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NOTES ON THE AFRICAN MODE OF PRODUCTION (ECONOMIC SYSTEM)
y. g-m. lulat

NOTE: The following notes detail my lectures on the general characteristics of the African economic system on the eve of the colonization of Africa that explain two important African experiences: the transient character of African kingdoms and empires; and the rather inconsequential role of the Atlantic slave trade on the economies of the African people engaged in this trade. This economic system, it must be cautioned while dominant within Africa, was by no means universal throughout the African continent. As I strongly emphasized at the beginning of this course, Africa is a huge and complex continent and therefore one must proceed with extreme caution when making generalizations. These notes are based on the general theoretical framework provided by Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972, and 1976; Duprey and Rey, 1973; and Hymer, 1970.

To begin with let me restate the problem we are trying to solve here. I explained to you guys that prior to the arrival of European colonization, Africa had a number of prosperous kingdoms and empires and whose prosperity depended upon engagement in long distance trade (including the slave trade) with other peoples in Africa and overseas. Now, the question that arises here is this: why is it that even the most advanced kingdoms that had developed a complex and advanced social and political system involving a considerable degree of labor specialization, was not able to evolve further to a stage where surplus production and capital accumulation would have begun to facilitate the emergence of a modern capitalist economic system? The answer lies in the fact that when close and direct contact took place between Africans and Europeans, it was a contact that was undertaken within the context of economic imperialism (taking the form, at the formal level, of the infamous "Scramble for Africa"). And within this context, the consequence was "the collision of two heterogenous modes of production: 'capitalist' and 'African', and the overthrow of one by another" (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1976:109).

This answer, by itself, is not entirely satisfactory; for, while one agrees that the appearance of colonialism halted and deflected the relatively logical evolution of African societies, one is forced to ask why, in the long period intervening the establishment of first trading contacts between Africans and Westerners, and the destruction of the African structures, the more advanced African societies did not take up and internalize elements of Western technology, culture and so on, and thereby evolve a socioeconomic system that would have been able to challenge colonization--at the point where its intrusion took military form. The answer to this more fundamental question is to be found in the characteristics of a mode of production that was unique to Africa and which I will describe in more detail, below. This was a mode of production that did not allow for surplus production in a manner that could facilitate economic progress, for whatever surplus production there was, it was one that: (a) took place outside the lineage mode of production (see below); and (b) was aimed at long-distance trade to obtain exotic goods (consumption goods as opposed to capital goods), and hence involved parasitic exploitation of resources such as slave-raiding and elephant-hunting (ivory). The nature of the trade contact between Western Europe and Africa, therefore, for a long period of time was one that involved essentially luxury goods (exotic or prestige goods). Here it is necessary that I stop and define what precisely is meant by luxury goods. It must be a definition that is not merely in terms of pointing to the trade-goods of beads, cloth, guns, ivory and so on as luxury commodities (because a minority, such as the kings and their courtiers, was involved in their consumption), but one that links these goods directly to the production process within an economic system. Pierro Sraffa defines luxury products in the context of an economic system thus:

Luxury products have no part in the determination of the system. Their role is purely passive. If an invention were to reduce by half the quantity of each of the means of production which are required to produce a unit of a "luxury" commodity of this type, the commodity itself would be halved in price, but there would be no further consequences.....
        What has just been said of the passive role of luxury goods can be readily extended to such "luxuries" as are merely used in their own reproduction either directly (e.g. race horses) or indirectly (e.g. ostriches and ostrich-eggs) or merely for the production of other luxuries.
        The criterion is whether a commodity enters (no matter whether directly or indirectly) into the production of all commodities. (Quoted in Wallerstein,1976:31)
Given then, that this long-distance trade was essentially in terms of luxury commodities, the most important factor at play in sustaining the trade was not demand but effective supply (which depended not so much on production but in Wallerstein's words on (1976:32) "the politico-technological ability of the long distance traders to transport the material." In this circumstance, there were two consequences: first that no incentives existed in modifying the production process since production was not linked directly to demand variations; and second, the trade was not so much a question of transfer of surplus, but simply "a mutual windfall" as Wallerstein puts it.(1976:32).

