlarge to become a university.[38] There were two curricular tracks that a student could choose from at this level: the arts course, where instruction was offered in English (aimed at those who wanted to study at universities abroad or at AUC itself as university-level courses were added) and a "government" course that was comparable to the regular government secondary school education with instruction in Arabic. By 1927 the AUC was offering eight years of instruction that included four years of college-level education similar to that available in U.S. universities—which meant that unlike the British-modeled Egyptian University, where students specialized in a single subject, students at AUC pursued a four-year undergraduate liberal arts curriculum where specialization was not permitted (other than having a major and a minor), but instead students were exposed to a variety of courses in the arts, humanities, social sciences, and the natural sciences. The AUC would also begin offering special English language instruction classes for not only its own prospective students but, through its adult education program, to others who were not AUC students. The university continued to offer preuniversity-level education for another twenty-five years or so when it became a university in the traditional sense, complete with various curricular divisions (e.g., college of arts and sciences, school of oriental studies, etc.), and unique to Egyptian higher education landscape, a program of campus-based extracurricular activities—including athletics—for its students where a student was expected to be a member of at least one club for purposes of out of class cultural enlightenment.

The expulsion of the British en masse from Egypt on the eve of the eventful 1952 military coup proved to be a boon for the university in later years as the Egyptians (especially the Westernized secular elites) increasingly became en-

amored with the United States.[39] Even after official relations with the United States soured and Egypt turned to the Soviet Union for assistance, the AUC, adapt at walking the tightrope of Egyptian cultural and political realities, retained sufficient goodwill in Egypt to assure its continued existence.[40] In time, despite its small size, and considering that it was a private fee-paying university of Christian missionary origins, the university came to play an important role in Egypt as a university of choice for the children of the elite, especially women, and those desirous of emigrating. What is remarkable is that even a person like Nasser felt compelled to secure elite status for his progeny by sending his daughter to AUC. The wife of Husni Mubarak also studied there.[41]

From the perspective of Egyptian higher education as a whole, the significance of the presence of the AUC can be traced along four major avenues: exposure to principles and methods of high-quality U.S. university education, at both graduate and undergraduate levels; access to excellent (in relative terms) library research facilities—in fact to say that the AUC library is a regional resource would not be an exaggeration; and access to first-class English-language training developed over many years through trial and error; and exposure to top U.S. and other scholars invited by the AUC from time to time to give lectures. As for the AUC and its U.S. backers, the AUC presence in Egypt has been a source of goodwill for U.S. higher education, not just in Egypt but in neighboring countries too. The AUC would also acquire importance for the U.S. government as well (to be especially emphasized after the *infitah*—see below) for such purposes as providing Arabic-language training for U.S. government officials (such as its embassy staff) on one hand, and on the other, English-language training for Egyptians working on either U.S.-funded assistance projects or for those awarded scholarships to study at U.S. universities.[42] In a sense, then, the AUC has served and continues to serve as an educational equivalent of a U.S. embassy in Egypt and its environs.[43]

Besides these first two secular universities, Egypt would see the founding of two others before that fateful year of 1952 (to be explained in a moment): the Faruq I University in Alexandria (later renamed University of Alexandria), which opened in 1942 by incorporating the University of Egypt's branch faculties of law and arts that had been established in that city in 1938; and Ibrahim Pasha University in Cairo (later renamed Heliopolis University after the suburb in which the campus came to be located, though today it is known by the Arabic version of the name as the University of Ain Shams) a few years on, in 1950. The driving force behind the birth of these new institutional scions of the University of Egypt was student overcrowding at the mother university, as well as a desire to open opportunities for university education elsewhere in the country.

Any periodization of *modern* Egyptian history, for any purpose, does not allow circumvention of 1952. Why? For in that year, on July 23, a group of young junior officers calling themselves the "Free Officers" executed a military coup (thankfully for the Egyptians a relatively peaceful one) against the constitution-

al monarchy, ushering in what may be called a populist praetorian oligarchy. Without going into the whys and wherefores of this event, it marked for Egypt an important break (*disjuncture,* perhaps, would be a better word since one of the fundamental lessons of history is that it is impossible for a society to engineer a complete break with its past) with its recent history in a number of ways: the overthrow of formal rule by two groups of foreigners, the Ottomans and their nominal affiliates, the Turko-Circassian-Albanian aristocracy, and more recently the British (still the power behind the throne even after 1922), and their replacement with Egyptian Arabs; the overthrow of the fledgling constitutional democracy with the return to the age-old practice of rule by a praetorian few; and an attempt (the key word here is attempt) at change in ideological direction from the capitalist West to the communist East, bringing in its wake a moderation of elitism with a significant dose of populism in national development policies. The period we have in mind here then is 1952 to the present, or to be accurate from 1954 to the present (1954 being the year when, in April, one of the officers, Jamal Abdel Nasser, engineered a coup within the military coup with the deposition of General Muhammed Naguib from the presidency). For higher education in Egypt these past fifty or so years have been a very important period for several reasons:

In keeping with Nasser's new ideology of "Arab Socialism," coupled with yet another stab at industrialization from above, there was a greater push toward a larger state involvement in higher education in terms of sector planning than had ever occurred before as the country moved toward a centralized management of the economy—a process that also featured an unusual emphasis on the cooptation of professionals (engineers, scientists, doctors, etc.) into the administrative bureaucracy (see discussion later).[44] From tuition-free education to mandates of what a student could study (in keeping with projections of human capital needs) to educational expansion, to guaranteed state employment of all university graduates, higher education in Egypt would never be the same again. In nearly all these respects, it is instructive to note, Nasser was not doing something that had not been tried before, though of course the rhetoric was different. In other words, much of what Nasser tried to do was reminiscent of Muhammed Ali's efforts.

The state also moved to exert political control over internal administrative and day to day operations of institutions by means of various legal decrees (e.g., law no. 504 of 1954, law no. 49 of 1972, etc.) where university autonomy was virtually obliterated. Reid (1990: 169) provides us with a portentous example of what Nasserism would mean in practice, as he graphically puts it with reference to Cairo University: "Few dropouts ever get the chance later in life to overhaul their alma maters. [Jamal] Abdel Nasser and his minister of education, Kamal al-Din Husayn, did. Both attended Cairo's Faculty of Law for a few restless months before being admitted to the military academy and—as it turned out—a new road to power. By 1954 they were in a position to reform the university,

which they believed had failed them and Egypt." The university (and the higher education sector as a whole) was given a taste of the flavor of Nasser's understanding of the concept of university autonomy on September 21, 1954, when he forced the dismissal from the university of a motley group (in terms of political sympathies) of some sixty to seventy faculty—ranging from full professors to graduate teaching assistants—without any explanation (p. 170). Obviously, military men, especially those of lower ranks, are hardly expected to understand, let alone respect, a concept such as "academic freedom." Even the curriculum was not out of bounds: Nasser insisted that all universities include in their curricula a national curriculum with mandatory courses in Arab socialism and allied subjects (see Reid for more on this).

Yet, at the same time, in terms of educational provision, the post–1952 period would witness nothing less than an explosion of unparalleled growth for the higher education sector with the establishment of many new universities (together with numerous branch faculties and other higher education institutions) on one hand, and on the other a simultaneous increase in enrollments at existing institutions, as well as the number of students dispatched for study abroad.[45] Here is a list of universities (minus branch faculties) that were created, beginning with those in the state sector: University of Assiut (1954); University of Tanta (1972); University of El-Mansoura (1972); University of El-Zagazig (1974); University of Helwan (1975); University of El-Minia (1976); University of El-Menoufia (1976); University of Suez Canal (1976); University of South Valley (1994). The private sector saw the founding of these universities: University of Sixth of October (1996); University of Misr for Science and Arts (1996); University of October for Science and Technology (1996); University of Misr International (1996). Such a large-scale expansion of the higher education sector (and the ensuing difficulties that have arisen) requires an explanation. A *combination* of four explanatory factors immediately come to mind: populism, the former Soviet Union, parents, and human capital theory.

Whatever the faults of the praetorian oligarchic "dynasty" (and there are many, not least among them high-level corruption, authoritarianism, and the massive violations of the human rights of the citizenry) that Nasser helped to create and which now rules Egypt, it has been one of a decidedly populist bent; that is, possessing in relative terms (the key word here is *relative*) a genuine desire to do more for the Egyptian masses than the previous dynasties had ever done in probably the entire history of the country.[46] In their quest to narrow the elite/mass economic gap, therefore, they saw mass access to education as a principal avenue of upward mobility for the children of the fellahin and the working classes. Hence, even as they clamped down on the universities, purging them of any potential political malcontents, they simultaneously abolished university tuition fees in state institutions (on July 26, 1962).[47] Twelve years on, looking back on their accomplishments, they explained their rationale for expanding access in one of their government reports thusly: "Higher education be-

fore the revolution…placed impediments in the way of the poorer classes, narrowed the circle of higher education, and subjected the enrollment of students to class considerations in which the position of the family concerned, favoritism and financial standing played a prominent part. The picture has been totally reversed in the revolutionary age where higher education has taken a successful leap forward with the collapse of the class rule, the establishment of social justice, and of equal opportunity…. The big development, started with the reduction of tuition fees, culminated in the introduction of free education in all stages up to higher education" (Reid 1990: 174). [48]

As the United States first, and later, Britain, moved to isolate Egypt as being too radical (provoking Nasser in turn to nationalize the Suez Canal that led to an international crisis, 1956–57, from which Nasser emerged, in relative terms, victorious), and especially following Egypt's defeat a decade on by the U.S.-backed state of Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, Nasser turned to the only other country outside the West that he deemed capable of assisting Egypt—following in the footsteps of Muhammed Ali to seek help from whoever was competent to deliver it—with that age-old goal that Ali had espoused: modernization of the armed forces, and industrial autonomy. That country, of course, was the former Soviet Union.[49] Against the backdrop of the Cold War, it was only too glad to oblige. Now, one of the influences that emanated from that quarter (in addition to a reinforcement, for obvious reasons, of the populism of the Nasserite autocracy) was an emphasis on the expansion of higher education to generate scientific and technological human capital. (The emphasis on science and technology in higher education was now pursued with the same level of vigor as in the days of Ali.)

By the 1950s, it had become clear to all parents in Egypt that those with a secular state education stood the best chance of securing a well paying job; ergo they and their children began to demand greater access to such education, most especially at the lower levels initially (in view of the less than adequate development of this sector). Later, however, as the economic value of secondary education began to wane as a result of the law of supply and demand, they turned their sights on to higher education. In this sense the policies pursued during the era of Nasser (1952–70) of greatly expanding the provision of primary and secondary education were coming home to roost. Seeking a secondary education alone, by the 1970s, simply did not suffice with the result that pressure mounted for higher education expansion as a whole, and for the establishment of universities in the provinces and not just in places like Cairo and Alexandria—as well as increases in enrollments at existing universities (the elite University of Cairo, for instance, would soon be transformed into a mass university).

Adding to the foregoing mix of factors, was the support derived from the theory of human capital that international development agencies had come to champion where education was viewed as an *investment* item and not as a *consumption* item in national budgets. This theory posited that what PQD countries

were missing in their effort to boost economic growth was trained person power (or human capital). In time the theory would degenerate into a simplistic and crass policy prescription for massive increases in educational expenditures irrespective of wider socioeconomic contexts, sweeping country after country into its ambit (see Chapter 7 for more on this theory and its limitations).

On September 20, 1970, Jamal Abdel Nasser died of a heart attack; by the time of his premature death (he was only 54) he had achieved a larger than life stature on the African continent and in the Middle East; and those who succeeded him remain, in the eyes of the Egyptian masses, mere shadows of him in terms of charisma and vision.[50] Be that as it may, his successor, Muhammed Anwar el-Sadat (one of the original members of the Free Officers) did not wait long to jettison Nasser's Arab Socialism; consequently, Egypt experienced yet another ideological sea change with the announcement by Sadat a year after the culmination of the 1973 Arab-Israeli October war of his pro-Western so-called "Open Door" policy (known as *infitah)*. Egypt would reorient away from the former Soviet Union to eventually become, practically, after the Camp David Accords (September 17, 1978), and, ironically, like Israel, a client state of the United States (or an "informal ward" as Moore (1994: 212) puts it; both countries are on the U.S. dole)—the move would cost him his life as Egyptian extremists would gun him down at a military parade on October 6, 1981.[51] His vice-president, also a military man, Muhammed Hosni Said Mubarak, would inherit the presidency.

Now, from the perspective of the core elements of higher education policy, this changing of the guards, did not and has not marked a major change; rather the policies adopted during Nasser's time have for the most part continued, most especially in terms of access (as just indicated). Higher education policy is, as they say, the "third rail" of Egyptian politics, no one dares touch it, except with the greatest circumspection. This is not to say, however, that the sector has not experienced any policy changes at all. In two areas, for example, one observes some important changes: the economic structural adjustment policies pursued at the behest of the United States and the West has also had some moderating influence, in favor of the universities, on the issue of the state versus university autonomy; and the debate that had occurred on the heels of the *infitah* on the desirability of allowing (beyond the American University in Cairo) the establishment of private—therefore feepaying—universities as one way of dealing with overcrowding in the public institutions (as well as lessening the cost of training the children of the elite—by obviating their need to go abroad in the early part of their university careers) went in favor of the proponents; hence the creation of four new private universities in 1996 as already indicated.

Following the inauguration of the *infitah* there were two other significant (but nonpolicy related) changes that the higher education sector would experience that are worthy of noting: first, the increasing cooperation between the United States and Egypt with the flow of U.S. dollars in the wake of the accords

began to have some impact on the academic culture (textbooks, U.S.-inspired research agendas, scholarly exchanges, student culture, etc.) of Egyptian universities.[52] At the same time, while this change was underway, Egyptian universities began to face a new kind of student political activism (which, as in the case of most universities throughout Africa, had always been part of their landscape, except for a short time when it had abated under Nasser's authoritarian rule). This new form of activism would be part of the rise of Islamism in Egypt that had been engendered, initially, during Sadat's era when he had turned to the Islamists to serve as a bulwark against the Egyptian Left—as one would expect, the university campuses were drawn into this struggle.[53] However, in later years, especially in the period following his peace treaty with Israel (arranged a year after the accords, on March 26), the chickens would come home to roost. At the same time, the fact that the massive expansion of the higher education sector had taken place without regard to Egypt's ability to finance this expansion has not helped matters. Student activism, secular or religious, is probably guaranteed under circumstances such as these: "If a student desires to attend classes, sometimes as large as 5,000 in a lecture, he must fight for space. If he does not want to attend classes, he can buy the professor's lecture notes, the text, and only appear for the end-of-year exams, which are constructed and graded by groups of professors and therefore must come from the text. Obviously there is not enough space for all the students to attend classes. When exams are given, tents are constructed in open campus areas in order to accommodate students" Cochran (1986: 71–72). She further observes: "Because their salaries are low, some professors teach at two or three different universities, commuting on unreliable trains, poor roads or through congested traffic. They may not arrive for their classes, making the printing and selling of lecture notes an economic and educational necessity." If this was the circumstance at the time she was writing nearly two decades ago, today it has gotten infinitely worse (except, of course, for the children of the wealthy).

We have now arrived in the present. From the hesitant, strictly utilitarian, beginnings during Muhammed Ali's rule to the present, secular higher education in Egypt has experienced tremendous growth, greatly expanding access to huge segments of the population that had been hitherto left out. It is no longer the preserve of the elites, new or old. This is a phenomenal achievement that even Egypt's detractors would have to concede. Yet, on the other hand, as the Egyptians themselves would admit, masking this immense positive achievements are serious imbalances, though by no means all unique to Egypt as will be shown later. From geographic inequality of access to elitist access through private education, from massive overcrowding in classrooms to stultifying end-of-year exams dominated pedagogy (as just noted), from rising budgetary constraints to inadequate logistical supplies for research and learning, the higher education sector in Egypt is facing what must appear at this juncture as insurmountable challenges. Even the rising influence of U.S. presence in Egypt has

not been an unmitigated blessing—ranging from the further complication of the university system as U.S. influence has been added to the traditional British/French mix that had guided the system in the past, to confusion in research priorities, to aggravation of the brain drain.

Then there is the matter of graduate unemployment and underemployment as the economy staggers under the burden of a relentless ever-expanding supply of job-seekers chasing fewer and fewer jobs. Even the escape route afforded some university graduates to seek employment in other countries in the region is now beginning to erode with the maturity of the higher education sector in these countries, bringing on tap their own human capital resources. Regarding this issue is an intriguing matter that has been raised by Moore (1994) and in which there are lessons for other countries in Africa (and indeed elsewhere in the developing world). It concerns the consequences for economic development in a country, as in the case of Egypt, with not only a glut of highly educated professionals *but where many of whom (as noted earlier) have become part of the administrative bureaucracy of the state*. Using the example of engineers in Egypt he shows that even though engineers are among the desirable group of professionals to have in any society that has industrialization as one of its major goals, in the absence of mechanisms that can allow engineers to flourish *as engineers* their talent is essentially wasted. As he observes: "Though trained to play the most strategic roles of industrial society, they contributed little to the development syndrome [*a la* "modernization theory"]—social differentiation, equality, administrative capacity—even though these corresponded respectively to the Nasserist formulas of corporatism, socialism, and statism. The engineers were joined in a professional corporation but could not develop a more rational division of labor, differentiating themselves in keeping with their society's technical needs, keeping up with the latest technological developments, and adapting such developments to the local industrial infrastructure." At the same time, he further observes: "Formally, in terms of numbers, degrees, and status, the profession was flourishing, but in reality engineering education and research were deteriorating, and the engineers were emigrating" (p. 205). What is more, in a context where even at the highest levels of the state bureaucracy engineers and other professionals pervade one would assume that at the very least, if nothing else, rationalism and professionalism would be the order of the day at the administrative levels of society. Yet, here again this has not been the experience of Egypt, so far. So, what gives?

The answer, explains Moore, is to be found in a combination of two principal factors: "diminishing economic resources and an impoverished political system"(p. 206). In other words, the failure to date of the professional classes (such as those represented by the engineers) to make a meaningful contribution to the development of Egypt, even when they have become a visible part of the higher echelons of the state bureaucracy—suggesting, ostensibly, access to decision-making power—is rooted in the prevalence of authoritarianism (termed

by Moore as Sultanism) and political-economic corruption on one hand, and on the other, the general poverty of the state and society as a whole in terms of access to adequate supplies of capital coupled with *sophisticated* technological know-how (itself a function of Egypt's place within the international economic system). Authoritarianism has led to politicization of even matters that are fundamentally of a technical nature; corruption has meant wastage, misuse, and inefficient allocation of scarce resources (including, through nepotism, human capital itself), not to mention the diversion of talent toward rent-seeking enterprises; and lack of access to sufficient amounts of capital of course implies projects simply cannot be planned or executed (regardless of whether they are undertaken on the initiative of the state or on the basis of private entrepreneurship). The fact that Egyptian engineers, as Moore astutely points out, do just as well as or even better than other engineers in the right circumstances—such as when they emigrate to the West—lends credence to this explanation.

Yet, even after the *infitah*, things have not improved much for the professional classes *in terms of their potential to contribute to the development of Egypt*; for in reality the *infitah* has not meant desirable and real structural changes at the political-level (the enactment of superficial multiparty national elections are a case in point), nor has it opened up access to the amounts of capital Egypt really needs. In fact on the contrary, regarding the latter, the massive invasion of foreign-owned transnational monopolies has merely served to exacerbate this situation with their tendency to concentrate in the distribution/service realm of the economy (exemplified by the building and operation of luxury oriented facilities for the elites, such as chain stores, hotels, international banks, fast-food chains, etc., that only serve to emphasize the wretchedness of the poverty of the masses), rather than the production realm. Yet, even when they have gone into the production realm it has not been at the substantive manufacturing and industrial levels, but ephemeral (production of processed foods, for example, or manufacture of consumer goods based on assembly of almost wholly imported components). Moreover, their increasing presence has been a source of a net drainage of investable capital. One important exception in the production realm is of course the petroleum sector where foreign capital is clearly present, but here again their presence takes on a perverse form: their monopoly of technology, which has rendered the Egyptian engineers, to use Moore's words, "marginal appendages of an international technology, mere translators of foreign technical instructors" (p. 209). (Compare this situation with that of China where foreign capital has become intimately involved with manufacturing and industrial production at all levels, albeit even there distortions are not entirely absent.) Under these circumstances, the true role of engineering and other professions in Egypt, remains in the main, simply one of serving as an avenue for the *legitimation* of a compradorial elite status. Clearly then, production of human capital in itself, does not ipso facto translate into a potential for development. Egypt demonstrates to us that there are severe limits

to development against a backdrop of politically "defanged" professional clas-
ses (no matter how well trained and professional they may be) amidst a general
poverty of resources. While this fact should perhaps be obvious to any one with
even a modicum of intelligence, it appears that it has escaped the proponents of
human capital theory (see discussion in Chapter 7).

al-Azhar

We can not leave Egypt before taking another look at al-Azhar (see Chapter
1). Although, today, in the Egypt of the twenty-first-century, the institution may
appear to some to be irrelevant and anachronistic; an institution from a bygone
era, given its primary role in the past as a religious institution and which it con-
tinues to perform, albeit on a more muted scale, to this day. The fact is that even
as secular forces, especially in the shape of the Westernized Egyptian elite, per-
sist in their effort to push Egypt toward what many among this elite would
probably prefer, the execution of an Egyptian version of the 1924 Turkish solu-
tion, al-Azhar's place in the Egyptian higher education system and in Egyptian
society as a whole continues to remain one of singular importance.[54] More im-
portantly: whatever its detractors among the Westernized elite may think of the
institution, the fact is that al-Azhar has managed to change sufficiently over the
years to secure its continued relevance to the Egypt of today.

The institution, however, would have to concede that this change had to be
foisted on to it by outsiders as they dragged the institution's ulama kicking and
screaming into the modern age.[55] In other words: in the modern era, the begin-
ning of which in Egypt we may trace to the demise of the Ottoman Mamluk
rule, the impetus for the reforms that the institution has had to succumb to
(eventually) have rarely come from autonomous (internal) initiatives. Instead,
they have come from Egypt's successively diverse ruling regimes: the French,
the Khedives, the British, and finally the praetorian Nationalists—each, howev-
er, motivated primarily by the same ultimate agenda, whatever the ideological
patina of the day: how to use al-Azhar as an ally (given the institution's histori-
cal centrality and sociopolitical legitimating role within Egyptian society, pa-
tiently secured through its monopoly of Islamic higher learning over the centu-
ries), in the perpetual struggle to dominate and exploit the seemingly long-
suffering Egyptian peasantry, the *fellahin*, as a means to the larger objective of
harnessing the fecundity of the Nile valley for self-aggrandizement; or failing
that, how best to neutralize and marginalize the institution. (It may be noted
here that such has been the importance of al-Azhar in the life of Egypt that none
of these regimes ever thought it wise to simply abolish and replace it with an in-
stitution closer to their hearts.[56]) The irony in all this, from the perspective of
the institution's original mission as one of the premier places of Islamic higher
learning in North Africa and the Middle East, is that it forced the ulama toward
some acceptance of that basic (Islamic) principle it had long forgotten: that not

only must knowledge and learning go beyond the immediate confines of the re-
ligious sciences, that is the secular also has a place in the institution's curricula,
but that its quest must not brook self-defeating administrative and curricular
morass.[57]

When the French arrived in Egypt they found al-Azhar in the state described
in Chapter 1. While Napoleon did initially attempt to elicit the support of the
ulama for his designs on the country, the atrocious French behavior (which, in
the eyes of the Egyptian Muslims, went well beyond the usual military effort to
quell resistance into the domain of cultural arrogance, sacrilegious conduct, and
wanton brutality—the last exemplified, for instance, by the murder of hundreds
of Cairene women, after labeling them as prostitutes, and discarding their de-
capitated bodies in sacks into the Nile river [Herold 1963: 161]) put to rest any
possibility of amicable Franco-Egyptian relations. Instead, such behavior
brought out the full force of the ire of the ulama; al-Azhar became actively in-
volved in fomenting Egyptian resistance to the infidels. The French did not hes-
itate to respond with even harsher measures; they executed some of the ulama
and temporarily occupied al-Azhar. (Later, the ulama themselves would close
the institution for about a year, from June 1, 1800 to June 2, 1801, as they wait-
ed for the political situation to stabilize.)[58]

Yet, if the ulama had thought that in their support of an Albanian cavalry of-
ficer, in the ensuing power struggles in the Cairo Citadel following the French
departure from Egypt, they would find a friend and a worthy patron, they were
sadly mistaken. Muhammed Ali may have been a Muslim, but the fortunes of Is-
lam were not his primary focus of attention; he had far more narrower and
earthly ambitions, as already noted. Ali was not against al-Azhar per se, but his
policy of looting the wakfs put a large negative dent in the financial circum-
stances of the institution. Such was the power of this autocrat that while this ac-
tion constituted, from the perspective of Islam, among sacrileges of the highest
order, the ulama were unable to put up any effective resistance to this move.
Further, while it was he who would start the process of making inroads into the
governance of the institution by assigning the responsibility of selecting the rec-
tor *(Shaykh al-Azhar)* to the state, rather than leaving it exclusively in the hands
of the ulama as had been the practice hitherto, he refrained from imposing any
major institutional change on al-Azhar or on the madrasah system as a whole.
The fact is that for Ali the institution, by being allowed to continue to play its
age-old role of providing human capital for administrative and educational pur-
poses, had its uses for his projects. In time, however, the modernizing changes
that Ali had set in motion would no longer permit the isolation of al-Azhar from
the impact of these changes long after the old lion had passed on.

