Two

THE HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF RACE

Race has been a constitutive element, an organizational principle, a *praxis* and structure that has constructed and reconstructed world society since the emergence of modernity, the enormous historical shift represented by the rise of Europe, the founding of modern nation-states and empires, the *conquista*, the onset of African enslavement, and the subjugation of much of Asia. To explain how race came to play this part in the making of modernity, and to trace the general pathways through which the relationship between race and the modern world system have developed down to our own time, is the task of Part I of this book.

In this chapter I present the outline of a *historical sociological theory of race.* To do so presents a profound intellectual challenge. The vast literature on race generally treats it in a reductionist fashion: it is frequently considered a manifestation of some other, supposedly more profound or more "real" social relationship.[1] The task here is to rethink that logic, to resituate the development of the race-concept in a historically grounded framework. This enables an alternative view of race to emerge, one that sees it as a key causative factor in the creation of the modern world. Imperialism's creation of modern nation-states, capitalism's construction of an international economy, and the Enlightenment's articulation of a unified world culture, I argue, were all deeply racialized processes.[2]

Why undertake this complex historical argument? Because I wish to demonstrate the continuing significance of race. Of course the flexibility of race must also be recognized: its meaning is always subject to reinterpretation, just as racial practices and racialized social structures are subject to reform and reorganization (Omi and Winant 1994). Racialized identities and social structures coexist with all other dimensions of social organization. Although arguing for the importance of race, I am not a racial determinist. The crucial point is that these racial dynamics, so characteristic of contemporary society both local and global, arrived in the present only through a profound gestation, a genealogy that eventually embraced the entire modern world.

The question of how race operated in the making of the modern world is of more than historical interest. To answer it is also to explain much about the

present. It is to put in context the concept—central to this work—that after World War II a break from the long-established verities of race occurred. This break, significant as it is, is not a full-scale repudiation of the past. It is one of many reorganizations and rearticulations of the meaning of race that have occurred throughout the centuries. Have the momentous changes in racial awareness experienced in the latter half of the twentieth century finally laid to rest the invidious racial legacy of centuries past? No, they have not. To what extent do these changes permit the present continuation of racial hierarchy? To a great extent indeed. These points, which receive central attention in Part II of this book, are historically grounded and contextualized in Part I.

How can we understand, how can we theorize, the multiple effects of race in shaping the transition to modernity? What Myrdal (no stranger to racial matters) called a logic of circular and cumulative causation was at work here (Myrdal 1963; see also Wallerstein 1991, 80–103). There is obviously no one "event" that marks the onset of modernity, no single chasm lying between the remote past and the start of the modern epoch in which we live. All the elements that were unevenly accumulated and accreted to create the modern world had their earlier incarnations: proto-capitalist systems for extraction of surpluses, for the organization and exploitation of labor; imperialisms with their states, their metropoles and hinterlands; and cultural logics of identity and meaning, can readily be found in the ancient and middle ages. Early forms of racial distinction can be identified throughout these precursive forms of sociohistorical organization.

Yet there is something different about the modern world system, as Wallerstein has argued extensively. This difference lies in its combination of global reach and lack of unified authoritative rule.[3] This system is a form of world-historical organization that came into being gradually, repeating organizational elements and social categories that had gone before, for example, slavery (here is Myrdal's "circularity"), yet combining and transforming these components in new ways, and achieving some sort of synergy (Myrdal's "cumulation") in the process.

Into the account of the origins and development of the modern world system—from which I have learned a great deal—I want to insert the theme of race. This account is not really a negation of other macro-historical sociologies; rather, it is an attempt to give race its due as *both* cause and effect in such accounts. I am especially opposed to relegation of race to an effect, an epiphenomenon, an outcome of, say, capitalist development, the emergence of the nation-state, the rise of Europe, or the onset of modernity.

Modernity, then, is a global *racial formation* project. In making this claim I draw not only on Myrdal and Wallerstein but on my earlier work with Michael Omi, which proposed that racial formation takes place in the national context through the clash of racial projects. In this approach, the key element in racial

formation is the link between signification and structure, between what race means in a particular discursive practice and how, based upon such interpretations, social structures are racially organized. The link between meaning and structure, discourse and institution, signification and organization, is concretized in the notion of the racial project. To interpret the meaning of race in a particular way at a given time is at least implicitly, but more often explicitly, to propose or defend a certain racial policy, a specific racialized social structure, a racial order. By studying the range of racial projects in given historical contexts it becomes possible to study given racial formation processes in detail, giving particular attention to the ways in which projects intersect (Omi and Winant 1994, 55–61).

That argument was framed in a largely national and comparative context that overlaps with the present work. The task here is to develop the racial formation approach in a world-historical perspective:[4] global racial formation. Indeed, historical time could well be interpreted in terms of something like a racial *longue duree*. Does not the rise of Europe, the onset of African enslavement, the *conquista*, and the subjugation of much of Asia represent an epochal sociohistorical transformation, an immense planetary metamorphosis? I take the point of much post-structural scholarship on these matters to be quite precisely an effort to explain Western or colonial time as a huge project demarcating human "difference," or more globally (as Todorov, say, would argue) of framing partial collective identities in terms of externalized "others" (Todorov 1984). Just as, for example, the writers of the *Annales* school sought to locate the deep logic of historical time in the means by which material life was produced—diet, shoes, and the like[5]—so we might usefully think of a racial *longue duree* in which the slow inscription of phenotypical signification took place upon the human body, in and through conquest and enslavement to be sure, but also as an enormous act of expression, of narration.[6]

The claim that race was one of the central ingredients in the circular and cumulative causation of modernity hinges on the presence of racial dynamics, key processes of racial formation, in all the main constitutive relationships that structured the origins and development of the modern world system. These crucial relationships involved the making of new forms of *empire and nation*; the organization of new systems of *capital and labor*; and the articulation of new concepts of *culture and identity*. Because these are circular and cumulative processes, they must be understood as thoroughly intertwined; there is no need or possibility of proposing one of these three as primary or causative. Nor is it desirable (or even possible) to offer any comprehensive theorization of these massive themes here. I simply indicate the presence of racial dimensions within each. Having suggested how in each area world-historical developmental and racial formation processes were intertwined, I trace the genealogy of the racial system of our own time. This is the task of the subsequent chapters of Part I:

to show how, from the dawn of the modern world to the middle of the twentieth century, the ongoing dilemmas of democratization, economic equality, and the recognition of human distinctiveness continue to be deeply shaped by racial logic.