For the African societies then, the net effect of this form of trade was that it allowed them to continue to harbor a mode of production characterized by a duality that I will describe shortly (long-distance trade co-existing with but not linked to the local village economy). Further any expansion of this trade had consequences that were more political than economic: such as the strengthening of the political machineries of the kingdoms involved in the trade. The converse was also generally true, that with the demise of trade the might of the kingdom in question also declined correspondingly; and if the trade stopped or began to bypass the kingdom, it did not usually take long for the kingdom to disintegrate as well.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in this context, "the goods supplied by European capitalism, far from causing, ipso facto, the expansion of the market economy, were absorbed by the lineage economy and transformed into prestige goods and as part of the trade between elders, took the place of locally produced goods (blacksmith crafts, raffia, loincloths, and so on)" (Coquery-Vidrovitch,1976:97). And without the expansion of the market economy such as to split open the "closed circuit" village economy, the possibility of evolution in the direction of a truly capitalist mode of production similar to the one that developed in Europe was ruled out.

I will now proceed to describe in greater detail the uniqueness of the African mode of production on the basis of the following observations:

(1) Prior to the European colonization of Africa, Africans had developed a unique economic system found nowhere else in the world. It was marked by a mode of production that was not based on slave labor (though its occasional use was not unknown - see for instance Mainga,1973:168), nor was it based on feudal or even capitalist relations of production. Rather it was one that was characterized by a lineage-based village subsistence production involving limited exchange of goods at the local level, on one hand, and on the other, the primacy of long distance trade - involving in many instances links with the coastal trade on both the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean seaboards. This new dominant mode of production, that when considered in its totality, was unlike any other mode of production found elsewhere in the world; and hence deserving the label: the African Mode of Production (after Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972, and 1976).

(2) The African Mode of Production was characterized by one important distinguishing feature: the absence of a meaningful level of articulation between the sphere of production, and the sphere of exchange (at the territorial level).

(3) The sphere of production can be described by identifying the following principal features specific to it:

(a) The village community lacked specialization and division of labor to a level where the family farming unit constituted a practically autonomous and self-sufficient unit of production and consumption. That is to say, the subsistence of each family in the village was procured through the labor of itself; and where additional labor was required in the execution of say, land-clearing - that is arduous activities (and which were clearly defined by the village community as such) - it was obtained not via contractual obligations, involving remuneration for the labor power utilized, but via ritual festivals.

(b) This form of production organization necessitated that the most important means of production: land, was made accessible to all who needed it. This however, did not imply that those to whom land was apportioned for cultivation (by the chief) acquired rights over the land akin to rights over personal property. Land was not a commodity, and as such, it was inalienable by anyone,(hence one finds that this mode of production was characterized by a distinct absence of ground rent.)

(c) The absence of ground rent had an important and a very significant consequence for the community: it helped prevent the emergence of social differentiation based on those who owned the major means of production (that is the landed), and those who labored for the owners of the land, (that is the land-less) given that no group could engineer artificial land-scarcity in the context of the prevailing land tenure system. This lack of a mechanism for social-differentiation based on the control on the major means of production by a minority (and the resultant absence of meaningful social-division of labor) meant that an effective ceiling was placed on the development of the forces of production capable of effecting the production of surplus. This meant that the dialectic between the development of the forces of production and surplus production on one hand, and on the other the development of social-differentiation based on the division of labor (signifying changes in production relations) was effectively eliminated. Hymer (1970:35-36) elaborates on this point thus:

"....the egalitarian nature of the land laws may have inhibited economic development precisely because they prevented a concentration of wealth and power. Let us suppose that a small group, of superior military strength, had been able to appropriate the land and develop a political system in which they obtained a large share of the agricultural output through rent or taxes. Such a system existed in miniature in various parts of Africa but did not grow to large proportions as in other continents. This would have had far reaching consequences on the economic structure. The landlords and the governing class would have used their income to buy food and other consumption and investment goods; part of the population would have left agriculture to become traders, artisans, servants and the like, engaged in supplying the needs of the leisure class, and the farmers would have had to increase agricultural production, and perhaps consume less food themselves in order to pay rent or taxes. The economy would have become divided into three social classes, as described by physiocrats: a military governing class which consumed and did not produce; a manufacturing and service sector which provided for the needs of the aristocracy; and an agricultural sector which produced the wherewithal to feed the population as a whole.
        The ruling group would then have channeled part of the surplus into palaces, monuments, and public buildings; to the extent that it built roads, irrigation systems, and other infrastructures; output per head would have risen and the capacity of the economy increased. Technological change might also have been speeded up as a result of this division of labor in manufacturing and other activities."


(d) The local market where villages exchanged goods (that is, goods produced locally) did not represent an economic institution mediating the realization of surplus for those marketing the goods, but rather it was "a multi-functional institution - social, religious and political" to use Coquery-Vidrovitch's phrase, (1976:103). The market constituted essentially a congregation of villagers, who were related to each other via social, economic, and political ties, on a fixed date; and further the market was also the place where, besides the exchange of goods, news was exchanged and information disseminated. Thus here, in other words was a situation where, although the village community possessed a market-place, in their relations with each other they did not as a general rule subscribe to the rules of market-exchange.

