

Chapter Five

The Undergraduate Curriculum and the Issue of Race: Opportunities and Obligations

INTRODUCTION

During the past decade administrators have found themselves in a reactive position in dealing with issues of race and racism. Responding to incidents and external pressures has been the norm. In terms of long-range planning, often they are left to worry about the problem without much prospect of being able to do something about it. The ability to seize the initiative and create a climate on campus genuinely inhospitable to racism has proved elusive. The continuing presence of racism in our culture is visible on campus in overt and implicit ways. Actual hostility, avoidance and condescension—even if it is thoughtless liberal rhetoric—are all elements of the larger dilemma.

A promising but difficult arena for effective action is the college curriculum. Not only can racism be combated directly and profoundly, but the horizons of students can be broadened in a way that can retard the spread of prejudice. How can knowledge, tolerance, respect and affection be nurtured through the work done by students in the college classroom?

Chief administrators usually focus on dealing with racism in the governance of the campus. Admissions, student life and hiring practices are among the most common issues. This essay focuses on the heart of the

university, the curriculum. Policy makers on campus must find a way to address the issue of race in the teaching function of the university without falling prey to strategies and techniques that provide little more than the appearance of efficacy.

The conventional approaches to the problem within the curriculum (e.g., special courses) may satisfy the immediate politics surrounding race issues. But these solutions can also disfigure the educational process, achieve little effect and even backfire. The calls for diversity and the attacks on traditional curricular practices seem to be effective slogans. But a more thoroughgoing reform of the undergraduate curriculum is necessary if the issue of race is really going to be grappled with.

The reform that is required may end up being more conservative in appearance and more radical in substance than any warring faction on today's campus may be willing to tolerate. Attacking racism in the curriculum requires attention to the aspirations and principles of liberal education to an extent that few institutions realize or may be prepared to give.

Historically, effective change within the university has required decisive leadership from above. In the matters of race, a commitment to widening access for students, diversifying the composition of the faculty and staff, and creating an atmosphere of respect and tolerance on the campus have clearly needed support from chief administrators and governing boards. With respect to the college curriculum, however, the patterns of change are more ambiguous. The protection of academic freedom and the traditions of faculty governance make intervention or leadership from above more problematic. Nevertheless, a commitment to a curricular vision and curricular principles and priorities on the part of the senior administration is indispensable.

This indispensability is not merely a function of the need to ensure that the proper resources are allocated. Substantive direction is required. Unfortunately, the recent pattern of administrative appointments has not demonstrated that intellectual leadership has been prized. Search committees have tended to select conciliators, mediators and managers. If the racial crisis within the university is going to be solved, principled intellectual leadership at the top will be necessary. Chief administrators can direct debate, eliminate uncertainty and combat inertia regarding the undergraduate curriculum, particularly where issues of race are at stake.

First, ten practical strategic suggestions are in order. They will be followed by a philosophical interlude which interprets the background behind the curricular debates now underway on many campuses. Last, some specific principles of curricular design will be discussed.

1. Administrators should raise the curricular question of how the curriculum deals with the issue of race even in the absence of a crisis or an existing debate.

2. The issue must be raised for all students, no matter their majors. The issue then becomes one of general education.
3. The curricular question must be posed in terms of the larger goals of the curriculum, not as a reflection of the interests of any specific field or group. Proposals should be evaluated in the context of a consistent notion of how and why the curriculum is organized in a particular manner.
4. The issue of resources should be set aside so that the discussion cannot immediately be translated into potential losses and gains for particular parties. Change within existing constraints should be stressed.
5. The administration should tap faculty leadership on the basis of how respected they are, not how vocal they are on this issue. The most helpful faculty may be those who by autobiography or field have not dealt directly with the issue. Expertise and professional qualifications related to the study of an ethnic group or the phenomenon of racism may not be initially helpful.
6. Inflammatory, self-aggrandizing rhetoric and journalistic clichés on the issue should be avoided scrupulously. The administration should draft a written challenge, a statement which helps frame campus debate on the curricular dimension in the most powerful and principled manner without accusation or praise. Achieving popularity is not the goal. No one will be entirely satisfied.
7. Outside assistance, in the form of a visiting committee, for example, should be considered so that a larger national and cultural issue does not deteriorate into a local provincial battle in which participants lose perspective. The issue of race should at no time be segregated from the larger questions of overall goals, standards and practices in the curriculum.
8. Adding courses and faculty will not solve the issue.
9. The underlying assumptions of protagonists as the debate proceeds must be examined vigilantly. The administration should, in an even-handed manner, question the facile claims of all groups.
10. Addressing the issue of race in the curriculum means reaching students, not preaching to them or satisfying nonstudent constituencies. This means providing students with a serious and vital general education which has resonance far beyond the issue of race, since how we deal with race and racism reflects the essential character of our values, our concept of truth and our attitude towards democracy.

PHILOSOPHICAL INTERLUDE

It may be useful to step back from the practical concerns of the curriculum to reflect on some important underlying philosophical factors that have a fundamental although indirect relevance to our concern with the relationship between the undergraduate curriculum and racial and ethnic issues on campus.

But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false . . . All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.¹

Wittgenstein's reformulation of the dilemmas of certainty and objectivity point to how difficult it has become to talk about the central activities of the university: inquiry, teaching and learning. We have become uncomfortable with the assumption that convictions are subject to verification by evidence or that proof and argument can be marshaled and communicated satisfactorily.

Contemporary philosophical and methodological discourse has generated fundamental skepticism about ideas of commonality and coherence. It has made agreement regarding the purposes, practices and principles of the university harder to obtain than ever before. As scholars, teachers and learners, we have come to identify ourselves locally—by gender, race, religion and nationality. The idea of a larger category—humanity—of which we all are part has disintegrated politically, socially and intellectually. It remains understood as the residue of a particular cultural conceit and not as a timeless, universal aspect. The same might be said of the idea of reason.

No discussion of so crucial a matter as race and racism within the curriculum can avoid confronting the underlying debate concerning epistemology and interpretation. Without valid intercultural canons of reason and objectivity, universal standards (however modified) combating racism intellectually on a comprehensive basis become difficult.