Empire and Nation

An important part of the transition to modernity was nation-building (Eisenstadt and Rokkan 1973; Bendix 1964), a process inextricable in Europe from conquest, exclusion, and the beginnings of empire. In becoming modern nations, in challenging their legacies of fragmentation and subordination to early empires, the countries on the Atlantic fringe of Europe both made themselves into racially/nationally homogeneous entities (with assorted tendentious and uncertain elements remaining, to be sure, but in much reduced and suppressed form) and sought new peoples to subordinate. They formed stronger, more centralized states (Tilly 1975); began the transition to capitalism, passing along various paths through plunder and mercantilism on the way; and sought adequate discursive representations of these undertakings in religious, philosophical, and political terms. All this was intertwined with the emergent racial projects of conquest and enslavement.

Only nation-states could tackle the immense efforts of restructuring the world economy (Polanyi 1980 [1944]). Yet nation-states themselves had to be created, both through internal unification and differentiation from peripheral "others"—whether local rivals, however recognizable, or distant and different peoples, however unknown and unrecognized.

Nation-building was a complex process. Within the local or regional context it involved expelling some of those viewed as "different" and incorporating others whose identities had to be amalgamated or subordinated in a greater, nascent, national whole. In the larger imperial sense, the transoceanic context, let us say, the process of nation-making entailed distinguishing the nation *en bloc* from other nations. There were two dimensions to this distinction: rivalry and "othering." Rivalry came from developing inter-imperial competition, which could be more or less ferocious and sanguinary. "Othering" came not from national, but from supranational distinctions, nascent regional distinctions between Europe and the rest of the world, between "us," broadly conceived, and the non-Christian, "uncivilized," and soon enough non-white "others,"[7] whose subordination and subjugation was justified on numerous grounds—religious and philosophical as much as political and economic.

Thus nascent states constructed their key instrumentalities, institutions,

and capabilities for action, particularly their own political and military apparatuses. Thus they worked out the beliefs and collective identities that would allow imperial activities to be launched and organized. The emergence of early concepts of race was integral in these processes. With the initiation of transatlantic conquest and African slavery, race begins to appear as an important tool in the advancement and interpretation of these activities.

The suggestion that the modern nation has ethnic or racial origins is a familiar one (Smith 1987). Certainly the nations of imperial Europe only forged themselves into racially/ethnically homogeneous entities through prolonged processes combining both amalgation (Weber 1976) and exclusion (Hroch 1985; Hroch 1993; Gellner 1983). In part this process unified nation-states internally, while separating them more definitively from one another and indeed pitting them against each other. All this made the endeavors of conquest and enslavement more vital, thus helping to constitute the imperial mission. By evolving systems of enslavement and conquest that differentiated their "nationals" (soldiers, settlers)[8] from the proto-racial "others" who were the conquered and enslaved, imperial nations also consolidated themselves. They were not only the French, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British; they were also the whites, the masters, the true Christians. A distinction crystallized between rulers and ruled that was readily "phenotypified," corporealized. This duality, complicated eventually by creolism, *mestizaje*, and the sometimes ambiguous status of workers, soldiers, and peasants (in both the mother-countries and the colonies), nevertheless laid out the national-political axes of the modern racial order and, as I have begun to suggest, of the modern world system.

Intermediate strata necessarily arose as colonization advanced and the slave system grew. Both class and status distinctions multiplied in colonies and metropoles, generated by burgeoning economic, political, and social contacts and conflicts among imperial enterprises: rivalries and competition, colloquy and debate, as well as outright warfare. As creole status-groups developed in the colonies, national rivalries with the colonial powers emerged (for example, *criollos* versus *peninsulares* throughout *Nueva España*). Often differentiated by a range of racial signifiers from the "true whites" of the mother-country, the creole (or planter, or settler, or *mestizo*) elites sought to establish their own national/political rights in various ways. Some wished only to administer their own slave systems, others to embark on a separate path of national independence, and still others to implement a new American version of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Since such desires generally required armed revolt, it was often necessary to emancipate slaves, enfranchise *mestizos*, and redistribute land and wealth in order to raise a revolutionary army and thus win independence. So at later stages of what was a long process, nation-building took place through upheavals in racially determined social status.

There were, of course, many forms of upheaval, many types of resistance.

Native peoples who were able to do so challenged their would-be conquerors and masters militarily, and took flight where possible. But confusion and division also characterized the subjugated. Amid the Africans and African-Americans of the New World, for example, many (intra-racial) divisions emerged from differences in national origin and the temporal/generational dimensions of exile from the African motherland.[9] That these particularities would have important consequences for the success of uprisings or patterns of escape and *marronage* is clear. Divisions between Afro-Creoles and native Africans are well recognized as crucial to the unfolding of the Haitian revolution, for example (Thornton 1991; Thornton 1993; Nicholls 1996).

Parallel complexities and social divisions emerged throughout the imperial world in respect to social class. These too had racial dimensions. In the earliest stages of American conquest there was not yet African enslavement. Native peoples were the first modern racial "others," and some Africans were among the *conquistadores*. African slavery only developed as a result of labor shortages of natives and indentured servants. Indigenous people were killed en masse, worked to death, fled, or occasionally went to war, none of which rendered them available for ongoing toil. Early imported labor (generally bonded and, although multiracial, largely poor and European) could not be had in sufficient quantity, nor degraded comprehensively enough, to produce profits from early mines or plantations (Morgan 1995; Rout 1976; Cope 1994; Russell-Wood 1998). Turning to Africa for exploitable labor meant creating a class of free persons, usually (although not always) white, usually (although not always) not slaveholders, and destined to be (or already perceiving themselves to be) competitors with Africans, both enslaved and emancipated. Since this situation involved a range of potential political alignments (both labor versus planters and whites versus blacks were possible lines of conflict), nation-building meant steering away from class conflict and toward race conflict, or at least entrenched social hierarchy based on racial status (Breen and Innes 1980).

Thus, while we must note the tremendous variations within this process of national ontogeny, it is equally important to recognize the centrality of racial dynamics in forging both imperial nations and colonies, and ultimately in sundering those identities and bonds.

Capital and Labor

The subjugation of the Americas and the enslavement of Africa financed the rise of the European empires, as the classical political economists including Adam Smith and Karl Marx recognized (Smith 1994 [1776]; Mill 1994 [1848]); Marx 1965–67 [1867]; Mintz 1985). Vast flows of treasure were shipped to Europe; millions came under the lash of planters and mine-owners (Williams

1994 [1944]).[10] The transition from an insular, regionally contained, and mechanically solidaristic social order to an integrated, global society with an increasingly complex division of labor demanded the creation of a worldwide racial division between Europe and the "others." Through slavery and colonialism, through the extraction of immense quantities of natural resources, and most particularly through the institutionalization and elaboration of techniques for the exploitation of mass labor at a hitherto inconceivable level, the apparatus was synthesized for the accumulation of wealth on a grand scale.

