In 1962 this territory became independent with the creation of two countries: Rwanda and Burundi. A year later, the National University of Rwanda was founded in Butare, while Burundi had already acquired its own university, the University of Burundi in Bujumbura in 1960. Given the presence of centuries old ethnic rivalry between the minority Nilo-Hamitic overlords, the Tutsi, and the majority Bantu peoples, the Hutu (upon whom the Tutsi had imposed a feudal system when they invaded the territory in the fifteenth-century), it is, perhaps, not surprising that both countries have experienced genocidal conflagrations of mind-numbing proportions. (Of course, colonialism did not help matters because it entrenched the ethnic divisions.) The latest to occur was in Rwanda beginning in 1994 when it is estimated that more than half a million Tutsi were either shot or more often butchered to death with pangas by the Hutu militias. Peace of some sort has been restored by the Tutsi rebel dominated government that came to power following military victory by the rebels—they had operated out of neighboring countries following the massacres.

In Burundi, one of the largest massacres occurred in 1963 against the Hutu by the Tutsi. A few years later, in 1972, yet another massacre was visited upon the Hutus when they tried to rebel against the Tutsi dominated government; an estimated 100,000 would be killed. In 1988, a much smaller number, but still in the thousands, would perish once more at the hands of the Tutsi-dominated military. (For more on the politics of the two countries see Gourevitch 1998, Huband 2001, Mamdani 2001, and Prunier 1995.)

Added to the barbaric genocidal carnage, there have been, as one would expect, accompanying movements of refugees in the millions. Yet many of them too would not escape death at the hands of various factions infiltrating their camps or ambushing them as they escaped—not to mention the fatal diseases and hunger that would also plague them. Given these endemic and horrific conflagrations, all forms of education, including higher education, would come to periodic standstill, in both countries. In sum: although meaningful progress had been achieved in building up the universities in the 1980s in both countries, it is only in the past few years that the situation in Rwanda has begun to improve once more, while in Burundi, it is only a little better.

THE ITALIAN COLONIES

Of all the post–World War II European colonial powers, the Italians, because of their relative weakness, as well as their gross error in placing themselves on the wrong side of history during the war, appear to have had the least influence in Africa (expressed, for instance, in their early exit from Ethiopia and Eritrea). There is one part of Africa, however, where the legacy of their presence was sufficiently strong enough to warrant their inclusion in this chapter; that place is Somalia. (Though it may be legitimate, perhaps, to also include Libya in this regard, but that country has already been discussed else-

where—see Chapter 3.) In Somalia, it is the Italians who planted the first seeds of Western secular higher education that would lead, in time, to the development of that country's first and only national university. The rest of this chapter, therefore, will be devoted to Somalia (given especially its current circumstances).

Somalia is located on the northeast edge of the continent that faces Arabia, and which is commonly referred to as the Horn—for obvious reasons, as one look at a map of Africa will reveal. The country stretches first eastward from Djibouti (once part of Somali domain) along the perimeter of the Horn and then goes down south along the east coast of Africa to the Kenyan border, forming the shape of the Arabic numeral seven. In other words, it is located in a part of Africa that is steeped in ancient history. The Greeks, for instance, knew of its existence (Herodotus mentions it in Book 2 of his *Histories*, albeit in passing), for they traded along its coast, as did many others (Arabs, Indians, Chinese, and so on).[21] The ancient Egyptians referred to it as the "Land of Punt" (God's Land). After all, it is among the Mediterranean lands from whence came the aromatic arboreal gum resins, frankincense and myrrh (highly prized, to the perplexity of modern medical science, by the ancients throughout the Afro-Eurasian ecumene)—and still does to this day—not to mention such other much-sought-after commodities as ivory, ostrich feathers, and clarified butter *(ghee)*.[22]

However, a rich past rooted in ancient history is no antidote to a chaotic and anarchic present that characterizes, to put it in mildest terms, present-day Somalia as of this writing (2005). Somalia fell apart in 1991; it has yet to become whole again. Here are two accounts, one written in 1992, and the other in 2005, that provide some idea of the tragedy that is Somalia today.

