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Conclusion: A Bridge over the Theoretical Divide

The Theoretical Divide

With a few exceptions,[1] the U.S. sociology of race relations has failed to provide an epistemologically coherent framework that explicitly addresses the role of the state in structuring black life-chances.[2] A sustained analysis of the state could serve as a bridge over the *theoretical* divide embodied in the arbitrary and unjustifiable separation of the economic sector from the sociopolitical order; the failure of an aggregate of conceptual communities to find common ground; and, the apparent inability of the sociology of race relations to discard the ideological baggage that marginalized the field in the first place. Conversely, contemporary developments in the theories of the state have had little to say about race specifically or processes of racialization generally. In the discipline of sociology as a whole, a renewed concern with the state did not become apparent until the mid-1960s when critical-minded neo-Marxists launched a series of debates about the capitalist state and instigated a paradigmatic shift that involved a fundamental rethinking of the role of the state in relation to the political economy.[3]

All explanations of race relations make implicit (or domain) assumptions regarding the nature of the state and its relationship to racial inequality.[4] In the U.S. sociology of race relations, thinking about the state rarely has gone beyond the "acceptable categories of thought" already defined by the state.[5] Generally, the field has ignored the power of the state to construct through its ideological apparatuses (notably, public education) the categories of thought that are subsequently applied to the analysis of both race relations and the state itself. Through its ideological apparatuses, the state proclaims that it acts in the interests of all; that is, it claims a false universality expressed, for example, in the American creed. The state's

assertion of universality is, in part, an attempt by the state to legitimize itself.[6] This process encourages a view that the state is not shaped by race because presumably it intervenes in, but does not constitute the structures of, race relations.[7]

Although some authors[8] challenged Wilson's[9] relatively benign view of the state in the modern industrial period, he laid the groundwork for, but did not suggest or develop, an argument that structural theories of the state can serve as a focal point for conceptually enriching the U.S. sociology of race relations. Particularly, Wilson introduced an element of historicism by arguing that each period of race relations embodies a different form of racial stratification structured by the particular arrangement of both the economy and the polity. And he countered (initially, at least) the liberal assumption that the state is a neutral arbiter in racial conflict:

> thus different systems of production and/or different arrangements of the polity have imposed different constraints on the way in which racial groups have interacted in the United States, constraints that have structured the relations between racial groups and that have produced dissimilar contexts not only for the manifestation of racial antagonisms, but also for racial group access to rewards and privileges.[10]

The promise of *The Declining Significance of Race* was its potential for theoretically analyzing the state and its role in structuring race relations through the course of U.S. history. In contradistinction to the popular tendency to psychologize race relations, *The Declining Significance of Race* introduced a greater degree of historical specificity and a sharper awareness of the role of social-class struggle. Race relations were detached no longer from the structure and functioning of the state (although Wilson did not develop such an argument in any of his published books or articles). The state supported the racial and social-class structures of society in the preindustrial and industrial periods, and it supports the social-class structure in the modern industrial period.

Nevertheless, Wilson's[11] framework was not state-centered. That is, it did not articulate a conception of the state that explains why the state acts as it does in structuring race relations. In effect, Wilson reproduced the shortcomings in the sociology of race relations itself. For example, Michael Burawoy[12] noted that the concept of the state is missing as well from Bonacich's[13] split labor market theory—a critical component of the industrial period. The central question is how certain social-class interests were able to prevail over other interests, which cannot be answered fully without an appropriate specification of the state, including the limits imposed, or the opportunities presented, by the specific contradictions of the state itself.[14] In this context, Wilson did not identify the broad limits of state

actions in each of the three periods; neither did he explain why these limits exist.

A substantial part of the sociology of race relations subscribes to liberal or pluralist views of the state or ignores the state altogether.[15] It is fettered by the older assumptions of a problem-solving, policy-oriented sociology that in its latest guise appears in *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*. In the memorable phrase of President Herbert Hoover, it is written as if the state were "the umpire in our social system."[16] Wilson's failure to adequately conceptualize the role of the state denies, in effect, what Skocpol[17] called the "inherent historicity of sociopolitical structures." Stated differently, Wilson's[18] failure to meaningfully articulate the relationship between the economic sector and the sociopolitical order resulted in the absence of a coherent conception of the structures and functions of the capitalist state. Wilson confined his analysis mainly to structures external to the state—for example, the split labor market. His sensitivity to the complex dynamics and contradictions that characterize the levels of the state was barely visible. This lack of sensitivity may lead to a serious error—the belief that if one has conceptualized the relationship between capital and labor in the context of race, then one has conceptualized the state as well.[19] Wilson recognized that race relations are conditioned by the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production as it evolves over time. However, these relations are embodied within, and mediated by, the apparatuses of the state.[20] The sociology of race relations is characterized by comparatively few attempts to conceptualize this problematic. In this context, Wilson[21] did not advance the theoretical standing of the sociology of race relations.

In short, despite his concern with policy, Wilson[22] did not offer a well-formulated, coherent, and sustained theoretical analysis of the state and its relationship to racial inequality. He did not make explicit the assumptions that define the nature of the state or explain why the state changes over time. The state as a neutral arbiter responding to societal needs and social dislocations was rejected, partially, in *The Declining Significance of Race* and was accepted, mainly, in *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*. This incoherence is possible because Wilson's work as a whole did not escape one of the main failings of the sociology of race relations: throughout its history, it has operated in a context in which sociological theories of race relations and sociological theories of the state are treated as if they are unrelated to each other.[23] Where the state has appeared, liberal and pluralist views encouraged the assumption that the economic sector and the sociopolitical order are separate; in other words, the state stands apart from, and acts as, a neutral arbiter or umpire in the social system.

In *The Declining Significance of Race*, Wilson overestimated the ability of the state to effect racial transformation and consolidate black socioe-

conomic status gains in the modern industrial period. In *The Truly Disadvantaged* and *When Work Disappears*, he underestimated the extent to which the spatial isolation of poor blacks is exacerbated by the indifference of political parties, public agencies, parastatal corporations, and local and regional governing bodies to their plight. The extent to which these bodies are capable of spanning numerous boundaries in order to "create interests which can be unified across racial lines" is an empirical question that cannot be adequately answered in the absence of appropriate theoretical specification.[24] In *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*, Wilson recognized the state as the focal point for collective change. However, he did not offer a thorough study of the intricacies of, and constraints on, collective action through the state. As I will attempt to demonstrate below, the state does not respond in a coherent, consistent, or contradictory-free manner.[25] In the formulation of policies to redress racial inequities, it is essential to know more about the contours of the state, how they have changed historically, and why they may change in the future. In short, no "politics of reformism" can take place without a theory of the character of the state.[26]

Although the U.S. sociology of race relations has discarded some of its ideological baggage in recent years, it has not rejected liberal or pluralist views of the state in which competing racial and ethnic interests contend with one another to make claims on the state and shape the decisionmaking process.[27] Here the state is, or ought to be, a neutral arbiter among contending groups and a guarantor of individual rights. Some groups may "capture" the state, thus encouraging other groups to develop strategies to capture it back.[28] In some pluralist accounts of the state, the proliferation of agencies, on the one hand, and the differentiation of state levels on the other, provide greater access for any group to block gross injustice and at least secure a minimum foothold in the state.[29]

Theoretically sophisticated versions of liberal and pluralist views of the state are available in the academic literature. However, in the abstract they seem more like a statement of what should be rather than a statement of what is. *These versions celebrate an ideal-typical system of governance that exists for some, but not other, segments of society and thus may be*—to paraphrase Alvin Gouldner[30]—*consistent with the dominant group's need to justify its social position.* To reject the assumption of the state as neutral arbiter would call into question the edifice upon which liberal accounts of race relations are constructed.[31] This edifice directs attention toward the politics of assimilation and integration and away from the sociohistorical and structural foundations of the state itself.[32] By representing the state as the aggregate of competing racial and ethnic as well as other interests, accomplished through institutions committed (presumably) to universalistic ideals such as due process, the U.S. sociology of race relations denies the intrinsically racial character of the state.[33] Implicit or explicit views of the

state imply appropriate political contexts within which to redress grievances and effect action. *Wilson's*[34] *"real world model" for the development of a multiracial political coalition that would address national issues is, in this context, little more than a reiteration of liberal assumptions about how the political process should work.* This view fails to answer important questions and is not consistent with recent historical studies.

Bringing Back the State

Structural theories of the state[35] provide a potentially useful framework for reconstructing the concept of the state in the U.S. sociology of race relations and advancing the field itself.[36] They are derived from, and are consistent with, a general Marxist tradition.[37] However, the Marxist classics lack a well-formulated theory of the state; and contrary to Wilson, their instrumentalist implications are not acceptable—as in assuming that racism is "unequivocally functional" for the capitalist class or that the state is merely a tool in the hands of the capitalist class.[38] Furthermore, the "Weberian tendencies" in some versions of U.S. Marxism detract from, rather than facilitate, an appropriate theoretical specification of the state and its relationship to racial inequality because they shift attention from the basic tenets of historical materialism to the idea that social life can be conceptualized and examined in terms of separate and distinct spheres (economic, social, political, ideological).[39]

In this context, few sociologists have applied structuralist analysis to the sociology of race relations. In contrast to the "abstracted empiricism"[40] that characterizes U.S. sociology at times, structuralist analysis requires the adequate theoretical specification of its subject as a precondition for the accumulation of knowledge. However, this requirement does not remove the necessity for empirical verification.[41] Structuralist analysis defines the whole (i.e., the social order) as consisting of complex and heterogeneous spheres that are dialectically interrelated but *relatively* autonomous. Examples include the economic, social, political, and ideological spheres. Although the economic sphere is determinant in the last instance in the capitalist mode of production, each sphere displays distinctive and internally contradictory characteristics and contributes in its own way to the functioning of the whole. In this context, individuals are the "supports" or "bearers" of the structural relations within which they are situated.[42]

At this level of abstraction, "structures" do not refer to the institutions that make up society; rather, they refer to the systematic interrelationships that exist among these institutions. Structures constitute a level of reality "invisible but present behind the visible social relations."[43] Amos Hawley's reference to a "web of discrimination"[44] is an example of a structure in this

context. In order to assess the ways by which state structures reproduce or undermine racial inequality, it is necessary to specify these structures and explain how they embody different interests. Otherwise, the state is likely to be seen as a neutral arbiter or a "functionalist thermostat."[45] Therefore, the theoretical works of Nicos Poulantzas, Claus Offe, and James O'Connor are invaluable for clarifying the theoretical dilemmas that appear in Wilson's work because they direct attention to the contradictory imperatives of the capitalist state—facilitating capital accumulation and legitimizing the system.[46] By analyzing the development of, and institutionalization of functions within, the formal apparatuses of the state, it is possible to grasp the "autonomization of the capitalist state" as a complex, concrete, and historically determined process.[47]

Because the economic sphere is determinant in the last instance in the capitalist mode of production, it is easy to dismiss, as Wilson[48] did, the consequences of the sociopolitical order for black life-chances.[49] The economic, social, political, and ideological spheres of the capitalist mode of production possess some degree of independence or autonomy; however, they are not discrete categories. In other words, despite the fact that the sociopolitical order may possess relative autonomy from the economic sector, the dualism of the polity and the economy is more apparent than real.[50] For example, the economic sector becomes subordinated to the sociopolitical order to the extent that the allocation of monies, resources, and rewards results from decisions made in the sociopolitical order rather than in the economic sector. Policies are shaped, and decisions on the allocation of monies, resources, and rewards are made, by political entities through elaborate bureaucratic procedures.[51] In addition, the capitalist state is engaged in the creation and legitimation of the frameworks and rules within which social life itself is structured, expressed, for example, in education, employment, low-income and public housing, marriage and family, and tax policies.[52] The capitalist state has assumed an increasing number of social welfare functions, including a bureaucratically ordered system of supervision of unwed mothers, nonintact or broken families, delinquent youth, and criminals patterned on therapeutic models. The tendency to psychologize the social costs of production has important ideological implications, because if the client is defined as the problem, then other causes, as well as other points of view, are excluded before the fact.[53]

Benjamin Ringer's[54] exhaustive analysis of the complex interrelationship between the spheres helps to illustrate these points. More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the right to vote is fundamental because it is the basis for the preservation of all other rights. Therefore, one would have expected the Court to apply the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to strike down the racially discriminatory restrictions on the right to vote that were adopted by many states after

Reconstruction. However, the Court confined its efforts largely to rhetoric and for many decades ignored the use of white primaries, literacy tests, poll taxes, and other devices to deny blacks the right to vote. The white primary was outlawed in 1944; however, the U.S. Congress did not act until 1957.[55] The Voting Rights Act of 1965 finally mandated federal approval of any changes in voting qualifications or procedures in states that had a history of racially discriminatory restrictions.