Slavery became "a massive global business" (Walvin 1986, 20), the first fully worked-out system of multinational capitalism.[11] An intense debate has taken place over how capitalist African slavery in the Americas actually was. That slavery, particularly in sugar production and milling, was the first capitalist industrial enterprise (preceding the "dark satanic Mills" of Britain), is an argument most closely associated with C. L. R. James' work (James 1989 [1938]).[12] Here there is no need to resolve the controversy over the relationship between capitalism and slavery; it is enough to specify that slavery served the developing capitalist system that traversed the Atlantic, that it provided the exploitable mass labor nascent capitalism required.

But what about *forms* of mass labor? What distinguishes its enslaved, peonage, and waged variants? Between slavery and peonage,[13] and between peonage and "free labor," there was in practice (and remains today) a continuum, a spectrum, rather than a clear-cut, formal distinction. This was evident in the ambiguities and conflicts among the legal and social statuses of lifelong/hereditary enslavement on the one hand, and fixed-term indentured servitude on the other. Throughout the developing Atlantic "mass labor market," uncomfortable convergences arose among these three different forms, and their political, moral, religious, and economic significance.[14]

In the developing empires, as has been amply documented, this tension rather quickly came to be seen in racial terms: it obtained among the statuses of enslaved blacks, free blacks, and free whites.[15] Resolving the ambiguities in law, politics, and common sense among these social positions was at most a gradual and partial process in the colonies and the early United States (Morgan 1995; Berlin 1998; Fields 1985; Davis 1966; Davis 1975; Moura 1990; Russell-Wood 1998). Similar variations among hemispheric slave systems—over manumission, "hiring out," religious and recreational practices, and a host of other regulatory systems—confirm that it was slavery's contribution to the accumulation of capital, not its legal-rational legitimacy (much less its "natural," Aristotelian state) that justified the enormous economic and ideological investments made in American slave systems from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. This is hardly news.

The metropolitan working classes, too, were complexly affected by the developing system of world racial hierarchy: as systems of imperial regulation

developed through slavery and peonage, the nascent working classes often found themselves equated with colonized or even enslaved subjects. Political technologies used to regulate their status were applied in the colonies, and vice versa. The relative merits and moralities of "free" and slave labor systems were continually discussed. Elites critical of the lack of discipline and absence of ascetism among their various "natives" often discovered these same defects in the working classes at home (Cooper and Stoler 1997). Yet in other respects the white workers of the mother-countries were insulated by their race and nationality from the full rigors of imperial domination. Thus they became ambivalent allies, or only partial critics, of the imperial order. They too were regulated by race.

No matter how much overlap between statuses may have existed in practice, these three categories of exploitable labor—worker, peon, and slave—can certainly be analytically (ideal-typically) distinguished, and doing so will help us understand their varied relationships to the processes of production that modern empires organized. Use of this Weberian methodological notion—ideal-typical categories of analysis—can also help bring into focus the racial distinction between types of workers, a distinction vital to the accumulation of capital throughout the entire history of the modern age. The threat of enslavement effectively provoked enmity and hostility toward (black) slaves among free (white) workers, thus helping to ground racial antagonism in popular culture (Roediger 1991; Saxton 1990). The promise of emancipation, of property rights in one's own person and in land, cemented the loyalties of intermediate groups and "middleman" minorities, in both slavery and debt-based systems of labor. In fact, in the Americas slavery, bonded labor, and free labor could coexist for centuries, so long as accumulation processes were largely uninterrupted.

What about other developing relationships between race and accumulation? Europe relied upon slavery and other forms of coerced labor to provide the raw materials, agricultural produce, and precious metals that were needed at home, in the colonies, and eventually across the entire world market. Particularly in the early capitalist period, slavery furnished the material inputs necessary to create the modern capitalist economy. Over time slavery shaped the European internal markets for both production and consumption of goods, creating both the mass commodification and the labor market characteristic of mature industrial capitalism.

Slavery-produced commodities reached the developing world market in a variety of forms, as both primary products and processed goods. Sugar, for example, was generally milled on or near the plantations where it was produced (Moreno Fraginals 1976; Mintz 1985), arriving by sea in varieties available for consumption or for further processing. Tobacco was harvested and dried before shipping, but usually processed after landing, at Bristol, for example.

Cotton was first cleaned by hand (that is, by African hands) in a labor process so difficult and slow that it seriously impeded cultivation and bred excessive brutality.[16] Only when ginning was introduced at the end of the eighteenth century did cotton begin to replace wool as the primary material of British textile manufacture, the leading edge of the industrial revolution. The cotton gin allowed the processing of this commodity to take place in successive stages on opposite sides of the Atlantic, with enslaved Africans serving as the cultivators and initial processors, and wage laborers in England functioning as secondary and relatively skilled industrial workers, who produced both textiles and sewn products. By the early nineteenth century New England factory workers would also be occupied in these tasks.

As this brief exposition already demonstrates, what slavery chiefly offered to developing capitalism was massive inputs of coercible labor, where, in the Americas, other sources were largely unavailable.[17] In later capitalist periods, the place of slavery in colonial or otherwise dependent settings was largely supplanted by peonage. Here the contribution to accumulation was generally equivalent, with the added advantage that the exploited were held responsible for the costs of their own reproduction (Luxemburg 1951 [1923]; Wallerstein 1979).

How profitable were slavery and peonage? Debates in the literature about the costs (and thus the profitability) of Atlantic slavery are long-standing.[18] Today it seems clear that, although the profitability varied, slavery was the linchpin, the core activity, in the creation of the modern world economy. Of course by the twentieth century slavery had been reduced in scope; peonage, however, still constitutes the principal form of labor worldwide. Although its gradual replacement by both agricultural and industrial waged labor[19] seems to be proceeding, this southern form of labor is still by and large distinguished from its northern counterparts by the criterion of race. As Du Bois could write in 1935:

> That dark and vast sea of human labor in China and India, the South Seas and all Africa; in the West Indies and Central America and in the United States—that great majority of mankind, on whose bent and broken backs rest today the founding stones of modern industry—shares a common destiny; it is despised and rejected by race and color; paid a wage below the level of decent living; driven, beaten, prisoned, and enslaved in all but name; spawning the world's raw material and luxury—cotton, wool, coffee, tea, cocoa, palm oil, fibers, spices, rubber, silks, lumber, copper, gold, diamonds, leather—how shall we end the list and where? All these are gathered up at prices lowest of the low, manufactured, transformed, and transported at fabulous gain; and the resultant wealth is distributed and displayed and made the basis of world power and universal dominion and armed arrogance in London and Paris, Berlin and Rome, New York and Rio de Janeiro. (Du Bois 1977 [1935], 15)