> Nineteen ninety-one is the year Somalia died. Since the full-scale civil war broke out on November 17, at least 14,000 people have been killed and 27,000 wounded in the capital city of Mogadishu. Most of the casualties are civilians. Rivalry between the forces of two ruthless men—interim President Mohammed Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farrah Aidid, both of whom belong to the same clan and the same movement, the United Somali Congress (USC)—has made Mogadishu an exceptionally dangerous place. In addition to troops loyal to both men, hundreds of armed "freelance" soldiers and looters contribute to the violence….Mogadishu and south-central Somalia also face the worst famine in the country's history. Drought has played only a minor role in this crisis. The famine, which has already begun, is largely man-made, the result of warfare during the past two years (Omaar 1992: 230).

> A blast has killed at least 14 people and injured 30 at a rally in a football stadium in Somalia's capital being addressed by the prime minister. The explosion went off as Ali Mohammed Ghedi began his speech. He later told the BBC that a security guard had accidentally set off a grenade. Mr Ghedi, on his first Mogadishu visit since being appointed, is negotiating his government's return from exile….The transitional government, which is based in Nairobi in neighboring Kenya, is under pressure from foreign

donors to relocate to Somalia. But Somalia's political leaders and warlords are divided over where in Somalia the administration should be based. Somalia has been devastated by 14 years of war. While the interim constitution names Mogadishu as the capital, the city is considered the most dangerous place in Somalia….Most of the city's government buildings are in ruins, or are inhabited by refugees after 14 years of anarchy….As many as 10,000 regional peacekeepers are due to start arriving in the next few weeks to provide security for the government. But some local warlords, who have been named as ministers, remain opposed to their deployment (source: www.BBC.com—the news story, "Blast Strikes Somali PM's Rally," is dated May 3, 2005).

The relevant historical antecedents of this awful circumstance, therefore, where Somalia is considered today as an example par excellence of a failed state, must be considered here, but only in barest outline for reasons of space.[23] To begin with, a note on the Somali people—an Eastern Cushitic (Afro-Asiatic family) language speaking people. They are thought to have spread either from the south going north or from the north moving south (or both) over a period of hundreds of years, beginning perhaps in the first half of the last millennium, into a region that at one point by the early twentieth century had been forcibly carved up among the French (French Somaliland), the Ethiopians (the Ogaden), the British (British Somaliland in the north and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya in the south), and Italy (Italian Somaliland).

While the Somali are a *relatively* homogenous people, with the exception of the interriverine minority in the south between the Shabeelle and the Jubba Rivers, sharing the same language and culture, their interaction with a harsh desert environment with episodic rainfall that comprises most of their lands of habitation (with the exception of the interriverine area), led to the development of a segmentary society—as a logical outcome of a culture in which nomadic pastoral transhumance has been the central ecological response to this environment. This society was marked not only by the distinct absence of a central governing authority, *but also by an allegiance of the individual and his/her family to fiercely competitive territorially-based subclans, clans, and clan-families* with lineages going back centuries, as a means, at the minimum, of "negotiating" access to water and pasturage, and best captured by these two Somali proverbs (from Cassanelli 1982: 21): "If you love a person, love him moderately, for you do not know whether you will hate him one day; on the other hand, if you hate someone, hate him moderately also, for you do not know whether you will love him one day."

I and my clan against the world.
I and my brother against the clan.
I against my brother.

At the same time, the varied mode of transmission of the Islamic religion to the Somali people over the centuries, perhaps beginning as early as in the eighth century, if not even in the seventh, involving itinerant "saints" with their

diverse and competitive Islamic Orders *(tariiqas)* considerably dampened the integrating influence of Islam at the political level. Ergo, even though almost all Somali people claim adherence to Sunni Islam and believe, perhaps mythically, that they are all descended from the Quraishi clan of Prophet Muhammed, their membership of the *ummah* has done little to encourage the Somalis to submerge their clannish divisions, except on those few occasions in history when faced with an external enemy—as at the time of their struggle with the Ethiopians in the sixteenth century under the leadership of Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (nicknamed by the Ethiopian Christians, Ahmed the Gran—see Chapter 2) when they almost wiped out the Ethiopian state, and in the early twentieth century while resisting British colonial rule under the leadership of Shaykh Muhammed ibn Abd'Allah Hassan (nicknamed by the British, the "Mad Mullah") of the Ogaadeen clan. (See Cassanelli 1982 for more on this issue.)