The Thirteenth Amendment, which was passed in 1866, abolished slavery as an institution; Southern states responded by enacting the Black Codes. The Fourteenth Amendment, which was passed in 1868, overruled the Black Codes and extended suffrage to blacks. The Fifteenth Amendment, which was passed in 1870, prohibited voter discrimination on the basis of race; however, this proscription was more a formality than a reality, as Southern states devised intricate election laws and other devices to disenfranchise blacks and many poor whites.[56] These practices were reinforced when the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1896 *Plessey v. Ferguson* decision, accepted as constitutional the doctrine of separate but equal and accorded state and local governments the right to enact legislation that sanctioned discrimination.[57]

The U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, overturned the doctrine of separate but equal, undermined state and local government support for racially discriminatory practices, and paved the way for civil rights legislation to be passed.[58] Despite *Brown v. Board of Education*, the U.S. Supreme Court left the formulation of specific orders to desegregate schools in the hands of U.S. district courts. Obstruction and delay resulted, with massive resistance in the South and a comparatively weak federal response. It was not until passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, when federal desegregation standards were adopted, that substantial desegregation of schools could begin. Thereafter, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and the federal courts became more unified in their attack on so-called free choice and various delaying tactics in the South. However, under the Richard Nixon administration, federal enforcement efforts were undercut. Major responsibility for enforcing school desegregation was shifted from HEW to the slower judicial efforts of the Justice Department.[59]

State and local governments may pass laws that legalize behaviors that later may be declared unconstitutional and therefore prohibited.[60] The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, the Voting Rights Acts of 1965, 1970, 1975, and 1985, and several U.S. Supreme Court decisions were required to eliminate state and local government restrictions on black voting.[61] The Civil Rights Acts were well-intentioned but not very effective. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1970, is now the principal vehicle for protecting blacks' right to vote.[62] U.S. Supreme Court support for, or oppo-

sition to, local autonomy has important implications in this context. For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 empowered agencies of the federal government to bring suit in federal court to protect the right to vote, and it created the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to enforce the provisions of the bill. Despite this empowerment, the act was only partially effective as local courts resisted.[63] State and local governments adopted ostensibly race-blind strategies that in fact had racially discriminatory effects, such as converting to citywide, at-large elections that effectively prevented blacks from obtaining office in cities that had a white majority.[64] The U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1969 *Allerven v. Board of Elections* decision, affirmed that all election law changes in the jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were to be cleared by the Justice Department, in effect giving it veto power over all changes in election practices in the South.[65]

At-large elections were introduced during the Progressive Era under the guise of "good government" reform. However, often the intent was to reduce the potential political power of blacks and ethnic immigrants. A meta-analysis of all cross-sectional studies completed prior to 1980 (with a sample size of sixteen or larger) that examined the relationship between at-large election systems and the proportional representation of blacks and Hispanics on city councils found evidence that at-large systems "diluted" the representation of minorities.[66] Furthermore, a study of forty-one political jurisdictions in Texas that changed from at-large to single-member-district elections in the 1970s revealed that the proportional representation of blacks and Hispanics dramatically increased after the changes. Where blacks and Hispanics were able to affect the boundary-drawing process, minority representation increased even more.[67]

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 focused on eradicating discrimination in employment practices; it established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to monitor compliance.[68] Establishment of the EEOC was followed by Executive Order 11246 in 1965, which required federal contractors to take affirmative action to recruit, employ, and promote minorities. It created the Office of Federal Contract Compliance with the power to terminate federal contracts for failure to comply with these provisions. However, as a caution against broad generalizations about the declining significance of race, the Reagan administration amended this order to eliminate timetables and certain measures of compliance. Although federal, state, and local governments have maintained prohibitions against racial discrimination in employment practices since the 1940s, the major legal weapon has been Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Despite limited resources, civil rights organizations more so than the federal government have carried the burden of enforcing this statute; they have won favorable judicial decisions in cases brought under this statute. Nevertheless, these decisions have had

mixed results in reducing the occupational and earnings disparities between blacks and whites.[69]

Thus, constitutional and legislative changes are processes of controlled conflict between competing interests.[70] A fundamental question in this context is whether, how, and under what conditions structurally determined disadvantages can be "undone."[71] For example, the U.S. Supreme Court may legitimize or delegitimize racially discriminatory policies, hinder social change or hasten it; however, its decisions have the force of laws only if other administrative apparatuses choose to carry them out.[72] The decisions that accord minorities broader citizenship rights may be contradicted by administrative obstruction, jurisdictional friction, informal social practices, or extralegal practices such as intimidation or terrorism.[73]

Restrictive covenants are a case in point. When state legislatures were prohibited from passing laws that enforced racial segregation, local courts assumed the role by legally enforcing the covenants. The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the contractual right of individuals to discriminate in the sociopolitical order and, in 1948, introduced restrictions on the exercise of this right. These discriminatory practices were reinforced by the FHA, which included "racially segregated criteria in guidelines to its 'valuators' for rating applications for housing loans in various areas. [The FHA] stipulated that an area should be given a high rating if covered by restrictive covenants and deed restrictions which would protect the areas from 'undesirable encroachment.'"[74] The John Kennedy administration issued an executive order to cease such practices; however, evidence indicates that the order was not very effective.[75]

In short, the tendency to reify the state as a transcendental reality that exists by and for itself[76] sidetracks important questions about (1) the role of the state in the formation, maintenance, and reproduction of racial inequality in the various spheres;[77] (2) whose interests the state secures and why;[78] (3) the ability of the state to effect alternative courses of action or to transform "recalcitrant [racial] structures";[79] and (4) the grounds on which a particular conception of the state can be justified.

"The State" Defined

Here "the state" is defined broadly as a system of governance that incorporates the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at the federal and state levels; regulatory bodies; parastatal corporations; public agencies; regional authorities; and local governmental bodies. These apparatuses represent the specific and often contradictory interests of different social classes, social-class fractions, and power blocs.[80] The state is characterized by all of the following:

1. *Structural selectiveness*, which determines how issues and matters are to be addressed by policies and actions.[81] For example, the guarantee of private property rights restricts the ability of the state to effect certain courses of action, such as gaining control over the investment priorities of major corporations or mandating nationalized health care.

2. *A paradigmatic framework*, which sets limits on the value and assumptive bases of the formulation and implementation of policies.[82] For example, policies and actions must be consistent with any of the following: private property relations, free enterprise, the American creed, philosophies of individualism, ideologies of equality of opportunity, and Anglo-Saxon Protestant values.

3. *Formal rule structures*, which predetermine content and outcomes. For example, procedural rules are embedded in bureaucratic administration, policy formulation and implementation, collective bargaining, and election campaigns. They, too, may favor or exclude alternative courses of action.[83]

4. *Repression*, which may be exercised through the police, armed forces, or judiciary.[84]

In this context, the state is excluded from organizing production for profit and from determining the allocation and movement of private capital; thus it can affect capital accumulation only indirectly.[85] Because the state is separated from capitalist production, its existence and ability to function depend on revenues that originate from outside its immediate control. Contrary to popular belief, because capitalism is neither self-regulating nor self-sufficient, the state has a mandate to create and sustain those conditions necessary to facilitate capital accumulation. Faced with a contradictory combination of exclusion and dependence, the state can function on behalf of capital only if it can equate the needs of capital with the national interest and secure popular support for measures that maintain the conditions for accumulation.[86]

Therefore, the capitalist state is a structure constrained by the logic of the economic sphere within which it functions and embedded in a complex set of apparatuses. Contrary to instrumentalist views, the state does not constitute itself as an executive committee of the capitalist class; rather, its overriding purpose is to be the "factor of cohesion of a social formation"[87] consisting of freely competing individuals. The state as the factor of cohesion of a social formation legitimizes the interests of the capitalist class (or one or more of its factions) in the face of the interests of other social classes and factions.[88] State apparatuses tend to serve the interests of the capitalist class because the characteristics of these apparatuses derive from the necessity to fulfill the contradictory imperatives of the capitalist system.[89]

Legitimation is crucial because mass participation in state decisions at any level will bring to the forefront the growing contradiction between the

socialization of the costs of production and the private appropriation of profits. Therefore, the state must fulfill its class-bound functions under the pretext of social-class neutrality—that is, the public interest—but not necessarily race-neutrality (as the history of legislative and judicial actions shows). Stated differently, the state conceals its obligations through a depoliticization of the public. Governance that openly favors one social class or faction over others involves the risk of polarization and a politicization of the social-class struggle.[90] In addition, in order to realize a common interest from among the competing factions of the capitalist class, the state must be able to override specific interests. This form of compromise allows subordinate classes to extract concessions and push for reforms.[91]

The philosophies, doctrines, and official accounts of the state tend to incorporate the values that protect the interests of the dominant classes or factions; its agents are recruited disproportionately from these groups.[92] For example, intolerant and exclusive (i.e., prejudicial and discriminatory) values and practices are endemic features of, but are not unique to, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture generally. They are grounded in the religious heritage of the country, beginning with the Puritans, and over a long period have been incorporated into the apparatuses and ideological rationales of the state.[93] These observations imply that the state does not exist outside the praxis that created it.[94] In this context, the state, as a collection of apparatuses and rule-bound hierarchies with roots in specific socioreligious and political heritages, can understand problems only in certain ways.[95]

In sum, the state is not a neutral arbiter; it is *simultaneously* an object, product, and determinant of race-class interactions understood within the context of (1) the contradictory imperatives of capital accumulation and legitimation, and (2) the degree to which the apparatuses of the state are at any point in time in the hands of various factions of the capitalist class.[96] Contradictory imperatives structure opportunities available to the capitalist class. By virtue of its historically specific influence in the state, the capitalist class structures opportunities available to racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the majority. Although these statements incorporate contradictory views (structuralist and instrumentalist), they might be interpreted to represent different tendencies within the state as a set of relations.[97] The state intervenes in racial conflicts; however, it does not do so in a coherent or unified manner, despite Wilson's[98] imputation to the contrary in the modern industrial period. Race occupies "varying degrees of centrality" at different historical moments in different state apparatuses.[99] Consequently, different levels of the state will act in contradictory ways. Nevertheless, through policies that are explicitly or implicitly racial, state apparatuses organize and enforce the racial politics of everyday life—for example, expressed in the enforcement, or lack thereof, of antidiscriminatory policies.[100]

Structural analysis highlights the relationship between the processes of capital accumulation and legitimation and the functions of the state. However, state activity is not a simple correlate of the processes of capital accumulation and legitimation. The state is bureaucratically organized and ruled by legal-rational authority. Therefore, the apparatuses of the state have a logic of their own that cannot be changed at will—in other words, a relative autonomy.[101] According to Ralph Miliband,[102] recognizing relative autonomy requires studying the forces that cause it to be greater or less and the circumstances in which it is exercised.