On the issue of certainty—and therefore the matter of truth—Wittgenstein avoided a position of radical subjectivity. Knowing something for sure, accepting the validity of an argument, or acknowledging the results of some procedure of verification become contingent on an "inherited background," a "system." The inherited system must be accepted before the process of determining truth begins. It is the framework in which language functions. That framework has rules, which themselves, as Noam Chomsky's work suggests, are prior to experience and the use of rules of grammar. These rules secure the utility and comprehensibility of language among humans.² What appears as a concession to relativism is really a clarification of the rules of life.

Wittgenstein sought to contribute to the philosophical challenge of the early twentieth century, to reigning nineteenth century notions concerning truth, the scientific method, the relation of subject and object, the character

of perception, the notion of the external world and the function of language as instrument of reason. These traditional verities frequently are condemned under the common heading of "positivism."

Despite the radical epistemological implications of his formulations, Wittgenstein was making a plea for identifying grounds of common truths. He was uncomfortable with either silence or the resigned acceptance of a jungle of diverse epistemologies, a Tower of Babel where there are no priorities, no legitimate questions of reliability or criteria of truth.³ Wittgenstein's position is helpful. It stands in sharp contrast to those who, pleading the case of diversity, deny the validity of any construct of multicultural standards of judgment or normative intellectual coherence. The case *against* racism, after all, is based on universal and true propositions of science, ethics and politics.

The model for the university with which we still work in our public and private institutions is a nineteenth century construct. It is organized structurally along lines compatible with traditional ideals about what can be learned from one generation to another, how inquiry can be conducted, and the standards of verification ("testing, confirmation and disconfirmation," in Wittgenstein's terms) and communication. America's nineteenth century model was influenced by the German university. One consequence of this legacy is the continuing hegemony of graduate school objectives over competing efforts to delineate a circumscribed, autonomous arena for undergraduate study.

The relative homogeneity—in terms of race, ethnicity, religion and social class—particularly before 1945 (when African-Americans in higher education were educated, if at all, largely in segregated contexts), of the professoriate and student body in America and the undisturbed allegiance to nineteenth century epistemological foundations are connected historically. Complementary relationships existed among (1) a stable intellectual ideology of knowledge and inquiry; (2) the structure of the university; and (3) the elite population the university served. The symmetry and symbiosis among these three elements has broken down since the early 1960s. This may be, in retrospect, the most striking legacy of the turmoil of the 1960s within the university.

In higher education, the past quarter century has brought economic and social democratization in terms of access. Since the mid-1960s halting but yet somewhat successful efforts to destroy the barrier of racial discrimination have occurred. The policies of the Reagan-Bush years will not reverse the process, despite the enormous retarding influence they have exerted. As the university faces the coming decades, the facts of our national demography (not to speak of the political and ethical imperatives) will occasion an even more radical departure from the traditional social

profile of students and unfortunately, to a lesser extent, faculty and other professionals.

It is ironic that the progress in democratization in terms of race in the area of student access coincided, historically, with the triumph of the several parallel critiques of traditional views of the nature of and approach to knowledge. The loss of coherence reflects itself in the character of faculty debates regarding priorities in the curriculum. The critiques have targeted the ideal of "objectivity"; a universal construct of "reason"; notions of "facts" and "certainties"; the legitimacy of the distinction between "fact" and "value;" and the validity of any particular system of hierarchy whether about an external world or truths within philosophical discourse, particularly in ethics and aesthetics.

Language itself has drifted from the status of a potentially objective instrument of discourse to a mechanism imprisoned in contextuality whose use as a neutral instrument, despite the insights of transformational grammar, is devalued as a cultural conceit. Phenomenological critiques have damaged the stability of meaning and therefore texts. The activities of speaking, writing and reading have undergone critical revision, the result of which is to enshrine the fundamental instability of any effort to derive or ascribe meaning from language generally, or to communicate through language over time and space, in print, beyond local niches of specific cultural coherences, ethnographically determined.⁴

The basic vehicle of learning, the written text, has been denied its historic and radical potential—to communicate over time and space with stable meaning, to carry identifiable meaning universally, irrespective of the identity of the reader. Complex modern theories of interpretation have damaged the idea of a fixed, shared object as the basis of discourse.

Since the 1970s, the American university has become a battleground of competing revisions of nineteenth century views of the enterprise of university education and research. This has been particularly acute for the humanities and social sciences, although the natural sciences have also been affected. The idea of "general education" is under a cloud, as a remnant of a particular social and intellectual tradition, as the residue of an historic and sustained domination by "others."

In the foreground of today's debate about methodologies of inquiry and expression is the intense struggle over content. Since the late 1970s, the attack on canons, the demand that heretofore forgotten dimensions of the past and present be reconstructed (e.g., the voices of women and minorities), the call for "globalization" in the curriculum, all have been hard. There is a sense that the inherited traditions cry out for revision and new interpretation. Behind these calls for change are voices representing women and the disadvantaged ethnic and racial minorities.⁵

The demand for access to the university, particularly with regard to race, which began in earnest during the civil rights movement in the 1960s, no longer can be described in ways analogous to the historic effort to gain access to the lunch counter, the voting booth and the purchase of housing—other objectives of the civil rights movement. No matter how uneven the achievements, the rights and services to which access has been gained (or still is being sought) other than the university remain quite fixed in their definition and social utility. With respect to higher education, however, the heretofore discriminated populations (whose equal access to the university is a political and ethical necessity) now encounter an institution once noted for its exclusivity whose character and purpose are in disarray. In other words, in terms of higher education, at the moment a new population is ready to sit down at the lunch counter, the counter is devalued. It is as if voting is suddenly deemed by its previous users as obsolete and fraudulent. The housing so eagerly sought is abandoned.⁶

The paradox is that at the moment access to an effective instrument seems at hand, the premises on which the existing system has wielded power (sometimes in an unabashed, arbitrary manner) are being undermined fundamentally. Those premises were considered the normative, universal rational methods and objectives now under attack. Therefore the university that functioned to provide power and confer status loses efficacy in the eyes of the elites that crated them just at the moment of serious social and ethnic democratization.