CULTURE AND IDENTITY

The enormous social transformations of conquest and enslavement demanded a lot of explaining; they occasioned fierce debates. In the early stages of empire the crucial question of human variation, of "difference," was widely addressed, both informally, for example, in literary work,[20] and officially. A good example of the latter process was the famous debate between Sepulveda and las Casas, held in Valladolid at the behest of the Spanish Crown in 1630. Here as elsewhere in the early moments of encounter between Europe and the "others," the terms of discussion were religious, as might be expected: Did the Americans have souls? Were they, then, humans to whom their conquerors would have obligations, or animals who could be subjugated without limit, indeed harvested? Should they be converted to the true faith? Were they, perhaps, humans of an inferior type, naturally suited for slavery (Todorov 1984)?[21]

Later in the imperial process, the terms of discourse expanded. Enlightenment thought evinced a deep preoccupation with racial difference, whose meaning was continuously interpreted as setting limits on "natural rights" and thus justifying systems of rule founded in profound commitments to inequality and exclusion. The great philosophers and statesmen of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from Kant and Hume to Jefferson and Napoleon, all endorsed the hierarchical division of humanity into superior and inferior races (Eze 1997; Count 1950). Artistic meditations upon the nature of "the other" were constant.[22]

Racial themes received ever-increasing intellectual and scientific attention as colonialism advanced to the moment when, at the end of the nineteenth century, it encompassed the entire world. The triumphant age of empire (Hobsbawm 1987) and the French revolutionary and Napoleonic legacies had generated substantial political motives for thinking racially, for "inventing traditions" that were often explicitly racial, in other words, for finding an ancient racial unity at the bottom of emergent national identities (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983). Numerous examples of this device exist, for example, Scott's *Ivanhoe,* or the Abbe Sieyès's (Pasquino 1998; Rooy 1990) interpretation of the Revolution as the triumph of an ancestral Gallic people over a usurping Frankish aristocracy.[23]

It is not surprising to find many disparate racial beliefs and practices melding into one broad stream of white supremacist common sense as modernity advanced. I have already noted that the philosophical foundations for this confluence were laid down across Europe and the Americas as early as the Enlightenment and throughout the age of revolution. By the end of the eighteenth century, Blumenbach had applied the principles of Linnaean taxonomy to humans. As more modern science arose, elaborate racial "knowledge" was created and widespread interchange took place among its practitioners: taxonomists, craniologists and phrenologists, criminologists, evolutionists, and so on

(Gould 1981; Mosse 1978; Chase 1977; Breman et al. 1990). The biological sciences, of course, were matched by contributions from the emerging social sciences: history, anthropology, psychology, and sociology also presented themselves as racially focused disciplines, especially in the aftermath of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species,* which was published in 1859 (Darwin 1988 [1859]). Consider here the work of Herbert Spencer, the rise of social Darwinism in both Europe and the United States, and the development of eugenics, a term coined by Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin (Stepan 1991; Kevles 1985; Chase 1977; Barkan 1992; Hofstadter 1959 [1955]).

Reactionary and romantic analyses also surfaced for the first time in the nineteenth century. Portraying race as the fundamental world-historical conflict, such work—particularly that of Arthur de Gobineau[24]—would leave a terrifying legacy, not merely through its legitimation of racial hierarchy, but through the link it forged between white supremacy on the one hand, and opposition to democracy and the legacy of the French Revolution on the other.

Nor was the interpretation of racial themes strictly a highbrow affair. Popular media, for example, the vastly important phenomenon of minstrelsy in the nineteenth-century United States, effectively diffused racial common sense among the subordinate strata, chiefly white male workers (Lott 1993; Roediger 1991; Rogin 1996). Institutionalized popular cultural forms reinforced racial divisions and eroded working class solidarity at both the national and global levels.

Even Marxism and socialism were affected by these tendencies, which had reached a high volume by the nineteenth century. The International Working Men's Association, founded by Marx in 1864, had an ambivalent relationship to the wave of racial belief that swept the nineteenth century. Its opposition to slavery and efforts to restrict European (particularly British) support for the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War were laudable. But Marxian socialism *as a doctrine* was still ambivalent about race and imperialism. The romantic view of Darwin taken by Marx (and even more by Engels) is well known. Deterministic views about evolution tended to be equated with deterministic views about history, so that in early Marxian accounts the "higher," more evolved social formations turned out to be not only the industrial capitalist ones, but also the northern, western, European countries, and so on. Thus the white mother-countries, the slave powers and their legatees, could be viewed (at times) as the pitiless sources of progress.[25] Marx and Engels' views of the development of capitalism, of the role played by the backward hinterlands, and of the necessity and even "revolutionary" character of the penetration of these areas by capital in the form of conquest and colonialism, have been extensively criticized, but not generally seen in racial terms.[26]

What role did this panoply of cultural developments play in the making of modernity? Of course no uniform or even consistent understanding of race can be drawn from such a varied collection of discursive and practical encounters with racial themes. But neither can there be any doubt that the complex of

racial signifiers attained unprecedented comprehensiveness and ubiquity as the imperial order, the world capitalist system, the modern pattern of nation-states, first hove into historical view and then, as it were, dropped anchor. Cultural factors—understood here as ways of representing and assigning meaning to the varieties of human identity—must be seen as causative in this developmental process in two ways. First, they allowed and indeed necessitated the emerging global social structure to ascribe identities to all actors, individual and collective, consistent with the emerging new world social order aka "modernity." Second, only by ordering the social world along racial lines, only by assigning racial identities to all beings, only by generalizing a racial culture globally, was the new world order able to constitute itself as a social structure at all. It was a system of accumulation and unequal exchange, a set of world-embracing institutions of domination, rule, and authority, only to the extent that it was racialized.

This is but another way of saying that modernity itself was among other things a worldwide racial project, an evolving and flexible process of racial formation, of structuration and signification by race. To the extent that it deployed cultural instrumentalities—of interpretation, of representation, of identification that made use of racial discourse—modernity was a culturally based racial project as much as it was an economically or politically based one. To identify human beings by their race, to *inscribe* race upon their bodies, was to locate them, to subject them, in the emerging world order. Here it avails to invoke Kafka's "The Penal Colony" once again.