Before proceeding to describe the highlights of the educational reforms that
were imposed on al-Azhar, slowly but surely, from 1805 onward (but most es-
pecially after 1849) by the various governing regimes that came to occupy the
seat of power in Cairo, it would be helpful to summarize the context out of

which these reforms grew by describing the interests of the various competing parties and constituencies that eyed the fate of the institution, as all manner of socioeconomic and political change swirled around it, over the course of some one and a half centuries. *(This summary will necessarily imply, it must be cautioned, considerable oversimplification of the complex landscapes of the education-society nexus that developed in Egypt over a period of some 150 years.)*

The ulama (1801 to the present): Their interest was to resist any reforms that upset the status quo; after all they were hardly in a position to champion the basic spiritual source of these reforms: the trend toward secularism and Westernization (read Christianization) that would not only greatly reduce their own societal influence, but which they felt would undermine Islam itself in Egypt. Moreover, they perceived the reforms as constituting nothing less than advancing the cause of imperialist infidels, which had to be resisted at all cost. (For them salvation from Western imperialism lay in resisting Westernization itself at all levels, a position that was completely the reverse of the one adopted by the Egyptian Westernizing elite.) Later, when they realized that the reforms were inevitable, their interest was then to see that not only were their own positions within the institution preserved, but the role of the institution within the education sector and in society at large was not completely marginalized. This entailed in their view demands for control over those competing institutions that they felt were making encroachments into their curricular territory (such as the *Dar-ul-Ulum* and the School of Law, *Madrasat al-Qaada*), and control over feeder institutions (primary and secondary schools) that provided it with its students.[59]

The students and their parents. (1801 to the present): Initially, their interests coincided with those of the ulama. Recall that the primary purpose of al-Azhar at its founding was not the production of graduates for secular oriented employment or even religious employment. The fact that the institution attracted large numbers of students even in the face of certain unemployment upon graduation was a testimony to the fact that attendance at the institution was considered a religious duty. Witness, then, for instance, the student strikes at the instigation of the ulama in 1908 and 1909 that led to the temporary closure of the university. However, later, all this was to change as the modernization efforts of Egypt moved apace because now two distinct categories of people began to emerge: those, who through their employment with the state and other entities on the basis of secular qualifications obtained from state schools in the newly emerging political and economic sectors enjoyed a materially prosperous life (enhanced by goods of the machine age); and those doomed to a life of poverty. In other words, the introduction of formal credentialing for purposes of state employment in Egypt (a process begun by Ali), in time, had a devastating effect on the fortunes of later generations of al-Azhar graduates (and graduates from other similar institutions). Therefore, student interests began to diverge from those of the ulama, but only to the extent that reforms would secure for them

acceptance of al-Azhar qualifications by the state for purposes of employment. That the students did not demand a complete overhaul of the institution in the direction of a secular institution was due to two factors: First, the students and their parents still valued a religious component to their education; and second, admission to al-Azhar was easier (relative to state schools) for children of the rural poor (given that their academic preparation for higher-level studies was generally less than adequate, not to mention financial considerations). One should note here that in the modern era, speaking to the second factor, class origins became ever more significant in Egypt's educational system, where increasingly the madrasah system became the preserve of the poor, while the state schools (to be joined later by private schools) became the educational homes of the children of the new and old elites. In other words, as in the case of all societies progressing toward the secular and the modern, education became the avenue of both class *formation* and class *reproduction*.

The Khedives (1805–1922): As traditional rulers they greatly valued the sociopolitical legitimating role of al-Azhar, but they were also conscious of the need to reform the institution even if, initially, only for the limited purpose of getting it to function more efficiently in terms of its own self-described mission as an Islamic institution of higher learning.[60] The first reforms they imposed on al-Azhar attempted to address matters such as the curricula, teaching expertise, entrance qualification of the students, and so on. Later, they began to demand even more changes as they became conscious of the fact that al-Azhar, with its medievally rooted anarchic laissez faire administrative traditions (see Chapter 1), was an administrative embarrassment as an institution of higher learning. By the beginning of the twentieth-century, as the political value of al-Azhar increased for the Khedival dynasty (in the face of erosion of their powers in other areas of society at the behest of British colonialism) they had come to realize that the modernizing transformations underway in the broader society were accelerating at such a pace that the earlier hesitant steps taken to introduce reforms in al-Azhar had to be undertaken with greater firmness, with or without the cooperation of the ulama, if al-Azhar was to survive.

The British (1882–1922): While they regarded al-Azhar as an anachronistic institution, they recognized its legitimating value, the benefit of which they felt would accrue to them by not interfering with it. (Later, however, as they became involved in a three way power struggle [between the Khedive, the secular-oriented government elite, and themselves] over the control of waqf property, they did have an indirect impact on the circumstances of al-Azhar.)

The constitutional monarchs (1922–52): The interests of the Monarchs was to accumulate as much power and influence as the constitutional arrangement permitted; this implied siding with the ulama when it suited the Monarchs as they enmeshed themselves in power struggles with the government.

The constitutional government and the prerevolution secularizing Egyptian elite (1922–52): Their interests were the opposite of the monarchs in that they

would have preferred to completely secularize al-Azhar and convert it into a Western-style university. As members of a newly emerging Western secular elite, some of them even went so far as to openly advocate the elimination of Islam from all public life (as in post–1924 Turkey). For them, while the West embodied everything that was worthy of emulation (they felt the Islamic civilization had no longer anything to offer Egypt), complete Westernization was the only key to freedom from Western imperialism.

The praetorian oligarchic dynasty (1952 to present): While the dynasty was also firmly wedded to the secular Westernization project, like all other rulers before them, it recognized the legitimating role of al-Azhar. However, without wishing to abolish it, they still insisted on reforms—drastic reforms. They had no time for any form of resistance from the ulama (or any one else for that matter) to their agenda of creating a new Egypt—an Egypt that was Western, but independent from the West, and secular, but mindful of the cost of taking the Ataturk route—both, internally (in terms of political stability) and externally (in terms of the new leadership role they envisaged for their country within the Islamic world of North Africa and the Middle East). From a foreign policy perspective, they also quickly became conscious of the potential al-Azhar presented through its ability to attract foreign students from all over the Islamic world (see Eccel's [1984] consideration of this issue at some length). At the same time, they rightly saw education as the vehicle for creating the necessary human capital needed to execute the modernization of Egypt. Therefore, to them al-Azhar had its uses; however, it needed secularizing reforms; and they would be carried out—through the barrel of a gun if necessary.

It is against the background of the tug of these often contradictory forces that al-Azhar was brought to the present form that it now assumes—namely, still a religious institution but much (though not all) of it operating in a secular Western mode like other Egyptian universities. The journey of reform would take more than a 150 years, propelled ultimately by a combination of the 'stick' of political pressure and the 'carrot' of the struggle to compete for "funds, students and jobs" (Reid 1990: 140). The highlights of this journey include the following:

The first major reform came by means of a Khedival decree issued on February 3, 1872 (supplemented by laws in 1885, 1888, and 1895), which introduced an examination system for the ulama to determine their competence to teach at the university, and placed a limit on the total number of subjects offered. In 1885, attention would now turn to the students: an order was issued to begin formal registration of students and the rationalization of the circumstances of their accommodations.

The next major reform was the creation within the institution of the al-Azhar Administrative Council, in 1894, a permanent policy body (but with the state having veto powers over it) headed by al-Azhar's rector to look into every aspect of al-Azhar's operation and propose changes. Government control over the

institution was further initiated by introducing government-paid salaries for the ulama the following year. (This was an important innovation because it made reforms that much easier; it could be used both as a carrot and a stick.) In the same year too, the formal appendance of other madrasahs to al-Azhar would begin with the *Ahmadi* madrasah. Other accretions in later years would include, in 1925, the *Dar-al-Ulum* (the teacher training college), set up in 1872 to train Arabic-language teachers, initially, because of the correct perception that al-Azhar had deteriorated to such an extent that it could not carry out even this very basic function well; and the School of Law *(Madrasat al-Qaada al-Shari'ah)*, originally established in 1907 to bypass al-Azhar resistance to curricular reform in legal studies.[61]

Two years later, in 1896, with the decree of the first al-Azhar Organization Law on July 1, the process of reform would acquire a greater degree of resolve on the part of the state—even as opposition to the reforms grew among the ulama and the students. In the following year, such matters as delineation of a program of study, class attendance, student behavior, teacher performance, the school calendar, and so on, would become the object of regulations. In the same year an order would be issued for the institution of a student admissions committee and the establishment of examinations (oral) for the two principal qualifications one could obtain from the institution: the *ahliya* diploma (requiring a minimum of eight years of study) and the *alimiya* degree (based on a minimum of twelve years of study).

A year later, in 1897, the first seeds were sown of a proper library with the purchase of bookcases; it would begin to grow until by 1936 the library holdings had been centralized and a number of full time employees were in charge of their maintenance. The creation of a central library at al-Azhar was not only important in terms of immediate learning needs, but in terms of the preservation of rare books and manuscripts as well.

In 1911 another al-Azhar Organization Law would be promulgated, followed in the same year by the al-Azhar Internal Organization Law. The aim of these laws was to bring further rationality to the administration of al-Azhar (matters ranging from procedures for hiring, firing and promotion of faculty to allocation of teaching loads to student admission requirements to establishment of new madrasahs (in the form of institutes *[ma'hads]*). During that year written exams for students were also introduced to the institution.

The year 1930 would witness the expansion of al-Azhar by means of the Reorganization Law (issued on November 15) with the addition of three new colleges: the College of Islamic Jurisprudence, the College of Theology, and the College of Arabic. In that year al-Azhar also came to be regarded officially as a university, for by this point many of the principal features (including such mundane matters as the use of desks and chairs) characteristic of a secular university were now integral to the institution. The following year the Internal Law of Personnel would tackle matters such as faculty disciplinary measures and pro-

cedures. The 1930 law would be supplemented by another law passed in 1933 and these two laws would then be folded into the March 26, 1936, law, the regulations of which in essence established the university's constitution. At the same time the law specified a comprehensive program of study for the entire al-Azhar system.

On June 22, 1961, the rubber-stamping national assembly enacted the al-Azhar reforms legislation that Nasser had been demanding. Its purpose? To "nationalize" the university by forcing on to it far-reaching secular oriented reforms that no ruler before had dared undertake. This effort entailed building a new campus at some distance from al-Azhar to house the new secular colleges by which the oligarchs hoped to make al-Azhar more relevant to Egypt's human capital needs. These colleges would include ones for communications, engineering, languages and translation, medicine, and science. For the first time, a girls college would be appended to the institution: the al-Azhar Girls College, which would offer programs of study to women in a variety of disciplines. New faculty were brought into these colleges without regard to their religious credentials and by separating the offices of the university rector and Egypt's supreme religious leader, the Grand Shaykh (or *Mufti*—he is elected by a body of prominent ulama, of whom many teach at the university), the oligarchs introduced a new equation into the governance of the institution: the rector need no longer be one of the ulamas.

The long struggle waged by outsiders to modernize al-Azhar was now complete.[62] While the reforms forced on to it by the oligarchs must have been the most excruciatingly painful of all the reforms ever imposed on it, they did not completely destroy al-Azhar. Consequently, Al-Azhar remains today among those few universities in Africa and elsewhere that can boast its own unified cradle-to-grave education system (that is, from first grade to a doctorate—comprising schools at the primary, preparatory, general secondary, and technical secondary-levels followed by its own institutes and colleges, all outside a parallel secular education system), yet its original role as an Islamic center of higher learning for domestic *and* foreign Muslim students has been preserved. (In an ideal world, for the majority of Egyptians one would surmise, there would be a single unified educational system for Egypt preserving the best of both systems—however, the die was cast almost 200 years ago by Muhammed Ali, it is unlikely to change any time soon, if ever.) At the same time, al-Azhar continues to be the home of the ulama and the Mufti.[63]

As for its other historic role, however, as an avenue for upward mobility for the children of the lower classes, it has been bypassed by the secular state education system; the proportion of Egyptian primary school children who enter the al-Azhar education system is now less than 2% of the national total (Reid 1990), the clearest indication that to gain entry into the upper classes, al-Azhar is not the most efficacious way to go. At the same time, this statistic also speaks to the fact that al-Azhar is not critically important to Egypt, relative to other

universities, *when viewed strictly in terms of secular human capital needs*. Rather, the relevance of al-Azhar for Egyptians stems from that broader societal role it has always played: the source of legitimation for the ruling classes; except the source of this legitimation is now primarily circuitous (the ulama have lost their legitimating role): in supporting the continued existence of al-Azhar, the ruling elite assures the Egyptian majority that it acknowledges the view of the majority that Egypt is both an Arab and an Islamic country—even though the elite itself may have completely different ideas. This legitimating role it should be added, has become of even greater importance of late as a result of a resurgence of Islam among the masses in Egypt and elsewhere in Islamic Africa.

ALGERIA

Less than a mere forty years after Napoleon's ill fated foray into Egypt, the French takeover of Algeria (which was marked by more than the usual level of brutality and slaughter) began with the capture of Algiers in 1830 and, later, annexation of the country in July 1834; bringing to an end almost three centuries of Ottoman Mamluk rule.[64] Despite, this time, strong initial armed resistance in some parts of the country, the French triumphed—at least momentarily (they would still be forced to leave, eventually, as will be indicated shortly, but that day of reckoning would be postponed for another 130 years or so). In the mean time, almost from the beginning, the French encouraged European colons (settlers) from France and elsewhere in Europe to settle in Algeria in large numbers so that by 1930 there were almost a million of them crawling all over Algeria. As has been the case in almost all colonial territories established by European settlers throughout the world in modern history, and despite the treaties and agreements rammed down their throats, the indigenous Algerians were subjected to all kinds of racist humiliations and socioeconomic and political injuries— thereby rendering whatever legal protections they had attendant upon the incorporation of the country into a Greater France a complete sham.[65] In a replay of a number of similar scenarios of European settler colonization, from the United States to Brazil to South Africa to Australia, millions of acres of land was looted from the Algerians and turned over to the colons; and to add insult to injury a onerous tax system was imposed on them to help finance their own subjugation and depredation at the hands of not just any colonizers, but ones who, as Christians, had been enemies of Islam for over 1,000 years. Living under the umbrella of a monumental lie (a particular forte of human beings) the colons, feigning ignorance of the "natural law of prior claim," convinced themselves that not only Algeria belonged to them by right, but that it is the indigenous who were the foreigners in this bit of overseas France. Under the circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that both the colons and the Algerians would, in time, take to the gun with considerable fervor as the looters and the owners fought to

settle the question of rightful domicile. In other words, independence would come to Algeria through massive violence and bloodshed as a guerrilla war (characterized by remorseless savagery on both sides) was unleashed by the Algerians under the oftquoted, though fallacious, slogan "Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my country," in the same year, in 1954, that France was dealt a humiliating defeat by barefoot and illiterate peasants in another part of its colonial empire (at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam).[66] The Algerian uprising under the FLN *(Front de Liberation Nationale)* would end with French capitulation in 1962 and the simultaneous exodus of thousands of French settlers, together with some of their Algerian collaborators—but not before they had inflicted on the country widescale vandalism prompted by spiteful rage (millions of dollars worth of state property would be looted and destroyed by these representatives of the "Greeks of the world," the self-appointed harbingers of an enlightened civilization). The project of *mission civilisatrice* ('civilizing mission') had collapsed under its own weight of unmitigated hypocrisy and lies.[67]

Against this backdrop, in surveying the development of higher education in Algeria following the arrival of the French, it is possible to extract six main motifs: First, was the French colonial effort at dominating the existing madrasah system by means of such measures as the wholesale looting of their waqfs (which invariably led to the demise of many of them and as if this was not enough, even a number of major mosques were taken over and converted into churches—the resultant deep humiliation of the religious sensibilities of the Muslim Algerians at a time when religion was an important force in their lives can only be surmised; it is certainly beyond description); the sponsorship of alternative French-controlled madrasahs out of a few existing and some new ones in which the teaching of French, among other humiliations, became mandatory; the prohibition of the founding of any others that were not under French supervision.[68]

Second, was the creation of secular institutions targeted primarily at the settlers (though children of a small Algerian Muslim minority, the compradorial elite, were admitted to these institutions too). The earliest of these began as separate institutes (first medicine and pharmacy in 1859, and then ten years later law, arts and letters, and science), which eventually coalesced to form in 1909 the University of Algiers with a student population of 1,605 (though only a tiny fraction of whom were Algerians [Tibawi 1972: 166]). By 1950–51 the student population at the university had reached 5,000, but of them only 213 were Algerians.[69] In 1961 the university spawned two university centers with faculties of law, letters, medicine, and science at Oran and Constantine (though here again the Algerian presence in the student population was miniscule).[70]

Third, by the time of the eve of the Second World War, under the twin pressures of supply far outstripping demand for education among Algerians, and at the same time an inability on the part of the French to fully control a surgent na-

tionalist effort to create madrasahs outside the French-dominated system, the Association of Muslim Algerian Ulama, founded in 1931 by Abd al-Hamid Ibn Badis, began developing what came to be known as the Free Madrasah system; the most prominent of which was the Al-Madrasah al Badisiyya (Ben Badis Institute) in Constantine (begun in 1936), which by 1950 had some 720 students.[71] (Graduates of these madrasahs, as in the precolonial era, who wanted to pursue further studies went on to either al-Azhar or al-Zaitouna in Tunis or al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco.)

Fourth, following independence, by which time the articulation (not abolition) of the precolonial mode of production with the new colonially mediated capitalist mode of production was now complete, the need to generate human capital resources under these changed circumstances led to a progressive marginalization of the madrasahs by default as the expansion of secular higher education under the aegis of the praetorian nationalist controlled state rapidly moved apace. The fruit of this development would be the creation of a host of new secular institutions: University of Constantine (founded in 1961 at Constantine as a university center attached to University of Algiers, but reconstituted as an independent university in 1969); University of Annaba (founded in 1971 at Annaba as Institute of Mining and Metallurgy but reconstituted as a university in 1975); Houari Boumediene University of Science and Technology (founded in 1974 in Algiers); University of Oran (founded in 1961 at Oran as a university center attached to the University of Algiers, but reconstituted as an independent university in 1966); University of Science and Technology of Oran (founded in 1975); and Ferhat Abbas University (founded as a university center in Setif in 1978, but later transformed into its present form in 1985). Other higher education institutions created after independence included university centers at Mostaganem, Sidi-bel-Abbes, Tiaret, Tizi-Ouzou, and Tlemcen. One interesting development was the opening in 1984, in response to the increasing strength of the Islamist tendencies within the country, of a university devoted exclusively to the Islamic sciences: Emir Abdel Kader University for Islamic Sciences. The dizzying scale of expansion of the higher education sector in the postindependence period is best described by Bennoune (1988): "The number of students registered in the national universities increased from 3,718 in 1962–63 to 55,148 in 1978–79. In fifteen years (1962–77)," he observes, "the number of university students multiplied by a factor of 14.6. The annual average growth of students of higher education was 10% during the three-year plan (1967–9), 25.7% during the first four-year plan (1970–3), and 14.7% during the second four-year plan (1974–7)." He continues: "[t]he total number of students…increased from 61,610 in 1979–80 to 166,600 in 1986–7" (pp. 229, 289).

Fifth, while in terms of organization and pedagogy, most of the new Algerian universities, like their precursor, the University of Algiers, were patterned on the French universities (though at the curricular-level an important difference,

as would be expected, was the teaching of certain arts and social science subjects, including law, in Arabic—one of the priorities established by the new government was the Arabization of the education system and to this end it would open in 1967 several Arabic training colleges)—following 1971, a number of educational reforms were instituted, which, like those in other parts of Afro-Arab Islamic Africa, included moving higher education toward a much greater emphasis on science and technology than ever before; widening access to women, and students from rural and lower class backgrounds (democratization); indigenization of university faculty together with some parts of the curriculum; and an increasing effort at the bureaucratic management of human capital formation (in contrast to leaving it to the dictates of the labor market) through such measures as curricular reforms, targeted production of graduates, assignment of state-funded scholarships, and so on.

However, as has been the case in most of Africa, the promises held out by the higher education sector have, in general, failed to *fully* materialize. As Bennoune, to quote him once more, puts it: "If the mission assigned to the universities is to raise society's consciousness and understanding of itself, of its culture and experience as well as of other people's cultures and experiences and also to teach the students how to master modern science and technology in order to increase the production of goods and services, they have failed, for political reasons, to fulfill it" (p. 291). His suggestion, however, that it was politics that accounted for this outcome does not tell the full story: economics also had a major part to play in the sense of the externally mediated obstacles to development imposed by the Western-dominated global economic system.

Sixth, is the impact on higher education of the development of an Islamist tendency in Algerian national politics in the 1980s and its subsequent, probably unforeseen, consequence as a transformed military wing of the praetorian oligarchy moved to crush it: a brutal military campaign notorious for its headline grabbing atrocities waged over a period *of more than a decade* against the civilian population in the name of defeating the Islamists.[72] The outcome of this horrendous Algerian nightmare for higher education has been nothing less than catastrophic: One, it politicized the academy to an unprecedented level as it was forced by circumstances to take sides (for neither the praetorians nor their Islamist adversaries would brook any protestations of neutrality); two, confrontations between the praetorian state and the students became endemic; three, members of all segments of the academy (students, teachers, administrators, etc.) *in their hundreds* were harassed, intimidated, raped, jailed without cause *or simply murdered* irrespective of their beliefs and opinions; four, the universities have been infiltrated with agents of the security apparatus (whose stock in trade includes blackmailing female students for sex and to get them to inform on their peers) thereby creating a permanent culture of fear and intimidation even as the more visible forms of repression have in recent years lessened; and five, thousands of talented Algerian faculty left the country for employment

abroad to escape the violent chaos in the country. The net effect of all this, on top of the severe financial straits that the education sector as a whole has been experiencing since the mid–1980s, has been to drastically (to put it mildly) erode its quality and vibrancy.

One may also note here that, at the same time, the net effect of the direct imposition of the military will on the polity (of which the long blood-soaked nightmare has been symptomatic), for the effort toward cultural authenticity that the call for Arabization had represented, has suffered a major setback. In fact, the new faction, being staunch secular, anti-Islamic Francophiles, have little time for any of the traditional *integrative* cultural mechanisms: Islamization, Arabization, and even anticolonial nationalism (given the faction's treacherous pro-French role during the war of liberation). One implication for higher education of this circumstance is that the those supporting the increased use of French (or English) are now receiving greater support from the state.

LIBYA

Before the arrival of the Arabs in 643 with their capture of Tripoli from the Byzantines, Libya essentially constituted three different entities: Cyrenaica in the east, Tripolitania in the west, and Fezzan in the southwest; and like the rest of North Africa it had seen in its long variegated history many invaders, going all the way back to the Phoenicians who were the founders of Tripoli. The roots of its present shape lie in the arrival of both Ottoman rule in 1551 when Sinan Pasha retook Tripoli from the Knights Hospitallers of St. John of Malta, and some centuries later, European colonial rule, which, by the time of Libya's colonization by the Italians, had managed to surround it with no less than six countries: Egypt and Sudan in the east, Chad and Niger in the south, and Algeria and Tunisia in the west.[73] Ottoman rule would last until 1912, with one major hiccup: in 1711, we see the emergence of the characteristic independent Ottoman Mamluk dynasty nominally beholden to the Ottomans in Istanbul: the dynasty established by Ahmed Qaramanlis. The Qaramanlis dynasty would survive until 1835 when the Ottoman Turks reestablished direct rule from Istanbul in order to save Libya from the same fate, European (French) colonization, that had befallen its other adjacent province on Libya's Western frontier: Algeria. As it turned out, it was a futile mission. Libya managed to retain its independence from European colonialism under the Ottoman's only for a short time, and even that mainly because of a political stalemate among the European powers on the matter of its colonization, which was only broken on September 29, 1911—not by the bigger imperial powers, but by the Italians (who, impelled, like the other powers, by the same heady imperialist cocktail of economics and grandeur, coupled with calculated opportunism, declared an unprovoked war on the Turks and mounted an invasion on October 3). While the invasion proved to be no easy walk to victory, precipitating as it did a spirited guerilla resistance from the

Libyans and the Ottomans, about a year later, on October 18, Italian fortunes improved considerably with the decision of the Ottoman's to withdraw from Libya.[74] However, it was a pyrrhic victory; for, Italian colonial rule would not survive for long; thanks to the Second World War—and which in any case, as a consequence of Libyan resistance, had never managed to go beyond the major coastal towns until the emergence of fascism under Benito Mussolini in Italy inaugurated a renewed and an exceptionally brutal Libyan campaign (in which thousands of Libyans were massacred) that saw the final defeat in 1930 of the lone Sanussi holdout, Said Omar al-Mukhtar.[75]

Colonial rule, from the perspective of education in general and higher education specifically, was characterized by an unremitting saga of *relative* neglect for a number of reasons. As in Algeria, the violence that accompanied the process of colonization led to considerable destruction of indigenous institutions including many madrasahs (*zawiyahs*) and there was little effort to rebuild them. The Italians (again like the French in Algeria), aimed to convert Libya into virtually an Italian province through a program of massive settler colonization (by 1940 there were 110,000 settlers), which entailed a dual-track segregationist education policy where some educational provision would be made for the settlers but not for the Libyan masses. Then there was the Second World War, which not only led to massive destruction of almost everything, material and institutional, that the Italians had introduced as the country passed from Italian hands into British and then into German and finally back into British and French hands, but the British and French military administrations that took over control of Libya were concerned less with socioeconomic and political development of any kind than simply maintaining an imperial presence in the country (with the least amount of financial expenditure necessary) while a decision was made on Libya's political fate. The sum total of the outcome of these circumstances is captured best by Elbadri (1984: 24): "In 1952, ninety percent of the population was illiterate and there were about fourteen university graduates in the whole country."