This process of theoretical undermining may look "liberal," even "radical," on the surface. Some of its advocates may be victims of discrimination. But the radical critique may actually be a form of delegitimization. Its impact may be reactionary and discriminatory, perhaps unconsciously designed to perpetuate the monopoly on power and authority of the traditional elite. In the case of the university one might say, following Wittgenstein: Yes, our institutions of learning are imperfect, concealed, and in some sense corrupt. But one might ask, are institutions in the world ever perfect? Might they really be different? Has there ever been a practical vehicle that did not break down, a bureaucracy without inefficiencies? Are not shortcomings really a matter of tolerable distances (within the complexities of modern society) between ideals and results rather than reflections of weaknesses in the ideals on which our institutions have been based historically?

If no utopian project has ever seen effective realization in the world, then perhaps the radical, skeptic attack on the epistemological traditions of discourse within the university is a highly masked but subversive project, particularly in terms of redressing racism. The fact that the rhetoric of critique is loaded with all sorts of claims regarding the possibility of achieving greater justice and equality in the future does not diminish the fact

that the effect of the methodological internal strife is to weaken the university and its significance.⁷

Politically conservative theorists in recent years have contented themselves with attacks on relativism. They preach a nostalgic and tendentious allegiance to a mythical consensus about standards, methods and content of the past. The appropriation of the word "excellence" during the 1980s by educational policy makers associated with the Reagan years is one egregious example. There is, therefore, the prospect that after two centuries of hegemony, the ruling elites, radicals and conservatives alike, are undermining the American university and its working definitions while graciously inviting those who have been shut out to enter. What may be left are dismantled remnants. The elite seems content to muse that the enterprise and its intellectual foundations are without firm utility, epistemological security, or ethical or political priority.

If the university does not come to grips with the fundamental crisis of method, content and social function, a process of such serious devaluation of the enterprise of higher education for the decades ahead may take place. The once coveted groves of academe may become abandoned neighborhoods. In the name of modernity, methodological sophistication, deconstruction, the continuing crisis of philosophical and linguistic conscience—thinking that is neither naive nor merely idle careerist speculation—the highly prized enterprises of research and learning become trivialized as credentialing operations based on subjective conceits and illusions. Higher education is left without the philosophical foundation and the epistemological prestige that can give the university its importance in helping humanity attempt to progress from barbarism to civilization, from war to peace, from oppression, race and class discrimination to justice. Diversity itself is no answer.

This is not to diminish the significance of essential critical discourse, the profoundly ethical and tortured reflection of which Wittgenstein was uniquely capable. As we proceed rapidly on the task of eliminating racism and incorporating the African-American and other cultural traditions associated often with victims of injustice into the university, we must not impose an insupportable, false or artificial epistemological order on our institutions. However, in order to come to grips with the racial crisis, we must generate a common theoretical basis and clarify shared principles of action and belief, even if it means seriously changing the structure of how we conduct research and teach. The obligation to find a solid, valid basis for continuing the functions of the university may mean preserving and extending the inherited tradition of practice, particularly in the matter of curriculum.

The superficial claim that tradition has been ethnocentric and Eurocentric will not suffice. The proper integration of diverse methods, materials, perspectives and traditions is part of the dynamic of the

old-fashioned project of the university. But the denial of the fundamentals of the old-fashioned enterprise without providing a resolution that creates an equivalent to the common-ground characteristic of the past is unacceptable.⁸ The empowerment that higher education promised, if not delivered in the past, assumed that common ground.

In a democracy, the political project that underlies the racial integration of student-faculty populations in the traditional university and the legitimate demand for cultural diversification within the curriculum is the search for meanings for that which is common among humans. The project of universal literacy and the provision to all citizens a high level of education assumes the dissemination of a shared language and criteria for judging good and evil so that violence might be contained and peace and justice flourish.

Higher education as it exists today still depends on the assumption that the rhetoric of social contract theory has value; that ideas of human nature, reason and freedom can be developed in ways that hold beyond diversity; that universality in ethical terms is desirable. What might be common to all humans— notions of individuality, dignity, tolerance and respect—ought to be concrete and meaningful.

The failure to defend common-sensical truth, content and the *shared* political project with respect to higher education on the part of the committed opponents to racism unfortunately has given credence to simplistic fulminations from the political right about the triumph of relativism and radical subjectivism in the American university.⁹ Our task within higher education (particularly in the curriculum) is to clarify and restore—in service of the ideals of racial justice and the death of prejudice and oppression—the validity of the "inherited background," the "system" in which we operate. That system serves to make the university an institution capable of sustaining freedom and truth against unpredictable but historically real enemies and odds.

Culture, knowledge, science, reason, and the search for and communication of truth—all the clichés reminiscent of tiresome, self-congratulatory university and liberal arts rhetoric—demand active reconstruction in ways that are compatible with institutional functioning as it is, not as it might be and never remotely was; with the university's central role in a society dependent on information and technology. We have an obligation to make the system and its rules work better than ever before.

THE UNDERGRADUATE CURRICULUM: THE CASE OF GENERAL EDUCATION

Recent debates on curriculum, particularly those at Stanford University, reveal that the balance between general education and the major—

specialization—must be redressed. The legitimate demand for the inclusion of non-Western materials and the need to respond to traditions such as the African-American, Mexican-American and Native American within the general education framework cannot be addressed if the total amount of time devoted to general education remains fixed.

Too little time is allocated now to general education in American colleges. As a result, what emerges is a false and divisive debate between so-called traditionalists and radicals, between supporters of “Western” culture and those who argue diversity and deny canons, or any effort to sustain hierarchies of cultural judgment. All sides of the issue are fighting over a marginal amount of curricular time. As the legitimate agenda for general education grows, so must the time devoted to it. College might start earlier and become a six-year program of study, and high school be reduced to a two-year program.

The argument for maintaining current general education schemes or restoring past programs is often an example of false history masquerading as a plea for tradition. The programs of the past, focused as they were on the “Western Tradition”, were neither so coherent nor so effective as to merit nostalgia. Living alumni often provide inadvertent evidence of the failure of past programs of general education to civilize students and instill the lifelong love of learning and critical thinking.

But an unnecessary struggle is provoked as requirements for completing the undergraduate major—which occupies up to 80 percent of a student’s time in college—remain stable in terms of the numbers of courses. The demands now being made regarding content diversity are directed at an artificially determined block of time devoted in the curriculum to general education, particularly of a required sort. Apart from the growing extent of remediation required of all undergraduates (owing to the failure of high schools to educate adequately both the advantaged and the disadvantaged student) and the range of basic skills ideally deemed desirable at graduation from college, the demographic and cultural changes of the twentieth century have substantially enlarged the potential need for and agenda of general education. Therefore, leadership on the curriculum must involve guidance on the basic issue of how much time in the undergraduate calendar should be devoted to common study within a general education program for all undergraduates, notwithstanding the range or diversity of the future interests of students in terms of specialization.