Toward the Twentieth Century

These epochal, convergent processes, racial formation and political economic development, constructed the modern world. As a result, democracy—a revolutionary, northern invention—encountered its most profound limitations. From its earliest modern, popular appearance (as opposed to its classical, Greek and Roman, patrician forms) democracy found itself tied up with the logic of race—not only in North America and France but throughout the world (Davis 1966; Du Bois 1977 [1935]); James 1989 [1938]). That the popular classes of the North generally abandoned the impoverished, the enslaved, and the superexploited of the South, is not difficult to explain. Powerful material and political forces, deep-seated cultural logics, impelled this.

Yet in the long run the price that the popular strata paid for this abandonment, even in the North, in the "developed" world, would be very high. "Democracy for some" is not a viable proposition; at best, it is a recipe for thoroughgoing social and political conflict, and often for open warfare. Yet this formula ruled for centuries, and in many respects continues to characterize the world today. Why? The denial of rights to large classes of people permits their *super-*

exploitation. Slavery and peonage throughout the world's South furnished to the metropoles virtually all necessary raw materials, and most of the manufactured ones as well—and provided them cheaply, at the point of a bayonet. What need had these workers, then, for schools, housing, health, even life? And as long as dark-skinned workers were available for sale or rent at well below the cost of their reproduction, sociopolitical arrangements not essentially different from those of the eighteenth century still obtained.

In this sense the racial history of the twentieth century can be seen as the general effort on the part of dark-skinned people to raise the cost to the metropoles (both for capital and, to a lesser extent, for northern labor) of doing business as usual. Nationalist movements and national liberation wars, as well as anti-racist and civil rights movements, contested the terms upon which racialized labor would be available for exploitation in the colonies and neo-colonies of the South, as well as in the "internal colonies" of the North. They were accompanied by vast population movements as "the south moved north" and the countryside flowed toward the city. This also tended to raise the political stakes, as the docility of the hinterlands gave way to the savvy of the metropoles.

The combined effects of these various struggles were not only to create new difficulties for capital and privileged sectors of the working classes, but also to problematize the forms of rule and cultural norms for states and social systems where hegemony was organized (as it almost universally was) along racial lines. By the mid-twentieth century, the challenges posed for power-holders by the mobilizations in various forms of their ex-colonials and former slaves had grown severe enough to dismantle most official forms of discrimination and colonial rule.

But with these developments—decolonization, the enactment of formally egalitarian "civil rights" laws, and the adoption of cultural policies of a universalistic and/or pluralistic character—the global racial order has apparently reached a new, if unstable, equilibrium. The concession of formal equality and sovereignty, perhaps paradoxically, means that the achievement of substantive equality is less likely. Certainly political and cultural reforms are not unimportant, and their conquest has represented a series of real gains for oppositional movements of natives and racial minorities. Yet nowhere have these gains resulted in the large-scale redistribution of resources. Perhaps that goal too will be achieved in the coming years, but at this point it seems that without a new wave of racially based resistance, the political momentum necessary for such a gain will be lacking.

The Break

Thus the world racial order evolved with and gave rise to modernity, inventing and instituting white supremacy as a global norm quite early on, and advancing

over centuries to a point at which that racial rule, while extensively questioned, still endures. To be sure there was always resistance. Racial rule was never unquestioningly accepted; it always had to be enforced. No system of subordination, however ubiquitous or well-entrenched, can expect to meet no resistance. Yet once well-established, white supremacy was also common sense. That is, worldwide racial rule, having moved from the particular to the general, having developed through a quasi-millennial process that displayed increasingly convergent tendencies over time, attained a state of normalization by, let us say, the turn of the twentieth century. The moment used to locate the apotheosis of this state of affairs can only be arbitrary. Certainly by this time significant challenges to racial rule had already appeared, in the forms of near-universal abandonment of slavery, for example, and of a budding if still preliminary critique of imperialism.

But by the end of World War II, not too many decades after Du Bois' famous 1903 diagnosis that "the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line," white supremacy had begun to experience an unprecedented crisis.[27] The color-line was not about to disappear from the world scene. But it began to be altered—by sustained political conflict, by massive population movement, by the unbridled globalization of capital, by tectonic cultural shifts.

What were the forces that contributed to the profound transformation in the global logic of race that began in earnest with the end of World War II? Among them were new anti-colonial pressures springing from the "liberation" of numerous countries from Axis occupation (and these countries' subsequent reluctance to embrace anew the Allied colonialists of the past). Then there was a need to reintegrate former soldiers who had become used to bearing arms, and who had been politically tempered by wide-ranging international experience. There was a (not unjustified) celebratory atmosphere surrounding the global victory over the horrors and racisms of the Nazis and the Japanese. There was the onset of new global competition between the "free world" and the Soviet Union, that is, the Cold War. All these factors (and others too numerous to list) contributed to the problematization of the traditional, racialized forms of rule that had shaped the world order in crucial ways for half a millennium or so.

For roughly a quarter century, from the war's end to about 1970 (another somewhat arbitrary date), these new, more progressive racial tendencies demanded dramatic amendments in the global sociopolitical constitution. They insisted upon the formal decolonization—often only as the result of ferocious armed struggles—of the great European imperial holdings in Africa, the Caribbean, Asia, and the Pacific. They challenged, sometimes successfully and sometimes not, the neo-colonial arrangements put in place by the new world hegemon, the United States, which sought to impose a new (let us call it northern) order after the old European powers had been compelled to lower their

flags. They set in motion other, deeply related tendencies: the old empires struck back as former colonial subjects—East and West Indians, Caribeños, Maghrebines and sub-Saharans, Filipinos and Moluccans, Koreans and Chinese—set off in unprecedented numbers for the northern metropoles, often locating themselves in the heart of their former mother-countries, indeed often recruited as *gastarbeiter*. As a result of these migrations the face of Europe was forever changed, Yamato supremacy in Japan was for the first time at all challenged, principally after the Korean War; and the United States became a far browner and yellower country (to use the vernacular terms) than it had ever been before.

Speaking of the United States, its postwar racial developments were perhaps the most remarkable of any nation, both because it was now the leading superpower and culturally hegemonic society, and because of its unique racial dementia, its centuries-long, convoluted complicity with both the conquest/deracination of its native population, and with African enslavement and its permanent consequences. It was indeed the only northern country whose national identity had been *internally* defined by these elemental experiences. Thus in the postwar period, as had been foretold by many—Du Bois and Myrdal among others—it underwent an internal, and of course unique, version of the whole international dynamic presented here. In this period the country experienced, for example, massive migration, intense mobilization of racially subordinate subjects demanding their political and social rights, and widespread reform of state institutions where racial matters were at stake. It also underwent serious and sophisticated "backlash," or "racial reaction" (Edsall and Edsall 1992; Omi and Winant 1994).