On December 24, 1951, as a result of a United Nations decree, Libya became the first colonial country to gain independence on the African continent.[76] This development, it is thought, was largely because of a promise made by the British to the Sanussiya, in exchange for the cooperation of the Sanussiya during the ferocious 1940–42 military campaigns in Libya, that they would not allow the Italians to return. The truth, however, probably lies elsewhere: most likely it has to do with the emerging postwar geopolitics of the region. Bearman (1986) suggests that there was a collusive attempt by the British and the Italians to get the United Nations to declare Libya a U.N. trust territory under Italian mandate, but the United States would have none of it (as a U.N. trust territory, its emerging arch Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union, would have meddled in U.S. plans to continue to retain its World War II military base, Wheelus Field Airbase, on the outskirts of Tripoli). Another factor that may have helped to

persuade the British and the Italians to capitulate to U.S. demands was, proba-
bly, the fact that petroleum, which would eventually transform Libya from one
of the poorest countries on the continent (and possibly the world) to the rich-
est—in terms of per capita GNP—would not be discovered until 1959.[77] Inde-
pendence brought a constitutional monarchy with the head of the Sanussiya,
Amir Muhammed Idris, being proclaimed king over a tripartite federal state.[78]
His close alliance with the West, specifically the British, coupled with griev-
ances provoked by his misrule, however, would in time cost him his crown; for,
he was overthrown in a bloodless coup on September 1, 1969, by a group of
radical young nationalist-minded, pan-Arabist military officers led by a 27-year-
old lieutenant: the son of a nomadic Bedouin peasant who would evolve to be-
come on the international scene a quixotic and mercurial gadfly, and on the
home front a populist, but an equally temperamental, leader—in other words, a
mini but erratic version of Nasser—by the name of Muammar al-Qhaddafi.[79]

On the domestic front, Qhaddafi (under his particular variant of praetorian
state capitalism—enunciated as *Libyan socialism* or *Third Universal Theory* in
two successive editions of his manifesto, the so-called *Green Book*) would em-
bark on a massive populist program of social expenditures that would include
the funding of an explosive expansion of educational provision for Libyans at
all educational levels under the slogan "knowledge is a right of all citizens." [80]
Perhaps more than most PQD countries, Libya's populist praetorian autocracy
saw in its education policies a panacea for not only the country's economic
backwardness, but also a means for the modeling of a new Libyan citizen loyal-
ly in tune with the autocracy's evolving ideology of an international anti-West
radicalism on one hand and for the Libyan variant of pan-Arabism on the other.
Under a regime of virtually unlimited financial resources following the long
overdue OPEC oil price hikes of 1973 that would more than quadruple the price
per barrel of oil within a year, coupled with the nationalization of all foreign-
owned petroleum corporations, the country's oldest secular university, Universi-
ty of Libya (founded in 1955 in Benghazi beginning with the College of Arts,
Letters and Sciences), over the next several decades would cease to be the only
university in the country. In 1974 the university would split into two separate
institutions with the creation of University of Garyunis, also in Benghazi. Then
would come other institutions, including, Sebha University (established in 1983
at Sebha); Al-Arab Medical University (founded in 1984 in Benghazi); the
Bright Star University of Technology (set up in 1981 at Adjabia); and the long
distance university, appropriately named The Open University (created in 1987
in Tripoli). There are a number of other lesser higher education institutions as
well, but all sporting university appellations; they include Al-Fatheh University
of Medical Sciences in Tripoli, Al-tabal-Gharbi University in Zintan, Al-Tahadi
University in Sirt, Derna University in Derna, Nasser University in Al-Khoms,
Omar-Al-Mukhtar University in Al-Bayda, and the Seventh of April University
in Zawia. (It may be noted that the predominant language of instruction at most

higher education institutions in Libya, besides Arabic, is English, rather than Italian or French.)[81]

It is instructive to note that despite the enormous wealth Libya has enjoyed (relative to most other countries in Africa) over the past three decades, and the enormous effort put into expanding all levels of the education sector, the country remains essentially a one-horse town in strictly economic terms—dependent primarily on petroleum. Even in agricultural terms it has failed to develop the sector to keep pace with population expansion; the result is that whereas once it was relatively self-sufficient in food production, today it imports three-quarters of its food needs. Clearly, large amounts of investable surplus, together with a concerted effort at human capital production, still does not ipso facto translate into meaningful development. While economic mismanagement does have some explanatory role here, compared to many other African countries, it is of negligible significance. The real issue is the same that has bedeviled almost all PQD countries, especially those in Africa: the nature of their relations with the international economic system that is deeply biased toward maintaining their role as primary commodity producers.

MOROCCO

From the perspective of history, Morocco, as part of the Maghreb, saw its fair share of outsiders contribute to its annals: Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Arab Muslims, Portuguese, Spanish, and the French. The most enduring legacy, of course, has been that of the Muslims (they arrived in 682) because the original inhabitants, the Berbers, in time converted to Islam; followed by that of the French who established colonial rule of a much different order—one characteristic of the modern post–1492 period. Skipping about 1,000 years of history of Muslim rule under a variety of Arab and Berber dynasties (such as the Idrisids, Almoravids, Almohads, Merinids) to come closer to the modern era, we witness the arrival of the Portuguese in Morocco beginning with the capture of Ceuta in 1415; however, they were not able to hold on to the country long enough to reach modern times because 1492 and the benefits of the post–1492 developments that ensued were yet to materialize (see Appendix II). For, a century and a half or so later, the Moroccans were able to throw out the Portuguese by dealing them a severe defeat in 1578. However, in the transformed circumstances of the Afro-Eurasian ecumene two and a half centuries on, by which time no North African state could effectively hold a candle to the economic and military might of any European power, it would be a different matter. Morocco's effort to get rid of the Spanish from Moroccan soil in 1859/1860 proved to be a disaster.[82] In fact, it would be one of several factors (which would include economic disarray within the country) that would lead, a few decades later, in 1912, to the imposition of a French protectorate with the blessing of other European powers—in itself telling—notably Britain.

When the French arrived the Sharifian Alawite dynasty was in power; and it continues to be so to this day (their luck in this regard no doubt secured by the ability of the Moroccans to resist Ottoman rule in the sixteenth-century—Morocco has the distinction of being the only North African country that did not succumb to the Ottomans to become part of their empire, even nominally).[83] Between 1912 and 1956 when independence came to Morocco and the sultanate would be transformed into a monarchy, France ruled most of the country; but it allowed Spain to continue its presence in parts of the north, and south of the country. The end of French rule also led to the withdrawal of the Spanish in 1960 from most of the zones they had occupied (Ifni would be vacated in 1969), except for a few northern coastal enclaves they continue to hold to this day.[84]

Given the differing economic strengths of the French and the Spanish, together with their unequal zones of control, during the colonial period the predominant influence in the education sector in Morocco was that of the French. Their policy in its essence was similar to the one they adopted with respect to Tunisia: not to disrupt the traditional madrasah system, but on the contrary work toward its preservation.[85] As in Tunisia, the long-term objective of this strategy had a threefold dimension to it: first, continue to provide a modicum of education to the masses (a strategy that at the same time obviated the incurrence of major financial costs—which would have surely attended the introduction of an alternative—secular/Western—education system); second, be perceived to be not in opposition to Islam by supporting its existing institutions; and three obtain the acquiescence of the ulama to French hegemony by not threatening the ulama's institutional base. At the same time, the French also made some provision for the education of a compradorial elite. In the case of Morocco, interestingly, this also entailed the support of the al-Qarawiyyin mosque-college along an opposite line of approach to the one they adopted with respect to al-Zaitouna, as will be indicated in a moment.

When the French imposed their protectorate on Morocco the circumstance of al-Qarawiyyin was, as mentioned in Chapter 1, not as it had been in its heyday, centuries before. However, that is not to say that the institution had become completely irrelevant to the needs of Moroccan society; for, one of the functions it had acquired over the preceding several centuries was to serve as a higher educational outlet for the sons of notables who would join the sultan's administration (referred to as the *mekhzen,* short for *rijaal al-mekhzen*). What this implied was that the student body was fragmented along four *coterminous* avenues: ethnicity (Arab versus Berber), geographic origin (rural versus urban), status (notable versus commoner), and income (rich versus poor) with almost no movement across these social fissures. The students in effect were segregated both residentially (the poor rural Berber commoners, referred to as the Sousi, were housed in the madrasahs while their opposite counterparts, the Fassi, lived with their families in the city), and at the places of instruction *within* the

institution. What the French chose to do was to exploit this dual role of al-Qarawiyyin: as an Islamic higher education institution for all, and as an educational institution for the sons of the nobility. While they did encourage some reforms in terms of mainly *structural* rationalization (as opposed to *content* rationalization)—covering matters such as calendars, appointment of teachers, salaries, schedules, general administration, the replacement of the *ijaza* with the *shahada alamiyah* certificate, and so on—through various decrees, for example, in 1914, 1918, 1927, 1931, 1933, and 1947, their main approach was to insist that the institution not deviate from its traditional educational curricula *as defined by them* (see Porter 2002). In practice what this meant was to unnaturally freeze education at al-Qarawiyyin from further evolution lest it evolve in a direction that would produce graduates who would challenge the legitimacy of not only the French colonial presence, but also the compliant sultanate itself for cooperating with the infidel.[86] In addition, the French instituted ranks among the ulama and kept control of hiring and promotion; hence further ensuring the development of a body of compliant ulama. In other words, the French sought to mold the existing ulama and future ulama graduates into a worldview that was stuck in the fifteenth century (use of texts written after the fifteenth century were, for instance, discouraged, and unlike the colonial practice in Algeria's madrasahs, French was not permitted at the institution) thereby hopefully prevent any possibility of a radical type of Islam from emerging—such as the one that arose in Algeria—that could challenge French hegemony (Porter 2002). The spirit of this policy was captured best by the first French governor (1912–25), Marshall Hubert Lyautey, arguably among the enlightened French colonial governors, that is as far as French colonial governors go, when he stated: "We must never forget that the native does not like to 'change the face of things,' if I may be permitted the expression; but that provided that the 'face' to which he has become accustomed remains the same, he is indifferent to which regime keeps it that way" (from Rabinow 1989: 164–65).[87] The Moroccans themselves, however, did not support this approach (except perhaps some of the ulama); they wanted an overhaul of the curriculum to not only include newer (secular) subjects like math and geography, but they also wanted to upgrade the religious subjects. The French, however, would have none of it. (Instead, to provide secular education to another group of select few, they created for them secular institutions, as will be noted in a moment.) To deflect complaints from some Moroccans that the French were relegating them to stagnation the French argued that their policies were driven by the desire to "respect" Islam and Moroccan customs and tradition.

Although in 1947 it became part of the state-sponsored educational system, undergoing further reforms, in both structure and content, it is only with independence, in 1956, that the government moved to completely reorganize al-Qarawiyyin (by means of a royal decree of February 6, 1963), which included shutting down the program at the mosque in 1957 by moving it to new premis-

es, an old French Army barracks. Further, the new organizational structure that would emerge of what was now officially called the University of Qarawiyyin (beginning in 1965) included the establishment of geographically dispersed faculties and institutes—such as a faculty of Islamic law in Fez; a faculty of Arabic Studies in Marrakech (which incorporated the Yusufiyya Madrasah founded in the precolonial era), a faculty of theology at Tatwan (which absorbed the Institute of Higher Religious Studies established after 1944 by the Spanish), and an institute specializing in the traditions of the Prophet in Rabat. Clearly, the Moroccans felt that the ossified education of al-Qarawiyyin bequeathed to them by the French was not what they felt was relevant for a new Morocco. In the newly organized and newly located University of Qarawiyyin, Morocco could train students in the Islamic sciences that could meet the challenges of a postindependent Morocco based on new texts, new curricula, professionally trained teachers, and so on. By turning their back on the Mosque and its madrasahs, it appeared the Moroccans had closed a Chapter in Moroccan higher education, which even though centuries in the making was in the end found wanting, thanks to the French. Yet, some thirty years later, the Moroccans decided to reopen classes at the Mosque. In 1988 King Hassan II would preside over the reinauguration of Islamic education in the al-Qarawiyyin Mosque. The question is, Why?

In part, this move, after an almost thirty-year absence of organized learning at the Mosque, was motivated by the continuing effort to recreate an authentic tradition in the life and activities of Fez's madina (where al-Qarawiyyin is located), which had been declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 1981 as a result of a Moroccan petition (tourist dollars no doubt having something to do with it); and in part it was a desire by the Monarchy (the sultanate became a monarchy in 1957) to counter the subversive potential of the newer curricular tendencies of the existing modern faculties of the University of al-Qarawiyyin. Feeling increasingly insecure in a world where few monarchies with executive powers continue to rule, the decision to resuscitate teaching and learning at the Mosque was a direct attempt to recreate a compliant body of ulama that would acquire legitimacy by going through a traditional Islamic system complete with its medieval trappings of both curriculum and physical space (e.g., modern conveniences are not permitted in the madrasahs or at the mosque), ostensibly motivated by pure motives: to seek knowledge for its own sake. Such a traditionally educated cadre of ulama, it was felt, would be a more reliable source of legitimacy for the current dynasty. By making the memorization of the entire Qur'an as among the major qualifications for admission to the Mosque program, true Islamic knowledge would issue forth from this institution untainted by modern perspectives available in the existing faculties and at other Islamic institutions in the country. The irony of ironies in this whole exercise is that the traditional (also referred to as original) Islamic education that was to be imparted was a replica of the one that the French had devised on the basis of their colonially

determined definition of traditional, and which was the same education that had been rejected by urban and rural students alike and abandoned in 1957, as not suited to the needs of a modern Morocco. Not surprisingly, those involved with modern Islamic studies look askance at this revival of traditional education, deeming it as primitive and irrelevant; plus the fact that those who attend the Mosque-based program of the university are in the main poor rural students (the sons of the rich) does not help matters. The student numbers are also telling: in the year 2000, of the 8,000 students at al-Qarawiyyin University's four Islamic faculties, only 200 were attending the traditional education program at the Mosque. In truth, the rich, with rare exception, had never found the concept of the pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge very appealing anywhere at any time in the Islamic empire. (For more on the foregoing see Porter 2002.)

Moving beyond al-Qarawiyyin, as noted, the French were not completely averse to secular/Westernist education for some of the Moroccan elite (after all they needed a cadre that could mediate administratively between themselves and the rest of the Moroccan population); they therefore established the College Moulay Idriss in Fez, the College Moulay Yousef in Rabat, and the Institute of Higher Moroccan Studies (Institut des Hautes Etudes Musulman, opened in 1920) to educate a compradorial elite. Education at the these institutions, which were similar to the Sadiki College in Tunisia, combined Islamic and French subjects and languages (the language of instruction, as was now the practice throughout Islamic Africa, depending upon the subject matter: Arabic for the Islamic subjects and French for the secular subjects). The creation of these institutions, however, would bring about a slow but steady demise of al-Qarawiyyin as more and more of the Moroccan elite, together with others, began to send their children to the secular Westernist institutions where they received bilingual education. By 1922, the student population at Qarawiyyin had dwindled to just about 300 total (Porter 2002: 411), and as just mentioned, following independence classes at the Mosque would be abandoned.

By means of a royal decree in 1957, the University of Rabat was established (to be later renamed Muhammed V University in 1975) with faculties of letters, Islamic law, law, medicine, and science. In 1962 the university had established branches at Fez and Casablanca; the total enrollment of the university was about 4,000 students of whom 600 were women (Tibawi 1972: 175) In keeping with other secular higher education institutions in former French African colonies, it used French as the principal medium of instruction and was patterned on French universities. Soon more universities would be established: the Averroes School of Applied Medicine, founded in Casablanca in 1959; these three created in 1975: Hassan II University (at Casablanca); Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah University (at Fez); and Cadi Ayyad University (at Marrakech); and following a major decentralization of the higher education system in 1989, these: Ibn Zohr University (at Agadir); Chouaib Doukkali University (at El Jadida); Ibn Tofail University (at Kenitra); and Abdelmalek Es-Saadi University (at Te-

touan). Other postindependence institutions include: Mohammed I University (founded in 1978 at Oujda); Moulay Ismail University (founded in 1981 at Meknes); Hassan II University (founded in 1992 at Mohammedia); Mohammed V Souissi University (founded in 1992 at Rabat).

SUDAN

To those with some familiarity with Africa, any mention of Sudan immediately conjures up in one's mind three simultaneous mental constructs of this country, each jostling for prominence, relating to size and topography, ancient African history, and ethnically-driven civil wars marked by much savagery and brutality against civilian populations. One may as well, then, consider an overview of the country along these axes.

Sudan is the largest country on the planet's second largest continent. Stretching some 1,400 miles from Egypt in the north, to Uganda at its southernmost reaches, it covers an area of nearly a million square miles (exact area is 2,505,800 sq km) encompassing, as one would expect, a huge diversity of flora, fauna and people, and bordering on no less than seven countries, besides the two just mentioned. To the east there is Eritrea, and Ethiopia; in the south, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and to the west are the countries of Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. Topographically, it is marked by two salient features: it shares the Red Sea coast with Egypt and others in the northeast, and it is home to the Nile River as it journeys its way north to Egypt—but not only that, the country is also host to the Nile's dual headwaters, the Blue Nile (which originates in the Ethiopian highlands) and the White Nile that meanders across the southern part of the country from the Ugandan border (to eventually join the Blue Nile in the vicinity of the country's capital, Khartoum). To round out this highly abbreviated geography, mention can be made of its climatic terrain; it is characterized by three major natural divisions: desert in the north, rain forest in the south, and a north to south blend of savannah and swampland (known as the *As Sudd*) in between.

Given this geography, it is not difficult to surmise that the country's history stretches back thousands of years into antiquity. There is evidence of human habitation going back 60,000 years into the Paleolithic period, and by the time one comes into the Neolithic period (around eighth to third millennia B.C.E.) a sedentary agricultural way of life among a people characterized by a genetic fusion of Mediterranean peoples and African peoples—facilitated by the Nile River—was now well established. In other words, an important portion of ancient Sudanese history is inseparable from that of Egypt's (and thence the Mediterranean's). Egyptian sources going as far back as to the Old Kingdom (c. 2650–2130 B.C.E.) refer to the central Nile region, the southern portion of Nubia—in antiquity a region encompassing northern Sudan from Khartoum to Egypt and from the Libyan desert to the Red Sea—as the land of the Cush (or

the "wretched") with whom the Egyptians had vibrant commercial and other transactions. Hundreds of years later, during the era of the New Kingdom (c. 1575–1105 B.C.E.), they would administratively incorporate Cush as one of its provinces. As the fortunes of pharaonic Egypt waxed and waned, a time would come when the Cushites would become rulers of Egypt—with the last Cushite pharaoh being Taharqa (690–664 B.C.E.—the fourth king of the 25th Egyptian dynasty, which is also sometimes known as the "Ethiopian" dynasty because the Greeks referred to Cush as Ethiopia).

As ancient Egypt fell into disorder, coming under the control of various foreigners—first the Achaeminid Persians (525–332 B.C.E.), followed by the Macedonian Greeks (332–30 B.C.E.), and culminating with the Romans (30 B.C.E.–642 C.E.)—the Cushites, under the leadership of Taharqa, who it is thought came to settle among them sometime after 650 B.C.E., asserted their independence, establishing their headquarters further southward at Meroe, to eventually give rise to the Meroetic kingdom (comprising an area stretching from the sixth cataract to present-day Khartoum). This Egypto-Cushite kingdom would last for almost a 1,000 years and come to enjoy much prosperity, accompanied by impressive cultural efflorescence. The demise of the Meroetic kingdom would be the handiwork of the emergent Axumite kingdom of Ethiopia, whose army would attack and destroy Meroe city (c. 350 C.E.).

The successor to the Meroetic kingdom would be various smaller states, of which not much is known, but which by the sixth century would come to comprise Christian Nubia practicing Monophysite Christianity, which arrived through the agency of Egyptian Coptic missionaries. The sunset of the Christian Nubian kingdoms (who would mark their apogee in the period encompassing the nineth to tenth centuries) would come about at the hands of yet another source from without, through the rise of Islam in Saudi Arabia. Although Nubian-Arab relations were of long standing as part of Nubia's commercial contacts stretching through Egypt into the Red Sea and Mediterranean basins and beyond, the arrival of Muslim Arabs in Egypt in the seventh century would set in motion a completely different historical trajectory for Nubia and the rest of Sudan (as would be the case for the rest of North Africa as well).[88]

Over yet another period of more than 1,000 years, primarily (though not entirely) through the peaceful agency of immigration, trade and commerce, almost all of Nubia (that is, northern Sudan) would undergo Islamic Arabization at all levels: linguistic, cultural and genetic. Now, the key developments in this historical process of relevance to the emergence of present-day Sudan are these three: at the level of ethnicity, the genetic merger between Arabs and locals; at the cultural level the supplanting of local languages with Arabic on one hand, and the demise of Christianity and its replacement with Islam as the religion of choice on the other; and at the political level the emergence of various Muslim sultanates and fiefdoms (such as that of the Kashifs, the Funj, the Fur, and the Sannar). The relevant time period is parenthesized by these chronological

markers: the arrival of Amr ibn al-'As in Egypt in 639 C.E. and the imposition of colonial rule through military force by Egypt's Muhammed Ali, primarily in the interest of slave-raiding, on Sudan in 1821—which would inaugurate the period of Sudanese history referred to as the Turkiyah (lasting until 1885).

Sudan has the dubious honor of being embroiled in what is perhaps the longest running civil war on the African continent. It began about a year before Sudan became independent of British colonial rule in 1956 when a group of southern Sudanese (the Anya Nya) launched a guerilla war with the objective of secession. Over the period of the next *fifty* years, almost *up to the present* (except for a short interregnum from 1972 to 1983) the ensuing civil war would be characterized in the south by: huge civilian population displacements; the use of food as a weapon of war by the government in times of famine and the resultant civilian deaths running into the thousands; massive human rights violations on both sides, including horrendous atrocities ranging from rape, torture, and murder to destruction of homes and livelihoods; the revival of the practice of enslavement of the southern Sudanese by some among the northerners with almost no opposition from the government; the wanton air-bombardment of civilians by government planes; the almost total absence of economic development, in relative terms, in the southern regions; and of course the failure by either side to achieve their objectives (which speaks to the remarkable perseverance of the southerners, led by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army—formed in 1983 under the command of the U.S.-educated John Garang—in the face of overwhelming military odds). What is more, as if this particular conflagration has not been enough, yet another one has emerged in the western province of Darfur that, in terms of violence and suffering, is an almost exact replay of the conflict in the south and perhaps even worse (in the period of just two years, while the United Nations wrangles over the definition of the conflict as "genocide," as suggested by the United States, hundreds of thousands have died and nearly two million have been displaced).

As of this writing (2005), the situation is that after nearly three years of negotiations, hosted by the Kenyan government, there is a real promise of peace in the south with the signing of a peace agreement between the Sudanese People's Liberation Army and the government on January 9, 2005, in Nairobi, which among its other provisions includes the sharing of Sudan's oil wealth (currently at more than 300,000 barrels a day) on a fifty-fifty basis with the south, and even more importantly, one that will give the southern Sudanese an opportunity to have a referendum on autonomy after six years. The conflict in Darfur, sadly, continues (and there is talk of rebellions breaking out in some other parts of the country as well).[89]

A burning question that emerges from the foregoing is, of course, Why? Was it necessary for nearly two million people to die in order for those in Khartoum to arrive at a peace deal with the south, and how many more will have to die before peace arrives in Darfur and the rest of the country? The popular me-

dia in the West has generally portrayed the conflicts in Sudan as racial and reli-gious; and there is some truth to this, but the picture is much more complex as Lesch (1999) demonstrates:

The 27 million Sudanese…vary significantly by language and religion. More than 50 ethnic groups can be identified, which subdivide into at least 570 distinct peoples. Forty percent of the population comprises Arabized peoples living in the north, and 26 percent are African peoples who also live in the north; the remaining 34 percent are African peoples in the south, who speak more than a hundred indigenous languages. About 70 percent of the population is Muslim; 25 percent adheres to indigenous religions, and 5 percent is Christian, consisting of Africans in the south, who converted to Christianity during the twentieth; and a small Coptic and Syrian Arab communities in the north. Linguistic and religious differences overlap; nearly all the Arabized peoples and most of the African peoples indigenous to the north are Muslim (p. 218).