The curriculum debate—the desire and call for cross-cultural comparisons and the extensive integration of non-European materials—mirrors a process of de-Europeanization in terms of world politics, culture and the character of the United States. The way out of the static debate regarding a canon and a core is not to concede that there are no canons, or that no valid

core can be constructed for all students. Rather, we should recognize that canons—as canons, not mere preferences—have always changed and must change periodically.

Two hundred years ago, Roman history and Latin authors occupied a central place in education. The Roman tradition provided many of the models for the Founding Fathers in America and the leaders of the French Revolution. But today, not even the most conservative proponents of courses on a common Western heritage, or even the centrality of antiquity are calling for Horace, Vergil, Sallust, Cicero or Tacitus. Since the late nineteenth century, in England, Germany and the United States, arguments for the pedagogical centrality of antiquity have been centered on the heritage of Ancient Greece.

If required general education is given the proper place, then racism can be addressed in the curriculum in part through diversity. The inherited traditions will flourish precisely through the integration of wholly new materials and perspectives. A core and canon might both emerge, specific to each institution. Dropping items and including new ones and basic redesign need not involve radical compromises in coherence or integrity.

Furthermore, if general education as such is properly prized by an institution as part of a genuine commitment to liberal learning, then the issues debated cease to be ones of constituent representation and political symbolisms, but become ones of authentic curricular and pedagogical principles. One reduces the likelihood that the curriculum will become a surrogate arena for political conflicts within institutions that have little to do with what is taught and required.

What has enraged so many observers is that the debate on the curriculum seems to be managed by all sides—by protagonists of change and those who defend tradition—as if the issues at stake were comparable to those associated with affirmative action policies, where numerical analysis and proportionate measurement are used to evaluate the legitimacy of the result. The proper conceit in faculty discourse about curriculum development is that the criteria of educational need and quality in materials and design—seemingly substantive and autonomous issues—must prevail. Within the accepted rhetoric of curricular discussion, a simple plea for diversity and representation is properly deemed insufficient.

The argument for change on behalf of issues and materials reflecting racial diversity and the equality of races should not resist the traditional premises of curriculum design. Neither should it manipulate them by using the rhetoric of curriculum as a thinly veiled disguise for other agendas. The best bases on which to challenge—from the perspective of excluded cultures—so-called tradition, current practice or reactionary schemes for

core programs are the classic assumptions, ideals and rhetoric of the liberal arts. These are the apparent premises embraced by the opposition.

Few existing programs actually honor the standards and normative claims asserted by those who think they are defending an historic curricular and intellectual tradition. Coherence and the transmission of the Western cultural heritage are difficult to document in existing programs of undergraduate study, least of all in distribution requirements or the definition of majors. The critics of pressures for curricular change have a hard time defending present or recent practice on the very grounds they invoke against reformers seeking to integrate new materials and points of view: effectiveness and coherence.

The call for cultural diversity in the curriculum coincides with the long overdue need to reconsider conventional undergraduate curricular design. The defense of changes which seek to deal with matters of race can, and should, be couched in terms of the overall validity of liberal learning. The virtues of the collection of courses and requirements outlined in most college catalogues, in terms of the ideal of the liberal arts, are rarely sufficient to frame a powerful argument for keeping curricular practice intact on the grounds of the traditional rhetoric of liberal learning.

However, if one takes the idea of general education seriously, then the matters of race and diversity come into play in a fundamental manner quite apart from efforts at visible racial representation in curricular materials.¹⁰ The kind of so-called curricular affirmative action argument that seems so offensive to so many faculty does not need to be invoked.

The obstacles to change in the curriculum that face proponents of diversity are the same obstacles facing the creation of any effective program of general education *per se*. These obstacles include (1) the criteria of hiring and promotion, which place a low value on participation in general education; (2) the excessive disciplinary narrowness of graduate training, which renders the Ph.D. holder insufficiently trained to teach in well-designed general education programs; (3) the failure of institutions to redress these two shortcomings, particularly to curb the power of departments; (4) the reluctance of faculty to train to teach outside of their disciplines; (5) the absence of sufficient resources to ensure that a general education program can be designed and implemented in a way that accounts for legitimate scholarly specialization and eliminates the fear that general education curricula must be, by definition, intellectually invalid and suspect from the perspective of individual disciplines.

Taking two common alternative principles of undergraduate curricular design—(1) the focus on broad issues and problems, and (2) the concentration on the historical dimension—the possibilities for practical resolution become clear. If one asked the question, how does one develop

among contemporary undergraduates the capacity to think, inquire and debate articulately about issues such as justice or the individual in society, then in proposing serious curricular solutions, the matter of race, nonwhite and non-Western cultures, as well as a reformulated construct of the Western tradition, all must come into play.

One must not forget that one is designing curricula for students born between 1970 and 1980. What will motivate them, in the first place, to serious thinking, reading and writing? In answering that question one must face the shared political and historical autobiography of the student body. Race and the development of African-American community, for example, cannot be avoided; neither can the cultural materials from that tradition. The history of slavery and the politics of race since 1860 until 1970 is essential history. By asking fundamental questions about what should be learned and how, the globalization and diversification process in terms of issues, materials and modes of interpretation can occur coherently. Serious attention to normative issues such as justice in the late twentieth century must include diverse and new materials and issues. Dusting off a curricular design from thirty years ago is clearly insufficient.

Alternatively, if one takes the historical as an essential, desirable sensibility to be encouraged by general education, the same conclusion will emerge. Clearly, one cannot teach traditional Western history, Chinese history and African history and account for new perspectives of historical research and inquiry in each arena all in two semesters. But if one devoted a reasonable block of time, then one could argue rationally and fashion a sequence of courses. For example, as part of a requirement to develop an understanding of history and the character of historical narratives and explanations, an undergraduate in California might read Herodotus for the interpretation of cultural difference; Thucydides for the relation of democracy to the pursuit of economic and military imperialism in a world power; and Bernal Diaz and Prescott on the conquest of Mexico. No American or Californian should be ignorant of Mexican history and culture, before Cortes and after.