However, the concept of relative autonomy is ambiguous. Particularly, the bases on which degrees of relative autonomy are to be determined are not explicit or well-formulated; the forms of autonomy may be diverse; and the "content of the concept" will vary from one social formation to another and, within each formation, from one specific conjuncture to another.[103] Relative autonomy is not a fixed feature of any governmental system; the potential for autonomous activity changes over time as state apparatuses undergo transformation. Neither, by definition, does the concept imply superior knowledge and capability. For example, state attempts to redress racial inequities may fail if they are based on incorrect assumptions and mediocre information, or if they emerge from "deficient state organization."[104] Therefore, to refer to the existence of autonomy is one matter; to locate its source, explain its existence, and show how it is exercised is another matter. The autonomy of the capitalist state is restricted by its dependence on the realization of profit before it can fulfill any of its other functions. Nevertheless, it is theoretically likely that at times state activity will contravene the interests of the dominant groups.[105]

The local state encloses distinctive political, economic, and social arrangements. It forms an "administrative matrix" through which national goals and policies are realized. It also holds an array of rights and powers that enable local apparatuses to pursue different goals and policies. For example, local state apparatuses "interpret" federal policies to suit local interests; therefore, they affect how policies are implemented. Evidence suggests great variation in the local implementation of federal policies, including the enforcement of national civil rights policies in the modern industrial period.[106]

The autonomy of the local state varies in relation to the constraints imposed by the national, state, and local social-class structures. For example, during the industrial period, the local state in the U.S. South maintained a high degree of autonomy from the national state because federal policy enforcement mechanisms were weak.[107] When the national state's constraints are strong, local social-class structures exert less influence on the local state; when the national state's constraints are weak, local social-class structures exert greater influence on the local state.[108] Local social-class structures establish the social context in which the governmental bodies, public agencies, and school boards that make up these apparatuses produce their effects. A high degree of local autonomy is associated with an ability to determine goals, and the capacity to develop policies to achieve those goals. Autonomy may be enhanced by the local state's capacity to control the recruitment of personnel to political and administrative offices, and by the degree of its power to tax its citizens.[109]

Under massive pressure from the civil rights movement, the executive branch of the federal government and the U.S. Congress strengthened the linkages between the national state and the local state in the latter part of the modern industrial period. The discriminatory procedures and practices of the local state in the South were dismantled. However, Gordon[110] noted that southern states used delaying tactics to resist; furthermore, changes in the goals and policies of the national state did not bring racial harmony. Nevertheless, the local state's dependence on the national state's resources restricts the ability of local apparatuses to initiate policies autonomously.[111]

At the national and local levels, states circumscribe how dominant groups will realize their objectives.[112] For example, after 1964 states to varying degrees constructed statutes that incorporated the principles and language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. These statutes represent mechanisms through which states create "institutional environments." Different institutional environments encourage different organizational practices.[113] More specifically, when circuit courts rule on compliance strategies, they indicate to organizations in their respective jurisdictions how a given law is going to be interpreted. States and circuit courts that incorporate the language of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action create uncertain institutional environments for the organizations that reside in those jurisdictions. They send a message that chances are good that the court will mete out liberal rulings if cases of discrimination are brought before it. Organizations respond to the uncertainty by adopting strategies that demonstrate to the courts that they are in compliance. If approved by the courts, these strategies then "diffuse across the organizational field"; that is, organizations adapt to, and internalize, the expectations that are defined by the institutional environment in which they are embedded.[114]

Structured by the state, institutional environments affect the degree of equality of opportunity in organizations. For example, they influence the likelihood that a woman or minority will become a chief executive officer, net of other factors such as the composition of applicant pools, the nature of sponsorship, or the accumulation of work experience. Institutional environments structure the strategies and practices that organizations adopt; in the face of uncertainty, organizations respond to cues by adopting strategies and practices that comply with these institutional environments and that

help to ensure their survival. The uncertainty created produces an environment that operates, to some extent, independently of the threat of legal action. Organizations in more liberal states and circuit court jurisdictions often step beyond the letter of the law, adopting strategies and practices that reflect a "substantive interpretation and internalization of the law."[115]

Racial struggles occur at all levels of the state and reflect attempts by various groups to gain control of the goals and policies shaped at those levels. Demands by groups upon the state are constrained to the extent that they must be congruent with the reproduction of capitalist social relations, generally, and the imperatives of capital accumulation and legitimation, specifically.[116] The concrete ways in which the state responds vary with such factors as (1) the level of capitalist development; (2) the forms of social-class struggle; (3) the relative strengths of racial groups as reflected in electoral politics, social movements, or other forms of insurgency; (4) administrative capacities and constitutional constraints; (5) local social-class structures and political histories; and (6) the zeitgeist of the times reflected, for example, in institutional environments.[117] The balance of these complex forces determines distributional outcomes for various racial groups, including access to educational, occupational, and income opportunities, as well as spatial mobility and political influence.[118]

This definition of the state (1) shifts the frame of analysis from liberal to structural accounts, bringing into question its presumed role as neutral arbiter; (2) accounts for the changing role of the state in historical context—a role that mediates between structural contradictions on the one hand and racial discourses on the other;[119] and (3) views the state itself as the preeminent site of racial conflict, as well as social-class conflict.[120] Wilson's[121] earlier work appeared to support the underlying assumption that state interventions in the structuring of race relations reflect the historical tendency for the reproduction of the social formation as a whole to take place through the mediation of state activity. However, in *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*, he backed away from this assumption in favor of an implicit—but distinctly liberal—conception of the state.

Bridging the Theoretical Divide: Twelve Propositions

1. *In the United States, the state is a structure that is constrained by the emergence, logic, and contradictions of the capitalist mode of production as a whole.*[122] It is composed of distinctive levels and practices that are defined according to the functions that they fulfill in relation to the whole; however, the state is not free to abrogate the structural requirements of the capitalist economy.[123] As O'Connor[124] argued, a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the sources of its own power: the economy's ability to produce a surplus and the taxes drawn from that surplus. Conversely, a state that openly uses its coercive force to help one social class or racial group accumulate capital and other advantages at the expense of others risks losing its legitimacy and may undermine the basis of its loyalty and support. The state at the national level is better able to represent the interests of the capitalist class or the dominant groups when it can transcend the parochial, individualized interests of specific factions and present itself as the embodiment of the aggregated interests of the nation as a whole within the context of a universal set of values such as the American creed.[125]

2. *As a structure, the state is relatively autonomous, with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or "fused with," the interests of the capitalist class or the dominant groups.*[126] In addition, *the separation of functions among different levels of the state affects the internal structure of each level, ensures its relative autonomy in relation to other levels, and shapes and limits forms of intervention.*[127] The concept of relative autonomy is not equivalent to the concept of neutral arbiter, or umpire, in the social system. The former creates the possibility that the state can act *as if* it were neutral despite structural constraints, whereas the latter assumes that the state *is* neutral. Neither is the concept of relative autonomy an invariant feature of the state. Problematic in this respect, one of the difficulties lies in specifying its nature, determinants, and limits within specific historical contexts.[128] However, the use of the concept corrects for problems in strictly instrumentalist and liberal interpretations of the state; it allows for the possibility that the state can serve as an emancipatory force for oppressed groups.[129]

3. *Individual states* (e.g., Alabama, Mississippi) *are constrained by local class structures, various political economic and social interests, and the national state; they change as these forces attempt to modify the "racial selectiveness" of these states in their favor.*[130] Historically, the division of functions between the national state and the individual states confined relations between dominant and minority groups within the boundaries of individual states; this division favored delaying tactics and obstruction in the pursuit of racial equality.[131] Individual states did not arbitrate between dominant and minority groups so much as establish the rules of the game for practicing racial discrimination.[132] Although individual states are constrained by the laws and resources of, and subject to review by, the national state, as fragmented and somewhat insulated political systems they hold an array of rights and powers that enable them to pursue objectives specific to local interests. These objectives may contravene the intentions of the national state.[133]

In addition, to varying degrees, minority groups themselves have distinctive histories, social structures, and degrees of consciousness and cohe-

sion. They are encapsulated within specific political jurisdictions—a concept that is more inclusive than, and subsumes, internal colonies. For example, when superordinate-subordinate relations emerge from intergroup contact, the superordinates may create (often arbitrary) political entities that incorporate the subordinates within the larger system. These political entities may take different forms; however, the incorporation is of such a nature that no alternative may exist other than to "[revise or destroy] the institutions of political, economic, and social subordination."[134] Such entities affect minority groups' political and economic strategies; patterns of conflict with, and access to, dominant groups; and ability to be represented at the various levels of the state.

Local states are replete with unique norms and implicit procedures that govern the conduct of politics.

> In the local political arena, unwritten rules and customary cultural practices [establish] the legitimacy of certain community actors to speak, the proper venues in which they [may] do so, and the most fitting means for expressing consent or dissent. Definitions of statuses, roles, and appropriate political behaviors [are] communicated and learned through localized social networks.[135]

Social conventions legitimize some forms of discourse over others; designate the actors eligible or ineligible to participate in the political process; define the appropriate and inappropriate forms of political action; and, therefore, circumscribe the range of solutions.[136] These forms of influence and manipulation may change even the most carefully formulated policies that originate at the national level.[137]

At each level of the state fundamental conflicts of interest may arise between, and within, dominant, minority, and state administrative groups. However, state administrators cannot abrogate the structural requirements of local, state, and national economies (and thus at least some of the interests of the dominant groups) without jeopardizing their own position.[138] This structural imperative places limits on which forms of state intervention will be acceptable—and therefore likely to be implemented—and which forms will be unacceptable. Furthermore, state administrators may restructure concessions won by minority groups to support existing racial relationships. To that extent, they serve to perpetuate the status quo.[139] The state, generally, is able to grant the concessions that the current dynamics of racial relationships require because it is capable of transcending parochial, individualized interests. These concessions may divide racial minorities into competing subgroups and further limit the possibility for fundamental social change.[140]

State interventions in the form of policies, programs, and directives may have unintended as well as intended consequences—for example, in the form of unforeseen social, political, and structural changes. These interventions are not necessarily coordinated, coherent, or unified; indeed, different levels and branches of the state may act in a contradictory fashion. For example, concurrent with the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s prohibiting racial discrimination, other branches of the federal government pursued policies that worked, in effect, to the disadvantage of minority groups.[141]

4. *The purpose of a capitalist state is to maintain the unity of the nation so that the objective interests of the capitalist class can be realized. However, the state does not function unambiguously in the interests of a single social class, social-class faction, or group regardless of historical period.*[142] In other words, the state serves the general interests of the capitalist class and specific interests of the dominant groups even as it portrays itself as serving the interests of all groups; thus, it is simultaneously a racial state (and has been since its founding) and a universal state claiming to act in the interests of all. The state can function on behalf of the capitalist class and dominant racial or ethnic groups only when it equates their needs with the national interest (however defined) and secures support for the policies, programs, and directives that maintain those interests.[143] Policies must be consistent with the demands of the capital accumulation process. Otherwise, the state risks losing the source of its power: the ability to tax the surplus.[144] Nevertheless, policy constraints are political and social, as well as economic, in nature; therefore, the state faces a series of inherent dilemmas as it carries out its functions, particularly how to establish and institutionalize a method of policy formulation and implementation that constitutes a balance between its structural requirements and the demands of various constituencies.[145]