Clearly, then, to suggest, for instance, that the conflict in Darfur is religious would be nonsense because the people of Darfur are Muslim as are those at-tacking them: the government-organized militias called the Janjaweed, compris-ing essentially Arabized pastoralists—who more often than not are indistin-guishable phenotypically from the people they are attacking. In other words, Sudan is an example par excellence of a society in which race is patently a so-cial construction. For political reasons, the Sudanese ruling elites over the cen-turies have found it in their interest to emphasize their "Arab" roots, *both real and imagined*, in their effort to monopolize the resources of the country. The irony is that the "real" Arabs in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, do not consider the Sudanese (whatever their claims on Arab heritage) as Arab at all. In fact, the name "Sudan," from their perspective, captures their view admirably; it is the shortened form of the Arabic designation *bilad al-sudan*, the "lands of the blacks." As has already been noted, Islam does not recognize racial or any other divisions in the *ummah*, yet the tragedy is that this has not prevented the Arabized Sudanese Muslims (Arabo-Sudanese) from carrying out their nation-ally divisive and exploitative projects, thereby fomenting the conditions that have led to horrendous civil wars. Note that what is also being suggested here is that even if the Arabized northerners had succeeded in converting the south to Islam, a project that was consciously pursued by various Sudanese regimes, it would not have guaranteed the absence of a civil war. Hence, for instance, the conflict in Darfur between Muslims and Muslims suggests that perhaps a better handle on that conflict comes from viewing it as one between pastoralists (the Arabized element) and a sedentary people for water and grazing rights against a backdrop of an ever-expanding Sahel. Moreover, Sudan, also presents us with a compelling case of the failure of "political Islam." The move toward the impo-sition of the Shari'ah on the country, begun under the dictatorship of General Gaafer Nimeiry (came to power by means of a military coup in 1969) for politi-cal reasons rather than those of piety, and continued by various regimes that

have followed him, did not create even a remote possibility for the emergence of a democracy that would respect the human and civil rights of all Sudanese; given, as indicated elsewhere in this chapter, the absence, historically, of an interest among the ulama in the Islamic empire to work toward the development of a constitutionally relevant body of law within the Shari'ah *with the potential to meet the challenges of a post-Columbian world* when it arose—expressed, for instance, in the continuing mind-boggling incongruence between, on one hand, an obsession among them with such minutia of daily life as how to take a bath, and on the other, the almost total lack of a concern with such matters as how to elect a democratic government, or manage economic development, and so on. Even the extensive body of Islamic law on the conduct of war, or respect for the rights of the *dhimmi*, has been conveniently dispensed with by Sudanese regimes, even as they have hypocritically professed adherence to the Shari'ah.

In sum, then, at the root of the conflicts in Sudan, as in much of the rest of post-colonial Africa (Algeria, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, etc.), has not been race or religion per se, *but ethnicity manipulated for political ends*. Note that in such a context there is a dialectic that emerges between the political uses of ethnicity and the preservation of ethnic boundaries, and it is a dialectic that is always, by definition, inimical to any project for democracy. (Compare here, for instance, the political/economic functions of racism in the United States today.[90]) In the case of Sudan, specifically, the ability to effect such uses of ethnicity has historically involved higher education itself against the backdrop of well-intentioned policies of a British colonial order. That is, historically, the narrowly conceived ethnicity-circumscribed nationalism of the Arabo-Sudanese elites which never envisioned, even in their wildest dreams, full political participation of *all* Sudanese, drew succor from higher education, against a background of British colonial policies aimed at protecting the south from northern encroachment in the interest of opposing slavery and Islam—which in a sense were intertwined since the business of slave trading, following the arrival of Islam in Nubia, would eventually pass into the hands of the Muslims. (It should be emphasized that the commerce of slavery long predated the arrival of Islam in North Africa, or elsewhere for that matter.)

British colonial rule arrived in Sudan, it is possible to assert, at the instigation of the French at the time when Egypt was under British overlordship.[91] The arrival of the French explorer Jean-Baptiste Marchand by an overland route from the west coast on July 10, 1898, at Fashoda on the White Nile (about 400 miles south of Khartoum), so that the French could boast to the world they had "pissed into the Nile upstream from Khartoum" (Andrew and Kanya-Forstner 1974: 70) and thereby lay colonial claims on a vast transcontinental region stretching from the west to the east coast of Africa, momentous as it was from his perspective—constituting the realization of a dream that he had first outlined some three years earlier and doggedly pursued—proved in the end to be nothing more than a French expeditionary farce. For the British had their own

colonial ambitions of a north-south transcontinental possession and with the threat of war between the two colonial powers over Fashoda, the French backed down—on September 19, General Horatio Herbert Kitchener (Lord Kitchener) had hurriedly arrived in Fashoda upon learning of the French presence there to press for British claims, but in the name of Egypt, after having routed the Mahdist Army at Omdurman a week earlier on September 2. (In other words, Marchand's small expeditionary force would have been no match for Kitchener's large well-equipped army.)

By means, on one hand, of an addendum to the Anglo-French Convention on West Africa signed June 14, 1898, and on the other, the ratification of a treaty between Britain and Egypt on January 19, 1899, Sudan in all but name became a British colony, known as the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. Nominally, of course, the Kitchener Anglo-Egyptian expeditionary force had been sent to restore Sudan to Egyptian suzerainty after the Egyptian Turkiyyah administration had lost control over Sudan following a successful Arabo-Sudanese rebellion in 1885—led by Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abd Allah (who had proclaimed himself as the *Mahdi*, a long awaited messianic redeemer who would bring about a just and corrupt-free Islamic state)—and which saw the death of the British general Charles George Gordon when the Mahdist forces razed Khartoum, an event for which the British never forgave the Mahdists.

Now, two salient points of relevance emerge here: first, is that the British, upon taking charge of Sudan following the collapse of the Mahdist state, came to adopt a dual pronged colonial policy of, on one hand, appeasing the former Mahdists by encouraging their rehabilitation by absorbing them into the colonial administration, and on the other making sure in every way possible that Arabo-Sudanese influence and activities would be restricted to their northern home-base; the south, for all intents and purposes, was declared out of bounds—not even Arabic was permitted to be taught there. Consequently, by the time independence came to Sudan, it was in almost all respects (geographically, culturally, linguistically, economically, etc.) a deeply bifurcated nation along a north-south axis. In other words, British colonial rule, far from uniting the country, merely reinforced the preexisting north-south divisions. Second, perhaps in an effort to appease his conscience—word had eventually leaked out that behind the grim statistics of nearly 27,000 killed or wounded among the Mahdists (against less than 500 dead among Kitchener's men), thanks to superior weapons, lay a picture of massive atrocities against the Sudanese—Kitchener embarked on a fund-raising campaign in England to raise capital for the construction of a college for the Sudanese, in memory of Gordon. Shortly after his return to England, in a letter addressed to the British press dated November, 30, 1898, Kitchener appealed:

I call your attention to an issue of very grave importance arising immediately out of the recent campaign in the Sudan. The region now lies in the pathway of our Empire, and a numerous population has become practically dependent on our race. A responsible task

is laid upon us, and those who have conquered are called upon to civilize.…I accordingly propose that at Khartoum there should be founded and maintained with British money a college bearing the name of Gordon Memorial College.…Certain questions will naturally arise as to whom exactly we should educate.…We should begin by teaching the sons of the leading men, the heads of villages, the heads of districts. They belong to a race very capable of learning, and ready to learn.…The fund required for the establishment of such a college is one hundred thousand pounds.…It is for the provision of this sum.…that I now desire to appeal, on behalf of a race dependent upon our mercy, in the name of Gordon, and in the cause of that civilization which is the life of the Empire of Britain (from his letter reproduced as an appendix in Beshir 1969).

The response of the British public was overwhelming (for both Gordon and Kitchener were viewed as heroes) and within two months the sum needed was not only raised but surpassed, with contributions coming from as far away places as Australia, New Zealand, India and even the United States. Thus was born Gordon Memorial College, but as Sharkey (2003) has demonstrated in her extensive study of the origins of Sudanese nationalism during the colonial period, this college became almost exclusively the haunt of the Arabo-Sudanese elite. It is they who would develop the Sudanese nationalism that would propel Sudan to eventual independence, but it would be one that would be narrowly circumscribed, resting on values derived from the Arabic language and culture, and the Islamic faith. More importantly, however, this nationalism would emerge *against a backdrop of an ethnically determined hierarchic social structure* in which membership of either the formerly enslaved (Afro-Sudanese) or the former enslavers (Arabo-Sudanese) determined one's status—not necessarily religious affiliation. By restricting admission to the college almost exclusively to Arabo-Sudanese elite males, which in turn meant access for them to positions in the colonial administration (albeit at lower levels), primarily in order to gain support from the elite for the British colonial presence in Sudan, the British became unwitting accomplices to the development of this attenuated form of nationalism.

Gordon Memorial College

Gordon Memorial College opened its doors in 1902, with Kitchener himself officiating, on a campus built on the bank of the Blue Nile. Only handpicked sons of the Arabo-Sudanese elite would be the first enrollees. Sharkey (2003) points out that British officials from the education department literally went door-to-door visiting prominent Arabo-Sudanese families looking for student recruits. Although there was some initial reluctance to allow their sons to enroll for fear that the college was a Trojan horse for Christian evangelization, their fears were soon put to rest once they realized that the teachers included Muslim alims and the curriculum included the Islamic sciences. The college did not as a rule admit Christian students from the south, instead the few from there who

qualified for higher education, in later years, were sent to Makerere College in Uganda. To ensure a steady stream of students the college also opened a number of primary schools in Khartoum and in Omdurman. Whether it was the primary schools or the college itself, the chief admission criteria (observes Sharkey) was social status even it meant lowering standards or providing financial assistance.

In the history of the development of higher education in Sudan, Gordon Memorial College holds pride of place. Therefore a closer look at this institution is in order. To begin with, it ought to be noted that while it had the appellation of college attached to its name, in reality it was not a college in the true sense of the word. Even after a period of some thirty years of existence, it would remain essentially a secondary-vocational school (in fact, initially it was a little more than an upper-level primary school.). That said, given the context of an absence of any other institution at or above its level capable of providing Western-style education, it was considered by all concerned as an institution of higher learning. Among the college's other characteristics, of general interest, included an annual student population of some 300–400; a curricular program that included both literary academic education and pre-professional training for teachers, surveyors, engineers, and later, after the opening of the Kitchener School of Medicine, medical personnel (biology, physics, chemistry, etc.); vocational instruction; and programs in athletic and other extra-curricular activities. As the college expanded it acquired such other non-teaching units as a research laboratory for tropical disease (the Wellcome Tropical Research Laboratories) donated by pharmaceutical magnate, Sir Henry Wellcome, the Antiquities Service, the Natural History Museum, and the Ethnological Museum. The large student dormitories included a common dining hall, and students were expected to assist with the cleaning and maintenance under a strict disciplinary regime. The college even had a Boy Scouts program, begun in 1917—that is less than years after the original founding of the movement (in Britain by Robert Baden-Powell in 1908).

In 1937, the college would undergo an important development: an inspection of the college by the De La Warr Commission (see Chapter 4). The commission did not have many positive things to say about the college. In a letter to the governor-general, Lord De La Warr would observe: "The Gordon College, which should have achieved a continuously rising standard throughout the thirty years of its existence, has failed not only to attain the complete university standard which its founders envisaged, but even to reach the stage of university entrance" (from Beshir 1969: 117). Against the backdrop of such criticism, it was decided to reorganize the college and accordingly in 1945 a new Gordon Memorial College was reconstituted that among other changes incorporated the various schools that had emerged in the 1930s and supervised by different government departments—namely, the schools of law, agriculture and veterinary science, engineering and science, and arts. From this time on, the College

would make steady progress toward university status. At the same time, the college was freed from direct government control and supervision and placed under a governing council with an independent constitution. Two years later, in 1947, the new college would enter into the special relationship with the University of London that the Asquith Commission (see chapter 4) had recommended as a means of upgrading higher education institutions throughout the British colonial empire. In fact, the college was the first institution in British colonial Africa to be transformed into what came to be known as the "Asquith college." In 1951 the college absorbed the hitherto independent Kitchener School of Medicine to create a faculty of medicine against a backdrop of further transformation of the entire college as it became the University College of Khartoum. Following independence in 1956, the college would be transformed again to become the University of Khartoum. In that year it had a population of slightly over 100 full time teaching staff and some 600 students.

The oldest Sudanese university, therefore, is the University of Khartoum. The second oldest is the Sudan University for Science and Technology; it was originally founded in 1950 as Khartoum Technical Institute. Later the institute would become a polytechnic in 1967 and achieve university status in 1975. In 1990 it would be reconstituted to become the institution it is today. Omdurman Islamic University, in terms of age, comes third. Its history dates back to around the time when Gordon Memorial College was first opened. The Sudanese ulama, perhaps not wishing to be left out of the new education game in town, opened a madrasah with the support of the colonial administration called ma'had al-ilmi in 1912, patterned on al-Azhar, at the Omdurman mosque. While its staff salaries came from a government subsidy, the madrasah itself could not qualify for government funds because it was not under the supervision of the education department. The rationale behind the government's support of the ma'had is that the governor-general (Sir Francis Reginald Wingate) believed that it was better to encourage students to remain in the country instead of going to al-Azhar for further study, so as to shield them from possible anti-British influence while in Cairo. In time, the ma'had developed to become a national institution under government supervision. Its graduates were destined primarily for teaching posts in primary-level schools (the kuttabs and khalwas), although some did find jobs in local Shari'ah courts. Later, in 1924, it would become a college and then in 1965 acquire university status. In 1975 it would be reconstituted into its present incarnation. (See Beshir 1969 for more on the ma'had.)

Other Sudanese higher education institutions include: Red Sea University (created in 1994); University of Juba (established in 1977); University of Gezira (founded in 1975); and Shandi University (set up in 1990). There are also a number of lesser institutions at the college level, but referred to in their titles as universities; they include: Sinar University, Atbara University, Bahr-Elghazal, Dongola University, El-Azhari University, El-Dalang University, El-Gadarif

University, El-Mahadi University, El-Nielien University, El-Obied University, University of Qur'an and Islamic Studies, and Upper Nile University.

By way of concluding this section, we may make these further observations: The account so far has been about higher education in the north, but what about in the south? The studies by both Beshir (1969) and Sanderson and Sanderson (1981) allows one to come away with the conclusion that the conscious decision of the British to leave the task of educational provision in the south in missionary hands, meant that the south experienced virtually no development at the higher education level (or even at the secondary school level). When independence came, the northern-dominated government saw little reason to change the status quo in this regard. The eruption of civil war ensured that the pre-independence circumstance of the south would remain, more or less, its permanent fate, until now (with the exception of the founding of University of Juba). Should peace hold, this, however, will now change. The question one may ask here then is this: When higher educational provision in the south begins to accelerate, will it have an integrative influence or a disintegrative one from the perspective of national unity? If the history of the north is any guide, one may legitimately surmise that it will be the latter.

The 1989 coup that brought the current regime to power, inaugurated a new and, from the perspective of some, a more ominous era for higher education in Sudan: a fundamental realignment of higher education toward support for the regime's Islamist influenced ideological agenda on one hand, and on the other a shift away from state subsidies for student finance.

The relationship between the University of Khartoum and the government has always been a thorny one from the perspective of students. During the colonial period the bone of contention was of course nationalism; in the postindependence period it has been the nature of the Sudanese state as it has moved back and forth across the dictatorship-democracy divide. In other words, as in almost all other countries in Africa, student political activism at the university has been an integral part of its history.[92]

TUNISIA

Prior to the arrival of the French colonial rule, as we have already noted, Tunisia, as part of North Africa, had a rich history that went back thousands of years. A brief note then on the modern period is in order: At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the European powers agreed to France's claims over Tunisia as part of its sphere of influence; it would be a matter of time before France proceeded to make good on this claim by invading Tunisia from Algeria in 1881.[93] The desperate diplomatic and other maneuvers of the Tunisian Ottoman Mamluks had, in the end, worked to save Tunisia only from the exact fate of the Algerians: direct colonization; instead, Tunisia was declared a protectorate—notwithstanding the demands of the Algerian colons that Tunisia be thrown

open to full colonial settlement as a colony. In practice, whether a colony or a protectorate, Tunisia was no longer free to chart its own destiny (though it was spared the brutal excesses of French colonization that the Algerians were forced to endure). Although, the Tunisians did offer some resistance to the French invasion, it was nowhere near that put up by the Algerians; ergo, within two years Tunisia was completely under French control. Nominally, the Husaynids were still in charge, but France pulled the strings. In 1955, after widespread but relatively peaceful nationalist agitation, Tunisia was granted limited self-rule, to be followed a year later by complete independence. Independence meant not only the end of French tutelage, but also the end of the Husaynid dynasty; the new rulers (whose political baptism of fire had involved imprisonment in Vichy France, only to be freed by the Nazis in 1942 and handed over to Mussolini's Fascist Italy, who then a year later allowed them to return to Tunisia) were not from the traditional aristocracy—though despite the modernist trappings of an independent Tunisia, in practice, as in most of Islamic Africa, they would soon recreate the autocracy of the Ottoman Mamluk dynasties, albeit infused with secularism and Westernism, under the leadership of the officially proclaimed president-for-life, Habib ibn Ali Borguiba (reigned from the time of independence until just three years before his death in 2000).[94]

Al-Zaitouna

It will be recalled that in Chapter 1 there was occasion to describe the oldest higher education institution in Tunisia, or even the entire Islamic Africa and the Middle East, the al-Zaitouna mosque-college or madrasah. Now, in the modern era, the evolution of al-Zaitouna in terms of its functioning and teaching would continue when it received some fillip with reforms introduced by the Ottoman Mamluks; specifically, Ahmed Bey in December 1842, and Khayr al-Din (ruled from 1873–77) in 1875.[95] The 1842 decree gave the madrasah a charter that formalized its educational functions as well as making it the center of higher education in Tunisia (the non mosque-based madrasahs in the city were as a consequence converted into residential quarters for students of al-Zaitouna); while the 1875 decree, among other things, sought to introduce governmental supervision of the institution, inject some professionalism in ulama conduct, as well as expand its curricular provisions. As may be surmised these reforms were only partially successful.[96] Following the arrival of the French (Tunisia was declared a protectorate in 1881) the institution over time underwent two contradictory developments: student agitation (marked by vigorous periods of unrest, as in 1910–12, 1928–30, 1947–50) for educational reform in consonance with the secularizing tendencies introduced by the French in Tunisia and championed by secularist Tunisians that, not surprisingly, were generally resisted by the ulama; and growing enrollments (both, in its Tunis and provincial locations where it had established branches)—the numbers speak for themselves: in 1881: 600; in 1927: 9,818; and in 1956: 20,000 (see the entry "Zaytuna" in

Encyclopedia of Islam (1986).[97] It may be noted here that French policy toward the institution was, for the most part, to leave it alone; for, like in Morocco (but unlike in Algeria), they felt that their aims would be better facilitated by co-opting the madrasah system rather than grievously weakening it.[98] There was one key exception, however, to this approach: in 1898 a commission was created to introduce curricular and pedagogical reforms at the institution. The rationale behind it, apparently, was a French desire (supported by secularist minded Tunisian bureaucrats) to elevate the al-Zaitouna in importance to a level beyond that enjoyed by al-Azhar in the Islamic world; as one of the French principals involved in the appointment of the commission, Louis Machuel, privately stated: "I dreamed of having in Africa Minor, which was now entirely under French domination, an Arab intellectual center of which the rays of influence would beam to all the other Islamic countries—a sort of vast and genuine Muslim university in which Arabic studies would be reformed and improved according to new methods and to which scientific notions (modest at first then later more extensive) would bring a new strengthening" (from Green 1978: 178).[99] Although the commission had a number of ulama from al-Zaitouna, in addition to the French and secularist oriented Tunisians, on it and despite what appeared to the French and the secularists as worthy proposals to bring modern rationality to educational practices at the institution, the ulama, perhaps predictably, made sure that the reforms remained a pipe dream; they steadfastly opposed them, fearing that the reforms would turn out to be a Trojan horse for not only fundamentally altering the mission of the institution, but also peripheralizing their own role within it.[100] Following Tunisian independence in 1956, however, and with the autocratic secularists fully in charge, the ulama could do nothing but acquiesce: the madrasah was forced to undergo major changes when it lost its primary and secondary-level educational functions and instead it was converted into a modern university specializing in the Islamic sciences—plus in keeping with these reforms it was moved to new premises. The formal appellation of university to the institution however would have to await the arrival of the once reformist president Ben Ali; it would become the University of Ezzitouna in 1988. In comparison to al-Azhar, the institution, although it continues to function (it has a population of about 1200 students), is of relatively low importance, both in educational terms as well as in social terms—thanks to the trenchant secularism of the Tunisian autocracy.

Besides al-Zaitouna, there were two other institutions worthy of note that existed prior to the arrival of French colonial rule, but they were of much more recent vintage and, significantly, were not part of the madrasah system: Bardo Military Academy and Sadiki College. Bardo was founded in 1840 for the same reasons that Muhammed Ali had established his military academies in Egypt: to provide training for a new cadre of military officers who could help modernize the army. The school enrolled between forty and sixty students from the Tunisian elite and offered instruction in military related and technical subjects (math-

ematics, engineering, fortifications, etc.); as well as Islamic and Arabic oriented subjects. The school was bilingual: French was the language of instruction for the former set of subjects (taught by French and other European instructors) and Arabic for the latter. Hawkins (2003) states that in terms of its original mission the school was a failure: it had a negligible impact on the modernization effort; however, at another level the school achieved, he points out, considerable significance: as in Egypt, its graduates went on to become the new secularist- and Westernist- oriented elite who championed the development of Western-style education outside the madrasah system. The fruit of this effort was manifest thirty-five years after Bardo had opened its doors: the founding in 1875 of Sadiki College by the reformist prime minister, Khayr al-Din (came to office in 1873)—a building that was once part of an army barracks was requisitioned for the purpose. Its curriculum was centered around the objective of producing civil servants and offered instruction in French and Italian, in addition to Arabic. A strong emphasis was placed on mathematics and sciences, though the Islamic sciences were not entirely neglected. In 1911 it began granting diplomas and in 1930 its curriculum was changed to conform to a typical French lycee curriculum. Many of the graduates of this college would go on to become Nationalist leaders of Tunisia—even Tunisia's president-for-life dictator, Habib Borguiba, had gone there for a short time before an illness forced him to withdraw from the school.

To provide additional openings to Tunisians who wanted to pursue secularist-oriented education, the alumni of Sadiki, following in the footsteps of the alumni of Bardo, and with the full cooperation and support of the French, established the al-Jamiya al-Khalduniyya Institute in 1896 (it was named after Ibn Khaldun) The ostensible rationale for its founding was that it would be a complement to Zaytouna by allowing that institution's students to obtain training in subjects that Zaytouna did not wish to include in its curriculum (such as the French language, geometry and surveying, medicine, accounting, etc.). In practice, al-Khaldunniyya (together with Sadiki), served to undermine the hitherto central position occupied by Zaytouna within the Tunisian higher education landscape. However, the significance of these institutions, in terms of the future of Tunisia, went beyond that of education. They would in time become the incubators of a new class of Tunisians: a secularist/Westernist nationalist elite with minimal connections with the old precolonial elite and who, through a political party they would establish, the Neo-Destour (New Constitution), would lead Tunisia to independence.[101] On the eve of Tunisian independence in 1956, a relatively peaceful event in comparison to neighboring Algeria, an Institute of Higher Studies *(Institut des Hautes Etudes)* was created In 1945 with sections covering law, economics, and administration; science and premedicine, and preengineering studies; sociology and history; Arabic studies; and archeology. Initial enrollment of Tunisians in the new institution was modest; for instance, in 1950 out of a population of 702 students only, 176 were Tunisians; the rest

were French and others. (The total higher education enrollment for all Tunisians in the same year was 604 students at secular institutions [Tabawi 1972: 160–161]). Independence, however, would change everything: like almost all nationalists in nearly all former European colonies, the Tunisian nationalists decided to stake the entire future of their country on the provision of secular/Westernist education (education would receive in 1972 almost a third of the nation's budgetary allocation; compare with the 14% in 1950 when still under the French [Hawkins 2003: 106]). In 1960, the institute would become the basis of the establishment of the University of Tunis. Initially the new university had four constituent colleges: arts and science; law; politics and economics; and Islamic law and religious studies—made possible by converting Zaitunah into a constituent college of the university. Other institutions were also appended to the university, such as a teacher's training college. Later, the university was reorganized into four separate institutions: Tunis I (University of Letters, Arts and Human Sciences); Tunis II (University of Sciences, Techniques and Medicine—established in 1988); Tunis III (University of Law, Economics and Management—created in 1987); and Ezzitouna (Zaytouna) University Tunis. Other higher education institutions in Tunisia today include: University of the Center, Sousse (set up in 1986) and University of Sfax, South (also founded in 1986). Tunisian universities, as would be expected, are patterned on French universities (with the exception of Zaytouna), but with both French and Arabic as languages of instruction (as at almost all universities in Islamic Africa, French is used in the sciences primarily, and Arabic in the arts and letters courses).[102]

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, we will delineate on the basis of the foregoing record, themes that are of specific relevance to the postindependence period. The first theme that forcefully stands out is that almost the entire region has been guided by these central objectives in its development of the higher education sector in the postindependence period: marginalization (sometimes de jure, sometimes de facto) of the traditional madrasah system; a massive expansion of enrollments to allow greater access to sections of society that had hitherto limited access to secular Westernist higher education; an appreciable effort at increasing female enrollments throughout the education sector as a whole; some attempts, though not always successful, at linkage of higher education growth with explicitly stated socioeconomic development goals; Arabization; indigenization of personnel. (Some of these objectives will be discussed later.)