Here the so-called classical tradition and the contemporary imperative to respond to matters of race and ethnicity merge easily. American history must also be taught. Cross-cultural comparison by the student then becomes ineluctable. The issues and correctives emerging from new social historical research can be integrated. When the motivation behind curricular decisions remains a vision of shared educational objectives and constructs of a common need, curricular coherence in terms of content and modes of interpretation is not hard to develop.

In the final analysis, it is the time-honored rhetoric of liberal learning that is the best strategy for widening the curricular frame of reference in

terms of race. Students who graduate from our colleges, white and black, need to (and should want to) question, think about and understand the world they live in. That has always been the guiding assumption of liberal arts curricula. Tradition and intellectual continuity have therefore been essential virtues. But tradition need not be construed as restoration. Tradition is not a static concept, but a dynamic one.

The great innovations in core curricula of the past to which we are inclined to turn for inspiration were motivated by specific political agendas. The Columbia University general education program was an outgrowth of the first World War and America's decisive entrance into European affairs. Hutchins' programs and those of Barr and Buchanan at St. John's College (and those of the Deweyite progressive opposition to core programs in the 1930s) were responses to the crisis of confidence in American democracy in the face of the arrival at the university of diverse ethnic and religious groups after 1918, and the allure of fascism and communism in the 1930s. The Harvard "Redbook" program of the postwar era sought to address specific perceived needs, which derived from an interpretation of the challenges of the postwar era.

There never has been a general education curricular program free of a political agenda. The only question, therefore, in the context of the centrality of race, is not the mere representation of cultural diversity, but rather what the political project beneath a curriculum in our era should be. A disciplined answer to that question will force the creation of a modern, culturally diverse program of study that honors the cultural traditions of the West (as they are now understood) and offers a more compelling strategy for teaching essential intellectual skills of analysis.

The obligation of administrators in any given institution, therefore, is to get the faculty to confront fundamental issues of general education and liberal learning. The traditions of liberal learning offer a fixed and stable context from which to combat racism. Superficial, short-term self-interest and vulgar politics can be deflected. There is no normative curriculum. Specific curricular content in general education will necessarily differ from one institution to the next. But there will be common features if the definition of objectives is fundamental. We live, after all, in the same national context. We all live on the same planet and face comparable challenges as a result.

What might be common, shared, basic objectives, in fundamental political terms, of curriculum building on the undergraduate level as we face the end of the twentieth century? Among those objectives must be the fostering of racial understanding, tolerance and pride within diverse heritages. At the core must be convictions about the character and direction of those aspects of life that all individuals and distinct groups share in

common. The celebration of diversity is legitimated by the support that celebration provides to the ethical priority of the sense of commonality and the recognition of the essential potential dignity and value of all human beings. The pursuit of the examined life by individuals in a democracy is the essential objective. Fulfilling the obligation of higher education demands that we assist all students in that confrontation.

Wittgenstein's "element in which arguments have their life" with respect to race, diversity and the curriculum is the traditional ideology of the liberal arts. The inclusion of cultural voices and heritages from within the United States and the global community is validated as an imperative consistent with tradition. The classic materials, primarily from Western history and literature, will continue to frame the enterprise, since the objectives—a critical, literate and politically active citizenry (not to speak of a productive one)—are themselves culturally derived and integral to the theory of democracy in the West.

The concept of rational discourse (no matter how refined and subtle), the encouragement of participation in decision-making within the public sphere, constructs of ethical responsibility, and individual autonomy gain their contemporary meaning within a stable historical framework. The result of vigilant criticism and review is a useful notion of freedom. Within the political project of linking education to democracy, the university can continue to function quite traditionally and effectively for all groups.

The expansion of programs of general education and the diversification of their content are crucial components in the service of this quite conservative definition of the goals of a college education. The radical epistemological critique that seeks to question the validity of the intellectual assumptions behind the university and its political significance ironically will serve the cause of combating racism only insofar as it helps to redefine the common human project, and does not subvert it.

The ultimate irony of the heated debate currently underway at many institutions is that the historic function of the undergraduate years in terms of traditional liberal learning has been honored for the most part only in rhetoric. The most radical avenue to combat racism in the undergraduate curriculum is therefore the most truly conservative: a genuine, if not revolutionary, effort to create serious programs of general education. Before the century comes to a close, we must realize the potential, in curricular practice, of the liberal arts. If we succeed, the promise of democracy for all citizens and the protection of freedom—not to speak of the potential of the United States culturally, politically and economically—might finally be realized.

NOTES

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 15–16.
2. See the essays, including one by Chomsky, in John Searle, *The Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
3. For a general and accessible view of these issues, see A. J. Ayer's *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Random House, 1982).
4. On the matter of reading, see for example "Reading: Old and New," in *Daedalus* 112, no. 1 (1983).
5. On the conservative side, a comparable call for radical revision of instructional practice (a variant on the general critique of the reigning intellectual foundations) has been reflected in the reintroduction of sacred premiums, the restoration of the regard for divine truth and Christian ethics, and the rejection of secular traditions of science and the nonsectarian claims to universal humanism. The flowering of new Christian colleges and universities and their struggle to integrate somehow modern science and the tradition of "neutrality" in scholarship with normative Christian ideals is the politically reactionary dimension of the general plight of the late twentieth century American university.
6. The closest analogy to this process as it regards the university is the contemporary critique of the legal system. The arguments of recent critical legal theory have deepened the skepticism regarding legal reasoning and assumptions about the traditions of the rule of law, including the autonomy of the legal dimension. The aura of neutrality—the law as blind to racial and class differences and as a vehicle through which justice might be achieved—has been cast into greatest doubt, ironically, within the university law schools.
7. This possibility is especially poignant given the general cultural climate that militates against the influence of the university and its curriculum on students. Confidence in the university needs to be higher, particularly because of the growing number of so-called nontraditional constituents. See Leon Botstein, "American Letters: An Absent Rigour," *Times Literary Supplement*, September 15–21, 1989.
8. It would be well to look for a moment at the political roots of much of modern theoretical skepticism in literary criticism, social science and philosophy. Beneath claims regarding the nature of inquiry and theories of language are often political projects. The cases of Paul de Man and Martin Heidegger are instructive. The arguable connections between their intellectual work and their association with radically evil political movements should inspire us to look carefully at the political overtones and linkages of contemporary, fashionable theories of perception, criticism and knowledge; at the connection between a philosophical psychology and methodology of interpretation and the inherent and potential political consequences. On Heidegger, see Victor Farias, *Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1989), particularly the introduction by Juergen Habermas.