5. *The intents and effects of policies, programs, and directives in the preindustrial, industrial, and modern industrial periods should not be assumed before the fact; they may be established by examining the determinants that shaped their formulation and implementation.*[146] Policies are composed of (1) values and assumptions that are made explicit only rarely; (2) operating principles that give those values and assumptions form in specific programs and directives; (3) the outcomes of specific programs and directives that enable policy planners to contrast ideals with reality; (4) the often weak linkages among aims, means, and outcomes; and (5) the strategies of social change suggested by, and omitted from, points one through four above.[147] By and large, programmatic recommendations are acceptable only by those who share the framework. As a set of objectives, policies emerge from compromise among contending values, assumptions, ideals, interests, and purposes; thus, they contain the limitations that made these policies acceptable.[148]

For example, the real estate and lending industries substantially influ-

enced the major provisions of the 1934 Housing Act that resulted in racially restrictive covenants on government-insured housing. They did so in part by staffing the FHA's administrative ranks. The provisions were intended to increase profits without altering existing patterns of residential segregation. The subsequent standards adopted and applied by institutions throughout the real estate and lending industries embodied the FHA's discriminatory recommendations and practices. In other words, the FHA legitimized the idea that racial discrimination is a necessary condition for profitable transactions in the housing market.[149] Once a state apparatus such as the FHA is racialized, it may function in such a way as to allocate differentially resources to whites and blacks, thus reinforcing relations of domination and subordination (reflected particularly in life-chances).[150]

6. As Wilson argued, *policies will not effectively redress the plight of the truly disadvantaged if they do not account for the rate of growth of the economy and the nature of its demand for labor; the factors that affect employment such as changing technologies and rising or falling profit rates; and the migration patterns of capital and labor that result from "industrial shifts and transformations."*[151] For example, community control strategies that encourage the development of black capitalism have important limitations because they do not address "structural realities"[152]—a contention supported by recent research. Compared to their white counterparts, black entrepreneurs have greater difficulties finding capital; even where capital is found, the technical assistance necessary for profitable investment strategies may be inadequate.[153] They face a lack of consistent community support; investments may be limited to failure-prone retail or service enterprises that offer little possibility for building a substantial job base that can reduce the occupational and earnings gap with whites. Ironically, black entrepreneurs also face a shortage of black workers; that is, unskilled and semiskilled black workers forego the possible long-term gains of employment in black businesses for short-term gains in white businesses in the form of higher wages, even though these wages may be lower than whites' wages and earned in jobs with few chances for promotion. Skilled and highly skilled blacks apparently prefer jobs in the state sector.[154]

Nearly one-third of all businesses in black low-income communities are owned by blacks. However, in terms of proportion of workers employed, percentage of wages paid, and income returns to owners, absentee-owned or -managed businesses dominate the economies of both black low-income *and* white low-income communities in major metropolitan areas. In this context, white-owned businesses employ a large majority of the people in low-income communities who work, and they are more likely than black-owned businesses to hire white employees in greater proportion than the racial composition of the area would suggest. Yet it appears that

the issue of who owns local businesses is not salient to most black residents; protests tend to originate mainly with black political and community leaders.[155]

The position of black-owned businesses relative to white-owned businesses in the U.S. economy deteriorated from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s, primarily because black-owned businesses did not successfully compete for the rising incomes of the black middle class. The black-owned businesses that survived did so by diversifying into computer-related technologies and telecommunications. Little growth is evident in the traditional fields that have served black customers for decades. Moreover, growth in those industries that benefited from affirmative action programs (e.g., public construction) has slowed.[156] Nevertheless, the proportion of black-owned businesses relative to other-owned businesses in a community appears to have a major impact on the relative well-being of blacks in that community "net of other contributory factors."[157] Stated differently, as the proportion of black-owned businesses in a community increases, the probability of black political influence in local government also increases. In turn, this influence may result in positive outcomes for the community.[158]

Studies of residential succession in low-income communities show that white-owned businesses depart in much the same way as white residents do, that is, at a fairly low but constant rate.[159] The rate of departure of white-owned businesses is relatively constant across industries in the early stages of succession, with retail and service businesses somewhat more likely to leave. In later stages, however, the loss of retail and service businesses is substantial and disproportionate compared with other businesses. The proportion of white-owned businesses decreases over time in black low-income communities because whites do not return to invest in these communities. Blacks lack both the capital and the experience necessary to take advantage of opportunities opened to them by the withdrawal of whites. Blacks who wish to start businesses face difficulties obtaining credit and are forced to rely heavily on personal savings.[160] Banks and other financial institutions do not build a proportionate number of their branches in ghetto areas—only small loan companies charging high interest rates do.[161] The gains that occur come about primarily when black entrepreneurs are able to take advantage of newly vacated niches.[162]

The loss of traditional entrepreneurial niches—for example, black skin care products to companies such as Revlon—means that an important avenue to self-employment has closed.[163] In the early 1980s, black entrepreneurship was most common in areas with large black populations, high black employment rates, and low dissimilarity between blacks and whites occupationally. This fact suggests that a sizable high-status black community supports black entrepreneurship.[164] A historical study[165] of black entrepreneurship demonstrated regional differences in the "character of black

businesses"; that is, black businesses are quite different in the western United States compared to all other regions. The profitable and expanding black businesses in the western United States do not specialize in delivering services to a primarily black clientele and have managed to penetrate high-technology fields. Entrepreneurs who have acquired highly specialized training run these businesses. To my knowledge, no study has attempted to examine a possible correlation between indices of segregation (the Southwest and West do not evidence the extreme segregation of the northeastern and north-central region) and the ability of black-owned and -managed businesses to thrive.

The black business community appears to be an extension of the competitive sector in the United States, even though this community is somewhat distinct by virtue of the fact that many of its businesses are black-owned and to some extent geographically isolated. The Cuban business community appears to be characterized by a greater degree of autonomy from the monopoly and competitive sectors, or by a greater degree of "self-enclosed interdependence," than is characteristic of the black business community.[166] Cubans have been more successful because they are linked to international trade; have greater access to investment capital; have more experience with entrepreneurship; and produce ethnic goods such as textiles, cigars, and food (only in the meat industry did the Cubans drive out black competition). In contrast, the black community lacks investment capital and the technical assistance necessary for successful development strategies; furthermore, most of the labor power in the black community, when it can be utilized, is exported to white businesses where wages are higher. In other words, situational factors have created employment alternatives.[167]

7. *The state is constrained in its ability to formulate and implement policies that significantly limit freedom of investment and subordinate "private units of production" to political decisions.*[168] For example, mechanisms such as constitutional restrictions and mission statements "ensure" that some options will not enter the arena of state activity.[169] Collectively, U.S. capitalists possess a de facto veto over policy formulation and implementation in that their failure to invest, combined with their willingness to disinvest, may create serious political problems for state officials. This possibility discourages officials from taking actions that challenge the priorities of major corporations.[170] Increasingly, corporations themselves structure the frameworks within which policy can be formulated and implemented, evidenced in the subordinate role that city and state governments play in their attempts to attract and retain capital.[171]

Constrained by contradictory imperatives and dependent on tax revenues, officials attempt to create the conditions that facilitate capital accumulation without exacerbating demands that policies should be oriented away from private needs and toward public needs such as universal health care. Therefore, the ability to plan is limited accordingly. Generally, current policies do not address the growing contradiction between the systemic needs of capitalism, such as capital mobility, and the social needs of communities[172]—a problem that is readily apparent in the emergence of neighborhoods characterized by extreme poverty. Planning requires prioritization and a need to justify proposals to constituencies fragmented by social class and racial struggles. However, mass participation in the planning process would open the door to greater scrutiny of private investment and production decisions—a problematic fiercely resisted by capitalists.[173] Furthermore, if officials are pressured from below to develop policies to meet social needs, the divide between (shortsighted) capitalists and officials may grow over time.[174]

Many officials acquire some consciousness of what is necessary to maintain the social order—for example, reflected in the co-optation of black demands for racial justice by expanding employment opportunities in the state sector. However, increased consciousness does not imply control over the "historical process."[175] For example, the penetration of the state by special interest groups constrains the ability of officials to develop more rational and efficient policies. Furthermore, no guarantees exist that the policies formulated by officials, and that have the support of major corporations or organized labor, will succeed in achieving their objectives.[176]

8. *Within state apparatuses, policies are formulated and implemented under a series of conditions and procedures. These rules of the game define what is and is not permissible.*[177] Understanding the conditions and procedures of policy formulation and implementation is important because they predetermine what can and does become policy.[178] Certain kinds of policies are much more likely to develop than others as a function of structural constraints and political considerations.[179] The state has the capacity to systematically exclude certain points of view (e.g., black nationalism) and certain policy alternatives (e.g., universal health care). In order to assess the contradictory ways by which state apparatuses constrain social change, it is necessary to identify who controls the policy formulation and implementation process.[180]

The state administrative system constrains policy formulation and implementation in two ways: first, various state apparatuses may act autonomously, not reducible to the preferences or pressures of any identifiable group. These actions may result because appointed as well as elected officials have organizational and career interests of their own; they will devise and work for policies that further those interests. If a given state apparatus provides no existing or readily feasible policy format for implementing an action, appointed and elected officials are not likely to pursue them, and politicians aspiring to office are not likely to propose them.

Second, state apparatuses both respond to, and influence, the conceptions that constituencies are likely to develop about what is desirable or possible.[181]

For example, in the passage of equal employment opportunity legislation, evidence is consistent with the view that the U.S. Congress responded as a consequence of constituent demands, well-organized lobbying by civil rights organizations, and a "liberal trend" in U.S. Supreme Court decisions.[182] Paul Burstein and Margo MacLeod[183] noted a lack of new ideas for equal employment opportunity legislation coming from most quarters after the early 1970s. The picture of congressional activity that emerged in their study was one of routine organizational response to a slowly changing environment. Interested members of the U.S. Congress responded to a social problem by developing a small number of proposals based upon past legislation with which everyone was familiar and by briefly searching for a solution. This practice is consistent with theories of U.S. political decisionmaking that claim that limits on decisionmakers' analytical capabilities and resources will encourage them to consider only a small number of solutions to any problem and to settle on a familiar solution.

A failure to recognize these constraints may result in overstating the progressive possibilities (i.e., the reductions that are possible in racial inequities) of the passage of civil rights, equal employment opportunity, affirmative action, and other forms of legislation. This conclusion is sustained because the political context in which legislation is passed and the likelihood of its enforcement are not sufficiently analyzed.[184] Wilson and Robert Aponte[185] pointed out that recent studies on the effects of budget cuts during the Reagan administration on the working poor are clear and consistent, revealing a "retreat" from the Great Society initiatives of the Lyndon Johnson administration. During the Bill Clinton administration, the federal government's reluctance to intervene on behalf of civil rights had parallels to the withdrawal of federal protection of black rights after Reconstruction. In other words, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld states' rights—for example, in decisions shielding states from suits for violating federal laws.[186]

9. *If the purpose of the state is to maintain the unity of the nation, then its apparatuses should be responsive to pressures instigated by constituencies from below.*[187] The degree to which the interests of various groups are realized, and distributional outcomes are affected, depend on a variety of circumstances. For example, Roger Friedland[188] concluded that the poverty funds made available by the Great Society initiatives of the 1960s were not distributed according to actual needs expressed in rates of poverty by locale. Rather, they were distributed to those groups who successfully pressed their demands into national issues and were deemed significant as a consequence. However, these groups were effective only in cases where they threatened corporate or union interests.