Second, termination of direct colonial rule did not lead to a demand by the masses (let alone the elites) for a return to status-quo ante in the education sector. In other words, however much there may have been opposition to European colonialism, the vast majority of the formerly colonized populations were now hooked on to the colonially bequeathed education almost as if it were a drug.

For the Muslim masses the madrasah system, *as traditionally constituted*, was no longer a viable option in an independent Islamic Africa (as, of course, elsewhere on the continent). Only the education of the infidel would now do. The question is, Why? It has to do with the difference between the old and new colonialisms: unlike the previous or classical forms of colonialism (those of the Greek, Roman, and Islamic eras, for example), modern European colonialism was a completely different kind of colonial animal never witnessed by human beings before: it involved the importation of an entirely new mode of production, industrial capitalism—but without however fully destroying the old, instead hijacking it to become an appendage of the new.[103] In practice this meant two things: one, that this was, for all intents and purposes, an irreversible transformation, in that it not only entailed the transmutation of old social structures, but extrication from a Western-dominated international economic system was now an impossibility; and two, material success in this new order required access to secular higher education introduced by colonialism. In time, therefore, even the masses began to clamor for this type of education with a vengeance. However, insofar as the promises held out for such education have failed to materialize for many, disillusionment has set in for some—such as the Islamists (more on them in a moment).

Third, where traditional Islamic education has been allowed to exist, government strategy, as one would expect, has been to co-opt it into non-oppositional forms of education; the historic role of the ulama to legitimate the reign of a ruler only on the basis of their adherence to that fundamental precept of Islam to "enjoin good and forbid evil" has been compromised in the service of an autocratic police state (much as it often had in the past as well). Therefore, true adherence to Islam has meant the belief among significant sections of the population of the necessity to go, paradoxically, outside the officially supported traditional Islamic institutions. In a sense this a replay of what occurred during the colonial period in some parts of the region. Ergo, it is important to stress that the current rise of Islamism in much of Afro-Arab Islamic Africa that often poses a threat to the ruling autocracies is not a product of the traditional madrasah system.[104] In other words, the political influence of the madrasah system on the current secular higher education sector has been marginal, if any. In fact, whether traditional or secular, the rise of Islamism has had little to do with higher education per se (even though it may have manifestations in that sector—as in the demand for Arabization, increased focus on Islamic studies, etc.), rather, its source lies elsewhere: alienation among the masses from the status quo engendered by such factors as these: (a) Whereas secularism in Western Europe had nurtured economic, political, and social progress, in the Islamic world the reverse has been true where it has been associated with economic and political chaos resting on a bedrock of massive and persistent violations of the human rights of the citizenry characteristic of police states (vide: Iran during the reign of the Shah, which was a staunch secularist ally of the West, or Iraq

during the rule of Saddam Hussein—until his invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, once also a secularist ally of the West—or today's Algeria with its pro-West secular military despots.) Note this circumstance is not unique to the Islamic world, but is endemic throughout the PQD world, especially in the poorest regions, such as much of Africa, should inure us from subscribing to the notion that this is a modern instance of Oriental despotism. (b) The ongoing Israeli/Palestinian conflict, which many Westerners tend to forget not only highlights current Islamic impotency vis-à-vis the West, especially when viewed against a background of memories that run deep (witness the continuing ideological relevance of the Crusades—see Appendix I), but it is a conflict that includes a struggle between Muslims and non-Muslims over the second holiest city for all Muslims throughout the world: Jerusalem.[105] (c) The association of the internal repression perpetrated by local autocracies with their treasonous links (in the eyes of the masses) with the traditional enemies of Islam: Christian West—including the United States (often dubbed the *Great Satan*).[106]

Fourth, the type of economy that was created in the postindependence era in much of the region has tended to be state-capitalist.[107] However, the consequence of the dominant role played by the state within the economy from the perspective of higher education has included: micromanagement of career choices of students; employment of large numbers of graduates in bloated state bureaucracies; an emphasis on science and technology training but without the concomitant expansion of appropriate training facilities, not to mention the inability to develop the requisite economic sectors to provide employment for graduates; and the discouragement of private sector education.

Fifth, historically, from the very beginning of the appearance of formal education in the Islamic empire (that is long before the arrival of the West), educational access had not depended on the ability to pay; it was almost always tuition free. During the colonial era this practice was continued (with a few exceptions), but for a different reason: as a way to entice students into the new secular/Westernist educational institutions at the time of their first appearance. Given this history, and adding to it the socialist rhetoric of the postindependence period, higher education in the public sector throughout the region has remained essentially tuition-free. The repercussions for state budgets is self-evident; and at the same time, user-fees as a politically volatile subject is also self-evident.

Sixth, as with tuition-free education, the concept of foreign study had been intrinsic to Islamic higher education long before the arrival of colonialism. However, with colonialism this concept underwent some change: foreign study did not mean going abroad to study at Islamic institutions, but rather Western institutions. In other words, during the colonial era, and even more so during the postindependence period, students from Afro-Arab Islamic Africa (as from the rest of Africa) went to study in the West (and continue to do so) in droves—both on state and privately funded sponsorship. For Islamic Africa, the outcome

of this global intellectual transhumance has been a multiedged sword: (a) it has helped to enhance the stock of human capital within Islamic Africa; (b) it has helped to reinforce the power of the compradorial elites (since it is mainly their children who have had the opportunity to study abroad, historically) by allowing them to develop a unique bilingual secularist/Westernist *in-culture* (in contrast to the *out-culture* of the masses); and (c) it has helped to subsidize the human-capital resources of the West through the phenomenon of *braindrain*, where some foreign students, usually the brightest, fail to return after completion of their studies for a variety of reasons.

Seventh, almost all the Islamic Afro-Arab countries have made considerable strides in emphasizing science and technology in their development of higher education—a situation that is the obverse of much of the rest of Africa. However, as just noted, this emphasis has not been matched by a breakthrough toward self-sustained economic development. In fact, on the contrary, it appears that the function of qualifications in science and technology have been to simply imbue their holders with an extra edge of prestige (relative to arts and social science degree holders) in their quest for employment in all sectors, including mundane non science-related government bureaucratic jobs (while for a minority, the very talented, it has garnered them a ticket on the braindrain gravy train). In other words, *underemployment* appears now to be the order of the day. How does one explain this phenomenon? It would seem that almost the same imperialist forces that had stopped Muhammed Ali of Egypt over a century ago dead in his tracks as he tried to industrialize Egypt, continue to plague North Africa (and the rest of Africa for that matter): a combination of political and economic muscle of the West ensuring that Africa continues to remain, by and large, an economic basket case. The following description of the fate of the Algerian precolonial urban economy, for instance, as a result of colonial intrusion is as much valid today as it was then: "[T]he opening of the Algerian market to the French speculators and the thrusting of the entire economy, without any tariff protection, first into the 'metropolitan' and then into the international market, undermined the local market for Algerian handicrafts…. In sum, all the Algerian traditional craft manufacturers were ousted by French industrial products. Thus the integration of the Algerian economy into the 'world system' also provoked the disintegration of the precolonial urban activities" (Bennoune 1988: 67). Today the role played by colonialism is now performed by the Western-dominated international regime of the World Trade Organization, but the effects remain the same: the inability of PQD countries to move into industrial manufacture on a sustained scale (unless their postindependence histories have included a period of relative withdrawal from the world economy, combined with an economically astute and politically stable governmental regimes). In other words, higher education *by itself* is powerless to move countries economically. However, in the specific case of Afro-Arab Islamic Africa one may concede a unique problem specific to higher education that is detrimental to economic development:

an overemphasis on science and technology, which has resulted in at least three hindrances: inadequate *qualitatively appropriate* training because of a dearth of resources (competent teachers, laboratories, supplies, books, equipment, optimum teacher/student ratios, etc.) in the face of demand for student places running far ahead of supply; inadequate economic opportunities (in terms of capital and economic know-how) to create science- and technology- based businesses; and three, quite paradoxically, an insufficient number of highly trained arts/social science graduates who alone (relatively speaking) have the capacity for imaginative socioeconomic planning and entrepreneurial creativity that can permit the exploitation of scientific and technological human capital. (This last problem is highlighted by the truism that, for the most part, scientists rarely make good politicians, managers or even business persons. The latest evidence on this, albeit anecdotal, comes from the experience in the 1990s in the United States of many newly created computer technology firms foundering for lack of good business/management skills on the part of their technologically creative founders—this is not to suggest by any means that this was the only problem they faced.) It appears that the competence to solve technical/scientistic problems does not necessarily equip one to possess what one may call visionary imagination that can facilitate the resolution of macrolevel social and economic problems for one very obvious reason: human beings are simply too complex and unpredictable to be amenable to the kind of problem-solving that can be undertaken with inanimate or nonhuman objects/subjects.

Eighth, almost all the postindependence nationalist leaders of Afro-Arab Islamic Africa (as in much of the rest of Africa) were, to varying degrees, committed to some reduction of social and economic inequality in their countries—their autocratic rule notwithstanding—especially in the immediate afterglow of achieving political independence. After all, populism was a sine qua non of nationalist struggles for independence. In this effort they turned to higher education as a means of reducing the elite/mass socioeconomic gap.[108] However, as experience has proven, they, like countless social engineers throughout the world, including in the former communist East and in the West, have been naive (no matter how well intentioned) on this score. The key problem has been addressing the thorny issue of equality of higher educational opportunity. As elites have shown time and again across the planet and throughout modern history, democratization of access merely calls forth greater ingenuity on their part to secure the intergenerational continuity of their status—for example by means of private schooling, education friendly child-rearing practices (which often only wealthy parents can afford), private tutorials to prepare for national gatekeeping exams, moving residences to exclusive neighborhoods to facilitate easier access to superior schools, access to nepotism, elite biases of educational foreign aid, their capacity to shoulder the burdens of income foregone, and so on. In other words, while the expansion of the higher education provision on the basis of more student places, coupled with such measures as tuition-free educa-

tion, a strategy that has characterized the development of higher education in Afro-Arab Islamic Africa (and the rest of the continent too) in the postcolonial era did, initially, have some ameliorative effect on the inequality of educational opportunities across different strata, in general it has been a transient phenomenon. In fact, on the contrary, as Lewis and Dundar's (2002) pithy summary of the pertinent literature on the subject indicates, the obverse has been the outcome over the long-term (not just in Africa, but almost throughout the world) of democratization of access through traditional measures: the historically privileged elite groups have increased their share of participation rates, while at the same time being subsidized by the rest of the population who are denied access to higher education because of factors just noted, coupled with other, historically determined, impediments, such as: cultural biases against the education of women; the urban bias of institutional location that adds additional financial burdens on the children of the rural poor (often the majority in almost all countries in Africa) who can ill afford it; the poor quality of lower-level educational institutions for the less privileged (which includes the absence of a rigorous college preparatory secondary school curriculum and inadequate or nonexistent career guidance opportunities at the secondary-level); the lack of adequate institutional supports in higher education institutions for children from lower socioeconomic status backgrounds that would help to match their admission rates with their *completion* rates; and so on.[109] Clearly, as this author noted more than two decades ago (Lulat 1982), in the absence of other social policies aimed at addressing the imbalance in power relations in a society, there is a severe limit to how much higher education can accomplish in reducing socioeconomic inequality. In fact, evidence in this regard is so strong across all societies throughout the world that one can be even more emphatic and simply state (depressing though this conclusion may be to the champions of social justice) that the vitiation of the class-reproduction function of higher education, against a backdrop of unequal power relations across classes, is a chimeral endeavor.

Ninth, from the purely technical point of human capital production the experiences of countries like China, Korea, Taiwan, and to some degree even the former Eastern bloc countries, there is little incompatibility between an authoritarian police state and higher education. The problem for higher education comes from the disruptive tendencies that ensue as a result of opposition to the authoritarianism that may take sometimes positive forms and at other times highly destructive forms (as has occurred in Algeria, for instance).

Tenth, it should be clear from the foregoing that a university has many uses beyond the instrumental (knowledge production and human capital formation) with which we are so enamored today. There was a time when a university (broadly defined) also existed as an expression of a society's piety where acquisition of knowledge for its own sake was considered a worthy goal to which a person could devote his/her entire life without social reprobation. However, there were other uses too, but of a political variety; such as serving as a poten-

tial source of legitimacy for ruling dynasties (or conversely as a seat of opposition to the state—for example, during the period of European colonial rule). The university was also at times a recruiting ground for new elites or a means of transformation of old elites into new (especially in the colonial and postindependence periods). Yet, in our penchant for viewing higher education in a strictly instrumentalist fashion (measured in terms of returns on investment—see Chapter 7) we often fail to recognize that even today, some of these same functions continue to be performed.[110] Given these multiplicity of roles, it should not be surprising that universities have the potential to be sites of much contention; consequently, universities are "political" institutions as well—especially, given their enormous appetite for financial resources, when they are state-funded. Those who are concerned with educational efficiency and educational reforms tend to overlook this basic fundamental fact. In the same vein: the foregoing historical survey also highlights an important fact about knowledge: it is not neutral. Knowledge has a sociological dimension to it in the sense that not all knowledge has equal social value; that is, some kinds of knowledge have greater social significance than others *independent of content*. For instance, secular knowledge obtained from Western institutions today has greater value than knowledge from a local institution throughout Islamic Africa (as well as the rest of the continent) because access to this knowledge implies access to symbols of elite status. Or take the example of the current conflict between three principal categories of knowledge in Islamic Africa: secular/Western knowledge, postindependence modernist-savvy Islamic knowledge (which does not, for example, depend on mnemonics), and traditional or classical mnemonic-oriented, knowledge-pursued-for-its-own-sake, Islamic knowledge. (In an ideal world, for the Muslim, the boundaries between these categories would be diffuse, but given the matrix of existing power relations this is not the case.)[111]

Eleventh, the great strides that Islamic Africa has made in the direction of expanding higher educational access has often occurred at the expense of quality (as already indicated). This is a problem that afflicts the rest of the continent as well and it will be discussed in greater detail later.

Finally, again, as with the rest of the continent, an important feature of the higher education sector in Islamic Africa has been student political activism from the very beginning of the arrival of colonially mediated higher education institutions. This activism continues to the present day, both in Islamic Africa and elsewhere on the continent.

NOTES

1. At the heart of the definitional problem is the matter of race, not geography; that is, the racism of the West—which has always sought to create racial hierarchies (positing peoples defined as black at the bottom and those defined as white at the top and the rest in be-

tween)—combined with the racism of the North Africans and Africans themselves, is the root of this problem. To elaborate, racism in any society creates hierarchies within which there is a struggle among the subordinates to identify with the dominant (even though they are all victimized, albeit to varying degrees, by the racism of the dominant group); moreover, it is a struggle that is encouraged by the dominant group—representing a divide-and-rule strategy. Classic examples of this phenomenon at work can be found in the United States; consider, for instance, that in that country North African Arabs are classified "white," or the fact that lighter complexioned blacks have, historically, tended to fare (relatively) better than their darker-skinned brethren. However, what is true of individual societies is also true at the global level. See, for instance, the discussion by Hawkins (2003) on how Tunisians see themselves, relative to Sub-Saharan Africa (which can be summarized in one sentence: they are in Africa but they are not of Africa), and one suspects that the Tunisian perspective is replicated all over Afro-Arab Islamic Africa, including, ironically, Sudan—a country where more than anywhere else in Afro-Arab Islamic Africa most of its Arab population had long merged genetically with the indigenous African population (notwithstanding the insistence by the ruling classes in Khartoum that they are Arabs and not Africans). In fact, with reference to the Sudan, the situation there has become so bizarre, that "peoples who have virtually no Arab 'blood' call themselves Arab by virtue of an adopted lineage that they trace symbolically to the family of the Prophet or to important Arab dynasties and tribes" in order to gain a higher social status (Lesch 1998: 211). There is probably no Afro-Arab leader today, with the exception, perhaps, of Libya's Muammar al-Qaddhafi, who shares Nasser's vision of being both Pan-Arab and Pan-African at one and the same time. To complicate matters even further, in Afro-Arab Islamic Africa, the more than thousand year presence of Arabs in that region has led to considerable intermingling with original populations (e.g., Berbers and black Africans). Consequently, from a purely phenotypical perspective, Arabs (like African Americans in the United States, for instance) range across a diverse hue, so much so that in some parts, they are completely indistinguishable from either black Africans or Berbers.

2. Those living in certain parts of East and West Africa where Islam is the dominant religion (e.g., in Somalia and in some parts of Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania [Zanzibar], etc.) may raise objections to their exclusion from this particular chapter. Are they not eligible to be considered part of Afro-Arab Islamic Africa as well? Strictly from the perspective of this chapter, the answer is, yes and no. Yes, they are part of Afro-Arab Islamic Africa if the focus of this chapter was exclusively religion, but that is not the case; further, they are excluded from this chapter because of two other reasons: their heritage does not have a strong enough Arabic cultural input to merit their consideration along side such Afro-Arab countries of North Africa as, for instance, Egypt or Morocco. This view draws succor from a comparative examination of two general histories, one focusing on Arab peoples (Hourani 2002) and the other on Islamic peoples elsewhere on the continent (Levtzion and Pouwels 2000). Even more importantly, however, since they do not have a separate political existence as national entities in their own right (though Somalia in this regard is an exception), the trajectory of higher education development in their areas has not been independent of the rest of the countries of which they are constituent parts.

3. The compradorial character of the colonially created new indigenous elite is exemplified by the one in Algeria; there they were pejoratively called *beni-ouis-ouis* (meaning "sons of yes-men") by the Algerian masses. It is from among this very elite, as Entelis (1986: 32) points out, that the future Algerian nationalists would be recruited.

4. The nature of this new elite is captured well by Entelis (1986: 209) in his description of the Algerian elite: "Contemporary Algeria has evolved into a bureaucratic polity—a political system in which power and national decision making are shaped almost exclusively by the employees of the state, and especially by the topmost levels of the officer corps, single-party organization, and civilian bureaucracy, including the significant socioeconomic class of managers and technicians." In other words: this elite does not really represent a particular class, rather it is a class in itself—especially when considered in the context of state capitalism (which is the economic system that is dominant almost throughout Afro-Arab Islamic Africa). In fact, the state is the elite. However, with recent moves toward limiting state capitalism under policies of structural adjustment (e.g., in Egypt), one is beginning to witness a fusion of this praetorian ruling elite with members of the other more traditional elites, such as the mercantilist elite.

5. This does not mean that they accepted colonialism per se insofar as it signified an external overlordship. The local elites did, in time, recover their political composure sufficiently to espouse nationalist aspirations of self-rule, but these aspirations had usually little to do with ambitions of working for a new egalitarian society in which the inherent inequalities created by colonialism would be the focus of ameliorative attention in a postcolonial order. Considering the postcolonial historical trajectory of Afro-Arab Islamic Africa on one hand, and on the other the prevailing circumstances of all the countries of the region regarding this matter, the truth of the following restatement of this issue is self-evident: the nationalist elites were merely competing with the foreign colonial elite for the same objective—how to exploit the masses for their own gain—something that, writing nearly a half a century ago, that psychiatrist and political observer from the Caribbean, Frantz Fanon (1968 [1961]), so astutely foresaw: "In its narcissism, the [nationalist elite] is easily convinced that it can advantageously replace the [colonial elite]." He continues, "[I]n an underdeveloped country an authentic [nationalist elite] ought to…put at the people's disposal the intellectual and technical capital that it has snatched when going through the colonial universities. But unhappily we shall see that very often the [nationalist elite] does not follow this heroic, positive, fruitful, and just path; rather, it disappears with its soul set at peace into the shocking ways—shocking because anti-national—of a traditional bourgeoisie, of a bourgeoisie which is stupidly, contemptibly, cynically bourgeois" (p. 150). But what does he mean by "cynically bourgeois?" He is referring to the incapacity of the nationalist elite to rise up above its own petty interests in the service of the true interests of the entire nation in whose name it had fought for independence in the first place—exemplified by its championing of all those ills that we have come to associate with underdevelopment today: sectarianism, economic and political corruption, administrative inaptitude, looting of national resources, massive and sustained violations of the human rights of the citizenry, pursuit of compradorial economic projects, and so on. (See his chapter, "Pitfalls of National Consciousness," for more.) A corollary of the foregoing is this central feature of compradorial ideology: their wholesale acceptance of the general mantra and belief propagated by many Westerners at all levels of society (from the media to think-tanks to academia) that if the developing world could be remade in the present likeness of the West (the most graphic instance of which is the current U.S. project to "bring democracy" to Iraq) than all their problems of poverty, etc., would disappear. Some sections of the compradorial elite, reacting with self-hate at the comparative technological and economic backwardness of their societies had even "proclaimed Western civilization as the highest stage of man's spiritual and material development; declared Islamic civilization and culture

dead and useless; and advocated the adoption of Western civilization and culture without reservations as the only way for the advancement of their country" (Vatikiotis 1991: 308). Yet, such a view consistently fails to notice the most basic error of this Eurocentric line of reasoning: the present did not emerge ex nihilio; that is, the present of the West is constructed out of a past; that is a post–1492 past (see Appendix II). And it is a past in which these very same countries were victims of Western imperialist predations that underwrote Western economic progress on one hand, and on the other its obverse: their underdevelopment (see Appendix II). In other words, to remake in the image of the present, then one must also remake in the image of the past (an impossible project); or alternatively, failing that, we must emerge with other ideas than the simplistic notions of remaking oneself in the likeness of others.

6. It should be noted here that, as Eickelman (1985) points out in relation to Morocco for instance, once members of the ulama who taught in the major madrasahs like al-Qarawiyyin and the Yusufiya were put on government payroll (regardless of how paltry the salary was) by the French colonial authority, their standing in the community, with rare exceptions, dropped precipitously. They were no longer held in high esteem by the community because now they were almost no different from other paid colonial civil servants.

7. In reality, there was a seeming ambivalence (once colonialism was a fact) among the local elites (excluding the ulama) toward Western secular education introduced by the colonial powers: on one hand they accused it of undermining indigenous culture and education; yet on the other they complained that they were not being given access to the genuine thing, but rather to a watered down version. How does one explain this ambivalence? The first argument was for the consumption of the masses (necessary to obtain their support for the anti-imperialist struggle), while the second was their perception that without access to such education they could not effectively compete with the colonial elite on its own terms. This fact allows us understand why, once independence came to these countries the indigenous elites (both the old and the new) opted for a secular Western education system and not an Islamic oriented modern education system.

8. The irony, in the case of Morocco, was that even when the ulama and students did desire some reforms the French resisted them for fear that a noncompliant elite would emerge from al-Qarawiyyin.

9. The French invasion (like the other modern European invasions) was, of course, unique in all of Maghrebi history, as has been pointed out earlier.

10. See the relevant chapters of volumes 1 through 4 of the monumental, multiauthored, 8 volume *General History of Africa* sponsored by UNESCO (1981–93) for a useable survey of the precolonial history of North Africa.

11. Many years later, Napoleon would characteristically muse about his ambitions in Egypt: "I was full of dreams. I saw myself founding a religion, marching into Asia, riding an elephant, a turban on my head, and in my hand a new Koran that I would have composed to suit my need" (Herold 1963: 5). Egypt in his mind was a staging post for an even larger goal: the conquest of India. Napoleon, however, was also at heart a practical man. In Egypt he saw the possibility of much economic wealth for France.

12. A concrete legacy of their brief stay in Egypt, besides the discovery of the famous Rosetta Stone in a village called Rashid (hence the derivation Rosetta) not too far from Alexandria, included the team's preparation of a prodigious serially published work (in Paris, 1809–28) titled *Description de l'Égypte*. (For a recent edited English extract of this work see Russell [2001], which not only has textual excerpts from it, but also includes reproduc-

tions of the impressive folios of engravings of Egyptian monuments prepared by the French team).

13. Remember, the distinction here between *Ottoman Mamluks* and the Mamluk dynasty proper rests on periodization as well as the politically transformed character of the Mamluk rule of Egypt under the Ottomans (see Chapter 2).

14. For a usable descriptive summary of the principle military encounters between Napoleonic and Ottoman Mamluk forces see Volume 1 of Russell (2001). For a more detailed examination of Napoleon's sojourn in Egypt see Herold (1963).

15. One must be extremely wary here of not giving in to the temptation of positing an orientalist spin on the source of Egypt's (or the Ottoman Empire's) relative "backwardness." To be sure, Ottoman Mamluk rule had been marked by considerable oppression of the populace, coupled with anarchy-inducing internecine struggles, but to seek an explanation for the waning fortunes of Egypt exclusively in the nature of Ottoman Mamluk rule alone is to discount the very real adversities that had now beset the rest of the entire Afro-Eurasian ecumene (outside Europe) with the emergence of Europe's global hegemonic ambitions in the twilight years of the eighteenth-century (see Appendix II). Moreover, even with regard to the specific character of Ottoman Mamluk rule one must be cautious in condemning it completely out of hand; for what Petry (1994: 3) observes about their forbears (the original Mamluk dynasty) was applicable, albeit to a considerably lesser degree one must concede, to them too: "Yet despite their excesses, the Mamluks hardly disdained matters of state security, mass prosperity, public welfare, or spiritual piety. On occasion, they showed genuine compassion for suffering endured by even the meanest of their subjects. In the prospect of their own destitution, they sustained a rich program of cultural endowment."

16. The French invasion would also prompt the commencement in the same year of the formal colonial takeover of India by the British. Therefore, while quite often the immediate motivations for European colonialism may have been political, the underlying rationale was always long-term economic gain of the type dictated by the needs of industrial capitalism as its transmutation from mesocapitalism moved apace in Europe around the turn of the century.