9. We currently focus on Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* (Simon and Schuster, New York: 1987). For a serious example of the conservative critique, directed at the development of modern social science, see Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

10. Among the institutional and curricular solutions to be avoided is the creation of ghetto-like enclaves such as area studies programs, which not only permit courses reflecting diverse cultures to be taken by students—in isolation—but also to be ignored.

Chapter Ten

*White Faculty Struggling with the
Effects of Racism**

Many decades ago, the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal and his American associates jolted the conscience of Americans with a book titled *An American Dilemma*.¹ Myrdal pointed out the discrepancy between the American creed of equality and the continuing brutal and unequal treatment of blacks in our midst. Since that time, significant changes have taken place both in the law of the country and in the behavior of its people. Yet, even the most casual observer finds persistent patterns of discrimination, including different rates of employment for blacks and whites, segregation in housing and social separation. We might expect that things would be better in today's colleges and universities, since these institutions have often been in the vanguard of social progress. Professors and students alike are dedicated not just to the pursuit of truth but to the ideal of reflective intelligence and to the task of furthering mutual understanding. The facts of university life, however, show fairly widespread racial abuse,² continuing underrepresentation of blacks on the faculty, social separation of black and white students and limited help for black students in coping with the effects of discriminatory prior schooling.

The project on which this chapter is based confronted me with some grim facts about the persistence of neglect, prejudice, fear and confusion

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among white faculty as they face black students in their classrooms. The project, which was conducted at a state institution, gave teachers an opportunity to investigate the role of racial issues in their teaching. I visited the campus on three separate occasions over a period of several days to conduct lengthy interviews with faculty and students. I repeatedly interviewed all members of project staff and participated in meetings with top administrators and university departments. The picture that emerged from my study is complex. I found no one who proudly voiced naive or vicious prejudices. Indeed, the faculty members whom I encountered were afraid and embarrassed to discover prejudicial thinking in themselves. But, many faculty tended to look away from the problems of race and thereby deprived themselves and their white students of the opportunity of becoming aware of their attitudes towards race and they deprived their black students of the essential opportunity of being treated unequivocally as equals. My experience made one major reason why racism remains an unresolved problem quite clear: One root cause of racism is passivity based on obliviousness and numbed feeling. This chapter will disentangle that obliviousness as it affects white faculty.

NEGLECT AND AVOIDANCE

It is a curious fact that the lessening of overt discrimination, the abrogation of legal barriers and enhanced access for black students to institutions of higher education have all supported neglect of the issue of racism. Many white faculty seem almost to think that the problem of racism has been solved. Occasionally, they are supported in this belief by some younger black students who, for their own spurious comfort, wish to deny the facts of the discrimination that they experience daily. The assumption that racism is waning leads many faculty to think that any special attention to their black students is itself a form of discrimination. Such professors, when asked about the distribution of grades of black students, will say that they do not want to engage in such counting. Yet, probing soon reveals that they think the grade performance of their black students is lower than that of white students. Further probing also reveals that thoughts and efforts devoted to raising the performance of underprepared students are not always pronounced. For instance, the introductory course in one science department had an unusually high failure rate; a large portion of the white students received less-than-passing grades, while the percentage of black students who received such grades was even larger. That department had rejected a proposal to improve the course by teaching it in two sections so that the failure rate due to differences in preparation could be lessened through

appropriate phasing of instruction. I was told that the faculty did not want to engage in "high school kind of teaching."

As I probed further into the causes of neglect, I found that almost all faculty had been brought up under conditions in which discrimination of blacks was accepted and even endorsed by parents and other significant people in their environment. For instance, I interviewed a white professor who in high school had a black friend—a fellow football player and lover of poetry—whom he could not bring to his house. Many faculty were brought up in an environment in which there were simply no blacks; that absence suggested that there was a reason for excluding them. Almost every faculty member whom I interviewed was ashamed to find racial prejudice in herself or himself. To counter this shame, white faculty looked away from issues of race for fear of having to become more aware of their own almost unwilling prejudice. This remarkable fact helps to explain the deep impact that Myrdal's book made.³ It touched people's conscience of finding irrational stereotypes within themselves. The feeling that prejudice is ego-alien distinguishes American racism from the antisemitic racism found in pre-Nazi and Nazi Germany, which cause neither embarrassment nor guilt for academics and nonacademics alike in regard to the stereotype of the evil Jew. This split in the American consciousness gives us a handle that can help us to clarify feelings and attitudes.

DIFFERENCES IN FACULTY ATTITUDES

There is a wide variety of attitudes among white faculty. On one end of the continuum are people like the young professor whose conscience was badly jolted when she was still in high school: Her state instituted a system of private schools in order to avoid federal requirements for racial integration. As soon as she could, she left the United States for study abroad. When she began teaching, she did so with a strong dedication to openness in the classroom. Her readiness to let black students know when they performed unsatisfactorily provided convincing evidence of her nondiscriminatory bent. (More encumbered faculty shy away from such clarity for fear that they may be thought prejudiced—perhaps as a defense against a lingering half-prejudice that they are dimly aware of in themselves.) Yet, even this professor found that her black students thought that she was not sufficiently caring. Only after she and her black and white students had shared their feelings about race did one obstacle to open communication fade. As she put it to me: "My perception of my class was that my students had been very interactive with each other. I saw the blacks as participating equally. In a group interview, black students in my class said that they perceived me to be

open and receptive to discussing racial issues, but they felt that if they said everything that was on their minds it wouldn't be received well, so they didn't feel that they unfolded or revealed as much of themselves and their own value system in the course as they could have if they had felt that there was more receptivity. The issue was that, if they said what they felt, nobody really cared. The learning for me was that, even though I was being open and not shying away from issues, there was a point beyond which the black students did not feel they were willing to go. It made me aware of how much I don't know about other people—not just blacks but whites, too. I became much closer to the students as individuals. As a result of that effort, they appeared to realize that I was genuinely concerned, especially the black students, who started showing up in my office more frequently than before."