By the time of its colonization in the nineteenth century, quite unusually for Africa, Somalia was already a unified "nation" given its territorially-based ethnically and culturally homogenous population (excluding the Gosha living in the interriverine area who at one time had been enslaved by the Somali—see Besteman [1999]). However, colonization meant the forcible dismemberment, against the wishes of the Somali, of the lands of the Somali nation. Those involved were no less than five: the Ethiopians, specifically Menelik II, following his defeat of the Italians at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, who established claims over the Ogaden (the western part of Somalia); the French, beginning in 1862, who went on to establish French Somaliland by colonizing the northwestern portion of Somalia on the Red Sea (today the tiny independent country of Djibouti), the Italians who began their forays into Somalia in 1869, the Egyptians who arrived in 1870 to take over Bullaxaar and Berbera on the Red Sea; and finally the British who took over the area adjacent to Aden between 1884 and 1886 (by which time the Egyptians had vacated the ports following the Mahdist revolt in Sudan) to give rise to British Somaliland, and in the south they took control of a portion that they eventually incorporated into Kenya in 1895 (the Northern Frontier District).

The final outcome of the various maneuverings of these different rivals over the lands of the Somali over the course of nearly a century, extending into the post–World War II era (involving machinations at the United Nations of not only the old colonial rivals, but also the newly emergent superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union), is that by the time Somalia gained independence in 1960 from the British and the Italians—the latter had been allowed to return to southern Somalia by the United Nations in 1950 to oversee Somali's U.N.-mandated decade-long passage to independence—it was beset with two major encumbrances. One was the fragmentation of the Somali people as a result of the permanent loss of some of their smaller territories to Kenya and Djibouti on one hand, and on the other, the much larger western territory of the

Ogaden to Ethiopia; and the other was the fusion of the remaining two halves of the country with radically different colonially-determined political, economic, linguistic, and administrative cultures in which the southern half under the control of the Italians was, interestingly (considering Italy's parlous economic circumstance relative to that of Britain's), much more advanced than the northern half administered by the British. Unlike the Italians, the British had never had much enthusiasm for their Somali colony, seeing it only as an adjunct to their main colonial interest in Egypt and Aden.[24]

Now, writing sympathetically in 1982, the consequences of a legacy of such a history for the Somali people was described by Cassanelli when he presciently raised a number of very pertinent dilemmas that faced the new Somali state and which help to throw light on the present terrible predicament of the Somali people—for it is the failure to resolve these dilemmas that explains, to a considerable degree, this predicament:

> How…does a government create an agriculturally self-sufficient society from a nation of nomads whose long struggle against the environment has proven time and again the resiliency of a pastoral existence? How can it sedentarize a population for whom regional mobility is an ingrained way of life? How are the proud descendants of once-powerful clans to be incorporated into the political leadership of a state determined to abolish "tribalism" and equalize opportunity? How is the deeply rooted but regionally focused tradition of Somali Islam to be marshaled in the creation of a modern socialist society? And how is the great legacy of Somali oral tradition to be preserved for posterity when some of its best examples consist of poetic diatribes by one clan's poets against members of another clan or region? (p. 261).

We may add yet one more important dilemma: How is the irredentist nationalism of a culturally and ethnically homogenous nation to be assuaged when world powers refuse to recognize the deeply felt legitimate desire of the Somali nation to reconstitute itself into a whole by bringing back the territories they lost to the various colonial projects? The effort to resolve these dilemmas, as we now know, eventually coalesced into a massive failure expressed in the total collapse of the Somali state into one of mayhem and anarchy. The critical events of *agency*—in contrast to those of *structures* of history just outlined—marking this path of failure include, first, the collapse of representative democracy under the weight of nepotism and corruption when the government of Prime Minister Muhammed Haji Ibrahim Egal was overthrown by the military in a coup led by Major General Muhammed Siad Barre on October 21, 1969, following the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke some days earlier on October 15.[25]

The new military government would remain in power for the next two decades in which while it made some meaningful progress in bringing economic and social development to Somalia—at birth a country with the lowest per capita income in the world—including the successful introduction of a Latin-based

orthography (against the ideological backdrop of yet another variant of African "socialism"), it also simultaneously began to sink into a virulent form of praetorian despotism, most especially in later years, characterized by an ever increasingly corrupt and nepotistic personality-cult-oriented governance.