Wilson[189] claimed that as long as the middle and lower classes are fragmented along racial lines, they would fail to see how their combined efforts could change the factors that affect their life-chances and thus promote policies that reflect their interests. His "real world model" called for the development of a broad-based political constituency consisting of civil rights groups, women's groups, labor unions, grassroots organizations, and religious organizations acting in a bipartisan way and focusing on their common interests. This constituency would concentrate on programs that benefit all groups in question, not just poor blacks. It would address national issues as well as specific grievances that could be rectified, such as flood control in poor neighborhoods and improved streets and sidewalks. Also, it would start an "earnest" national debate on extant approaches and prompt public officials to "consider seriously the effects of their action or inaction on a broad range of issues that impact vulnerable families."[190] Recently, Wilson[191] cited the role that faith-based organizations might play in revitalizing neighborhoods characterized by, or vulnerable to, concentrated poverty.

It is not clear, though, how constituencies—particularly those at the bottom of the stratification system, with little or no formal political power—are able to influence the policy formulation and implementation process. Opportunities to create alliances with sympathetic elites, access to financial resources, an organizational structure that can leverage the state, and "a modification of known forms of action" may be crucial.[192] For example, in the early-twentieth-century South, disenfranchised blacks allied with northern philanthropists used private funds to secure public funds to construct an adequate system of elementary education for blacks. Once this service was established in the state sector, then it could be institutionalized as a "routine matter of state policy."[193]

In this context, research is needed to determine how, under what circumstances, and to what extent race and class inequities might be redressed by popular participation in the political process.[194] Because subordinate class unity is a threat to capitalists, Poulantzas posited that the state functions most fundamentally to disunite the masses; at the same time, the political system allows them to vote and to form political parties and interest groups to achieve concessions. In effect, subordinate classes become competing subgroups.[195] Intraclass conflict increases when these groups have to vie with each other for scarce resources.[196]

10. *Extrainstitutional methods and tactics may be required to redress racial inequality.* How, and in what ways, organized protest, insurgency, and violence affect objective outcomes for the groups employing these

strategies are open to debate. Policies, programs, and directives may reject, ignore, co-opt, or embody the group demands that emerge from these methods and tactics.[197] For example, some views claim that the expansion of the social welfare system was a response by a neutral state to the dislocations inherent in, and the needs created by, an expanding industrial society. Other views suggest that the expansion was a response by a capitalist class–dominated state to the threats posed by social movements from below.[198] Larry Isaac and William Kelly[199] showed that collective violence in the form of urban riots played an important role nationally in the short-term expansion (in the aggregate) of several major relief programs after World War II. Thus, they provided empirical support for Francis Piven and Richard Cloward's[200] controversial thesis in *Regulating the Poor*. However, Isaac and Kelly added that centrally controlled programs were no more "riot elastic" than locally controlled programs; and riot frequency better predicted the expansion of major relief programs than did riot severity. Furthermore, extrainstitutional politics yielded greater benefits for those who did not have access to existing welfare institutions, whereas electoral politics yielded greater benefits for those who already had acquired access. In this context, they stressed the importance of developing an empirically justifiable theory of the state that identifies the forces that affect the formulation and implementation of policy, as well as the consequences for reducing educational, occupational, and earnings disparities between the races.[201]

Edward Jennings challenged Isaac and Kelly's[202] research on methodological grounds. That is, its statistical methodology constituted an inappropriate test of the comparative effects of variables drawn from different theoretical traditions. Urban riots alone did not prompt the state to respond by expanding major relief programs. In a study of the U.S. welfare system from 1947 to 1976, Jennings[203] argued that the state acted as it did *also* because of "increased economic capacity" and "a general propensity to respond to aggregated individual preferences." According to Jennings, the data are sufficient to support elements of both mainstream and alternative views and that the two can be "reconciled." More recently, sociologists have moved beyond the traditional focus of social movement theories (which examine how the state shapes the outcomes of organized protest, insurgency, and other forms of extrainstitutional politics) to consider how social movements affect the process of state formation or transformation itself. For example, Jill Quadagno[204] identified changes that occurred within the state as a consequence of the conflict between civil rights activists and organized labor over the definition of economic justice. Changes included new policies and programs to expand and implement civil rights.

The redistribution of society's rewards and privileges depends on the mobilization of political resources, even if this is difficult for many groups to accomplish. With few electoral resources, blacks have had to rely on the

legal system and on extrainstitutional methods and tactics.[205] Reductions in racial inequality from the early 1960s to the present would have been substantially less in the absence of these efforts and the effects on state actions expressed in legislative initiatives, judicial decisions, federal enforcement efforts, and employment opportunities. In part, demands for racial reform reflect changes in collective identities as electoral bases are sought, administrative procedures contested, and judicial decisions handed down.[206] The problematic here is to link political inputs (which may originate from a variety of sources) and systemic constraints to the outputs of state activity, such as new or more favorable interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.[207] In a government of legislation and litigation, politics might be defined as the struggle to translate economic, social, and racial interests into law. In this context, crises serve as the steering mechanism for state interventions. Because crises result from complex dynamics and affect different social classes, social-class fractions, and races in contradictory ways, conflict is likely to occur over their interpretation and resolution.[208]

Legal mandates to reduce racial inequities may be issued; however, legal mandates may not include the organizational capacity and resources to effect change, particularly if the apparatuses in question have strong ties to local political and social-class structures. "Organizational capacity" refers to the extent to which goals can be fulfilled. The capacity of an apparatus to implement policies depends on formal and informal norms, standard procedures, routines, and conventions embedded in its organizational structure. In addition, its policy legacy sets boundaries on the options open to it, as well as limiting the direction of future programmatic possibilities. In these cases, the autonomy to act may (and probably will) be compromised, and state interventions may not succeed.[209] For example, in the absence of federal intervention, the southern elite "by proper choice of tactics" could use the legal system in the South to harass, and occasionally defeat, civil rights forces.[210]

11. *Ideologies* (such as philosophies of individualism) *serve the function of cohesion by minimizing complexities, as well as the significance of contradictions; often they resolve contradictions by excluding them from consideration.* Wilson[211] claimed that ideology was a problem of the sociopolitical order; thus, by definition, it was relegated to secondary consideration. Katherine See[212] countered that an understanding of the role of ideology is crucial in any attempt to comprehend the opposition to redistributive policies in the United States. Research studies continue to show that whites generally reject, ignore, or are unaware of structural accounts of poverty; adopt individualistic accounts; and interpret socioeconomic successes and failures as a consequence of personal characteristics. These views shape perceptions of the extent and causes of racial inequality, as well as the appropriate solutions.[213] This problematic is apparent in over-

generalizations about the poor expressed, for example, in culture of poverty arguments contrasted with processes of hyperghettoization. Even extrainstitutional politics may be framed in terms of the dominant ideology, thus demonstrating the efficacy of that ideology itself.[214]

12. *The study of how policies emerge within, and may be co-opted by, state apparatuses and structures requires a high degree of historical specificity.*[215] Research may be able to determine (1) who develops, administers, and controls what forms of intervention at various levels of the state, in whose interests, and why (e.g., by legitimizing the civil rights movement and repressing alternatives such as the Black Panthers, the liberal wing of the U.S. capitalist class set the parameters for public discourse and practice and avoided more fundamental social change); (2) when, why, and to what extent state administrators can act against the general interests of the dominant groups; and (3) how the potential for any form of intervention changes over time as internal transformations occur in the organization of the state. This research may reveal how, and why, state interventions prove effective or ineffective in redressing racial inequality, as well as the direct and indirect effects from above of dominant group challenges to minority group claims.[216]

For example, according to Quadagno,[217] although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed segregation and banned racial discrimination in education and employment, compliance was uneven across institutional spheres. Racial integration proceeded more rapidly in the health care system than in other institutions because Medicare, the largest expansion of the welfare state since the New Deal, provided the leverage to force health care providers to comply with the law. The federal government had allowed a racially segregated health care system to flourish in most southern states and in some northern states by defining hospitals as "private" institutions whose rules and regulations weren't subject to state jurisdiction. A redefinition of the scope of state authority transformed hospitals from private institutions into public institutions. Therefore, the state can promote racial equality if political resources are available to challenge racially discriminatory practices; institutions with a history of racial discrimination are incorporated into the state sector; the conditions for the distribution of benefits support the objective of racial equality; and the benefits are provided on a continuous and universal basis.[218]

Theory and Practice: Wilson on Affirmative Action

If race is to be used as an instrument of policy, then racial groups have to be constructed; people have to be assigned to one racial group or another; relations between racial groups have to be quantified; and the reasons for

educational, occupational, and earnings disparities have to be assessed.[219] Racial classification systems present difficult ontological, methodological, and political problems. Officially approved or adopted by the state and incorporated into legislative initiatives and judicial rulings, racial categories raise questions about how they came into being. Understanding racial classification systems requires analysis of the historical context in which they arose; processes of codification, reification, and legitimation; and problems of politics reflected in social movements, on the one hand, and the "race relations industry" on the other.[220] For example, the color caste system in Brazil makes it nearly impossible to decide who should be *eligible* to receive racially based preferences. This conundrum may extend to the United States as it becomes increasingly diverse. In other words, the growing population of multiracial individuals and families increases the confusion of determining who should benefit from affirmative action programs.[221]

Wilson did not address these issues in a systematic way. Rather, he argued that affirmative action programs likely will improve the opportunities of the advantaged, but not the opportunities of the disadvantaged, if they are proffered on the basis of racial-group membership. The problems of the disadvantaged require "nonracial solutions" that address fundamental causes—in other words, a "social democratic policy agenda that highlights macroeconomic policies" and is promoted by a "progressive coalition for change."[222] In this context, comprehensive research on the impact of affirmative action programs is hard to find. Affirmative action programs increased access to the professional and administrative positions that are crucial to the black middle class. However, they also increased access to the blue-collar and government jobs that are crucial to the black working class.[223] On a limited scale in the early 1970s, programs such as the Philadelphia Plan were implemented that opened the building trades to blacks. In the late 1970s, programs were expanded to require minority participation in major construction projects—for example, the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 and the ensuing *Fullilove v. Klumnick* U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1980 upholding "set-asides" for minority contractors (however, it was reversed in the Court's 1989 *Richmond v. Croson* ruling).[224]

Shortly after *The Declining Significance of Race* was published, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that affirmative action programs whose intent was to improve the skills of black workers with low seniority were legal, as were racial preferences in hiring in occupations such as sheet metal fabrication and state and local police forces. Wilson was correct to argue that affirmative action programs are of little value for less-skilled blacks in blue-collar industries that have experienced massive layoffs, such as the U.S. automobile and rubber industries. However, in his overemphasis on

the black middle class, he overlooked the fact that some blue-collar occupations, such as the construction industry and state and local police forces, are not declining. Here, the contributory potential of affirmative action programs for blacks without advanced degrees may be significant.[225]

Wilson was aware that as long as affirmative action is framed as a race-targeted, outcomes-equalizing program, opposition will continue. The degree of opposition hinges on the explicitness of race-targeting and on whether the program's goal is equality of opportunity or equality of results.[226] On the basis of research that shows that whites will support affirmative action programs that "enhance opportunity" vis-à-vis establish preferential quotas, Wilson[227] envisioned programs guided by a principle of equality of life-chances, wherein programs would be applicable to all of the truly disadvantaged regardless of their race or ethnicity; he referred to this principle as "affirmative opportunity." Affirmative opportunity is not a guarantee of equal results; it avoids the negative connotations of preferential quotas, lowered standards, and reverse discrimination. This principle would not require reference to past discrimination as a justification. Rather, it would attempt to overcome the disadvantages of lower-class background through programs such as compensatory schooling and job training, income redistribution, and special medical services. These programs would not be mistargeted to those who are relatively affluent. Wilson argued that only programs such as these are capable of simultaneously helping the truly disadvantaged and achieving public support. His qualified support for race-specific programs reflects their major flaw: they ignore class deprivations among poor whites.[228]

In this context, Wilson acknowledged that blacks would disproportionately benefit from affirmative opportunity programs intended to redress environmental disadvantages because they disproportionately suffer from the effects of such environments. Nevertheless, these programs would be available to disadvantaged whites as well, defraying some opposition.[229] However, Americans as a whole have not rejected the view that individuals, regardless of race, are responsible for their plight. Committed to meritocracy and fair play, denying structural limits on opportunities, and opposed to governmental intrusion, they are more likely to stigmatize the poor than defend their citizenship rights.[230] In this context, Wilson's belief that affirmative opportunity is more likely to succeed than affirmative action may be little more than wishful thinking.