The peculiar state of racial affairs in which the postwar world found itself, then, a few decades after the surrender of the Axis, was *dualistic*. The old white supremacy had been challenged, wounded, and changed. A new, countervailing framework had emerged after centuries of lonely and isolated gestation in many varied settings, and had gained considerable ground. Reforms had occurred, populations had moved, democracy was at least widely espoused in racial matters. Yet white supremacy, although perhaps weakened, had hardly died. Indeed, it could be said to have gained some real new strength from the very racial reforms that it had been forced to initiate.

The Stakes Today

This is the situation that exists today, then. Colonialism is finished; apartheid, in both its South African and U.S. forms, has been discredited; the northern, post-industrial countries are all permanently polyracial; in the world's South, an ostensibly color-blind transnational capital seeks labor and markets without

recourse to racialism, not to mention explicit white supremacy. Yet beneath the surface, below the commonsense understanding from which nefarious racism has been banished, a global racial order remains: transformed, but not transcended; revivified by decades of battle with (and yes, concessions to) the menial laborers and peasantries of the world, the darker peoples it formerly held in contempt.

At the same time those once-excluded peoples—ex-colonials, descendants of slaves, indigenes—confront the present from a greatly altered position. Many millions of them are long gone from the hinterlands, the *sertões*; they are to be found today in the metropolitan centers, of both the South and the North. They have achieved some measure of political inclusion and democratic rights that would have been inconceivable only a few years ago. Limited and uneven as their oppositional victories were over the past half century or so, the scope of their postwar challenge to white supremacy still dwarfs the accomplishments of any other movement of resistance to the world racial order that took center stage from about the fifteenth century on.

More yet: a variety of solidarities—let us call them southern or diasporic—has flowered in the last decades, both fulfilling and obviating earlier dreams of resistance. Pan-Africanism as a movement lost much of its rationale as the sun finally set on the British (and French, and Belgian, and Portuguese) empires, yet Afro-diasporic solidarity continues to flourish, impelled as in the past by cultural as well as political interchange, conscious as in the past of the necessity, as well as the perils, of black self-determination. Indigenous movements have probably reached new heights in the present, giving rise to hemispheric congresses of native peoples in the Americas and movements for reparations in such unexpected spots as New Zealand (Farnsworth 1997). Meanwhile, communities with origins in the sending regions of the world's South—such as Turkey, the Philippines, India, and China—are also experiencing new (if sometimes uncertain) diasporic impulses.

Undoubtedly one factor generating such transcontinental ties is simply the vastly reinforced presence of racialized minorities in the former imperial homelands; another is the relative freedom and ease of communication and travel, which in the past was the preserve largely of Europeans. But undoubtedly most important in the gestation of diasporae are the political achievements of the "others" since World War II's end. These gains—of voice, vote, and (sometimes) democratic inclusion; of the means of communication and cultural production; and here and there of the attainment of material well-being and the progressive redistribution of income and wealth—serve as models and resources across borders and beyond oceans.

Diasporic tendencies and movements call into question the nation-state. They are thus linked, as were their predecessors slavery and peonage, with capital's forms of accumulation and rule. Their presence, both within various national political scenarios and globally as circuits of labor, culture, and political influence, suggests that a new racial order is emerging. Without making predictions, it is possible to identify the world racial dynamics that will shape the twenty-first century: in the near-term future the color-line will not be superseded, but will operate in a far more contradictory and contested way.

Hegemony works by incorporating opposition. Thus global racial dynamics will reflect the unstable equilibrium, the uneasy tension, between the centuries-long legacy of white supremacy and the post–World War II triumphs—ambiguous and partial but nevertheless real—of the movements of the colonized and racially excluded. The world racial system will therefore simultaneously incorporate and deny the rights, and in some cases the very existence, of the "others" whose recognition was only so recently and incompletely conceded. In short, we are witnessing the dawn of a new form of racial hegemony. In the twenty-first century, race will no longer be invoked to legitimate the crucial social structures of inequality, exploitation, and injustice. Appeals to white superiority will not serve, as they did in the bad old days. Law, political and human rights, as well as concepts of equality, fairness, and human difference will therefore increasingly be framed in "race-neutral" terms.

Yet the race-concept will continue to work at the interface of identity and inequality, social structure and cultural signification. The rearticulation of (in)equality in an ostensibly color-blind framework emphasizing individualism and meritocracy, it turns out, preserves the legacy of racial hierarchy far more effectively than its explicit defense (Crenshaw et al. 1995). Similarly, the reinterpretation of racialized differences as matters of culture and nationality, rather than as fundamental human attributes somehow linked to phenotype, turns out to justify exclusionary politics and policy far better than traditional white supremacist arguments can do (Taguieff 2001 [1988]).

These are merely some early indications of what the world racial system will look like in the twenty-first century, when it will have to operate under the contradictory (or dualistic) conditions that tend toward the development of a variety of "anti-racist racisms." Contemporary world racial dynamics are unique, most notably because they have had to adapt for the first time in half a millennium to a relatively comprehensive opposition to racial inequality and injustice. If the opposition that has developed since World War II has not achieved the elimination of racial injustice and inequality, it has at least succeeded to an unprecedented degree in legitimizing the struggle against these patterns. This alone is a great achievement, one that would not be intelligible without a comprehensive account of the evolution of the world racial order to the present day. Yet the reordering of world racial dynamics over the past decades does not suggest that we are in any way "beyond race," or that comprehensive patterns of racial inequality and injustice are no longer fundamental to the global social structure. It only means—and this is important enough—that world racial formation continues.

Sharpeville (1960) massacre. It also expressed a continuing international affinity with the U.S. civil rights movement, whose leader Martin Luther King Jr. had just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and which was then at the height of its confrontation with the North American version of apartheid. The 1965 Resolution's "preambular paragraphs," notes the British racial theorist Michael Banton, "present racial discrimination as caused by racist doctrines and colonialism" (Banton 1999, 608).

6. The United States was a latecomer to the field of international deliberations on racial matters. In fact, it refused for thirty years to sign the UN convention just discussed, the one that called for the elimination of all forms of racism.

7. See Hanchard 1992. Nancy Leys Stepan notes the ambiguity of early-twentieth-century Latin American commitments to *mestizaje* as a response to racism (Stepan 1991). For Vasconcelos especially, there was a significant eugenicist dimension involved, which grew in importance as he moved rightward politically. Freyre signed a 1935 manifesto against racism. In his early days Freyre criticized both North American racism (he had observed it while studying under Franz Boas at Columbia University) and the Brazilian ideal of whitening (*branqueamento*). Later in life (especially during the years of dictatorship: 1964–85) Freyre inveighed against any black Brazilian identification with the U.S. or South African black movements. See Carvalho 2000.