To shore up his regime that was facing ever-mounting opposition from various clan-based Somali factions, in 1977, Siad Barre undertook a project dear to the hearts of most Somalis: launching an attack on Ethiopia in a bid to liberate the Ogaden. The attack, however, in the process provoked/encouraged a major realignment of the Cold War superpowers in the region. The United States was replaced by the Soviet Union as the ally of Ethiopia and the Soviet Union was replaced by the United States as the ally of Somalia. This realignment proved to be the undoing of the initially successful Ogaden project; whereas the United States was a lukewarm ally, the Soviet Union (assisted by Cuban soldiers) was quite the opposite. By early 1978 the Somali forces, who had managed to capture the Ogaden a year earlier were on the retreat, leaving in their wake thousands dead; and the country would be plunged into a massive economic crisis against the backdrop of a deeply parasitic militarized state budget dominating the economy.

The defeat of the Somali in the sands of the Ogaden at the hands of their former Cold War ally, further deepened the resolve of the various Somali opposition groups to work toward the armed ouster of Siad Barre as his popularity plummeted even further, most especially after he signed a peace-accord in 1988 with Ethiopia under Western pressure. The latter event provoked a civil war, beginning in the northern part of the country, as Somali guerrillas fighting the Ethiopians now turned their sights on Siad Barre's forces in one of a number of other developments (e.g. conflicts between Ogaden refugees and the local population in which the locals, the Isaak clan, came to believe that the Siad Barre regime was on the side of the refugees since his wife was an Ogaden). Thereafter one catastrophic event led to another unified by the theme of clan– and sub-clan– based armed violence in a country awash with armaments (acquired over decades from the Soviet Union, the United States, and others during the period of the Cold War), as each group sought to establish claims of hegemony over different parts of Somalia and different sectors of the capital, Mogadishu. As the civil war spiraled out of control, especially in 1990-91 (against the backdrop of international disinterest now that the Cold War was over with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991), famine began to stalk the land as food production and distribution was disrupted. The sight of thousands of starving children on television (against the backdrop of clan-based thugs looting food-relief supplies) *as Christmas approached* in the West proved too much for Western publics to bear. They put pressure on their governments to intervene.

In December 1992, a fairly sizeable multinational U.N.-approved military task force of some 30,000 soldiers, led by the United States, arrived in Somalia

with the aim of bringing a modicum of order to the business of food distribution—the project was code named "Operation Restore Hope." At first greeted warmly by most Somalis, within about six months the mission was in tatters and by March of the following year (1994) the last of Western troops were withdrawn. Emblematic of the disaster that the mission had become, which it is estimated cost a total of some four billion dollars (amounting to roughly two whole year's income for each and every Somali), was the shooting down of a U.S. "Black Hawk" helicopter that led to the death of some eighteen marine soldiers (with many more injured) at the hands of the Somali, and the alleged involvement of Canadian soldiers in the torture/murders of Somali civilians.[26]

While this is not the place to go into the whys and wherefores of how one of those rare, truly well-intentioned missions of mercy ended in a massive military debacle, it will suffice to simply say, on the basis of hindsight (which is always 20/20) that at the heart of it was the failure to see that security preceded all else in the violent chaos that was Somalia where access to food itself was also a weapon of war among the combatants. The planners of "Operation Restore Hope" did not realize that the various Somali factions (who had steadily degenerated into pure warlordism) would force the militarization of what was essentially planned as a humanitarian famine relief operation; the planners were caught unprepared for this eventuality with disastrous consequences.[27]

It is against the backdrop of the foregoing that one may delineate the history of higher education in Somalia, and it should be obvious that it is a history that lends itself to periodization along four main avenues: the pre-colonial period; the colonial period; the pre-1991 postindependence period; and the post-1991 period. During the pre-colonial period the chief agency for the development of higher education in Somalia was Islam with its mosque-madrasahs as well as other places of higher learning—such as those found in Harar (now in Ethiopia), an important Somali Islamic center of higher learning. Since madrasahs have already been discussed elsewhere at some length in this work (see Chapter 1 and Appendix I) nothing more need be said further about them here.