17. See Marsot (1984), for a well researched biography of Ali.

18. To ensure that there would be no possibility of any future opposition to him from the old rulers, the Ottoman Mamluks, in a modus operandi that had become characteristic of political affairs in the "peace-loving" and "brotherly" House of Islam, Ali had their leaders massacred en masse when the opportune moment presented itself—at a military investiture ceremony for his son in the Cairo Citadel (in March 1811).

19. What is more, Ali never trusted the Egyptians; like the Mamluks and others before them, he, as Marsot (1984) puts it, "despised the Egyptians and looked upon them as an inferior race of dirty peasants (*pis fallah*) created to work for the benefit of their masters, the rulers" (p. 109). Marsot further notes: "To him Egypt was a piece of property he had acquired by guile and ability. The Egyptians were there to do his bidding; they could become cannon fodder, workers and fellahin, or even minor administrators, but no more. The very ethnicity of the Turks made them fit for government" (p. 131). Not surprisingly, he would concentrate all power within the hands of his family and himself. That is, as Hunter (1984) has shown, his administration was not only Turkish in terms of ethnicity and language, but he allocated key offices of responsibility to his kith and kin (they were brought over later from his hometown after he took power). The question then that has been raised by histori-

ans, states Hunter, is whether Ali was just another Mamluk ruler or the true founder of modern Egypt; the answer, Hunter replies, was that he was both.

20. In addition to the encounter with the French, he would have another opportunity to observe closely the might of the European armed forces: when his navy, together with that of the Ottomans, would be dealt a humiliating defeat by a combined naval force of the British and other European imperial powers at the Battle of Navarino (on October 20, 1827), which was forced on him for successfully squelching a Greek rebellion against the Ottomans in Morea (Peloponnisos peninsula of modern Greece)—a project he had undertaken at the behest of the Ottoman sultan—needless to say they had to abandon the reconquest and two years later all of Greece would be independent of Ottoman Turkish rule (see Fahmy 1997, regarding the battle and its effect on Ali). For more on Muhammed Ali and his autocracy see Batou (1991); Cuno (1992); Fahmy (1997); Hunter (1984); Marsot (1984); and Rivlin (1961); and for a general history of post–1798 Egypt, see Sonbol (2000) and Vatikiotis (1991). Note: it is important to read Sonbol first before any of the other sources because she provides a corrective to the orientalist bias in some of them.

21. Even after 1922 when Britain formally ended the protectorate status of Egypt, Britain continued to dominate Egyptian affairs by interfering in its internal politics—motivated by the desire to secure its communications (the Suez Canal), commercial and security interests (in fact, British armed forces did not vacate Egypt until 1956).

22. Regarding the issue of culture, accompanying this group was also a chaplain (an imam) to take care of the group's religious needs; his name Shaykh Rifa'ah. He, as it turned out (perhaps not unexpectedly since he was a graduate of al-Azhar and therefore inured to the rigors of study), used his leisure time in France productively to return as "[t]he most successful of the batch from an Egyptian point of view," according to Heyworth-Dunne; he also makes this additional comment about him: "It was sheer accident that gave to Egypt a revivalist, a reformer and the father of modern Arabic literature" (p. 167).

23. The term *praetorian* is being used in this work loosely to denote an authoritarian polity that is led by the military and derives its legitimacy from the use of military force—military dictatorships are examples par excellence of such a polity.

24. This "new" ruling class—new only in the sense that, on one hand, the old Turkish mamluk aristocracy, together with the Egyptian notables and merchant class, took on a secularist Westernist ideological framework to legitimate their elite positions, and on the other it was joined by an emerging Western-trained Egyptian nationalist bureaucratic elite (which later would also incorporate a military elite following the overthrow of the monarchy)—came to consider, like their Western orientalist mentors and supporters, that the ills of Egypt (and the Islamic world generally) were rooted in Islam itself. Overawed by the material progress of the West, they fell into the trap of confusing secularism and Westernism with modernity. In other words, secularism and Westernism became both the readily visible mark of social structural differentiation and a source of ruling-class self-legitimacy—the latter function was captured in the following formula: secularism/Westernism = modernity = "progress" = fitness to rule in a modern world—regardless that such rule was autocratic (and hence anti-democratic) in form. For more on the genesis of the current Egyptian ruling class, aptly described by Sonbol as the "new Mamluks," see Eccel (1984), and Sonbol (2000). (Both sources, however, should be considered together.)

25. By 1858, when it was decreed that all government correspondence was to be in the Arabic language, Arabic had supplanted the Turkish language in higher educational institutions as well. The linguistic barrier between the old Ottoman Mamluk aristocracy and the

emergent Egyptian administrative elite was now in tatters as the two elites began their long journey toward a marriage of convenience.

26. See below for an explanation of why coercion was often necessary.

27. To give another example, consider the problem faced by the medical school when it was first established. Let us allow Heyworth-Dunne again to describe the difficulty: "It was a most curious situation; a hundred Egyptian students from al-Azhar who knew only Arabic and who had never received any training but in Arabic grammar, *Qur'an*ic Exegesis, Fikh, etc., gathered together in order to be trained in medical and scientific subjects of which they had not the slightest idea by a number of European teachers who did not know the language of their students and who themselves were not even homogenous, Clot, Bernard, Barthelemy, Duvigneau being French, Gaetani, Spanish, Celesia, Alessandri and Figari, Italian, Ucellli, a Piedmontese and Pruner, a Bavarian" (p. 127). The solution, which of course was far from satisfactory, Heyworth-Dunne goes on to explain, was the use of a cumbersome instructional method involving interpreters. Notice also that he brings out here the problem of recruiting qualified students in the absence of adequate secular educational facilities at the secondary/primary school levels.

28. Later, Ali did become cognizant of the problems he had created for the madrasah system and in response to which he directed the establishment of several new madrasahs in upper Egypt in 1833 (however, it appears that possibly only the poorest students attended them—to avail themselves of the rations, clothing and allowances that became the hallmark of all education institutions that were set up by Ali). Some years later still, in 1837, a department of education (Diwan al-Madaris) was created to begin the process of reorganizing the provision of secular education in Egypt, and it involved the establishment on a modest scale of three types of hierarchically related educational institutions: primary schools, preparatory schools and special schools (these were the vocational-type schools looked at above). Yet, on the other hand many of these schools (at all levels) did not survive much longer beyond Ali's reign for reasons of Khedival misrule, politics, and finances. It is only with the passage of the Law of 10th Rajab, 1284 (November 7, 1867) during the reign of the Khedive Ismail Pasha that a serious attempt was made to breathe new life into a crippled madrasah system. Under this law some of the waqfs were restored to the madrasahs to the extent possible (though the effort had begun earlier with the passage of the Land Law of 1858) and the establishment of new ones were encouraged (though there was one fundamental change in the status of waqfs, henceforth the state would play a major role in their supervision); a greater effort was made to standardize instruction in the system; part of the system was brought under government control; examinations were introduced; and so on. See Heyworth-Dunne (1939) for details.

29. It is highly doubtful, for example, that one as astute as Ali would have acceded to the kinds of terms that Sa'id Pasha accepted in the Suez Canal Concession of 1858.

30. For more on all these developments during the period under discussion see Heyworth-Dunne (1939), and Eccel (1984).

31. Cromer, it may be noted here, like many other Westerners at the time and since then, also believed that countries that had huge rates of illiteracy (as in the case of Egypt) had no business attempting to develop higher education. Obviously he was patently ignorant of the history of universities in Europe: the first ones had emerged there in the twelfth-century (see Appendix I) as islands amidst a sea of illiteracy and ignorance.

32. About the staff development recruits, Reid (1990) tells us that the institution sent out a total of twenty-four students for foreign study in the period 1908–25. Unfortunately,

for the institution, it turned out to be money not well spent: only five returned with doctorates to teach at the university (and of these only three stayed on to teach for a meaningful period of time). The problem with the staff development program was the same that all foreign student missions had experienced from Muhammed Ali's days to the present (a problem that is not even unique to Egypt but appears to be universal): a high wastage rate, for a multiplicity of reasons: ranging from the financial to student indiscipline to the brain drain (where students refuse to return upon completion of their studies).

33. There was, however, one small tenuous connection, of sorts, with the United States that the university dearly wished it had not brought about: a conferment of an honorary degree on ex-President Theodore Roosevelt in March 1910; wantonly oblivious to the smoldering Egyptian nationalism, his address to the institution echoed the British position that Egyptians were not mentally or institutionally ready yet to forsake British colonial tutelage. The university and the country were livid; Roosevelt, in the typical arrogant and racist fashion characteristic of much of the history of Western relations with the rest of the Afro-Eurasian ecumene, dismissed the Egyptian reaction with the words: "That speech of mine at Cairo was a crackery jack. You should have seen the Fuzzy Wuzzie's faces as I told them off. They expected candy, but I gave them the big stick. And they squirmed, Sir; they squirmed" (from Reid 1990: 43).

34. A year later a special women's section was opened under the leadership of a French female professor, A. Couvreur—the latter fact in itself, as Reid (1990) reminds us, represented a milestone for women's education in Egypt and elsewhere; and even from the perspective of the West, it was an important achievement because female professors there too were rare. It ought to be noted here that from the perspective of higher education in general, that is going beyond university education per se, whether secular or religious, women did have access to such education prior to 1908 (recall the training in the School of Midwifery in Ali's time, or to give another example: according to Reid [1990: 108], the establishment of the Sanieh Training College permitted, from 1900 onward, women to train as primary school teachers in the state system), but it was always either on an ad hoc or a highly limited basis. True institutionalized access to full university education commenced with the Egyptian university and thereafter continued to accelerate to the point where even al-Azhar would end up admitting female students.

35. The university opened its first student dormitory (for males) in 1949, while female students had access to university rented housing. In 1957, however, they too would have their own regular dormitory.

36. The United Presbyterian mission in Egypt (which came to be known simply as the American Mission) was already involved in the educational enterprise in Egypt; by 1899 it was operating some 171 primary/secondary-level schools with some 15,000 students. The one place where it did not have a secondary-level school however, was Cairo; consequently it made sense that some of its missionaries [such as Andrew Watson, the father of Charles R. Watson who would become the first president of AUC (1919–45]) would broach the idea for such an institution for Cairo—to be modeled on two other institutions it was operating elsewhere in the region, but outside Egypt, Robert College in Istanbul and Syrian Protest College in Beirut (would evolve to become the American University in Beirut). The two decades that would elapse before the dream expressed in 1899 became a reality spoke to the mountains that had to be moved as funding was secured and administrative and political hurdles were overcome. Among the many dramatis personae involved in this endeavor (see the account by Murphy 1987) included the indefatigable Charles Watson, who begin-

ning in 1902 had been heading the activities of the United Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in India and the Middle East, the principal of the American Mission-run secondary school in Asiut in upper Egypt, Assiut College, Robert S. McClenahan; and Elise Weyerhaeuser and her husband William Bancroft Hill—as the name indicates, Elise came from the Weyerhaeuser family who owned the largest timber enterprise in the United States and this connection became a financial lifeline for the AUC project over the years. In the genesis and implementation of the project there are several markers that are worthy of mention here: (a) Although the term "university" was used from the very beginning, it initially implied a hope rather than reality in that when the AUC would first open its doors it would offer only secondary-level education. (b) Although it is the Presbyterians who must be credited with the original idea for the institution, by the time of its implementation it had become a project that attempted to involve other Protestant groups in the United States as well (albeit with limited success). (c) While the university was to be a Christian Protestant institution operated by U.S. Americans, the objective was not overt proselytization, because of an awareness that Muslims rarely converted; instead the underlying rationale for the project was to have a Protestant Christian presence in Egypt's educational landscape that could serve as a beacon of U.S. American "secular" enlightenment for higher education students of any religion. However, very early on, at least from around 1923, the university's connections with the churches began to move toward the nominal until the institution would become what it is today, a primarily secular institution. (Without this change over the course of the institution's history, it is doubtful that it could have survived some of the more turbulent anti-foreigner, and at times anti-American, phases of modern Egyptian nationalist history.) (d) The legal basis for the university as a U.S.-domiciled institution of higher learning required a charter from a U.S. agency; the board of education of the District of Columbia was the source for the charter (on July 11, 1919). However, it would not receive accreditation until 1982 (from the prestigious Middle States Commission on Higher Education—a nongovernmental, voluntary, peer-based organization.) (e) Given the financial difficulties of the churches, the primary source of funding for the project was from inception based on private, usually religious inspired, philanthropic contributions (from people such as the Weyerhaeusers).

37. Originally, the AUC wanted to establish its campus near the Pyramids of Giza, but as a result of opposition from Egyptians and the British that idea was scuttled. Interestingly, such are the ways of history, that today, located as it is in downtown Cairo, the main AUC campus has the distinction of occupying among the most expensive real estates (7.3 acres) in the world. More recently (1997), it purchased a 260-acre property some thirty-five kilometers east of its present location in New Cairo where it intends to relocate some time in the future (as of this writing, early-2005, the new AUC campus is still in the architectural planning stage).

38. Initial enrollment during its first 1920/21 academic year was 142 students; while its first college level students—admitted in 1925/26—would number 51. Total enrollments for the institution (based on Murphy 1987) show the following progression over a fifty year period: 1920/21 academic year: 142; 1930/31: 355; 1940/41: 433; 1950/51: 689; 1960/61: 383 (by this time it was no longer offering secondary-level education); 1970/71: 1378. (Current—2005—student population is approximately 5,000.) Note: these figures do not include enrollments in its adult education programs.

39. An indication of this fact is Egyptian foreign study missions. As Reid points out, for example, that whereas the tradition of sending foreign students abroad had meant send-

ing them to Europe (chiefly Britain by the 1940s), by the early 1960s the United States and Canada would begin to surpass European countries in this regard (p. 165).

40. Consider the revised mission statement of the AUC issued in 1958; it reflected the considerable acumen and flexibility of the AUC to adapt to changing political circumstances: "The American University at Cairo seeks to be an excellent small experimental university, coming out of the American cultural and educational tradition, stressing the liberal arts in its undergraduate program and choosing especially needed and timely areas for development of its graduate program, and working toward the end of producing educated and responsible citizens of Egypt, the Middle East, and the world at large, and encouraging by its existence, as well as by its programs, both the West (especially America) and the Middle East, a common effort to understand, appreciate and work with each other" (from Murphy 1987: 140). There was one other reason, according to Murphy, why Nasser did not nationalize the AUC as he had all other foreign educational institutions under Law No. 160: his perception that the AUC would be an avenue for maintaining cultural ties with the United States that he did not wish to sever.

41. For more on the AUC, see Murphy 1987, which is the only source that provides a comprehensive history of the institution.

42. The U.S. government over the years would also become involved in directly providing funding for university activities, including its capital program. As with any privately-funded higher education institution, finances have always been a difficult part of the AUC's checkered history, and the saga of these difficulties is well captured by Murphy.

43. However, one would be remiss if it is not pointed out that not all Egyptians view the institution with equanimity; some Islamists view it as a subversive institution given its association with the United States on one hand and the Egyptian Westernized secular elite on the other.

44. Nasser's "Arab socialism" was one of the various "socialisms" embraced in the 1960s and the 1970s by some of those countries in the developing world that sought to steer a middle course in the global Cold War rivalries between the United States and the former Soviet Union—these countries also came to be known as the nonaligned nations. (In the African context other examples include the "socialisms" of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana, Sekou Toure's Guinea, Julius Nyerere's Tanzania, Muammar al-Qaddhafi's Libya, and Kenneth Kaunda's Zambia). While the ignorantsia in the West took the self-proclaimed "socialist" notions by the leaders of these countries as indicative of a communist takeover, nothing could have been further from the truth. They were socialist only in name, for they remained essentially capitalist in orientation with the exception of two main differences: the nationalization of the major means of production, and the institution of centralized economic planning (and even that was usually a charade)—in other words, these "socialisms" were variants of state capitalism embedded in populist-tempered authoritarian political systems. Moreover, their hallmark included articulation and imposition of their tenets on skeptical societies by charismatic leaders such that with their passage their socialisms also went with them. It is rare, therefore, to find today any leader on the African continent propounding any kind of socialism, Arab, African, or anything else. In Egypt, Sadat's infitah was, not surprisingly, a rejection of Nasser's Arab Socialism.

45. Consider, for instance, the case of Cairo University: whereas at the time of the coup it had just under 19,000 students, within a mere two decades, by 1970, the student population had climbed to 50,000 (Reid 1990: 175–176). In 1970, to give another example, some 700 students in that single year—compare with the estimated total figure of 349 for the en-

tire period of Muhammed Ali's rule already mentioned—were sent to study abroad in a variety of countries, both in the former Soviet bloc countries and in the West (Hyde 1978: 140).

46. The original coup took place on July 23, 1952, with General Muhammed Naguib as president and prime minister and Nasser as the deputy prime minister and minister of the interior. The use of the term "dynasty" is appropriate (even if in this case bloodline is not the unifying factor in leadership successions) given the as yet unbroken continuity of the oligarchy (see also Sonbol 2000).

47. Up until 1978, even the large contingent of foreign students, numbering in the thousands, studying in Egypt were exempt from tuition fees.

48. Regarding the elite/mass gap, while there is no doubt, as, for instance, Williamson (1987) has noted, that increased higher educational access for children of the lower classes did, initially, have considerable impact on income inequality in Egypt, it was a short-lived outcome. In fact, on the contrary, with the passage of time, there was even a reversal of this particular intended function of higher education as remnants of the old and newer middle and upper classes moved to consolidate their position by a variety of mechanisms (private schooling, nepotism, etc.) to ensure access for their children to the best and most prestigious institutions. See for example Moore's (1994) discussion of this phenomenon with respect to engineering education in Egypt. For more on education in general and higher education in particular during the Nasserite period, besides Williamson and Moore, see also Abu Izzeddin (1981); Cochran (1986); and Hyde (1978).

49. Sonbol (2000: 124) reminds us that until the United States expressed its hostility to Nasser's regime, Nasser had defined the West as not including the United States. In other words, his hostility toward the West did not include a rejection of the United States. (Compare with the initial stances of Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro toward the United States, they too had seen it as a potential ally at one point in their political careers before the United States moved to disabuse them of that notion.) Clearly, the Cold War imperatives of foreign policy, in themselves artificially manufactured, had completely warped the U.S. view of the world, much in the same way as the current struggle against "terrorism" has distorted its perceptions of global realities—characterized by such infantile drivel as "they don't like freedom that is why they are engaged in terrorism" passing for intelligent analysis (thereby demonstrating the truism that brawn and brain do not always go together).

50. See Abu Izzedin (1981) for a historical survey of the Nasserite period.

51. See Hinnebusch (1988) for a historical survey of the Sadat years.

52. One change that followed on the heels of the *infitah* (but had little to do with it directly) was the coincidence of the oil price boom of the early 1970s. Its effect was to encourage the Egyptian professoriate to pour out on to the international labor market—specifically the Middle Eastern, where a rapidly escalating supply of petrodollars fueled the desire of the oil-rich countries to seek large-scale development of their infrastructures, including educational systems. The consequences of this braindrain on the Egyptian universities, as one may surmise, was far from salutary (Reid 1990). On the matter of foreign (U.S.) influences on Egyptian higher education see Cochran (1986) who, for instance, observes among its deleterious consequences the widening of the elite/mass gap brought on by U.S. aid assistance to the higher education and other sectors: "It is evident to the Egyptian people that the United States is supplying aid to Egypt, some Egyptians are getting richer and going to the States and Americans are becoming more visible in Egypt." "Moreover," she continues, "rampant corruption only further frustrates the effective use of incoming capital.

Innumerable Egyptian professionals and bureaucrats have climbed aboard the USAID gravy train and are riding it for all they're worth, which, in an increasing number of cases, is quite a lot. Enjoying high disposable incomes, they of course are in search of purchases and pleasures, further discrediting themselves, their government, and American assistance in the process" (1986: 113).

53. This is not to imply by any means that Sadat was responsible for the rise of Islamism in Egypt, for it is a development that to varying degrees has swept across most of Islamic Africa (if not the Islamic world in general) in recent decades—and to that extent it is indicative of complex but related causes going well beyond Sadat's policy. In other words, even without Sadat Egypt would have still experienced this phenomenon, but perhaps not to the extent that it has had Sadat not coddled up to the Islamists (until they forced his hand, but by then it was too late).

54. About the Turkish solution: reference here is to the effort of that Westernizing secular autocratic zealot by the name of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who, beginning in 1924 (as the West looked on approvingly—though absolutely clueless as to what kind of Turkey the autocrat was really creating, certainly not modern and not democratic), sought to forcibly expunge Islam from Turkish society, lock, stock and barrel, leaving in its wake the secular Western praetorian Turkey of today with its ridiculous schizophrenic mask—believing that this Anatolian peninsula is a European country at the illusory level, but yet firmly Asian in terms of geographic and cultural reality. For a history of secularism in Turkey see Berkes (1964) and Macfie (1994).

55. See the account in Eccel (1984) for details of the resistance the ulama put up to the reforms imposed on al-Azhar.

56. There may be another reason why this has been the case: at the end of the day, the ulama has nearly always found it expedient to cooperate with whoever held the reigns of power in the country. In other words, the ulama has never, except on the rarest of occasions, posed a serious and credible threat to any of the rulers who have ambled through the corridors of Egyptian Islamic history. As Lazarus-Yafeh (1995: 175) has astutely observed about the ulama in general (not simply in Egypt): "[a]lmost everywhere they supported any Muslim authority uncritically, thereby safeguarding not only the continuity of the Islamic system but their own political and economic security as well."

57. A cautionary note is in order here: The effort to reform al-Azhar was ultimately motivated by instrumentalism. Whereas in the past education was merely the transmission of knowledge, skills and values from one generation to the next, with the advent of colonialism it acquired a new baggage: the task of remaking an entire society anew (Coleman 1965: 3). Consequently, education became "vocationalized" (instrumentalized). But education is more than that because it leads to the adoption of "civilized" attitudes, which, ironically, includes the principle of the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. To the ulama who resisted reforms, the matter was not simply a refusal to change in order to protect their perceived interests; it was also a question of the fundamental mission of their enterprise highlighted by this hypothetical scenario: Suppose one knew that there would never be an opportunity to use one's literacy to make a living; would one therefore forego literacy altogether (in the absence of any other obstacle (Hawkins 2003, also discusses this issue). In Islam the pursuit of religious knowledge, as explained in Chapter 1, is in itself an aspect of piety.

58. Napoleon was stunned by the seeming ungratefulness of the population because he had tried to present himself to the Egyptians as their liberator from the oppressive Ottoman

Mamluks. As his proclamation to the Egyptians had read in part: "People of Egypt, you will be told that I have come to destroy your religion. This is an obvious lie; do not believe it! Answer back to those imposters that I have come to restore to you your rights and to punish the usurpers…. Henceforth, with [God's] help, no Egyptian shall be excluded from high office, and all shall be able to reach the highest positions…. Once you had great cities, large canals, a prosperous trade. What has destroyed all this, if not greed, the iniquity, and the tyranny of the Mamluks?" (To access the entire proclamation, see Herold 1963: 69–70.) One may note here, with an eye to the present, how history has a ceaseless penchant for uncannily repeating itself: compare the goings on in Iraq today (2004) with the West thrown into the abyss of incomprehension at the seeming ingratitude of the Iraqis.

59. One should also mention here that sometimes reforms were imposed on al-Azhar because of the misdeeds of the ulama themselves that stemmed from internal conflicts over sources and amount of remuneration, leadership positions, and so on. Moreover, the historically rooted self-destructive penchant of the various factions among the ulama to turn to external actors for support during moments of internal crisis, created further opportunities for outsiders, as they pursued heir own agendas, to foist reforms on al-Azhar. It appears that for the ulama autonomy was sacrosanct only during times of unity against a common foe.

60. Consider this: In 1872 a teacher training college called the *Dar-ul-Ulum* would be established to take care of the perpetual problem of shortages of competent Arabic language teachers. Now, even though the college was staffed by Azhari graduates and concentrated on producing language teachers (though in later years other subjects, secular, were slowly added), as Eccel (1984) reminds us, the very fact that it was felt necessary to establish a separate college for subject matter that rightfully belonged to al-Azhar, spoke volumes for the abysmal state of education at that institution.

61. Later, with the transformation of the Egyptian University into a state institution, the *Dar-ul-Ulum* would be transferred out of Al-Azhar to the new state university.

62. Since all major long-lasting changes in society occur as a result of the dialectic between the ideational and material, one ought to indicate here the key dramatis personae of the al-Azhar reform effort; they include (besides the ulama whose main role appears to have been more of reacting to, rather than initiating, change): Muhammed Abduh, 1849-1905 (a religious scholar, social reformer and ardent admirer of the West in the latter part of his life, who despite his blindness went to study at Al-Azhar [graduating from there as an alim in 1877, and where he would also later lecturer]; in time, with British help, he was elected as Egypt's mufti in 1899); Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, 1838–97 (an Iranian anti-imperialist Sh'ite, itinerant agitator and scholar-journalist and one time mentor of Muhammed Abduh); Khedive Ismail Pasha, 1830–95 (Khedive from 1863–79); Taha Hussein, 1889–1973 (graduate of al-Azhar and the Egyptian University [Cairo University] and who also taught at the same university Arabic literature); Sa'ad Zaghlul Pasha ibn Ibrahim, 1857–1927 (a graduate of al-Azhar and the School of Law, he was the leader of the nationalist Wafd Party that helped engineer Egyptian independence in 1922; from 1906 to 1910 he was the minister of education); and Jamal Abdel Nasser 1918–70 (ruled Egypt from 1954 until his death).