(e) While the presence of a market-place does point to the presence of some surplus in the village subsistence economy, this surplus was minimal in volume, relative to the volume of production. And given that there was little incentive to effect substantial increases in production for surplus, the level of sophistication of technology demanded by the village subsistence economy remained at a very low level, typified for instance by the absence of even such elementary forms of agricultural technology as the plough. This low level of technological sophistication further meant that the implements of production (that is the means of production) were accessible to all who needed them; and thereby further ensuring that no one group could monopolize ownership of the implements at the expense of another.

(f) While in terms of production relations, the family farm units were autonomous from each other, this autonomy did not extend to kinship relations; and as such strong kinship bonds existed between the family farm units, providing the basis for an extended family system. This extended family system, by providing a considerable degree of social security for the family farm units encompassed by it, acted as a further disincentive towards surplus generation for even such purposes as cushioning the members against unforseen calamities like famine. To put the matter differently: the social security provided by the extended family system acted to create short "time-horizons" in terms of production, because to put it colloquially, 'keeping something in the kitty for a rainy day' was not necessary for the individual farm units (other than that demanded by seasonal change).

(4) Side by side with the local village subsistence economy, a broad economy existed based on long-distance trade (and also war to further facilitate this trade).That is to say, this was an economy dominated by the sphere of exchange (and thereby lending specificity to the African mode of production). This sphere of exchange can in turn be described by identifying the following major features:

(a) The commodities involved in the long-distance trade, and here consideration is being restricted to the trade originating on the coast were not derived from production in the village economy (for not only was the surplus not large enough to meet the requirements of the trade, but also there was little demand for the products of the village economy. The commodities were 'produced' in an economic system largely external to the village economy; and the 'production' took the form of not so much as production in the usual sense of the word, but as extraction, (for example mining - gold and copper; hunting - ivory; and warring - slaves).

(b) The growth in the long-distance trade in a number of instances provoked the development of large bureaucratic systems - often because of the need to provide security for the traders. And with the erection of these bureaucratic structures (with strong military content) there arose centralized kingdoms with a sovereign at the head to oversee the maintenance of stability and security in the kingdom. Hymer (1970:42-43), explaining this development points to the dialectic that was operative between long-distance trade and the growth of the centralized bureaucratic systems. As he explains:

"Without a strong state, long-distance trade is continuously in danger of predatory attacks by armed robbers. A military group, able to maintain peace and security in a given area, can ensure the safety of traders and then tax them accordingly.
        This symbiotic relationship between the military and the merchants has a dynamic which can lead to the formation of larger and larger trading empires. The more effective the political and military organization is, the wider an area it can encompass, the greater the trade it can stimulate, the greater the taxes it can collect, and hence the greater an area it can pacify."
This development of centralized kingdoms however, was essentially a political development rather than an economic one that signified changes in the dominant mode of production. The economic basis of these kingdoms in other words, was not the village subsistence economy, but rather the extractive and parasitic economy of trade, warfare and hunting.

(c) The 'surplus' generated from the trading activities was largely destined for the chiefs and kings, who however, either hoarded or redistributed whatever 'surplus' that could not be consumed. They did not and could not use the surplus for investment (and thereby stimulate production), because no mechanism existed that could allow this, given the absence of organic linkages between the two spheres of production, and exchange. As Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976:97) explains: "the sovereign's power was closely tied up with a specific economic formula: absolute control over a large sector of trade not integrated into local trade and a massive exchange of products rather than true trade, since the king was not looking for profit so much as ways to obtain certain merchandise from far off lands - weapons (basic to his power and his supply of slaves), textiles, alcohol, and various trade merchandise (la pacotille)". It is precisely because of this accessibility to luxury commodities generated virtually entirely within the sphere of exchange that the sovereign never felt inclined to intervene in the sphere of production (that is in the village subsistence economy).