Near the other end of the continuum are professors who object to what they consider the unintelligibility of black dialect, the special clannishness of black students and the inadequacies of black students' academic performance. In the words of one professor, "I cannot communicate well with the black subpopulation. It is apparently very important for blacks to know the right handshake, to know how to talk mumbo jumbo or whatever. There are things that I don't agree with that blacks do; for example, their vocabulary when they get together. They may be doing enough of that—talking in the black jargon—that they do not have enough practice using English. In consequence, they are poorly prepared for higher education." The professor and the students speak different languages, and because translation has barely been attempted there is a sense of threat and illegitimacy.

ROOTS OF DISCRIMINATION

One asks why our society still seems compelled to continue mental and physical segregation based on skin color. Historians have explored the economic basis of discrimination. Images of black inferiority arose at the point at which exploitation of blacks became profitable for whites. As Fredrickson writes, "When it became more profitable to use black slaves rather than white indentured servants on the tobacco plantations of the Chesapeake . . . a powerful incentive was created for degrading all blacks to an inferior status."⁴ But, whatever the legitimacy of economic interpretations of discrimination, they should not lead us to hide from ourselves the fact that segregation provides an opportunity for expressing malign inclinations. We know that economic reasons do little to explain the Nazis' extermination of Jews. In this country, the discrimination written into the fabric of social life had kept blacks and whites so far apart that they do not have an adequate base for learning about and testing preconceptions. Very few white faculty whom

I interviewed had acquaintance relations, not to speak of friendships, with blacks. There is thus a fertile breeding ground for the development of fears and for the projection of impulses and attitudes that are unacceptable and feared in oneself onto members of the "strange" group. Thus, a psychological walling in is added to economic segregation.

While one can view an excluded minority negatively, one can also project onto it qualities that one believes that one lacks or that one possesses to a diminished degree. Some white faculty whom I observed ascribed a depth of affect, emotional straightforwardness and directness in admitting anger to blacks that they felt to be lacking in whites. While such idealization is more benign than the projection of undesirable qualities, it constitutes another form of prejudice. It places a burden of specialness on blacks and thus hinders the intercourse of people on the basis of equality of virtue and fallibility. Racial liberals need to struggle their way through to a demystification of blacks. Attitudes towards women are both denigrated and idealized. Under conditions of oppression, women are both denigrated and idealized. In either case, they become an object of male projections.

There is a borderline area in which unacceptable and idealized impulses merge—the area of sexual feelings. I was struck that, not much below the surface in some academics, black people and black students aroused strong sexual feelings. In the case of women students, there was definite hedging about sexual attraction. A male professor referred to his fear (desire) that black female students would find him too attractive; hence, he had to keep a certain distance. A female black student reported that she had noticed that her white professors often stepped back a pace or two when a black female student approached them. Images of black males stressed aggression (fear of aggression), but these images, too, at times merged with sexual ones.

Other emotions were closer to the surface. Some faculty expressed their fear of discussing facts of economic discrimination and disparity of income in their classes. As one professor said, "I cannot look black students in the eye when I talk about black unemployment." Faculty said that they were afraid of encountering feelings of anger among black students and feelings of guilt among white students that presentations on the economic situation of blacks might arouse. Fear of black anger, based on the professor's own guilty identification with a long history of oppression, surfaced many times in my investigation.

Thus, underlying the routinized meeting of white professors and black students in the classroom is a tangled web of feelings and emotions. A professor's disregard of the emotional, social and intellectual situation of black students goes hand in hand with limitation of feeling, poverty of empathy, and attempts to avoid acknowledging anger and fear. Prejudice not only humiliates and dehumanizes the oppressed, it does something similar to

the oppressor. However, professors who came to see their black students as full human beings were increasingly freed from the burden of alienation. Some, in the first flush of enthusiasm, seemed to want to throw content out of their classes. But, a balance was soon established. One does not need so much to talk about feelings as express them. Students want subject matter content, but they are very quick to discern and respond to caring, particularly when caring flows not from guilt but from a decently unencumbered openness to other people. The project that I observed found it necessary first to tackle the problems of white professorial attitudes before it could proceed to its initial priority, knowledge and awareness of black students.

While white professors both overidealize and disparage black students, black professors are not immune from prejudice. However, for them it takes other forms. At the very least, self-consciousness about white stereotypes can lead black professors to be sensitive if not defensive about shortcomings that black students sometimes exhibit. I found that black professors were particularly sensitive to black students' use of the allegation of discrimination as an excuse for poor performance. To quote a black professor: "A student will say to a professor, 'You didn't allow me a fair chance in this course. Your line of thinking is contrary to that of my culture, and therefore you are a racist.' The faculty member has two alternatives, one is to confront the student and say 'You are wrong. I am not a racist!' and ignore the student. The other alternative is to bend the rules and allow students to get away with this. I say *get away* in the sense that, in many cases, they had just as much of a fair chance as other students in the classroom. My bias is that at a college level we are training students to become competitive in the job market. Therefore, white faculty have the responsibility to treat all students as fairly as they can, and they should understand the games that a black or white student plays in the classroom to undermine the teaching-learning process. Fortunately, in the situation that I described, a female black student observed the conversation and said to the black student, 'You are wrong. He has been more than fair with you, and I really don't think that he should give you another chance, because it is going to dilute the learning process and the struggle that I have had to go through to obtain this grade.' The teacher did tell me that at the time he was wavering on whether or not to be more lax, but the support of the black female student helped him reaffirm his stance."

Black professors were more outspoken than white professors about manipulateness on the part of black students. It was part of black professors' being refreshingly free of the idealization of black students that, I have suggested, is itself a subtle form of racism. At the same time, some black professors stressed what they considered the realistic needs of black students to make it in the white world—for instance, to learn the ways of competitiveness and other behaviors rewarded in the white world. In that

respect, they questioned the standards of the white world less than one might expect them to, given the fact that they can look at white shortcomings from a different perspective.