8.

"And until the ignoble and unhappy regimes
That hold our brothers (sic) in Angola, in Mozambique,
South Africa sub-human bondage
Have been toppled, utterly destroyed
Well, everywhere is war, we say war."
(Marley 1976, following Selassie 1963)

Note the extent to which these views continue to apply, as much in "post-colonial" Angola, still riven by civil war; as in southern Africa.

9. See Mamdani 1996; Adam et al. 1997a. Mamdani and Adam have engaged in spirited debate over the continuing significance of South African racial issues. See Mamdani 1997; Adam 1997.

10. This can also be applied to women, gays, the aged, and youth. In other words, the complex of issues we designate as "human rights" calls into question the supposed realization of democracy in the West, centrally in respect to race, but also in terms of other (non-racial) aspects of identity.

11. The term *Jubilee* refers to the biblical injunctions against transferring debts, slave status, or accumulated property in land across generations. At the time of the biblical "Jubilee" (roughly once every fifty years), debts were to be cancelled, slaves emancipated, and land returned to its original cultivators. The website of the Jubilee 2000 movement to cancel the external debt of the poor nations can be found at http://www.j2000usa.org.

12. Thus the question of who is indebted to whom is itself a major political issue.

13. If the "40 acres and a mule" program had been carried out during the Reconstruction period in the United States (instead of being scuttled by order of President Andrew Johnson in 1868), the process of "making whole" the injustices of slavery would not only have been greatly facilitated in North America, but also on a world-historical scale. In truncated fashion this argument is proposed by Du Bois in *Black Reconstruction* (1977 [1935]), but of course cannot be fully worked out.

Chapter Two. The Historical Sociology of Race

1. This argument is presented in greater depth in Omi and Winant 1994.

2. There is a wide range of methodological limits to most social scientific approaches to race, limits that cannot be addressed in depth here. Schematically speaking, most social scientific approaches to race are *nomothetic* in terms of methodology: that is, they follow scientific norms assumed to operate universalistically. Thus they propose to investigate a clear cause-effect relationship between two or more sets of variables, some of which are known (dependent) and others of research interest (independent). The need for precise specification of each variable's dimensions, and for strict separation between cause and effect variables, is basic to such techniques.

But if race is as constitutive of social order as I suggest it is, then assigning it to one or the other side of this equation is problematic. On the one hand, to treat racial phenomena as dependent variables—the effects of other, putatively more fundamental or "objective" social structures or relationships (such as social class, cultural identity, or nationality)—is prone to reductionism, as I have shown elsewhere (Omi and Winant 1994). On the other hand, to consider racial dynamics as independent variables—studying, say, the effects of race on family dynamics or employment patterns—tends to ignore the tremendous variability of the race-concept, which operates both as a social structure and a dimension of lived identity/experience. The flexible and malleable character of race, which has evolved over an immense historical span, cannot be captured if it is merely treated as a fixed category. See Wallerstein 1991, 242–244.

3. No early empire could attain truly global scope. None could exist without a central administrative nucleus, a politico-military authority that extended and disciplined the imperial domain, directing the empire's accumulative flow toward the center by various means (tributary, coercive, etc.), and accepting no rivalry within the boundaries of the system.

4. Of course this is undertaken in light of many influences, among them "world-system" analysis and the pragmatic, progressive social science of Myrdal, as well as such other currents as Foucauldian post-structuralism and Gramscian theory.

5. For example, the magisterial work of Braudel 1975. See especially Braudel's treatment of slavery in vol. III.

6. In his story "In the Penal Colony" Franz Kafka depicts an infernal machine of punishment, designed to execute insubordinate natives in a prison colony located on an unnamed tropical island. The form of capital punishment is brutal and prolonged: tortuously, slowly, the rule which the condemned has violated (in the story, this rule is "HONOR THY SUPERIORS!") is written with needles on the condemned's body, embellished and elaborated until at last, bleeding from the very words it has defied, covered with the mark of its own shame, the body dies and is discarded (Kafka 1961).

7. Let this overly general assertion be qualified: early modern European relations with littoral African states and kingdoms, and indeed with native Americans (first in the Caribbean and then more widely), were not immediately and uniformly those of conquerors and subjects. There were wide variations in the early experiences of transcontinental contact. African fighters repelled European raids and efforts at pillage. In the fifteenth century, for example, there were naval battles between Portuguese vessels and large war canoes off the Senegambian and Kongolese coasts (Thornton 1998, 37–40). There were wars among Portuguese, Angolan, and Kongolese forces—often involving shifting patterns of alliance—as late as the end of the sixteenth century. Such experiences led to trading rather than raiding relationships (or complex combinations of the two), which often endured for long periods (Miller 1988, 551–552). In the early plantation experiments on the Atlantic islands, in early African slavery in the Americas (Rout 1976; Davidson 1961), and in the centuries-long process of subjugation of American native peoples, similar interweavings of depredation and coexistence can be discovered. Overall, of course, tendencies toward outright conquest and hierarchization, and the abundant testimonies of racialization, do predominate. But these patterns too are more circular and cumulative than abrupt, immediate, or unproblematic for the particular European power involved.

8. Such distinctions must always be seen as schematic, for several reasons: early imperial missions of raiding or trading were staffed at all ranks by a variable and itinerant lot of seamen, soldiers, and freebooters of all types, many of whom were mercenaries, not "citizens." (Columbus himself is the most ready example.) Later imperial trading and shipping bred a seafaring working class whose national and indeed racial particularities tended to be homogenized by its conditions of labor (Rediker 1987).

9. Many of the slave revolts that took place throughout the hemisphere were organized along ethnic/linguistic lines (Thornton 1998).

10. For debates on Williams' thesis, see Solow and Engerman 1987; Wood 1997; Drescher 1999.

11. Voluminous literatures exist on virtually every imaginable aspect of slavery. In Chapter Three I discuss slavery at greater length, although writing on the topic is so extensive that I cannot claim to address it thoroughly.

12. See also Engerman and Genovese 1975; Fogel and Engerman 1974; Fogel 1989; Williams 1994 [1944].

13. By "peonage" I mean coerced forms of labor that do not extend to chattel status. Serfdom, bound labor, and *corvée* could be mentioned here. Some forms of landless peasant labor, for example, tenant farming and sharecropping, also qualify. Where arrangements of superexploitation short of chattel slavery exist, it is worthwhile to classify them as peonage, even though they may involve some wages or in-kind exchanges of value.