(5) Given the lack of articulation between the sphere of exchange and production one hand, and on the other the presence of an egalitarian land-tenure system, social differentiation within the African societies in Zambia was not very marked. Social-differentiation of course there was, but this differentiation was not on the basis of a social division of labor. Hence the differentiation was not along class lines but along the lines of strata, with status rather than wealth, as an important distinguishing factor. In describing the social structure that existed at the time-period under consideration, the following major characteristics can be identified:

(a) At the top of the social structure was the king (with his relatives and courtiers), and members of the upper echelon of the military and the bureaucracy. This position in the case of those societies that did not have a centralized political system was occupied by the chief and the elders. The significance of the presence of the sovereign in a large centralized bureaucratic structure is that while the sovereign was able to maintain cohesion and harmony among village chiefs in his area of control (for purposes of maintaining an environment conducive to trading and warring), the sovereign did not find it necessary to intervene in the basic village subsistence economy - a point already mentioned above. To elaborate further, in the words of Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976:107): "No African regime, no matter how despotic, felt the need to eliminate communal village structures within its borders, for the villages scarcely interfered with the process of exploitation. As long as the village transmitted its tribute to the chief of the district or the province, it ran the life of the collectivity as it pleased. The leaders assured the worship of the clans's ancestors; the chief of the land allotted arable land to each family and each generation..." An important aspect of the structural position of the sovereign was that given the tenuous nature of the economic base of the kingdom, the power and position of the sovereign could suffer demise at any time that the long-distance trade passing through his kingdom was deflected away (for whatever reason: internal instability, competition from a neighboring group, etc.), from the area under his jurisdiction to that of another sovereign or authority.

(b) Below the kings came the village chiefs and the elders; and below them were the youth. In turning attention to the village chiefs and elders, the discussion necessarily shifts to the level of the internal economy of village subsistence (as distinct from the external economy of long-distance trade). The social differentiation that characterized the lineage social formation was indicated by membership to an age-set. However, the significance of the age-set arose from the fact that the elders controlled the process of what Dupre and Rey (1973) call "demographic reproduction" -which they say was the basis for the reproduction of the conditions of the lineage mode of production. This control of the process of demographic reproduction was achieved via the elders' monopoly of the means of access to women, whose significance in this instance arose not from their role as complements in sexual partnerships, but as bearers of children. The means of access to women was the dowry, which comprised 'elite' goods that were rendered inaccessible to the youth, until such time that the elders were willing to sanction matrimonial exchange for a given instance. Thus, although it was the youth who procured the 'elite' goods through their labor, either directly or indirectly (via exchange), their subordination as a group to the elders was effected through the system of payment of the dowry. It must be pointed out of course that the system could only work if the elders of the different lineage groups formed an alliance to ensure that the payment of the dowry, fixed by them at a level beyond the normal reach of the youth, was always adhered to by all the elders. Explaining this point, Rey and Dupre (1973:145), quoting C. Meillassoux state:

"Of all the goods produced for the collectivity and given in prestation to the elders, some will never be re-distributed but will be retained in the possession of the elders who will use them to sanction access to the women. The elder of a group who was party to such a transaction with an individual who lacked the necessary status for participating in the business would weaken his partner's authority and his own in turn. The elders have a joint interest in respecting the established order."
(c) The youth, as just indicated, constituted a strata dependent upon the elders. And this 'dependency' was such that according to Rey and Dupre (1973:151) the elders actually exploited the youth. However, as Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976:103) points out "as each man throughout his life passed from one age class to another, it balanced out in the end." Perhaps even more fundamental though (for the purposes of this paper), about this exploitation of the youth strata by the elders, is the point that the elders exerted control only over the distribution and consumption of the production-output, and not over the means of production. Thus while there was surplus skim-off by the elders as a group, the skim-off did not take on the economic form of "profits", and as such it was not only quantitatively of a constant low order of magnitude, but also no part of it reentered the production process as investment - which could have led to eventual economic progress, including the reconstitution of the strata of the elders into a class of elders. The net effect, to put it differently, of the skim-off of surplus by the elders in the village subsistence economy was to simply render part of the surplus economically impotent.

To sum up then, on the eve of the establishment of European colonial rule in Africa, the political economy of most of the continent--especially South of the Sahara--could be described as one dominated by a social formation with a mode of production specific to Africa--characterized principally by the presence of two relatively impervious major economic spheres: the spheres of exchange and production; and a social structure marked by the absence of classes. Symptomatic of this particular configuration of the mode of production was the non-existence of ground-rent (despite the over-riding agrarian character of the economy); the low level of technological sophistication; and the low level of surplus output.

 References

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. 1972. “Research on an African Mode of Production.” In Perspectives on the African Past, ed. by M. A. Klein and G. W. John-son, pp. . New York, NY: Little, Brown.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. 1976. “The Political Economy of the African Peasantry and Modes of Production.” In The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, ed. by Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, pp. . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Dupre, Georges, and Rey, Pierre-Philippe. 1973. “Reflections on the Pertinence of a Theory of the History of Exchange.” Economy and Society 2 (May): 131-63.

Hymer, Stephen. 1970. “Economic Forms in Pre-colonial Ghana.” Journal of Economic History 30 (March): 33-50.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1976. “The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy.” In The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, ed. by Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, pp. . Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.



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