Contrary to the claims of some of his critics, Wilson did not advocate eliminating race-targeted programs altogether. However, Wilson did not address the fundamental justifications for affirmative action; whether affirmative action should be limited to hiring or should include promotions and terminations; whether a less-qualified member of a beneficiary group should be selected over a better-qualified member of the dominant group

(in contrast to selecting the beneficiary-group member from among equally qualified candidates); whether affirmative action ought to take the form of quotas or goals; or what characteristics a group would have to have in order to warrant awarding its members preferential treatment.[231] Wilson could have, but did not, make a case for affirmative action programs based on inadequacies in the merit system, which should work rationally and objectively to allocate rewards and privileges. In fact, the merit system contains a variety of nonrational and subjective components that prejudice results in favor of some groups and against others[232]—a point that is apparent in the promotional practices of major corporations discussed above.

According to Wilson, even though affirmative action programs may be useful in a delimited sense, they have fragmented the liberal coalitions crucial to his social-democratic policy agenda. The Republican Party has capitalized on public opposition by criticizing affirmative action programs and promoting policies that benefit whites in the upper reaches of the U.S. social-class structure. Thus, Wilson saw a need to deemphasize divisive programs that target particular racial groups in favor of inclusive programs that target all groups. Race-targeted programs would be considered an offshoot of, and secondary to, universal programs.[233] Social-democratic policies requiring (unspecified) "macroeconomic changes" to promote balanced economic growth and public-sector employment would benefit the disadvantaged, regardless of race, while attracting and sustaining the support of more advantaged groups from different racial and social-class backgrounds.[234]

Balanced economic growth is a popular idea. If the economy expands at a sufficient pace, profit and wage rates should increase and the unemployment rate should fall. For these reasons, racial disparities in socioeconomic status attainments should also decrease. This expectation explains why policies to promote economic growth are popular substitutes for affirmative action as the most appropriate way to reduce disparities between blacks and whites.[235] However, the post-1982 experience challenges this expectation, suggesting that Wilson's emphasis on policies to promote economic growth may be misplaced. The impact of economic growth may be mediated by other factors, such as reduced enforcement of antidiscriminatory laws during the Reagan administration.[236] Particularly, in *The Declining Significance of Race* Wilson claimed that government intervention in U.S. labor markets between 1930 and 1980 promoted opportunities for blacks and decreased racial disparities in educational, occupational, and earnings attainments; others[237] argued that the government's retreat from equal opportunity employment and affirmative action programs in the 1980s reversed the trend. That is, the 1985 cohort of young blacks competed in a labor market that had become less sympathetic to achieving racial equality than was true a decade earlier.

Data analyzed by Fossett et al.[238] suggest that economic growth is less consequential than "strategies of social intervention" for promoting the movement toward racial equality. When they examined the period 1940–1980, they found that the correlation between economic growth and reductions in racial inequality is inconsistent at best. Civil rights legislation, judicial decisions, and other social interventions contributed much more toward reducing disparities in educational, occupational, and earnings attainments. According to Fossett et al.[239] the claim that reductions in racial disparities would have occurred in the absence of social interventions—that is, an activist state—cannot be supported on the basis of available evidence. Furthermore, given deindustrialization and disinvestment, the economy may not have the capacity to absorb a significant part of the black population in other than low-paying service-sector jobs that offer few prospects for socioeconomic advancement.[240]

In Summary

Without a doubt, Wilson's contribution to the sociology of race relations ranks as extraordinary and productive. Nevertheless, I have to conclude that his attempt to bridge the racial divide through affirmative opportunity and balanced economic growth falls short. An explicit recognition of the state's role in structuring life-chances in the industrial and modern industrial periods is missing—apparent in U.S. Supreme Court decisions; housing, mortgage-lending, and insurance practices; low-income housing and community development initiatives; zoning and land-use policies; tax incentive programs; interstate highway construction projects; and local control issues.[241] The evidence evaluated here suggests that Massey was right: the housing market plays a crucial role in the socioeconomic well-being of blacks. Given substantial evidence of discrimination in the housing and lending markets, its significance as a determinant of racial disparities in socioeconomic status attainment outcomes cannot be dismissed.[242] The high level of black segregation cannot be explained by improper relational contexts or by blacks' objective socioeconomic characteristics, their housing preferences, or their (limited) knowledge of suburban housing markets. Rather, it is linked empirically to the "web of discrimination"—the combination of banking, finance, insurance, real estate, and government practices that structure life-chances.[243]

Supply-side economic policies (e.g., urban renewal, tax incentive programs, and free enterprise zones) have done little to redress the inequalities that result from private investment practices. This fact has led to calls for strengthening enforcement of fair housing and credit laws at the national, state, and local levels; revising the mortgage practices of the FHA and the Veterans' Administration; increasing oversight of landlords; expanding rent subsidies to allow lower-income blacks to move into higher-quality housing; increasing the stock of affordable housing; developing regional planning agencies with sufficient authority to implement metropolitan-wide land-use and transportation policies; restricting plant closures; making available investment monies for community-owned and worker-owned enterprises; and encouraging unionization in the service sector.[244]

Most of these proposals, as well as others, are controversial. Those whose material interests are threatened, and those whose cultural repertoires do not acknowledge (or exclude before the fact) the grounds that resulted in these proposals, will protest. Cultural repertoires play an important role in how people explain, and propose solutions to, racial inequities. These explanations may not be only or even primarily about race. Inferring meanings, attributing motives, and predicting outcomes have become difficult because today ambiguity, inconsistency, hesitation, and avoidance are common in all spheres of social life, not just race relations.[245] Nevertheless, these explanations provide insights into how people connect themselves to each other. Cultural repertoires may mitigate, sustain, or intensify conflicts. Because these repertoires vary widely across the white population, it is difficult to accurately predict how whites will react to proposals intended to redress racial inequities.[246] However, if racial disparities in educational, occupational, and earnings attainments are the consequence of complex political economic and social relations, then no proposal compatible with the maintenance of the prevailing relations will have much impact on reducing these disparities.[247]

Notes

1. E.g., Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States From the 1960s to the 1980s*, 1st ed.
2. Hawkins, "The 'Discovery' of Institutional Racism," 179.
3. Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 5, 7; C. Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict."
4. Cf. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, 33–34; Gouldner, *The Two Marxisms*, 55, 71, 312; D. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 15; Wagner and Berger, "Do Sociological Theories Grow?" 700–702.
5. Wolfe, "New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics," 149.
6. Ibid., 149–150.
7. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 2nd ed., 82.
8. E.g., Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America*.
9. Wilson, "The Declining Significance of Race"; Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.
10. Wilson, "The Declining Significance of Race," 56–57.

11. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*; Wilson, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*.

12. Burawoy, "The Capitalist State in South Africa," 284; cf. Burawoy, "State and Social Revolution in South Africa."

13. Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism"; Bonacich, "Abolition, the Extension of Slavery, and the Position of Free Blacks"; Bonacich, "Advanced Capitalism and Black/White Race Relations in the United States"; Bonacich, "The Past, Present, and Future of Split Labor Market Theory"; Bonacich, "Class Approaches to Ethnicity and Race"; Bonacich, "Capitalism and Race Relations in South Africa."

14. Burawoy, "The Capitalist State in South Africa," 286; Geddes, "The Capitalist State and the Local Economy"; cf. Bonefield, "Some Notes on the Theory of the Capitalist State."

15. Cf. Niemonen, "The Race Relations *Problematic* in American Sociology"; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 6.

16. Cf. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 561, 591.

17. Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 28.

18. Wilson, "The Declining Significance of Race"; Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.

19. Cf. Frankel, "On the State of the State," 203.

20. R. C. Hill, "Race, Class, and the State," 45.

21. Wilson, "The Declining Significance of Race"; Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*; Wilson, "When Work Disappears."

22. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*; Wilson, "When Work Disappears."

23. D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State," 205.

24. Weir, "From Equal Opportunity to 'The New Social Contract,'" 104; cf. Valocchi, "The Racial Basis of Capitalism and the State, and the Impact of the New Deal on African Americans"; Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 371. Although Wilson (*The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*) neglected the role of insurgency expressed in race riots and other forms of noninstitutional politics, he recognized the importance of popular democratic struggles.

25. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1980s*, 1st ed., 76.

26. M. Keith and Cross, "Racism and the Postmodern City," 19; Wolfe, "New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics," 143.

27. Cf. Wilson, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*, in which this assumption is embedded deeply.

28. Connell, "The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics," 512.

29. Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 187.

30. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, 47–48, 126.

31. For additional evidence showing that the state is not a neutral arbiter in racial conflict, see Barnes and Connolly, "Repression, the Judicial System, and Political Opportunities for Civil Rights Advocacy During Reconstruction."

32. Jorgensen, "A Century of Political Economic Effects on American Indian Society, 1880–1980," 2; Mosley, "Capital and the State," 27.

33. Frankel, "On the State of the State," 199; Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 1]," 37; Isaac and Kelly, "Developmental/Modernization and Political Class Struggle Theories of Welfare Expansion," 213–214.

34. Wilson, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*, 89.

35. E.g., O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*; Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State"; Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State"; Poulantzas, "Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State"; Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State."

36. Connell, "The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics," 509; Mollenkopf, "Theories of the State and Power Structure Research," 256.

37. Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 7–8.

38. Franklin, *Shadows of Race and Class*, 40; Willhelm, "Can Marxism Explain America's Racism?" 105.

39. Levine, "Marxism, Sociology, and Neo-Marxist Theories of the State"; cf. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.

40. C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*.

41. Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 5, 9.

42. Ibid., 7–8.

43. Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 1]," 36.

44. Massey and Fong, "Segregation and Neighborhood Quality," 17.

45. Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 197.

46. Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State"; Poulantzas, "Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State"; Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State"; Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State"; Offe and Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State"; O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*; O'Connor, "Some Reflective Criticisms on Mosley's 'Critical Reflections on *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*'"; Frankel, "On the State of the State," 209; Schroyer, "The Re-Politicization of the Relations of Production," 117.

47. Mayer and Fay, "The Formation of the American Nation-State," 71. Mayer and Fay's article is useful in that it provides a historical overview of the emergence of the formal apparatuses of the capitalist state.

48. Wilson, "The Declining Significance of Race"; Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.

49. Fine and Harris, "'State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism,'" 109.

50. Cf. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*.

51. Bjorklund, "Ethnicity and the Welfare State," 20–21.

52. Abu-Febiri, "The State, Racism and Domination in Contemporary Capitalist Societies," 194–195; H. Baron, "Racism Transformed," 26; cf. Navarro, "Political Power, the State, and Their Implications in Medicine," 74.

53. H. Baron, "Racism Transformed," 27–28.

54. Ringer, *We the People and Others*, 3–559; cf. McDonald, "The Legal Barriers Crumble."

55. McKay, "Racial Discrimination in the Electoral Process."

56. Cloward and Piven, "Race and the Democrats," 737; D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State," 191, 194–195, 205; Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, 185; Turner, Singleton, and Musick, *Oppression*, 148–150.

57. Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, 281; Ringer and Lawless, *Race-Ethnicity and Society*, 153; Scott, "Afro-Americans as a Political Class," 386, 388–389; Scott, "1984: The Public and Private Governance of Race Relations," 175–178.

58. Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, 287, 293; Ringer and Lawless, *Race-Ethnicity and Society*, 153.

59. Edelman, "Southern School Desegregation, 1954–1973."
60. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, 438–439, 448, 450, 480–481.
61. Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, 185.
62. McKay, "Racial Discrimination in the Electoral Process."
63. Turner, Singleton, and Musick, *Oppression*, 99.
64. Edsall, with Edsall, *Chain Reaction*, 84.
65. Ibid.
66. Davidson and Korbel, "At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation."
67. Cited in Davidson and Korbel, "At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation."
68. Ironically, the federal civil service was openly discriminatory against blacks until the 1960s. Its discriminatory practices have a long history. For example, in May 1914, the U.S. Civil Service Commission approved a proposal to require photographs on the application forms of prospective employees, which became a means to exclude black applicants. See King, "A Strong or Weak State?" 24.
69. Cf. King, "A Strong or Weak State?"; Rosenthal, "Employment Discrimination and the Law."
70. Willie, *Race, Ethnicity, and Socioeconomic Status*, 243.
71. K. Brown, "Keeping Their Distance," 389; Esping-Andersen, "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State," 94; Girardin, "On the Marxist Theory of the State," 193; Held, "Democracy, the Nation-State, and the Global System," 140–141; Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 355; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 15.
72. Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, 251; Turner, Singleton, and Musick, *Oppression*, 155; Edsall, with Edsall, *Chain Reaction*, 187–188.
73. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, 17, 435, 484–485; Turner, Singleton, and Musick, *Oppression*, 148. King ("A Strong or Weak State?" 41) noted that the New Deal exposed the inequities imposed upon blacks; however, it took three decades before the U.S. Congress "decisively legislated" equality of treatment for blacks.
74. Ringer, *We the People and Others*, 261; Judd, "Segregation Forever?" 740; Tabb, *The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto*, 15–20.
75. Turner, Singleton, and Musick, *Oppression*, 152; cf. Reese, "Residential Segregation," 60–61.
76. Girardin, "On the Marxist Theory of the State," 195.
77. Boston, "Racial Inequality and Class Stratification," 67; Burawoy, "State and Social Revolution in South Africa," 98; Burawoy, "The Capitalist State in South Africa"; Dubin, "Symbolic Slavery"; Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States From the 1960s to the 1980s*, 1st ed., 62–64; Turner, Singleton, and Musick, *Oppression*, 169–178.
78. Mosley, "Capital and the State," 25.
79. Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 16, 19.
80. Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State," 75.
81. Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," 39.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 40.
84. Ibid.
85. Cf. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*.
86. Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 366.
87. A. Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State," 165.

88. Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," 73; Poulantzas, "Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State," 171.
89. Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," 74.
90. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*; Schroyer, "The Re-Politicization of the Relations of Production," 115, 118; Gough, "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," 65; Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," 47. For example, when the legitimacy of the capitalist class was threatened by popular protest movements and social unrest, antitrust activity by the Federal Trade Commission increased; when legitimacy was secure, antitrust activity decreased. Threats to the legitimacy of the system account for the growth or decline in antitrust activity over time better than do changes in levels of corporate concentration. See Neuman, "Crisis and Growth in U.S. Antitrust Policy Activity."
91. Gough, "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," 65; Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State," 47.
92. C. Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict," 73.
93. Hughey, "Americanism and Its Discontents," 534, 536–537.
94. Girardin, "On the Marxist Theory of the State," 210.
95. McAll, *Class, Ethnicity, and Social Inequality*, 134; Rueschemeyer and Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation," 52–53.
96. Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 191; Ollman, *Dialectical Investigations*, 89.
97. Ollman, *Dialectical Investigations*, 91.
98. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.
99. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 2nd ed., 83.
100. Ibid., 82–83.
101. Burawoy, "The Capitalist State in South Africa," 315–316. It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasize the independence of the sociopolitical order from the economic sector; see Akard, "Bringing the Economy Back in (Again)." Cf. Gulap, "Capital Accumulation, Classes, and the Relative Autonomy of the State"; Gulap, "State and Class in Capitalism."
102. Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," 85–88; cf. Das, "State Theories: A Critical Analysis."
103. Bamat, "Relative State Autonomy and Capitalism in Brazil and Peru," 75; Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 11; Gerstenberger, "Theory of the State," 88; Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State," 72; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 14.
104. Rueschemeyer and Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation," 62, 67.
105. Gerstenberger, "Theory of the State," 87.
106. Chouinard and Fincher, "State Formation in Capitalist Societies"; Solomos, "The Local Politics of Racial Equality," 145–146; D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State," 191–192, 194, 206; Frankel, "On the State of the State."
107. D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State," 194–195.
108. Ibid.
109. Greer, "The Political Economy of the Local State," 515; D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State," 205–206.
110. M. Gordon, "Models of Pluralism," 178–188; D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State," 198.
111. Local state fragmentation is an important determinant of racial inequities. When metropolitan areas fragment into autonomous units, the boundaries that are

created impede systemwide policy implementation. For example, political fragmentation has enabled suburban whites to avoid, to some extent, disproportionately black schools. Suburban school boards ignore the demands of disadvantaged constituencies for more equitable funding and high-quality education. See D. James, "City Limits on Racial Equality," 981, 983; Walters, James, and McCammon, "Citizenship and Public Schools," 50.

112. Greer, "The Political Economy of the Local State," 515–517, 523–524, 526–527.

113. Guthrie and Roth, "The State, Courts, and Equal Opportunities for Female CEOs in U.S. Organizations."

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid. Consistent with earlier observations, Guthrie and Ross determined that nonprofit (especially state) organizations have been more effective in institutionalizing structures that embody equal employment opportunity practices than commercial organizations.

116. Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 198; Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 2]," 46; Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 358; O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*.

117. Elkins, *Slavery*, 2nd ed., 37–80; Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 215; Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 1]," 36.

118. Esping-Andersen, "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State," 99–100; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 24.

119. Cf. Isaac and Kelly, "Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion"; D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State"; Scott, "1984: The Public and Private Governance of Race Relations"; Scott, "Afro-Americans as a Political Class"; Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.

120. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States From the 1960s to the 1980s*, 1st ed., 76; cf. Nikolinakos, "Notes on an Economic Theory of Racism."

121. Wilson, "The Declining Significance of Race"; Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.

122. Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 2]," 46; Gough, "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," 66; Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," 75; Kelly, "Dos Santos and Poulantzas on Fascism, Imperialism, and the State"; Pooley, "The State Rules, OK?" 55–56.

123. Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 9–10; Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 188; Fine and Harris, "'State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism,'" 99; Mosley, "Capital and the State," 30.

124. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*.

125. Bamat, "Relative State Autonomy and Capitalism in Brazil and Peru," 75; Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 1]," 37–38; Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," 73.

126. Burawoy, "State and Social Revolution in South Africa," 109; Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 10; Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 19; Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 1]," 31; Miliband, "State Power and Class Interests," 59.

127. Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 9–10; Greer, "The Political Economy of the Local State," 515; Mayer and Fay, "The Formation of the American Nation-State."

128. Bamat, "Relative State Autonomy and Capitalism in Brazil and Peru," 75; Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule," 9; Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 11; Esping-Andersen, "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State," 14–15; Gough, "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," 64; Greer, "The Political Economy of the Local State," 525; Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State," 72; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 5, 12.

129. Miles and Satzewich, "Migration, Racism, and 'Postmodern' Capitalism," 351.

130. Cloward and Piven, "Race and the Democrats," 737–738; D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State," 191, 195, 198; Quadagno, "Race, Class, and Gender in the U.S. Welfare State"; Solomos, "The Local Politics of Racial Equality," 144–156.

131. Mayer and Fay, "The Formation of the American Nation-State," 72; Ono, "The Limits of Bourgeois Pluralism," 62.

132. D. James, "The Transformation of the Southern Racial State," 194–195.

133. Ibid., 195, 198; Greer, "The Political Economy of the Local State," 516, 523–524; Hicks, Friedland, and Johnson, "Class Power and State Policy"; Mayer and Fay, "The Formation of the American Nation-State," 72; Isaac and Kelly, "Developmental/Modernization and Political Class Struggle Theories of Welfare Expansion," 217.

134. Lieberson, "A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations," 904–905, 908; cf. Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America*; Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*.

135. Mele, "Asserting the Political Self," 75.

136. Ibid., 76–77, 81; Eliasoph, "'Everyday Racism' in a Culture of Political Avoidance," 481.

137. Piven and Cloward, "We Should Have Made a Plan!"

138. A. Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State," 173; Miliband, "State Power and Class Interests," 60; O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*; Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis," 182–183.

139. Greer, "The Political Economy of the Local State," 525; Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State," 75; Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis," 184.

140. Bamat, "Relative State Autonomy and Capitalism in Brazil and Peru," 75; Navarro, "Political Power, the State, and Their Implications in Medicine," 63–64; Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," 73; Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis," 170–171.

141. Omi and Winant, "By the Rivers of Babylon," 57.

142. Poulantzas, "Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation-State," 171; Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 9–10; Miliband, "State Power and Class Interests," 59, 62, 65; Weir, "Race, Localism, and Urban Poverty"; Pierson, "New Theories of the State and Civil Society," 567.

143. Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 1]," 40; Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 366;

Omi and Winant, "By the Rivers of Babylon," 57; Wolfe, "New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics," 149–150.

144. A. Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State," 178.

145. Mollenkopf, "Theories of the State and Power Structure Research," 256; Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 198; Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," 140.

146. Gotham, "Racialization and the State."

147. Rein, *Social Science and Public Policy*, 141–142.

148. Ibid., 25, 79; Solomos and Back, *Racism and Society*, 74.

149. Gotham, "Racialization and the State."

150. Cf. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States From the 1960s to the 1980s*, 1st ed., 77, 138; Omi and Winant, "By the Rivers of Babylon," 48–49; Connell, "The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics," 519–520, 529–530; Frankel, "On the State of the State," 209; Freitag, "Class Conflict and the Rise of Government Regulation," 51, 53; Dubin, "Symbolic Slavery"; Wuthnow, "State Structures and Ideological Outcomes," 805, 815; Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," 75, 78; K. Brown, "Keeping Their Distance," 393; Aronowitz, *The Crisis in Historical Materialism*, 93–94, 103–104, 189–190; Chang, "Toward a Marxist Theory of Racism," 39.

151. Wilson, "Race, Class, and Public Policy," 129; Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, 122; Wilson, "When Work Disappears"; Wilson, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*; Kasarda, "Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass," 27; Sullivan, "Absent Fathers in the Inner City," 58; Esping-Andersen, "Power and Distributional Regimes," 224; Stanfield, "Theoretical and Ideological Barriers to the Study of Race-Making"; cf. Kirkland, "Social Policy, Ethical Life, and the Urban Underclass"; Solomos and Back, *Racism and Society*, 75–76; Bash, *Sociology, Race, and Ethnicity*, 119; Carmichael and Hamilton, *Black Power*; McLaughlin, "Beyond 'Race vs. Class'"; McKee, *Sociology and the Race Problem*, 348; Pelton, "Misinforming Public Policy."

152. Villemez and Beggs, "Black Capitalism and Black Inequality," 139.

153. K. Wilson and Martin, "Ethnic Enclaves," 156–157; cf. K. Wilson and Portes, "Immigrant Enclaves."

154. K. Wilson and Martin, "Ethnic Enclaves," 157.

155. Aldrich, "Employment Opportunities for Blacks in the Black Ghetto"; Reiss and Aldrich, "Absentee Ownership and Management in the Black Ghetto," 334–338.