14. For U.S. defenses of the moral superiority of slavery as against waged forms of labor exploitation, see Wish 1960; see also Genovese 1992b; and Fredrickson 1971 on these points.

15. In those areas where feudalism was slow to decay or left behind significant social residues, for example, in Russia and Junker-dominated Prussia, peonage remained the prevalent method of extracting labor (Kolchin 1987). In other areas peonage operated through traditional systems of peasant-based agriculture. Still elsewhere, for example, in the Caribbean and East Africa, indentured labor was imported by colonial powers (through recruitment of South Asian labor in these cases) as an alternative or competitive strategy to slavery-based or traditional peasant-based systems of exploitation. The regulatory aspects of these developments, and their underlying racial logics, are quite apparent. Although not racialized everywhere (Russia, for example, retained its interest in the Jewish "other" whose racial difference was not deeply significant there), in most of the imperial world Europeans ruled non-European "others." Thus racial distinctions came largely although variably to coincide with political-economic and cultural ones.

16. But what is "excessive"? Slave labor almost always takes place under the shadow of brutality.

17. This was especially the case after: (1) the effects of contagious diseases began to be felt throughout the Americas; (2) the depredations of early slave-labor mining schemes, particularly under the Spanish, laid waste many indigenous populations; and (3) the inadequacy of the supply of indentured servants (largely white) to the developing plantation agriculture system was recognized, particularly in the North American colonies (Klein 1986; Tannenbaum 1992 [1947]).

18. Already in Weber's treatment of slavery—focused on the classical period, particularly Rome (Max Weber 1976)—there is the argument that high demand for slave labor and its products are crucial to its profitability, for in times of slack the maintenance of slaves can become a drain on their owners; slaves cannot be laid off like wage laborers. In respect to Weber and race more generally, see Weber 1978, 385–387; Manasse 1947; Rex 1980; Guillaumin and Poliakov 1974; Guillaumin 1995.

Whether the maintenance of slaves is a fixed cost, whether their mistreatment is involved in this determination, remains an open question. Owners of course had varying interests in maintaining the well-being of their slave "capital." When new "supplies" (i.e., replacements) were readily available, slavocratic regimes were more draconian (Schwartz 1985; Toplin 1972; Berlin 1998). See Chapter Three, below.

19. Although once more, between peonage and southern waged labor there may be distinction without difference.

20. In *Don Quixote* and *The Tempest*, to pick two prominent works.

21. Notably las Casas, who argued for the Indians' humanity and suggested their innate suitability for conversion, did not hesitate to recommend the substitution of African for Native American enslavement.

22. Consider, among many possible examples, Verdi's *Aida* (1871). Another high art object worth mentioning is the painting by Joseph M. W. Turner, *The Slaveship* (1840), which is a clear denunciation of the slave trade. The painting is probably based on a 1783 incident in which the masters of the slave ship *Zong*, lost at sea and despairing of their voyage's profits, decided to throw their living cargo into the ocean, the better to offset their losses with the ship's insurers (see Thomas 1997, 489–490). It hangs in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.

23. "Threatened by the absolutism of the king, the nobility had reverted to the argument of an ancient race in order to claim freedom and equality—for themselves alone. The revolutionary bourgeoisie took up the challenge, rejected the Germanic myth, and replaced it with a Gallic one (still traceble in the popular adventures of [the French comic book series *Asterix and Obelisk*). Historian Guizot, for instance, would picture the French Revolution as a veritable war between two peoples" (Rooy 1990).

24. Gobineau 1984 [1853–55]; Biddiss 1970; Todorov 1993; Rooy 1990. Both John Lukács and George M. Fredrickson analyze the extensive correspondence between Gobineau and Tocqueville, who were friends; see Lukács 1974; Fredrickson 1997a. As many of these writers make clear, Gobineau's racism is rather more anti-democratic and counter-egalitarian than full-fledged white supremacy. Unlike his proto-Nazi successor Houston Stewart Chamberlain, he is not particularly anti-semitic. His hostility to Africans is explicit, but less color-oriented than Europeanist. Gobineau's antagonism is to what he sees as race-mixing: thus Finns and Magyars (European descendants of Mongol invasions) are also perceived as threatening. Gobineau, let it be noted, was a French diplomat (ambassador to Brazil as well as elsewhere), an early Orientalist who wrote on ancient Greek and Persian texts, and a historian of Norwegian piracy in France. He also published fiction and poetry.

25. The 1914 breakdown of the Second International indicated the endurance of this ambivalence into the twentieth century.

26. Of course, this is not to characterize Marxism in toto by such positions. Marx's comments on the barbarity of slave-trading ("the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins"), and on the brutalities of Asian and Latin American conquest as well, have often been noted.

A noteworthy exception to the Marxian founding fathers' somewhat sanguine attitude toward imperialism may be found in Luxemburg's *The Accumulation of Capital* (1951 [1923]), which sees the world's hinterlands as a permanently necessary source of regressive subsidization for capitalism, notably in their coerced use as an under- (or un-) valued source of exploitable labor. Wallerstein (1979a) shares some of this optic.

27. The Duboisian dictum is in *The Souls of Black Folk* (1989 [1903], 1). It should be remembered that Du Bois located the color-line, not only in the United States, but as a global phenomenon. His analysis of racism focused not only on the aftermath of African enslavement in the United States, but also on the unraveling of European empires, and on the fate of "the darker nations of the world—Asia and Africa, South and Central America, the West Indies and the islands of the South Seas" (Du Bois 1995 [1915], 645).

Chapter Three. Learning to Catch Hell

1. Many discursive conventions have been applied to the racial body, each bearing its own theoretical presuppositions. For present purposes, it is enough to evoke some of the terms in which "somatic normativity" has been expressed.

2. With small exceptions, neither the classical nor the contemporary literatures on the transition from "pre-capitalist economic formations" to capitalism have much to say about race. In *Capital I* (1967) Marx refers in passing to the racial dynamics of "primitive accumulation," equating early conquest, pillage, and African slavery with the dispossession of European (notably English) peasantries. To mention only a few works: the otherwise magnificent books of E. P. Thompson on enclosure (1975); of Paul M. Sweezy et al. on the breakdown of the feudal order and the rise of the bourgeoisie (1976); of Robert Brenner on the onset of mercantilism in England (1993); of Barrington Moore on the "making of the modern world" (1966); of Karl Polanyi on the role of the state in constructing—and later destroying—the system and ideology of the capitalist "free market" (1980 [1944]); and of Theda Skocpol on the revolutionary crisis of the ancien régime (1979), are all quite circumspect—to put it generously—about racial matters. This list could go on, and certainly is not intended to diminish these books' valuable qualities. But despite their many merits, these accounts also suffer