During the colonial period our main focus must be when Somalia was handed back to the Italians as a trust territory, for in the pre-World War II era Italian Somaliland did not have any secular institution of higher learning (the same was true for British Somaliland). The Italy that came back to Somalia in 1950 was not the same Italy of the pre-War period (that is fascist Italy). The new Italy, a democratic Italy, was committed to preparing Somalia for independence as mandated by the United Nations. In this task educational development was considered by the United Nations as an important item on Italy's trusteeship agenda. Italy obliged by launching an educational development program that included at the higher education level the establishment of the Teacher Training Institute (opened in 1953), the School of Islamic Studies (opened in 1952), the School of Politics and Administration (opened in 1950-51), and the Higher Institute of Economics and Law (opened in 1954, with Pa-

dua University providing curricular guidance and logistical support). In 1960, the institute would become the University Institute of Somalia (and it would be affiliated with University of Rome which provided curricular guidance and logistical support). It ought to be noted that the U.N. trusteeship agreement did not require Italy to build *higher* education institutions within Somalia, but rather it was required to provide places for qualified Somalis at its universities in Italy. In this regard too, the Italians were forthcoming and they provided higher education opportunities for hundreds of Somali students, in Italy.

In British Somaliland of the post–World War II era, in stark contrast, there was practically no higher education comparable to that being developed by the Italians, other than a teacher training institute and one or two vocational schools. The principal determinant of this parsimony in educational provision appears to have been the decision by the British to govern British Somaliland as cheaply as possible. The principle that underlay the British approach to educational provision for the Somalis was spelled out in one of the Education Department's Annual Reports (for 1953): "Quite apart from the very strict limitations imposed by financial considerations on the rate and extent of the expansion of educational facilities, it is not intended at present to attempt to provide formal education on a very wide scale nor to make an attempt at mass literacy" (from Kitchen 1962: 97).

When independence came to Somalia, and especially after the military coup in 1969, the Somalis (like others elsewhere in Africa) proceeded to put vigorous energy into the development of the entire education sector. One outcome of this effort was the upgrading of the University Institute of Somalia to the status of a national university—thus was born the National University of Somalia in 1969 with six constituent colleges. It should be noted that while the university provided tuition-free education, the main beneficiaries were (as in most countries in Africa) the emerging urban-based elites and not the children of the vast majority of the Somalis, the rural poor. By the time of the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime, the university had grown to the point where it had an enrollment of over 15,000 students, spread out among twelve faculties of learning (ranging from law to industrial chemistry).

Turning now to the post-1991 period where higher education (as in the case of other levels of the education system) has been, until very recently, in almost complete state of collapse. Even as late as 1998, an observer of the educational circumstances of Somalia would have come up with a chilling description, as this one, by Abdi (1998: 327):

> Since the collapse of the Somali state in January 1991, Somalia has been a country without any level of organized systems of learning. This is obviously the result of the division of the country into clan-based fiefdoms….In this process of social disintegration, schools, technical training centers and university facilities and resources became among the first casualties of the senseless mass destruction of the country's total infrastructure. The physical destruction of the facilities was, at times, peculiarly coupled

with the targeting of the educated cadre among the warring factions. As a result, underdeveloped Somalia seems to have embarked on the treacherous road of de-development, defined in this sense as reversing the limited trend of development by deliberately destroying everything that could function in, and sustain a civil society.