63. For more on the reforms at al-Azhar and the history of Egyptian secular higher education generally see Crecelius (1968); Dodge (1961); Eccel (1984); Heyworth-Dunne (1939); Radwan (1951); Reid (1990); and Vatikiotis (1991).

64. The complete conquest of Algeria would allude them until after more than 100,000

French troops had laid waste to large parts of the country in their pursuit of the rebel guerilla forces of Abd al-Qadir ibn Muhyi al-Din (popularly known as Amir Abdel-Qadir) from 1839–47. Though even here a more vigorous adherence to historical facts would extend the period of the French conquest for another 100 years to the French takeover of the Anti-Atlas in 1934; up to that point it had had to contend with a number of other wars of resistance in the hinterland, including the celebrated Berber uprising under the leadership of Muhammed al-Muqrani that was only put down in 1871.

65. Consider, for example, the *Indigenous Code* (applicable only to Algerians—not the settlers); among its "forty-one unconscionable provisions," to quote Entelis (1986: 32), included these: Algerian Muslims were not allowed to utter anything against France and the French state; they were not allowed to move freely within the country without a permit; they could not become teachers in any educational establishment (private or state) without French authorization.

66. The slogan was fallacious because one part of it was not applicable to all Algerians: the part about Arabic since Arabic is not the language of an important minority in the country, the Kabyles (a Berber group); they have their own languages and culture. In fact, this issue has been an important bone of contention between the Arab-dominated government and the Kabyles. Note: Dien Bien Phu is a famous village in North Vietnam. During the Franco-Vietnamese War it was chosen as the site where the French colonial army (heavily infused with U.S. supplied weaponry), under the leadership of General Henri Navarre, was to break the back of the Vietnamese guerrilla army, commonly known as the Viet Minh, which was leading the Vietnamese struggle for independence from French colonial rule—reimposed with the support of the United States following the Second World War. (During the war the French had been expelled from Vietnam by the Japanese.) The French had announced this objective to the world and they assured all concerned that no rag tag army of PQD peasants would be able to resist their trained men and modern armor. As it turned out, the Viet Minh under the leadership of the brilliant military strategist, General Vo Nguyen Giap, proved to be more than an equal match for the French. The Viet Minh, on May 7, 1954, forced the final and permanent capitulation of the French in Vietnam—albeit at great cost to the Vietnamese, in terms of lives lost. Nevertheless, the victory proved to be not only a military one for the Vietnamese, but also a psychological one that reverberated positively far beyond Vietnam among other PQD peoples. It proved that PQD peasants could defeat a modern industrial power—a lesson that later would have to be taught time and again: to the Portuguese in Africa; the French (again) in Algeria; the United States in South Vietnam; and not too long ago, the Russians in Afghanistan.

67. The process of French decolonization, however, would prove to be somewhat more intractable, not only because of the almost total domination of all facets of Algerian society during more than 100 years of French colonial rule, but because the new praetorian secular bureaucratic elite that took over the reigns of power did not wish to sever all connections with France. For more on Algerian past and recent history see Abun-Nasr (1987); Bennoune (1988); Ciment (1997a); Entelis (1986); Gosnell (2002); Naylor (2000); the pseudonymous Martinez (2000); Roberts (2003); and Ruedy (1992). Note: for balance it is important that if Naylor and Martinez are consulted, then Roberts should be read as well.

68. About the weakening of the madrasah system: the damage the French inflicted on it was such that even a zealous proponent (and contemporary observer) of the French imperialist project like Alexis de Tocqueville (of the *Democracy in America* fame), following his trip to Algiers in 1841, was moved to lament: "Muslim society in Africa was not uncivi-

lized; it was merely a backward and imperfect civilization [sic]. There existed within it a large number of pious foundations, whose object was to provide for the needs of charity or for public instruction. We laid our hands on these revenues everywhere, partly diverting them from their former uses; we reduced the charitable establishments and let the schools decay [kuttabs], we disbanded the seminaries [madrasahs]. Around us knowledge has been extinguished, and recruitment of men of religion and men of law has ceased; that is to say we have made Muslim society much more miserable, more disordered, more ignorant, and more barbarous than it had been before knowing us" (from his writings on empire and slavery [Tocqueville 2001: 140–41]). It may also be noted here that the legendary penchant of the French for the separation of church and state appears to have had minimal impact on their desire, for obvious reasons, to fully dominate the madrasah system to the point where they even helped fund mosques and pay the stipends of the ulama in charge of them.

69. In 1954 the total number of Algerians receiving secular higher education throughout the country was a paltry 685, however, eight years later at independence in 1962 it had climbed to 3,000, and thereafter the growth was simply exponential: within about two decades, by 1984, the total number had exploded to reach 107,000! (Tibawi 1972: 168; Entelis 1986: 91)

70. In 1967 the university had a total enrollment of some 10,000 students of whom a majority (80%) were Algerians (and of these 20% were women). (Tibawi 1972: 170).

71. Ibn Badis (Ben Badis—in Gallicized Arabic "Ibn" is usually spelled "Ben") was the scion of a prominent Muslim Berber family (who ironically had good cooperative relations with the French), and interestingly, was a graduate of al-Zaitouna and al-Azhar. For more on him see Alghailani (2002), whose work shows how this particular section of the Algerian ulama represented by Ibn Badis and his colleagues and the Association they helped found played a critical role in the evolution of Algerian nationalist struggle for independence. (Needless to say, by the time Ibn Badis arrived on the scene, much of the rest of the Algerian ulama had been either cowed or co-opted by the French.)

72. While this is not the place to delve into a detailed account of the course of events that led the military junta to plunge Algeria into an abyss of remorseless and widespread violence and terror that would consume tens of thousands of lives of innocent children, women and men and out of which it is just beginning to emerge, it will suffice to note this much: As the praetorian, FLN (*Front de Liberation Nationale*) dominated, nationalist elite proceeded over the course of some three decades following independence to constitute itself into a secular, and ironically, a Francophile oligarchy (socialist in rhetoric but pragmatic in practice), it produced along the way a deep economic, political, and cultural alienation in the rest of the population as the elite-mass gap widened, from almost all perspectives, to a chasm. With the collapse of oil prices in the mid–1980s (over 90% of Algeria's foreign-exchange earnings, which pays for almost everything Algerians consume, including food, come from the sale of oil and gas) this alienation reached boiling point as the country experienced unprecedented turbulent mass agitation during the month of October 1988, forcing the oligarchy to loosen its political stranglehold on the country while it simultaneously continued with the highly unpopular (understandably) program of structural adjustment that the West—by manipulating the instruments of international credit—was forcing it to implement. Consequently, it moved to permit for the first time the formation of other political parties and the holding of general elections with the hope that the carrot of a modicum of democracy would obviate the need for the stick of even greater repression of an economically beleaguered populace. At the same time, this strategy was welcomed and encouraged

by France—the Western country with the closest connections with Algeria—not so much for reasons of the new dawn of "democracy" in Algeria (after all democracy and human rights have never been among the top items on the agenda of Western relations with the nations of the Afro-Asian and the Caribbean-Latin American ecumene at any time in the history of these relations, notwithstanding the current pious rhetoric of Western politicians), but because it held out the promise of the marginalization of their old nemesis against whom they had fought bitterly during the Algerian revolutionary war of independence and who they have never forgiven for the loss of "our *l'Algerie francaise*" (French Algeria) and who, in the postindependence period, to add insult to injury, had, through their pursuit of the objectives of "socialism" (namely state capitalism), long placed obstacles in the path of the French in their quest to dominate the strategic and lucrative Algerian petroleum sector. The first elections held were municipal and regional elections which took place in 1990, and a year later came the first round of elections for a parliament that was to be entrusted with the task of authoring a new constitution for Algeria. However, to the horror of the praetorian oligarchs (most especially the military wing and their Western allies), the municipal as well as the parliamentary elections were won by an unlikely alliance of mass-based groups with Islamist leanings, the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut—Islamic Salvation Front), and it appeared to most that the scheduled second round of parliamentary elections (for January 1992) would also be won by the FIS, but most certainly not by the FLN, hitherto the sole political party in Algeria.

Clearly, decades of indulgence in a potent combination (for an Islamic country) of ostentatious materialist, secularist and Westernist excesses by the praetorian oligarchy, coupled with its penchant for severe political repression and flagrantly rampant corruption against a backdrop of widespread nationwide economic disarray replete with mass poverty and unemployment, had finally come home to roost (see, for instance, Tessler 1997). However, rather than speaking to these specific causal factors explaining the rise of the Islamist tendency in Algeria (Islamism proper has been the preserve of a very small minority), the military wing of the praetorian oligarchy—aided and abetted by the West, principally France—characteristically, and spurred on no doubt by exaggerated apocalyptic visions of a Maghrebi version of post–Shah Iran, nullified the first round of parliamentary elections of December 1991, cancelled the second round and instituted a military coup on January 11, 1992. They (and their French allies) could not, however, have foreseen the result of this patently retrogressive action; it would precipitate violent opposition which in turn would elicit nothing less than cataclysmic blood-soaked military repression—as savage in its brutality as that which characterized French repression during the war of independence itself (complete with state-sponsored El Salvadoran-type right-wing death squads engaging in unspeakable barbarity; even the GIA [Armed Islamic Group] to which some of the atrocities have been credited appears to be in the pockets of the Algerian security apparatus). Baldly stated thus, this foray into the provenance of the Algerian blood-soaked political nightmare necessitates several further observations: First, in apportioning blame for the horrendous atrocities, assassinations, etc., the most important question (as in the case of so many other similar circumstances all over the world; vide: the Palestinian conflict, the Chechnyan conflict, the current so-called "war on terror") is not who is responsible for specific acts of violence and barbarity, but rather, who is responsible for creating the conditions that have led to, what is always the case, a pattern of such acts in the first place. For without raising the latter question, the former question not only becomes one of simple criminal wrong-doing requiring the attention of the security apparatus, but closes off any

possibility of coming up with solutions (requiring political attention) to prevent the recurrence of such acts. In the Algerian case, the answer to the latter question is self-evident to any one who has studied the Algerian blood-soaked nightmare with some diligence. Second, in circumstances where analysis of seemingly inexplicable events leaves one hopelessly nonplussed, the doorway to enlightenment is sometimes to be found in a more nuanced analysis, such as sub macro-level explorations of the key actors. In this particular instance this certainly is the most fruitful approach. Hence, any proper understanding of the recent blood-soaked Algerian history and the role of the military in shaping it necessitates one to go beyond considering the military wing of the Algerian praetorian oligarchy as a monolithic entity. The fact is that it comprises factions and the faction that is of interest here is the one that has been ominously (for the Algerian masses) on the ascendance in recent years—in a sense signifying a creeping coup within the broader 1992 military coup—the watershed year being 1988 when highly consequential changes began taking place in the military high command and continuing until 2000 (Roberts 2003). This faction consists primarily of France's old allies from the days of the Algerian war of liberation; namely, those Algerian collaborators (or to be blunt, traitors), who had served under the French, but who, after seeing the writing on the wall on the eve of Algerian independence, had quickly switched sides to become Algerian *pseudonationalists*. It is in the main these ex-French Army officers (who had learned their *dirty war* tricks from the French), more than any one else within the Algerian military wing, who were behind the dirty war campaign—with its massive stomach churning and mind-numbing human rights abuses (the barbaric torture of suspects, the massacres of civilians, the use of napalm, the false propaganda, etc., etc.) and which has left those in the outside world unfamiliar with the nuances of recent Algerian history hopelessly at sea in finding reasonable explanations for this particular turn of events in a country that had once held out, for many in Algeria and in the rest of the Third World, so much promise upon the conclusion of the war of liberation; other than falling back on hoary essentialist (meaning in this case Orientalist) explanations a la Oriental despotism. Third, the role of the French (and by proxy the West) in aiding and abetting the violent Algerian nightmare—albeit inadvertently it must be stressed emphatically, to repeat: inadvertently—demands elaboration; taking the lead from Roberts 2003: it is not that they had wished Algeria to descend into the hellhole of nightmarish violence and bloodshed (after all such conditions can hardly be conducive to any form of advantageous relations, economic or political, for any country; unless the objective is outright looting of resources—as has been the case in some other countries in Africa, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone), but rather, in quietly championing the demise of the traditional nationalist populist state capitalism—which the FLN nationalists had long pursued (under Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene regimes)—through coercive encouragement of the adoption of structural adjustment policies so as to permit French capital to resubordinate the Algerian petroleum dominated economy, they discovered their natural allies in this endeavor, at this particular juncture of Algerian history, to be the ex-French Army officers—hence those with Islamist tendencies had to be vanquished (especially when one adds Western stereotypes of Islamists to the equation), together with the FLN. At the practical policy-level the role of the French in the Algerian nightmare is summarized thusly by Roberts (2003: 338): "The withholding of assistance from Boudiaf, the opposition to Abdesselam's strategy, the reckless insistence on rescheduling, the failure to support Zeroual's dialogue in 1994, the sly manipulation of the Rome Platform, the negative reaction to Zeroual's election in 1995, the refusal to support the UN's mission to observe the

June 1997 elections, the calculated patronizing of Algiers since 1998; the list is long and could be lengthened" (see Roberts to make sense of these individual acts and their consequences). Fourth, from the perspective of the masses not all oppressors are the same. For all the tyranny of the FLN dominated praetorian oligarchy of yesteryear, the current military junta that forms the dominant part of the Algerian praetorian oligarchy is infinitely worse. Sadly, one cannot rule out more violent conflict in years to come for it lacks legitimacy on five counts: they have not achieved their power through the ballot box; they were not the architects of Algeria's independence, as the true FLN elite are; as secularists they are virulently anti-Muslims (not just anti-Islamists); they are unpatriotic in their economic policies as they systematically, under the structural adjustment regime, abandon state capitalism (it is worth remembering that for all its faults, from the perspective of the masses, it has at least two positive features: a built-in bias toward national economic sovereignty, and state-sponsored welfare patronage); and they are developing a close alliance with the West, especially the United States (In a nutshell: they are not in the least bit the custodians of Algerian national sovereignty without which there can be, in reality, no coherent Algerian state.) Fifth, the holding of recent legislative (2002) and presidential elections (2004), coupled with the fact that they have been on the whole unmarred by violence, does not necessarily speak to the emergence of democracy in Algeria; for, so long as the military junta continues to remain the actual power behind the throne—even in the mechanics of the election process itself (proscribing parties, banning candidates, encouraging ballot-tempering, etc.)—Algerian democracy will remain a sham. The French (and by proxy other Western governments) in placing their stamp of approval on them are of course not in the least bit bothered by this "minor" fact. The French drive to convert Algeria into yet another Western client-state in Afro-Arab Islamic Africa (compare Egypt) will brook no nonsense from those who insist on the "genuine thing." At the same time, the propaganda moves by the Algerian military junta to take advantage of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States by positing opposition to its brutal repression as solely an expression of Islamist terrorism has paid of dividends; the United States has firmly aligned itself behind the junta. (September 11, 2001, proved a godsend to a variety of dictatorships all across the planet seeking to entrench their rule as they lined up to be blessed as allies in the so-called "war on terror," by the United States. This development in turn, has been a godsend for Western capital in its relentless effort to expand its domination of the planet (supported by most current dictatorships—the lone holdouts, perhaps, being those of Cuba and north Korea). Under these circumstances, the global future promises to be even more turbulent.) For sources on this postindependence nightmare inflicted on Algeria by the pseudonationalist military faction over the course of the past thirteen to fourteen years, see Ciment (1997a); Human Rights Watch (2003); Naylor (2000); the pseudonymous Martinez (2000); and Roberts (2003). (Note: among these sources Roberts is mandatory for his analysis appears to be the most cogent).

73. About the presence of the Hospitallers: Tripoli had been conquered some years earlier, in 1510, by Christian Spain during the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic; the city (together with Malta) was bestowed on the Hospitallers by Charles V—King of Spain and Holy Roman emperor.

74. The Turks were forced to give up Libya mainly because of their military defeat elsewhere: in the Balkans (at the hands of a Russian sponsored alliance of Turkey's rebellious Eastern European provinces, known as the Balkan League).

75. Al-Mukhtar was the head of the Sanussiya, a Sufi missionary brotherhood which

was founded by an Algerian Sufi, Sidi Muhammed ibn Ali-as-Sannusi, in Yemen in 1837 as a puritanical revivalist movement that, like other Sufi orders, sought to purge Islam from what it saw as accretions of heretical innovations (bidaa). The Sannusi would establish their first religious complex (zawiyah) in Cyrenaica in 1843 and from there they would soon come to dominate much of the Libyan countryside, eventually coming to play the role of, to exaggerate slightly, a state within a state until their defeat by the Italians in 1930. One may also point out here that it is the Sanussi who would bring forth the first constitutional monarch of an independent Libya.

76. Recall that the one other country vying for this distinction, Egypt, did not gain its "real" independence until after the Nasserite coup that finally terminated the behind-the-throne British presence in the country (plus, in any case, some may semantically argue, Egypt was never a formal colony of any European power).

77. In other words, it is quite unlikely that independence would have come to Libya so soon and so easily, one can safely conjecture, had the petroleum discoveries occurred before 1951 (regardless of U.S. diplomatic pressures or any wartime promises made by the British to the Sanussiya).

78. In 1963 Libya would become a unitary state when the three autonomous provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan would be merged by royal decree on April 27.

79. The latest manifestation of his mercurialism is his decision to cozy up to the West despite decades of being in the cross hairs of Western assassination attempts and being branded variously as "mad dog of the Middle East," "the most dangerous man in the world," etc., by the United States for waging a proxy war against the West, principally Britain and the United States. Consider this: the beneficiaries of the Libyan petroleum largesse, as part of its proxy war, would range from the Irish Republican Army to the Palestinians, from rebels in Chad to the Black Panthers in the United States, and from Uganda's brutal dictator Idi Amin to the Iranians. To the majority of the population in the West, however, his name would become synonymous with PanAm Flight 103: a dastardly in flight destruction on December 21, 1988, of a Pan American Boeing 747 passenger plane by means of an explosive device over Lockerbie, Scotland, in which all those aboard (259) perished (as well as eleven on the ground killed by falling debris) and which some have thought was a response, at the behest of the Iranians, to an equally horrendous event: the shooting down of an Iranian Air-Bus on July 3, 1988, by the U.S. guided-missile ship, the U.S.S. Vincennes (supposedly by mistake, but whose commanders never the less would later be awarded medals of honor by the U.S. Congress) where all 290 passengers and crew aboard died. For more on Qaddhafi's personal imprint on Libya and Libyan foreign policy see Bearman (1986) and Vanderwalle (1995).

80. Considering that Qaddhafi has played such a dominant role in shaping the course of post–1969 Libya, including needless to say, its educational development, it is necessary to consider for a moment his most cherished publication in which he lays out his ideas of how a society should be governed and the path it should pursue. To begin with the perspective from which the book is written can be accessed by considering such comments by Qaddhafi as these two:

The great rich nations spend large sums of money to invent bombs and to create new nuclear weapons, and to nourish the projects of space invasion. Also these nations pay large sums of money on false advertisement and propaganda, and spend on projects of psychological warfare; instead of helping the people and other nations of the world who are suffering from diseases, hunger, mal-

nutrition, and the crazy rise of prices. Such careless nations are no doubt led by the devil itself. They follow the Theory of Malthus and not the message of the Bible.

By the grace of God we have left communism far behind us. We are much more progressive than communism, which in our opinion transformed itself into a reactionary system. The works of Lenin, Marx and Engels, are meaningless now; history has passed them by.

So what then can one honestly say (without giving in to the sport of either Qaddhafi-bashing or its opposite), about Qaddhafi's much-maligned and derided (especially in the West) *Green Book* which he has published in three parts: (1) *The Solution of the Problem of Democracy: "The Authority of the People"*; (2) *The Solution of the Economic Problem*; and (3) *"Socialism": The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory*. Upon reading this publication (the text of which is available at various sites, such as www.mathaba.net, on the Internet) there are three points that immediately come to the fore: First, there is considerable justification for the derision that most intellectuals in the West and elsewhere have exhibited toward the publication; for it is nothing more than an inchoate simplistic mish-mash of a dab of this and a dab of that from what appears to be the author's poor understanding of a number of sources: the Western capitalist democratic tradition, Marxism, Islam, anarchism and possibly his own nomadic Berber tradition. Second, that one is forced to take this publication seriously only because its author has the dictatorial powers to impose (or at least he has tried to impose) some if not all the ideas propounded in the book on a country of some strategic importance to the West (and therefore by implication the rest of the world). Third, that perhaps the best that can be said about the *Green Book* regards not so much its content, but what it tells us about the author: that for a man of such humble economic and educational background, and even more importantly when compared with the preoccupations of other dictators on the continent and elsewhere (essentially, self-aggrandizement), it demonstrates a praiseworthy effort at grappling with the most difficult issues of modern societies, ranging from governance to matters of existence. Of course, the most damning aspect of the *Green Book* is that it is authored by someone who thinks he has all the answers (and in fact within the confines of his own country has the necessary powers of a dictator to act like he does) and therefore no one should dare question it, except on the pain of imprisonment, torture and even death (as some Libyans have discovered).

What about education? Does the *Green Book* have anything to say directly about education? Part three does, it has a section titled "Education". Here is a small sample of his thoughts on the subject:

Education, or learning, is not necessarily that routinized curriculum and those classified subjects in textbooks which youths are forced to learn during specified hours while sitting in rows of desks. This type of education now prevailing all over the world is directed against human freedom. State-controlled education, which governments boast of whenever they are able to force it on their youths, is a method of suppressing freedom.

This does not mean that schools are to be closed and that people should turn their backs on education, as it may seem to superficial readers. On the contrary, it means that society should provide all types of education, giving people the chance to choose freely any subjects they wish to learn.

Ignorance will come to an end when everything is presented as it actually is and when knowledge about everything is available to each person in the manner that suits him or her.

That the book is a collection of little more than inchoate ramblings is not difficult to

conclude.

81. For more on education in Libya see Elbadri (1984); Monastiri (1995); and Teferra and Altbach (2003).

82. In reality, the Moroccans were maneuvered by the Spanish into armed conflict (by means of unreasonable demands for territory and money as compensation for real and imagined injuries of centuries past) because the new Spanish government of Leopoldo O'Donnell needed a war to distract the populace from the political chaos that had engulfed Spain by 1858, and in the words of Pennel (2000: 64–65), "the only enemy that the Spanish Army could conceivably beat was Morocco." Even though the Spanish Army proved to be more incompetent than usual, the Moroccans were even more so.

83. The founder of the Alawi dynasty was Mawlay ar-Rashid, whose occupation of Fez in 1666 gave birth to the dynasty. It is under his iron rule that much of Morocco was brought together under one titular roof—the disparate warring tribes were no match for his forces. (He ruled until his death in 1672.)

84. Notwithstanding the much-vaunted Arab/Islamic nationalism of North Africa, Spain continues to rule the port of Ceuta (together with Melilla, Alhucemas, Chafarinas Islands, and Penon de Valez de la Gomera); constituting part of its five-link chain of Spanish North African enclaves which by rights belong to Morocco. Originally, it had been conquered by the Portuguese in 1415; however a little over a 100 years later, in 1580, the Spanish took it over—though Spanish suzerainty over the port was formally confirmed by the Portuguese only after another 100 years had gone by, with the 1688 Treaty of Lisbon. Morocco's periodic efforts to gain control of the port (the latest being the 1859/1860 effort) came too late as just indicated. What is more, to add insult to injury: Morocco had to cede even more territory (enabling Ceuta to enlarge its borders) and pay onerous compensation to the Spanish following the 1859/1860 debacle—the latter injury that the Moroccans found difficult to handle was among the factors that helped to propel Morocco into the arms of the French. That the Spanish continue to occupy Moroccan soil is an affront that the autocratic Monarchy considers well worth the economic aid and other benefits it derives from Spain (though what some sections of the masses, especially the Islamists, think abut the issue is another matter). From the perspective of higher education, this semi autonomous city-state, like Melilla too, possesses a number of institutions (e.g., a teacher-training college, a school of nursing) that are affiliated with a Spanish university, the University of Granada.

85. The quotation marks around madrasah is to draw attention to what was already indicated in Chapter 1: that in the Maghreb the term had a different meaning: it referred to the dormitories of the students attending a mosque-college, not the mosque-college itself; however, this applied only to the urban areas, in the rural areas the original meaning was retained.

86. In fact their insistence on "tradition" went so far as to also include the forced preservation in amber (so to speak) of even the physical space and amenities; In other words, they even resisted things like electric lighting, the use of blackboards, modernization of toilets, and so on.

87. Lyautey's insistence on tradition (which Rabinow explains was not a result of reaction on the part of Lyautey, but conservatism) had a dual pronged objective: First, was to save Morocco from the predations of the colons for whom he had little sympathy: in his words: "[d]epraved and blind to the true meaning of the Protectorate, to the legitimate rights of the natives, the colonists claim for themselves all the rights of Frenchmen, behav-

ing as conquerors in a conquered land, disdaining the laws and institutions of a people which exists, owns, keeps accounts, which wants to live and which does not intend to let itself be despoiled or enslaved" (from Rabinow 1989: 285). The second was to harness the existing traditional social structure for his vision of the colonial mission in Morocco (which Rabinow describes as the introduction of *technical modernity*—in contrast to modernity in general which includes *social modernity*); again, to quote Lyautey: "Vex not tradition, leave custom be. Never forget that in every society there is a class to be governed, and a natural-born ruling class upon whom all depends. Link their interests to ours" (from Rabinow 1985: 285).