156. Brimmer, "Long-Term Trends and Prospects for Black-Owned Businesses."

157. Villemez and Beggs, "Black Capitalism and Black Inequality," 137; cf. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, 55, 61; Wilson, "American Social Policy and the Ghetto Underclass," 58–59; Wilson, "A Response to Critics of *The Truly Disadvantaged*," 134.

158. Villemez and Beggs, "Black Capitalism and Black Inequality," 122–123, 137.

159. Aldrich and Reiss, "Continuities in the Study of Ecological Succession," 865.

160. Ibid.

161. Hiltz, "Black and White in the Consumer Financial System," 987–988.

162. Aldrich and Reiss, "Continuities in the Study of Ecological Succession," 864–865. No compelling evidence exists that growth in the Asian population is pushing blacks out of the small business niche. See R. Boyd, "Black and Asian Self-Employment in Large Metropolitan Areas," 268–269.

163. R. Boyd, "A Contextual Analysis of Black Self-Employment in Large Metropolitan Areas, 1970–1980," 423–424.

164. Ibid., 424; cf. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, on the consequences of the exodus of relatively high status members of the community.

165. A. Smith and Moore, "East-West Differences in Black Economic Development."

166. K. Wilson and Martin, "Ethnic Enclaves," 155.

167. Ibid., 156–157.

168. Frankel, "On the State of the State," 224.

169. Bonastia, "Why Did Affirmative Action Fail During the Nixon Era?" 525–526, 529, 533; Gold, Lo, and Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State [Part 2]," 38.

170. Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule," 15.

171. Pellow, "Environmental Justice and the Political Process," 47, 50–51.

172. Beverly and Stanback, "The Black Underclass: Theory and Reality," 30.

173. Frankel, "On the State of the State," 224; cf. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*; Offe, "Structural Problems of the Capitalist State."

174. Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis," 183, 189–190.

175. Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule," 27.

176. Mosley, "Monopoly Capital and the State," 56; Quadagno, "Race, Class, and Gender in the U.S. Welfare State," 12; cf. O'Connor, "Some Reflective Criticisms on Mosley's 'Critical Reflections on *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*,'" 63; Pierson, "New Theories of the State and Civil Society," 567.

177. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States From the 1960s to the 1980s*, 1st ed., 77.

178. Offe, "The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation," 135, 140; Burris, "Introduction: The Structuralist Influence in Marxist Theory and Research," 10; Pierson, "New Theories of the State and Civil Society," 567; Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 370.

179. Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 214.

180. Ibid., 197. The fact that the state (as a set of apparatuses) exists reinforces an illusion that the state is neutral or independent. This illusion is maintained through compulsory legislation, for example. See Müller and Neusüss, "The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction Between Wage Labor and Capital," 74, 80.

181. Weir and Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States," 118.

182. Burstein and MacLeod, "Prohibiting Employment Discrimination," 529.

183. Ibid., 531.

184. Gerber, "A Politics of Limited Options."

185. Wilson and Aponte, "Urban Poverty." Wilson and Aponte did not point out that this observation was a clear departure from the main thesis of *The Declining Significance of Race*.

186. Glenn, "Citizenship and Inequality," 5.

187. A. Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State," 169, 178–179; cf. Wilson, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*; Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States From the 1960s to the 1980s*, 1st ed.

188. Friedland, "Class Power and Social Control," 466, 487–488.

189. Wilson, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*, 1–6, 43, 76–77.
190. Ibid., 70, 89–90.
191. V. Ford, "Review [of *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*]," 585; Lehrer, "Wilson Says Faith Can Help the Inner City [An Interview with William Julius Wilson]," 21; cf. Billingsley, *Mighty Like a River*.
192. Strong et al., "Leveraging the State."
193. Ibid.
194. Pierson, "New Theories of the State and Civil Society," 567; Esping-Andersen, "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State," 94.
195. Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis," 170.
196. A. Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State," 174; Gerstenberger, "Theory of the State," 88.
197. Andrews, "Social Movements and Policy Implementation," 71; Isaac and Kelly, "Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion," 1350, 1356, 1380; Leiman, "The Political Economy of Racism," 95; Esping-Andersen, "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State," 16; Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States From the 1960s to the 1980s*, 1st ed. Generally, textbooks in the sociology of race relations have neglected the role of extrainstitutional politics in effecting social change. See Niemonen, "Some Observations on the Problem of Paradigms in Recent Racial and Ethnic Relations Texts."
198. Isaac and Kelly, "Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion," 1350.
199. Ibid., 1348–1386.
200. Piven and Cloward, *Regulating the Poor*.
201. Isaac and Kelly, "Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion," 1348, 1374, 1376–1377.
202. Jennings, "Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion," 1226; Isaac and Kelly, "Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion."
203. Jennings, "Racial Insurgency, the State, and Welfare Expansion," 1221, 1235; cf. Olzak and Shanahan, "Deprivation and Race Riots," 951–953.
204. Quadagno, "Social Movements and State Transformation," 616, 630.
205. Quadagno, "Promoting Civil Rights Through the Welfare State," 74–75.
206. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 2nd ed., 89; cf. Pierson, "New Theories of the State and Civil Society," 568.
207. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 2nd ed., 89; cf. Wilson, "When Work Disappears."
208. Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 366.
209. Quadagno, "Promoting Civil Rights Through the Welfare State," 77, 79–80, 82; Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis," 173, 178.
210. Barkan, "Legal Control of the Southern Civil Rights Movement," 553.
211. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*.
212. See, "Ideology and Racial Stratification," 76.
213. Ibid., 81; Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink, "Equal in Christ, but Not in the World"; cf. Pettigrew, "New Black-White Patterns," 334.
214. A. Bridges, "Nicos Poulantzas and the Marxist Theory of the State," 180, 183; Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 368; cf. Carmichael and Hamilton, *Black Power*; Burawoy, "The Capitalist State in South Africa," 319. For a brilliant example, see Emerson, Smith, and Sikkink, "Equal in Christ, but Not in the World."
215. Pierson, "New Theories of the State and Civil Society," 567.
216. Cruse, *The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, 310–311, 380, 394; Esping-Andersen, Friedland, and Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," 197; Mosley, "Capital and the State," 28; Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis," 182; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 14, 20; Therborn, "What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?" 11.

217. Quadagno, "Promoting Civil Rights Through the Welfare State," 68–69.
218. Ibid.
219. Fyfe, "Using Race as an Instrument of Policy," 70.
220. Starr, "Social Categories and Claims in the Liberal State."
221. Ibid.; Guillebeau, "Affirmative Action in a Global Perspective."
222. Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race*, 99–100, 102; Wilson, "Race, Class, and Public Policy," 113–115, 147; Wilson, "A Response to Critics of *The Truly Disadvantaged*," 135, 144; Wilson, "American Social Policy and the Ghetto Underclass," 60–63; cf. Omi and Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States*, 2nd ed., 149; Tigges, Brown, and Green, "Social Isolation of the Urban Poor," 74.
223. Steinberg, "Occupational Apartheid," 746.
224. Guillebeau, "Affirmative Action in a Global Perspective."
225. Ibid.
226. D. Williams et al., "Traditional and Contemporary Prejudice and Urban Whites' Support for Affirmative Action and Government Help," 522–523; Bobo and Kluegel, "Opposition to Race-Targeting," 443, 458–460; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*, 203–204.
227. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, 116–118, 120, 123, 153–155; Wilson, *The Bridge Over the Racial Divide*, 102, 110–113, 125; cf. Washington, "The Civil Rights Movement After Three Decades," 260–262.
228. Implicit in Wilson's recommendations is an assumption that small reforms may indirectly prompt larger structural changes. Cf. H. Hunter, "Oliver C. Cox: Marxist or Intellectual Radical?" 21.
229. Wilson, "American Social Policy and the Ghetto Underclass," 61; Wilson, "A Response to Critics of *The Truly Disadvantaged*," 135–136; Wilson, *When Work Disappears*, 198–199.
230. Fraser and Kick, "The Interpretive Repertoires of Whites on Race-Targeted Policies"; Bobo and Kluegel, "Opposition to Race-Targeting"; Bobo and Smith, "From Jim Crow Racism to Laissez-Faire Racism"; Kluegel and Smith, "Whites' Beliefs About Blacks' Opportunity," 518, 529; Kluegel and Smith, "Affirmative Action Attitudes"; Kluegel, "Trends in Whites' Explanations of the Black-White Gap in Socioeconomic Status, 1977–1989"; Kluegel and Smith, *Beliefs About Inequality*; D. Williams et al., "Traditional and Contemporary Prejudice and Urban Whites' Support for Affirmative Action and Government Help," 507–508, 522; cf. Ryan, *Equality*. Some black conservatives (a category that does not include William Julius Wilson) argue that, because of the declining significance of race, affirmative action and other equal employment opportunity programs are no longer necessary; indeed, these programs may be detrimental to the advancement of blacks. They contend that continuing racial disparities in educational, occupational, and earnings attainments can be explained by factors other than race. See Boston, "Racial Inequality and Class Stratification," 46; cf. Pride, "Public Opinion and the End of Busing," 221; Adkins-Covert et al., "News in My Backyard."
231. Cf. Stroud, "The Aim of Affirmative Action."
232. McLaughlin, "Beyond 'Race vs. Class'"; Ringer, "Affirmative Action, Quotas, and Meritocracy."
233. Wilson, "American Social Policy and the Ghetto Underclass," 61–63;

Alexander, Bronner, and Jacobsen, "The Angst of Affirmative Action"; cf. D. J. Harris, "The Black Ghetto as Colony," 27.

234. Wilson, "American Social Policy and the Ghetto Underclass"; Wilson, "The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy."

235. Cf. Villemez and Wiswell, "The Impact of Diminishing Discrimination on the Internal Size Distribution of Black Income."

236. Guillebeau, "Affirmative Action in a Global Perspective"; Shulman, "Competition and Racial Discrimination," 113; Marrett, "The Precariousness of Social Class in Black America," 17.

237. Cancio, Evans, and Maume, "Reconsidering the Declining Significance of Race," 554.

238. Fossett, Galle, and Kelly, "Racial Occupational Inequality, 1940–1980," 426, 428.

239. Ibid., 428.

240. Beverly and Stanback, "The Black Underclass," 26.

241. Kushner, "Apartheid in America"; cf. Rabin, "Highways as Barriers to Equal Access"; C. Smith, "Public School Desegregation and the Law," 326–327.

242. E. Rosenbaum, "Racial/Ethnic Differences in Home Ownership and Housing Quality, 1991," 418. In 1977, the Department of Housing and Urban Development attempted to measure the nature and extent of racial discrimination in housing. The nationwide audit, which incorporated rigorous controls, concluded that racial discrimination in housing was pervasive, although geographical variations were evident. See Saltman, "Housing Discrimination"; cf. Farley and Frey, "Changes in the Segregation of Whites From Blacks During the 1980s."

243. Massey, "American Apartheid," 354; Massey and Fong, "Segregation and Neighborhood Quality," 17; Squires, "The Political Economy of Housing."

244. Beverly and Stanback, "The Black Underclass," 31; Eggers and Massey, "The Structural Determinants of Urban Poverty," 250; Massey, Gross; and Shibuya, "Migration, Segregation, and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty," 443; Rabin, "Highways as Barriers to Equal Access."

245. Downey, "Situating Social Attitudes Toward Cultural Pluralism," 93; Eliasoph, "'Everyday Racism' in a Culture of Political Avoidance," 483, 494, 496.

246. Downey, "Situating Social Attitudes Toward Cultural Pluralism," 91, 104; Eliasoph, "'Everyday Racism' in a Culture of Political Avoidance," 497.

247. Darity, "The Goal of Racial Economic Equality," 66; cf. Darity, "The Undesirables, America's Underclass in the Managerial Age"; Quadagno, "Race, Class, and Gender in the U.S. Welfare State," 11.

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