Today, there is clear evidence that some heart-warming positive change is afoot, but it is taking place mainly through the initiative of private individuals. For instance, although the National University of Somalia no longer exists, a private secular not-for-profit university (the first of its kind in the history of Somalia) has replaced it in the guise of Mogadishu University.[28] The university, the brainchild of a group of former professors from the old university, opened for business in 1997, even in the absence of a functioning government (which says a great deal for the resolve and perseverance of its founders). Its financial base rests on both money and in-kind donations from the Somali diaspora and other international well-wishers (NGOs, universities, some governments, etc.), a trust fund, and student tuition. There are at present six faculties of learning: Shari'ah and law, education, math and physics, social science, arts and human sciences, economics and management sciences, computer science and information technology, and nursing. The language of instruction is English in the science and technology faculties, and Arabic in others. The student population in 2000 was less than 500. The university also has a graduate program (up to doctoral level) offered in conjunction with Sudan's Omdurman Islamic University. The role of Mogadishu University is to host the program, while Omdurman is in charge of everything else, from admissions to provision of teaching staff to thesis supervision and final conferral of degrees.

Turning to the internationally unrecognized, but thriving (in relative terms) breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland in the north, there too there are significant signs of progress: they have started their own independent universities as well. While Puntland appears to have only one, East Africa University, located in the port city of Bosasso and which commenced operations in 2003 (offering courses in subjects ranging from the Shari'ah to business studies), Somaliland has four: Amoud University in Borama (founded in 1998), University of Hargeisa (opened its doors in 2000), Berbera University (established in 2004), and Burao University (commenced operations in 2005 at the site once occupied by a German-funded technical institute). As would be expected, all these institutions are essentially small shoe-string operations based on finances derived from varied ephemeral-type sources such as donations from the Somali diaspora and contributions from NGOs and U.N. agencies. Support has also come through in-kind donations (such as books and computer equipment) from well-wishers from abroad. Government funding for these institutions is extremely limited; however, when Somalia reunites (possibly as a federated state) this hopefully should change.[29]

By way of concluding this section, we ought to consider, even if only briefly, an important question that the violent and cataclysmic breakdown of

the Somali state raises: Had Somalia possessed a well-developed educational system, going all the way to university level, capable of providing quality education to anyone who qualified without regard to ability to pay (and thereby creating a large population of highly educated citizens), would Somalia still have collapsed in the way it did? The answer is not a difficult one to surmise: the presence of an educated population *in itself* does not guarantee a *vibrant* civil society, which is the only insurance against total anarchy that Somalia became from 1991 onwards. Yes, education is a prerequisite for the emergence of such a civil society, but it is not a sufficient condition. The examples of Nazi Germany, the former Soviet Union, the present-day China, and the former apartheid South Africa provide ample testimony to this fact. No matter how much faith educators may place in the broader liberatory and civilizing powers of education (formal or otherwise), there are limits to what it can do in the absence of conducive circumstances at the political level. Moreover, history shows us that even among the educated, tyrants have not been missing.

NOTES

1. "Indirect rule" refers to the type of colonial administrative practice that meaningfully relied, albeit at a lower administrative level, on indigenous (often traditional hereditary) rulers who had been allowed to retain nominal power over their subjects; "direct rule" was the obverse of this approach to colonial government. One may note here that in the case of acephalous societies where traditional rulers did not exist, *indirect rule* led to the imposition of artificially created "traditional" rulers.

One should remind the reader of another type of comparative approach to the study of European colonialism in Africa: comparing the internal differences in colonial practices among the colonies ruled by a given single colonial power: an especially fruitful exercise in Africa in the case of the two major colonial powers, the French and the English. For instance, the most obvious contrasts emerge between colonies that were targets of sustained European colonial settlement (e.g., Algeria and South Africa, for instance), and those that were not (e.g., Nigeria and Mali). (See the Chapter 1 for more on this point.)

2. From the perspective of French colonialism, the evolue were those colonial subjects who had demonstrated the potential to evolve toward a "civilized" condition (and thereby merit French citizenship) by the acquisition of modern education and French cultural patterns of behavior. Within the context of colonially inspired racism they were both a much despised group and a potential ally in the colonial project. In the movement toward the devolution of governmental authority (albeit circumscribed) in the colonies in the waning days of European colonialism in the aftermath of the Second World War, it is the evolue that the French hoped to enlist in this exercise. In the British colonial empire their equivalents, to give two examples, were the *educated natives* of Africa and the *babus* of India; while in the Portuguese colonies they were referred to as the *assimilado*. (Note: in time they would come to constitute Fanon's campradorial elite.)