88. For sources on Sudan in antiquity see Adams (1977), Arkell (1973), Crawford (1951), Edwards (2004), Hassan (1967), Holt (1975), and Shinnie (1967, 1978).

89. One ought to mention here that the response of the international community to the massive suffering unleashed by the Sudanese government on portions of its population over the past decades, and which continues in Darfur, has been, to all intents and purposes, one of relative shameful neglect—How else can one explain its magnitude and longevity? For sources on terror and war in Sudan, as well as general political developments in that country in the postindependence era, see: Amnesty International (2004a, 2004b), Anderson (1999), Beswick (2004), Burr and Collins (2003), Evans (2002), Garang and Khalid (1987), Glazer (2004), Harir, Tvedt, and Badal (1994), International Crisis Group (2002), Jok (2001), Khalid (2003), Layish and Warburg (2002), Lefkow (2004), Lesch (1998), Niblock (1987), Oduho and Deng (1963), Patterson (2003), Scott (1985, 2000), Sidahmed (1996), Warburg (2003), Woodward (1990). See also the news archives on Sudan available at the www.BBC.com website. Another useful source is the historical dictionary on Sudan by Loban, Kramer, and Fluehr-Lobban (2002).

90. The following sources, considered together, provide an adequate entry point into this topic: Bell (1988, 1990), Omi and Winant (1994), Orfield and Eaton (1996), and Rothenberg (2005).

91. The following sources, taken together, provide an ample survey of the arrival of British colonial rule in Sudan, as well as its origins and aftermath: Abdel-Rahim (1969), Bates (1984), Collins (1983), Daly (1991, 2002), Lewis (1987), Nicoll (2004), Powell (2003), Sanderson and Sanderson (1981), and Sharkey (2003). For a brief overview of the history of Sudan beginning in the seventh century up to the present, only Holt and Daly (2000) will do.

92 For sources on higher education in Sudan see Beshir (1969), Carr-Saunders (1961), El Gizouli (1999), El-Tayeb (1971), El Tom (2003), Kitchen (1962), Lobban, Kramer and Fluehr-Lobban (2002), Maxwell (1980), Sanderson and Sanderson (1981), and Sharkey (2003).

93. The 1878 Congress of Berlin was in a sense equivalent to the infamous 1885 Berlin West Africa Conference that finalized the European dismemberment of the African continent, except it applied to Europe in relation to the domains of the Ottoman Empire.

94. A word of caution: autocracy in present-day Islamic Africa may tempt one into believing that it is a feature intrinsic to the religion of Islam; however, even a cursory glance at the rest of Africa should help put to rest such a notion.

95. Ahmed Bey (Ahmed ibn Mustafa—*bey* is the shortened version of the Turkish word for governor *beylerbey*), who ruled from 1837 to 1855, was the tenth ruler in the Husaynid dynasty (reigned from 1705 to 1957 and started by an Ottoman Mamluk, al-Husayn ibn Ali); he was involved in a number of reform efforts aimed at modernizing Tunisia.

Khayr ad-Din, also a zealous reformer, was prime minister from 1873 to 1877.

96. See Green (1978) and Hawkins (2003) on the specifics of the reforms and their fate at the hands of the al-Zaitouna ulama.

97. Green (1978: 214–20) has a fairly lengthy discussion of the 1910 student strike at al-Zaitouna (aided and abetted by secularist Tunisians, including students from Sadiki College) which, in essence, arose out of student grievances regarding some of the very matters that the 1898 reform effort had tried to address, but was also a reflection, he suggests, of a class division between the children of the urban elite and those of rural (and therefore less well-off) backgrounds—the strike had been dominated by the latter group. (Needless to say, the strike also enlarged the wedge between the ulama and the secularists to the detriment of the former in a future postindependent Tunisia. In other words, the characteristic anticolonial alliance between the ulama and the nationalists that emerged in Algeria and Morocco, Green states, did not materialize in Tunisia.)

98. See Green (1978), for more on the French education policies in Tunisia.

99. On the face of it, to a Westerner, this may have appeared to be a laudable goal: traditional Islamic education would be preserved and even expanded; but in reality it represented an approach that was quintessentially representative of Orientalism: the Westerner would define what constituted tradition and would supervise its evolution (yet always against a backdrop of an understanding that however much respect an Eastern culture deserved, it was still inferior to Western culture).

100. Concerning the French attitude toward the madrasah system in general and al-Zaitouna specifically, one may note this irony of history: their conciliatory approach helped to make al-Zaitouna an important refuge for scholars and students from Algeria escaping from the depredations inflicted on the madrasahs of Algeria by the very same people, the French.

101. Almost all the early leaders of the Neo-Destour, states Hawkins (2003), were graduates of Sadiki College.

102. It ought to be pointed out here that unlike countries such as Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, independent Tunisia has never felt uncomfortable with French in their educational system; In other words, Arabization of the educational system has never been their goal, stated or otherwise. In fact given the obsession of the Tunisians with everything French, it is almost as if French neocolonialism has been a badge of honor for the Tunisians. (As Tunisia's historians never tire to point out: the first wife of the Tunisian dictator Habib Borguiba was a white French woman.)

103. This particular configuration where there was an interpenetration of the new and old modes of production, but yet each retaining some level of autonomy (even within a context of domination by one of the other) sufficient to guarantee identifiability of each, is sometimes referred to as the *articulation of modes of production*. Note, mode of production is being used here to mean not simply the mechanics of the means of production, but also the social relations of production (the relations of power that exist between producers and the nonproducers in terms of control of the means of production).

104. The concept of *Islamism* requires definition at this point. To begin with it is important to stress that, as Roberts (2003) reminds us, Islamism should not be conflated with so-called "Islamic fundamentalism." In fact the latter does not really exist because all Muslims who practice their religion are in a sense "fundamentalists." Why? Because the Qur'an is unlike the Bible (hence the fallacy of the analogy between Christian fundamentalism and so-called Islamic fundamentalism) in that the Qur'an is primarily a constitutional document

prescriptive in intent—whereas in contrast the Bible is essentially a historical document. In other words, to be a fundamentalist in Islam is to adhere to the true tenets of Islam, it does not imply a form of "anti-scientific eccentricity appropriate to fundamentalist Christianity," as Roberts puts it (p. 4), where the objective of the Christian fundamentalist is essentially the advocacy of the literal truth of creationism as it appears in the Book of Genesis. So, what then is Islamism? It refers to the belief among some sections of Muslims that it is possible and necessary to dissolve the division between church and state (or more correctly between mosque and state) that currently exists almost throughout the Islamic world—with the exception of one or two instances (such as Iran). While in theory that may be so, in practice it has amounted to merely a call to replace the current secular authoritarianism of the praetorian oligarchies that dominate (what are virtually) police states that make up a large part of the Islamic world with an equally virulent brutal authoritarianism of a theocracy with a matching horrendous anti-Islamic human rights record (vide the experiences of Islamist rule in Afghanistan, Iran and perhaps one may also add to the list, Sudan). The problem is not just a question of good intentions gone awry, but a fundamental theoretical weakness emanating from the refusal by the ulama to grapple with what Islam has to say on such critical questions as representative government, human rights, checks and balances, social inequality, economic exploitation, the nation-state, the modern world economy, science and technology, and so on—not in terms of airy-fairy nostalgic references to the caliphates of the past (capped with the usual escapist lines like "God knows best" or "God will take care of it"), but in terms of real, practical, day to day program of action. No Islamist has yet come up with a single example of what a concretely viable Islamic constitution, one that can be implemented in the modern world of today, would look like. The problem is highlighted by Lazarus-Yafeh (1995: 175) when he accurately observes about the ulama "It is a puzzling historical fact that although Islam produced some of the greatest empires the world has ever known, the ulama eschewed for centuries the issues of the political and constitutional structure of the state and preferred, much like the sages of the small, dispersed Jewish people, to deal in great detail with such problems of the divine law as prayers and fasting or purity and impurity." There are two related conjectural explanations one may hazard to offer here for this circumstance: One, is that in Islam a political tradition arose where the executive and the legislative branches of government were considered to be subordinate—at least nominally if not always in practice—to the judiciary (since the latter drew its legitimacy from the scriptures). Yet, as we all know, in the context of the complexity of the modern world of today the judiciary, by itself, lacks the wherewithal to be able to fully confront the complex daily tasks of modern governance. Two, is that in its early caliphal history, Islam was perceived to have been ruled by God-fearing and just rulers (even if autocratic) who obeyed Islamic law, the effect of which was to obviate the thorny task of grappling with the issue of devising a political system with the potential to neutralize an unjust and oppressive ruler should one emerge in the future (that is a democratic political system). At the same time, there arose a tradition of almost blind obedience to those in charge of the state. In other words, on the issue of political authority, while Islamic doctrine evolved to include injunctions for obeying authority, it had little to say in practical terms on what to do if that authority was unjust or non-Islamic because the issue of democracy simply did not enter the equation, especially in a context where Islam did not recognize the separation of church and state. However, even when in later times it became absolutely necessary to confront these thorny issues, especially following the arrival of Western imperialism, the ulama were still found wanting. The reason this time was a peculiar dialectic that

had emerged where the traditional refusal by the ulama to accord importance to *awail* (the foreign sciences) in the curricula of madrasahs as they insisted on hewing to the traditional categories of mnemonic knowledge as a response, ironically, to the increasing irrelevance of Islam in matters of a modern economy and state in a post–1492 Western-dominated global arena, in turn, continued and continues to reinforce this irrelevance. The frustration presented by this dialectic has surfaced among some—repeat, *some*—sections of Islamists in the form of terrorism (which is tragically ironic given that, supposedly, an important element of Islamism, by definition, is self-righteousness and piety, and Islamic piety—unlike Christian piety of the Crusader era—does not brook terrorism, however the terrorism may be defined.) The political failure of Islamism in the context of a modern world stems from the fact that it has emerged as a political enterprise of an essentially flag-waving anarchic identity politics bereft of concrete Islamic proposals to address the very problems that are at the root of the rise of Islamism (and this failure one must stress is not because Islam is wholly incapable of supplying these proposals, but for lack of intelligent philosophic analysis of how Islam can provide the answers to the problems of governance in a modern world). Perhaps, Moore (1994) comes closest to the mark when he defines Islamism as "a political ideology akin to nationalism and should be viewed primarily as an abstract assertion of collective identity. Like nationalism, it may harbor a variety of contents or purposes. Consequently it may take many forms, depending on the social and political contexts in which it is expressed. Like nationalism in a colonial situation, however, it becomes a vehicle for collective action when alternative channels are suppressed or lose their legitimacy" (Moore 1994: 213). For a discussion of Islamism, especially with reference to Afro-Arab Islamic Africa, see the following: Beinin and Stork (1997), Ciment (1997a), Entelis (1997), Naylor (2000), Sonbol (2000), and Wickham (2002).

    105. On the other hand, Jerusalem is extremely important to the Jews as well, it is their holiest city—something that the Jordanians conveniently overlooked when they were in charge of East Jerusalem from 1948 to 1967, preventing Jews (in complete violation of Islamic law) from visiting the most sacred of their holy shrines, *Ha-kotel Ha-ma'aravi*, or the Western Wall, or sometimes referred to by others as the "Wailing Wall". Two wrongs do not make a right, however: the present Israeli refusal to recognize that for Muslims too (and to some extent the Christians as well) the city is of great religious significance, second in importance to Mecca itself, has been one of the gigantic flies in the ointment bedeviling the effort to peacefully resolve the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In other words: until the Israelis and their Western allies recognize the fact that Jerusalem (at least the part that hosts Qubbat as-Sakhrah [Dome of the Rock] and the al-Aqsa Mosque) is not for the Palestinians to bargain over as if it is their exclusive patrimony, the resolution of the conflict—and all that it entails for global peace—is that much further away. Yet the tragedy is that the resolution of this particular part of the conflict does not require the assistance of a rocket scientist: Jerusalem can easily be governed by a triumvirate of representatives of the three religions guaranteeing equal access to the three faiths to their holy shrines without any hindrance; but the Israelis (whose numbers total no more than a mere 6.5 million), no doubt emboldened by the carte blanche support of the United States for whatever policies that have taken their fancy in recent decades vis-à-vis the Palestinians—especially against the backdrop of a weak, demoralized and an ineffectual Islamic world—have yet to consider this option. The outcome of this state of affairs is that we must all pay the price: be potential victims of, seemingly mindless, "Islamic" terror. To credit such terrorism to radical imams in madrasahs is to miss the point by a mile!

106. In other words: It would be wrong to think that the roots of Islamism lie entirely in the political economic realm, there are also cultural and social factors involved too. For some segments of the Muslim intelligentsia their affinity with Islamism is a result of their frustration with what they perceive as the humiliation of a civilization that was once the better of the present Western civilization; emblematic for them is the oppression of Muslims (aided and abetted by the West) in as far-flung places as Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Chechnya, China, and Palestine. For the masses, in addition to their economic woes, the appeal of Islamism includes not only the matter of Islamic dignity, but also their disgust with the secularist Westernism and crass materialism of their autocratic rulers (the latter only serving to further highlight their economic degradation).

107. Westerners, including academics, often mistakenly label state capitalism as "socialism" on the basis of the rhetoric of governments of relevant countries, as well as because the state usually owns the major units of the means of production. So, What then is the difference between ordinary "private" capitalism and state capitalism? Simply put, in a state-capitalist system surplus is appropriated at the individual level even while the means of production is collectively owned; in almost every other key aspects (production for profit, etc.) it is similar to an ordinary capitalist system. One may further note here that from the perspective of PQD countries, such as those in Africa, the state-capitalist route proved irresistible for many following independence on several counts; such as: it allowed the possibility of dispensing state patronage for populist projects and programs; it answered the demand for national economic sovereignty against a backdrop of colonially determined domination of the local economy by foreign (Western) capital; and it has been an avenue for the personal enrichment of the ruling autocracies. From a purely economic point of view, state capitalism (compared to ordinary capitalism) is simply too inefficient, for it is a truism that bureaucracies lack the will and the wherewithal to engage in efficient entrepreneurial activities. In recent years, state capitalism, has been of course the target of a concerted effort on the part of the West to obliterate it: that is, PQD countries, such as those in Africa, have been forced to implement (primarily by means of manipulation of avenues and mechanisms of international credit and legitimated through the rubrics of neoclassical economics) the policy of what is euphemistically dubbed as *structural adjustment* by the chief architect of the policy, the World Bank. The net effect of these policies has been a "recolonization" of the most lucrative sectors of the economy by foreign (primarily Western) capital, destruction of nascent industries through cheaply produced imports and increased pauperization of the masses—the latter, in turn, provoking political instability (as in the case of Algeria). In a sense, this is a replay of what occurred in the immediate aftermath of 1492 (see Appendix II).

108. That education in general, but higher education specifically, should be burdened with this task is testimony to the power of the belief in one of the central and most enduring tenets of modern capitalist democracy: meritocracy. Such is the depth of the belief in this concept that its proponents are completely blind to its inherent fallacy. To explain: meritocracy is a concept that sees the allocation of material rewards in society as resting on merit, which itself is assumed to be based on such qualities of an individual as intelligence, effort and ambition and not on membership of preordained social groups—whatever their definitional criteria: class, sex, race, ethnicity, and so on. In other words: from the meritocratic point of view, one's class status in society is based on social achievement, not social ascription. One of the most widely used and accepted measurement of social achievement in modern societies today is educational qualifications or academic achievement. Now, in a

meritocratic society academic achievement is presumed to rest on equality of educational opportunity. However, equality of educational opportunity itself is supposedly governed by the principle of meritocracy: namely that academic achievement is a function of one's individual qualities of intelligence, effort and ambition in school, and not on one's social background, be it in terms of class, race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. It follows from all this that if there is a slippage in academic achievement then explanation for it must be sought in flaws in the individual's qualities (perhaps there is limited intelligence, perhaps there is insufficient effort, perhaps ambition is lacking, etc). And if this slippage is consistent among some social groups then these flaws must also be universal within these groups. (A corollary of this view is that since these groups (leaving class aside) are presumed to be biological constructs, regardless of what science states, the flaws are biologically determined and hence society is powerless in the face of their immutability.) However, the meritocratic logic rests on the assumption that we do *not* live in a society that is social structurally riven for historically determined reasons (rather than biological reasons), and where social groups exist in unequal power relations. But is this assumption correct? Is the social structure biologically determined? More to the point, Does academic achievement rest solely on individual qualities? Is it not possible that it may also depend on where one is within the social structure because one's location in that structure allows one access to specific educational advantages (manifest in such ways as access to resource-rich schools, qualified teachers, safe neighborhoods, etc.) In fact, research in support of this point is so extensive and ubiquitous in the field of education that it even renders reference citations to it redundant.

109. It is sobering to note that even in countries of the former Soviet bloc with explicit authoritarian agendas of eliminating socioeconomic class differences, the higher education sector continued to be biased in favor of the children of the elites—old and new. (Lewis and Dundar 2002). (One suspects that the same probably held true for China and Cuba.) For more on issues of equity in higher education see also Ziderman and Albrecht (1995).

110. A word of caution here about reading Chapter 7. What exactly is being suggested in that chapter? That, since it is impossible to measure the true economic significance of education generally and the generic university specifically—one of the central theses being advanced in the chapter—(or that since they help to reinforce inequality in society by serving as vehicles of class-reproduction), one may as well dispense with the university altogether as a luxury most of the countries in Africa can ill afford? (After all, this is exactly the line that has been taken hitherto by institutions such as the World Bank, but from the other side of the argument: yes, you can measure the economic worth of all education—vide, human capital theory and rates-of-return studies—and universities have come up short relative to other levels.) Such a conclusion would be a complete misreading of the thrust of the chapter. In fact, a reviewer, with some chagrin, did raise this issue—after reading only Chapter 7, but not the other chapters (because of time constraints)—albeit in a slightly different way:

I was sitting on the edge of my chair, as if [I was watching] a Hitchcock thriller, wondering when on earth [the author was] going to challenge, rather than merely deride, the World Bank's argument that universities [in Africa] are a poor investment, given the low rate[s] of social return…. When we finally [come] to the rebuttal, right at the end of the chapter, I find the [author goes] through the [same] hoary…arguments, long since established and well known, of the inadequacies in human capital theory. Well, alright, but just because the World Bank is relying on inadequate theory to support their unwillingness to fund universities, this does not in itself make universities a good investment. Universities might be a poor investment for other reasons, or might even be economical-

ly and socially damaging. Where is [the author's] alternative theory to show that universities deserve international funding, either because they actually are a good economic investment, or for other reasons?

In fairness, the reviewer, however, also goes on to note in the same breadth, "Maybe there is a proper justification for (the present scale of [development]) of universities in Africa somewhere else in the book, and [the author] can escape from this dilemma by some suitable cross reference. Otherwise, [the author is] asking the reader to make the assumption that a university is necessarily a good thing until somebody can conclusively prove otherwise. (Why not the converse proposition?)"

When Chapter 7 is placed in the context of this entire work then the thesis being put forward is that history shows us that all advanced civilizations have possessed institutions of higher learning in some form, but not purely for their directly measurable economic significance as understood by practitioners of the so-called "economics of education" (see critique in Chapter 7)—compare here the raison d'etre for the creation of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina in ancient Egypt (see the preceding chapter). Institutions of higher learning (that is the generic universities) serve many diverse functions and this is especially true of the modern university (which in most of Africa is the public university). Yes, of course, important parts of them (such as the professional schools and the science and technology research centers) do contribute directly to the economy by providing trained personpower and critical scientific/technological knowledge, but universities at the end of the day are not glorified vocational schools. It is not without reason after all, that even where institutions are created primarily for their vocational functions (broadly understood), such as "institutes of technology," they soon acquire the curricular mantle of a generic university. Universities, in other words, also have a number of non-economic functions, but which are critical to the health of a modern society, such as: training leaders; raising the level of education (broadly understood) within a society generally—thereby raising the potential for greater enlightened thinking, creativity, etc. Moreover, where they enjoy academic freedom they serve as beacons of democracy. A succinct description of this multi-faceted role of the modern university is perhaps best captured by Article 1 of the UNESCO sponsored "World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty First Century: Vision and Action" (UNESCO 1998):

We… participants in the World Conference on Higher Education, assembled at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris, from 5 to 9 October, 1998… affirm that the core missions and values of higher education, in particular the mission to contribute to the sustainable development and improvement of society as a whole, should be preserved, reinforced and further expanded, namely, to: (a) educate highly qualified graduates and responsible citizens able to meet the needs of all sectors of human activity, by offering relevant qualifications, including professional training, which combine high-level knowledge and skills, using courses and content continually tailored to the present and future needs of society; (b) provide opportunities *(espace ouvert)* for higher learning and for learning throughout life, giving to learners an optimal range of choice and a flexibility of entry and exit points within the system, as well as an opportunity for individual development and social mobility in order to educate for citizenship and for active participation in society, with a worldwide vision, for endogenous capacity-building, and for the consolidation of human rights, sustainable development, democracy and peace, in a context of justice; (c) advance, create and disseminate knowledge through research and provide, as part of its service to the community, relevant expertise to assist societies in cultural, social and economic development, promoting and developing scientific and technological research as well as research in the social sciences, the humanities and the creative arts; (d) help understand, interpret, preserve, enhance, promote and disseminate national and regional, international and historic cultures, in a context of cultural

pluralism and diversity; (e) help protect and enhance societal values by training young people in the values which form the basis of democratic citizenship and by providing critical and detached perspectives to assist in the discussion of strategic options and the reinforcement of humanistic perspectives; (f) contribute to the development and improvement of education at all levels, including through the training of teachers.

It is instructive to compare here also the "Accra Declaration on GATS and the Internationalization of Higher Education in Africa" issued at a conference organized by the Association of African Universities, UNESCO, and the South African Council on Higher Education (reproduced in no. 36, summer 2004, issue of *International Higher Education,* pp. 5-7 [a quarterly newsletter of the Boston College Center for International Higher Education]):

We participants, in this workshop on the Implications of WTO/GATS for Higher Education in Africa assembled in Accra, Ghana from 27–29 April 2004:
Recalling: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 26, paragraph 1, which affirms that "Everyone has the right to education" and that "higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit…."
Noting: The negative impact of decades of structural adjustment policies and inadequate financing on the viability of higher education institutions as teaching and research institutions in Africa…. the lack of transparency in GATS [General Agreement on Trades in Service sponsored by the World Trade Organization] deliberations, and insufficient knowledge and understanding of the full implications of GATS for higher education, especially in developing country contexts.
Declare: A renewed commitment to the development of higher education in Africa as a "public mandate" whose mission and objectives must serve the social, economic and intellectual needs and priorities of the peoples of the African continent while contributing to the "global creation, exchange and application of knowledge" (AAU Declaration on the African University in the Third Millennium)….

No society that aspires toward political, economic and social modernity can do without a university even in a context of, yes, poverty and mass illiteracy (compare, for instance, the socio-economic and political contexts within which the medieval universities of Europe existed). We must champion the development of flagship public universities, most especially in the face of the current subtle and not so subtle onslaught against them from forces of reaction sponsored by globalized corporate capital—is it any wonder that in response to this ominous onslaught there is now talk among some universities to patent the word "university" in order to protect its historically-rooted structural and mission agenda of viewing education as *a common good* (Halvorsen and Skauge 2004—see also endnote 21 in Chapter 8). In doing so, however, *the effort must not rest simply on grounds of their economic worth as generators of capitalist accumulation*. (But what about the issue of ever-mounting national budgetary constraints? One possible answer is, against the backdrop of equally ever-mounting global corporate profits and average per capita GDP growth rates in the OD countries, for the lords of globalized corporate capital and their pseudointellectual allies to advocate a global program of beating swords into ploughshares; the other is to call for the democratization [from each according to his/her/its ability] of national and corporate tax-structures, which almost throughout the world, albeit to varying degrees, are skewed in favor of the corporate rich and the powerful.) To justify the existence of universities purely on grounds of economic theory not only creates the problem of the cogency of the theory in the first place, but it also runs up against the counter lessons of historical experience. For example, consider

the matter of the universities vis-à-vis the so called scientific revolution in Europe (see the discussion in Appendix 1), or consider the matter of the role of universities in the genesis of the so-called "East Asian Miracle." Regarding the latter, as Carnoy, for example, has convincingly demonstrated:

The role of universities in bringing countries into a competitive position in the new world economy is inextricably tied to the broader policies in which their governments engage to achieve economic and social development. There is very little evidence in any of the countries studied that high quality science and engineering or technical research in universities created the basis for technological development in the economy. Rather, the success of the Korean and Singapore cases depended on an overall set of "developmental state" strategies that pushed export-driven economic growth and technological upgrading into science-based industrial production (Carnoy 1994: 90).

One other point: The foregoing discussion should not detract in the least bit from the fact that universities as they presently exist in Africa are in need of dire reform, especially in terms of finances, curricula and the matter of social structural inequality of access. (See, for example, Doss, Evenson and Ruther [2004].)

111. See also Gorman (2003) for an excellent study of the politics of knowledge; in this instance the politics behind Egyptian historiography, where he demonstrates that "historical interpretation is empowered by political forces as a means of defining, reinforcing, justifying and above all contesting what is politically legitimate and feasible" (p. 197).