In moving toward increased equality, one can also lose some of the benefits that come from the distinctive experiences of different ethnic groups. One of my white interviewees stressed his consciousness of the difference in the behavior and attitudes of white and black students. Listening to him, I asked myself whether I was trying to blur distinctions, just as the notion of unisex had tended to blur some of the differences between men and women. Differences created by ethnic backgrounds and experiences have given American society a multiplicity of customs and variegated perspectives on common experience. At the same time, some of the differences have an artificial base. Blacks were forbidden to whites. This aroused the excitement and attraction of the forbidden. The demystification of blacks—a way station in the experience of white professors as they get to know black colleagues and black students better—will also mean the loss of seductive illusions.

I have sketched some underlying factors in black-white relations—emotions that often are more exciting, crude and complex than what surface behavior shows. Surface behavior is subject to psychological censorship and dominated by rules of accommodation that make a kind of minimal coexistence possible. One has to have come to grips with the underlying trends for the surface to be different, too. Black students consistently report that white professors avoid eye contact with them and engage in other forms of behavior that limit contact and recognition of the contributions and thoughts of black students. The averted eye or ear is, among other things, an expression of the need to look away from and not hear the facts of discrimination. Indeed, it is probably not just a looking away from the black student but also from one's own felt guilt. The unconscious wish is that it would be nice, at least in the classroom, if everyone were white. That is the wish of the faculty member who says that he or she treats all students alike regardless of skin color. Once professors begin to change, they can become overly self-conscious about the transition. One faculty member almost inflicted eye contact on his students: "I have been very careful to maintain eye contact with students and to make doubly sure that I do this with black students. I have found that, in some instances, maybe I am overdoing it. It seems to make some of the black students a little uncomfortable, so that they will look away."

Black students often report that the professor's tone of voice or facial expressions display disbelief or surprise when they respond correctly or otherwise show good performance. Here, the underlying prejudice that blacks are not as good as whites shows itself against the professor's conscious will. Prejudice and bending over backwards go together, and when

it comes to helping, black students report that white professors offer little guidance and criticism of black students' work. The reasons for this behavior probably differ with the individual. For some, there is the fear of being perceived as too critical—meaning prejudice. For others, a low opinion of blacks makes them feel that guidance and criticism will simply not be productive. Still others wish to minimize contact with people that their culture has stamped as pariahs. Racism is so much a part of the texture of our culture that professors will often make stereotypical comments about blacks without being aware of the hurtful impact that these comments can have on black students, particularly when they imply that blacks are less competent than whites. This is very similar to the thoughtless behavior of many professors when they address women or talk about women in class.⁵ Part of the looking away involves white professors' ignorance of the contributions of blacks to society, including black literature. One of my professorial interviewees said that he assigned black writers in his literature classes but that he did so out of duty, not from a feeling for what the writers said. An economics professor described the persistent neglect of the facts of black economic life in the textbook literature of his field.

POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE

My observations reveal a powerful taboo: Blackness is a forbidden territory, to which badness is ascribed. Blacks stir up fears and at the same time they exert a seductive attraction, which must be compensated by the defense of rejection. Under these conditions, how might change come about? One would expect psychotherapy to be a powerful instrument. Indeed, whether they had been aided by psychotherapy or not, some of my interviewees reported that they began to grow as persons once their attitudes towards blacks underwent change. But, psychotherapy is available only in some cases. Another way of effecting change is to increase acquaintance. The process can begin by bringing about more open discussion in class, enabling students to hear about the economic, social and psychological facts of black lives. But, mere talk has its limitations. For some of the professors whom I interviewed, their behavior and attitudes to blacks began to change as a result of their having had the opportunity to become better acquainted with blacks. For instance, there was the professor referred to earlier in this chapter who had had a black friend in high school; their friendship was based on common interests and activities. In prolonged association, we can reveal to each other the depths of our being and transcend segregating rejection or romanticization. But, such friendships are difficult to initiate in the university setting, and in any case they extend beyond the confines of the classroom.

Happily, there is another means at hand: participation in a joint project. As psychological research has shown, cooperation is achieved less by talking than by working together on a joint task when objectives are shared by all members of the group, when the group's well-being depends on joint work and problem solving. Assigning projects to teams of students in one's class, and defining tasks that require a mixed group of white and black students to work together encourages people to express more of themselves in a setting of solidarity. One can also expect classroom cooperation to spill over into these people's personal lives and to lead to the beginnings of friendship.

There are reasons to believe that there are more bases for friendship between blacks and whites than we realize. Black students whom I interviewed talked at first as if there were little or no communication between black and white students and indicated that they moved in entirely different social circles. When I probed, however, it emerged that many black students had at least one or two close white friends. Thus, precedents for interaction exist, but they need strengthening. It is an astonishing fact that, in a society as open as ours, attitudes persist with such vigor that the relationships between people of different color are embarrassing, distant and confused. Besides the intrinsic significance of deepening acquaintance and friendships, they are likely to enhance learning and stimulate interaction in the classroom.

The experience of the project that I studied shows that one effective way of countering racism in the classroom is to bring the facts of the black situation into the open in the classroom and to give black and white students full opportunity to express their views, attitudes and feelings about them. Such expression can increase insight and change attitudes among students and professors alike.

This chapter has explored some of the resistance that attempts to resolving the problem of racism will encounter in the classroom. The resistance is formidable and deep. If it was not, the problem would not have lasted as long as it has. But, at the same time, the resistance is not insurmountable. It can be overcome by the healing power of abandoning prejudice; by the realization of people who take the first steps that they are growing as people, that they are less defensive in their imagination, thinking and experience, and that they have a new warmth in their perception of others and—astonishingly—of themselves. The ultimate incentive is that the process enables one to become more fully human. It is an irony that the universities—those great promoters of productive social change—that have opened their doors wide to black students have in so many ways been remiss in constructing the bases for an emotional and intellectual regeneration of black-white relationships. Here, indeed, is the challenge. While there has been a great increase of commercialism and passivity in the universities over

the last decade, there is also an opportunity to revivify the university's humanistic and transforming function.

NOTES

1. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper, 1944).
2. D. A. De Coster and P. Mable, eds., *Understanding Today's Students* (New Directions for Students Services, No. 16), (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981).
3. Gunnar Myrdal, *op. cit.*
4. G. M. Frederickson, "The Black Image in the White Mind," *Arts and Sciences* 5 No. 2, (1982): 14-19.
5. R. M. Hall and B. R. Sandler, *The Classroom Climate: A Chilly One for Women?* (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Colleges, 1982).