3. The federation of French Equatorial Africa (Afrique Equatorial Francaise) was

on August 18, 1960. The CIA's Sidney Gottlieb duly prepared a cobra venom for administration to Lumumba, but in the end it was not necessary to use it. Other means evolved in the course of events. (For more on the U.S. intervention in Zaire see Kalb 1982; and Weissman 1974, 1978.) Undoubtedly, for the West (and the apartheid government too), Mobuto was a godsend—but then, through out the history of Africa and other PQD regions, people like him, willing to sell their country into bondage for the price of Western trinkets and a few pieces of gold and silver, have always abounded. Thus since 1965 until Mobutu's eventual demise at the hands of rebels, U.S. policy "[had] consisted of an unswerving support for Mobuto, his corrupt, arbitrary, and dictatorial rule notwithstanding. The support was based on at least three premises: (1) that a vast and multiethnic country like Zaire need[ed] a strong man whose iron rule would help maintain stability and thereby safeguard Western interests; (2) that the United States ought to support its loyal friends, regardless of their behavior; and (3) that Zaire under a pro-Western government [could] play a gendarme role in the region as a whole" (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1985: 233).

It is this type of government capable of meeting these kinds of objectives that the United States and the apartheid government had wished to see installed in both Angola and Rhodesia (and one may add even Mozambique). It did not matter that such a government would consist virtually of a gang of thugs (armed and supported by the United States and its allies); inflicting terror on their people to keep them subservient, while systematically looting the national treasury. To take the example of Zaire itself, and here it is important to emphasize that Zaire was not alone in this, its human rights record was awfully abysmal. Arbitrary arrests, torture, murder, and mutilation of opponents or simply suspected opponents was rampant under Mobutu. As for corruption, the following example provided by Young (1985: 221) is graphically indicative. He describes: "Mobuto spent at least $2 million in 1982 taking an entourage of ninety-three, many of them close relatives in mourning for recently deceased senior kinsman (and vintage embezzler) Litho Maboti, to Disney World in Florida, aboard a chartered aircraft."

20. For more on the politics and history of Zaire see International Crisis Group (2005), Kelly (1993), Hochschild (1998), and Nzongola-Ntalaja (1988).

21. For a useful introduction to *The Histories* by Herodotus, a combined reading of the Waterfield translation (Herodotus 1998) and the excellent three-volume commentary on Book 2 of *The Histories* by Lloyd (1975-1988) is the best approach.

22. For more on the precolonial history of Somalia see Ahmed (1995), Cassanelli (1982), Lewis (1960), Lewis (1966), Taddesse (1977), and Turton (1975). For a general quick overview of the history of Somalia from the precolonial era to the present see Laitin and Samatar (1987), Lewis (2002), Metz (1992), and Mukhtar and Castagno (2003).

23. But what exactly does one mean by a "failed state"? The chilling description provided by Adam (2004) with respect to Somalia sums it up best:

> Around January 1991 and during the ensuing months, Somalia experienced a cataclysmic event, virtually unseen since the Second World War. It was not simply a military coup, a revolutionary replacement of a decayed and ineffective dictatorship, or a new, radical regime coming to power through a partisan uprising. Somalia's collapsed state represented the literal implosion of state structures and of residual forms of authority and legitimacy, and the situation has lasted for over a full decade. In some respects, the country seems to have reverted to a nineteenth-century status: no

internationally recognized polity; no recognized national administration exercising real authority; no formal countrywide legal and judiciary system; no national banking and insurance services; no national telephone and postal systems; no national public services; no national educational and health systems; no national police and public security services; and no reliable electricity or piped water services (p. 254).

There is, of course, from the perspective of the place of a failed state in the international arena, more to it than that hinted by Adam: it becomes available for the activities of all kinds of international carpetbaggers and organized crime. For instance, there are reports circulating that European organized crime has been dumping nuclear waste in Somalia, a country with the longest but unpatrolled coastline in Africa. It is not enough that the Somali poor must deal with the conditions of their abject poverty, but now they must also confront, in the cruelest of ironies, the garbage of the foreign rich (see news story titled "Waves 'Brought Waste to Somali'" dated March 2, 2005, at the www.bbc.com website, as a starting point).

24. The following sources on the colonial period of Somalia's history, when considered together, provide a useful survey: Ben-Ghiat and Fuller (2002), Fatoke (1982), Hess (1966), Jardine (1969 [1923]), Kelly (2000), Mohamed (1996), Palumbo (2000), and Tripodi (1999).

25. On the matter of historical structures and the collapse of the Somalian state, some, such as Tripodi (1999), have suggested that the economically weak colonialism of the Italians (what Tripodi describes as a "ragamuffin" colonialism) also played a part in setting the stage for the tragedy that befell Somalia by its failure to build in that country robust institutional political and economic structures—capable of withstanding the gale force winds of violent anarchy that were unleashed on the country upon the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. That may be so, but it has to be considered as only *one* among a number of factors—and possibly it is not among the most important ones. The past or current experiences of Algeria, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, and so on, suggests to us that civil war and anarchy in Africa has, perhaps, little to do with *who* the colonizing power was and *what its relative economic strength was in Europe*.

26. The following quote from the section titled "The Somalia Affair" at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation website (http://archives.cbc.ca) provides a brief overview of the Canadian dimension of the debacle (however, for a detailed examination of this topic see Brodeur [1997], Razack [2004], and the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia [1997]).

Canadian peacemakers were lauded as heroes when they went into an untamed land ruled by rebels. Their mission, Operation Deliverance, charged them with restoring order in Somalia. But in fact, the Canadian Airborne regiment was splitting apart at the seams, lacking both leadership and accountability. Murder after murder, the troops came home disgraced. Tracks were covered and responsibility shifted up and down the chain of command during an investigation that would dismantle the army and implicate the government in a high-level cover-up.

For the "Black Hawk" debacle see Bowden (1991), DeLong and Tuckey (1994), and Center of Military History (2003).

27. As, perhaps, would be expected, there are scores upon scores of sources on the

collapse of the Somali state, its historical antecedents, and its aftermath, as well as on the subject of the "Operation Restore Hope" mission. As a starting point into this still-growing literature see: Besteman (1996, 1999), Bryden (1995), Center of Military History (2003), FitzGibbon (1982), Fox (2001), Gardner and El-Bushra (2004), International Crisis Group (2004), Issa-Salwe (2000), Little (2003), Maren (1996), Menkhaus (2002, 2003), Mukhtar and Castagno (2003), Peterson (2000), Prunier (1998), Razack (2004), Samatar (1993), Samatar (1994), Simmons (1995), and Tareke (2000).

28. Here is a description of what one journalist saw of what had remained of the old National University of Somalia, while on a visit to Somalia in 1995:

> We arrived at Lafoole [LaFolle] College. A low-rise, modern-looking place, it had been the home of the college of education and the history faculty of the national university. Now it was a displaced-persons camp. The classrooms and dormitories were full of families; the walls were blackened by cooking fires. We pulled up to a row of small cinder-block houses standing apart in the scrub—faculty housing. A tall, middle-aged man [Professor Hussein]…came out to greet us…. The college had closed in December, 1990, two days before the final battle for Mogadishu began, Professor Hussein said. It had been closed ever since…. He offered to show us around the college…. We came to a large green building. It was the old main library…. It was a world of dust. Books were piled everywhere, on sagging shelves, on toppling heaps. Some were stained and disintegrating, but most were intact. Every title I saw seemed, under the circumstances, absurdly ironic: "The Psychology of Adolescence," "Adolescents Grow in Groups," "Primitive Government," "The Red Badge of Courage." Sunlight drifted through high windows on the west wall. A cow mooed somewhere. The dust was so deep it was as though the desert itself were creeping through the walls, burying the books in fine sand (Finnegan 1995).

29. For information on Somali higher education it will be necessary to mine the following: Abdi (1998), Adam (1980), Bennaars, Seif, and Mwangi (1996), Dawson (1964), Hoben (1988), Kitchen (1962), Mebrahtu (1992), Nur-Awaleh (2003), Perry, Schmutterer, and Pride (1964), Robinson (1971), and Samatar (2001). Of these, consult Nur-Awaleh first. Some of the sources on the Italian colonial period, such as Tripodi (1999), are also of relevance here too (see note above).